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Abstract
From 1975 to 1981 the governments of the ASEAN states claimed 
theat changes in th e i r  regional s tra teg ic  environment, resu l t ing  from 
thee seizure of power by communist regimes in South Vietnam, Cambodia 
ancd Laos, and from Vietnam's subsequent invasion and occupation of 
Caimbodia, ser iously threatened the securi ty of th e i r  countr ies.
Object ive ly , the most serious threat that the ASEAN states faced 
as a resu l t  of the 1975 communist v ic to r ies  in Indochina was the 
i m p l i c i t  challenge posed to the somewhat f r a g i le  p o l i t i c a l ,  soc ia l,  
amd economic status quo in non-communist Southeast Asia by the 
emergence of th is  radical  new p o l i t i c a l  order and, p o te n t ia l ly  an 
a l te rn a t i v e  developmental model, in Indochina. But the ASEAN
governments did not wish to h igh l igh t  th e i r  own countr ies'  p o l i t i c a l ,  
soicial and economic weaknesses, and for  th is  reason did not emphasize 
th i is  type of threat .  They did , however, claim that Vietnam presented 
a d i rec t  m i l i t a r y  threat to the region, especia l ly a f te r  the 1978 
imvasion of Cambodia. A f te r  1978, the ASEAN governments also 
expressed concern about the implicat ions fo r  th e i r  countr ies'  securi ty 
o f r Hanoi's increasingly close m i l i t a r y  re la t ionsh ip  with the Soviet 
Umion. Successive administrat ions in Bangkok accused the Indochinese 
communist regimes of supporting revolut ionary movements in Thailand, 
paart icu lar ly  in the northeast. Al l  ASEAN governments claimed that the 
f  11 ow of refugees from Indochina after  the 1975 communist v ic to r ie s ,  
amd p a r t i c u la r ly  in 1978-79, threatened secur i ty ,  especia l ly  in terms 
off the possible impact on socioeconomic s t a b i l i t y  in countries 
grranting ' f i r s t  asylum'.
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The ASEAN governments' declarat ions regarding th e i r  securi ty  
conncerns did not always re f le c t  object ive threat assessments, often 
exaggerat ing and misrepresenting the dangers posed by developments in 
Inddochina. To some extent th is  may be explained by the d is to r t in g  
in f f luence on pol icy-makers' perceptions of an array of 'background 
fa c c to rs ' ,  including the region's internal and external h is to r ica l
i n t e r n a t io n a l  re la t ionsh ips ,  the foreign po l ic ies  of the Indochinese 
Staates af ter  1975, the po l ic ies  of major extra-regional powers, and 
dommestic p o l i t i c a l  and socioeconomic problems in the ASEAN states. 
Butt there is also substantial  evidence that some of the ASEAN
govvernments - -  or at least fact ions wi th in them - -  purposely
mannipulated various secur i ty  threats related to Indochina, to f u l f i l
thee ir  own domestic and in ternat iona l  p o l i t i c a l  object ives.
From 1975 to 1978, the ASEAN governments were broadly successful 
in containing and managing the i r  securi ty concerns with Indochina, 
altthough th is  success was not due only to th e i r  s k i l f u l  diplomacy. 
Des:spite frequently declared h o s t i l i t y  towards ASEAN and i t s  members, 
thee communist Indochinese regimes displayed wil l ingness to cooperate 
w i t th  non-communist Southeast Asia in order to f a c i l i t a t e  post-war 
reoconstruct ion. The ASEAN states' 'success' in managing th e i r  
seccur i ty concerns with Indochina was reinforced by the wil l ingness of 
a l 11 parties to the intra-communist dispute, which broke out in 
Incidochina in 1977-78, to seek more harmonious re la t ionships with 
nonn-communist Southeast Asia. Moreover, i t  became increasingly clear 
thaat Indochinese communism would not, in the foreseeable fu tu re ,  
prresent c i t izens of the ASEAN states with an a t t ra c t ive  a l te rna t ive  
p o l i t i c a l  and developmental model.
VHowever, the higher p r o f i l e  which the ASEAN governments adopted 
in managing the i r  secur i ty  concerns with Indochina af ter  the 
Viet?ttnamese invasion of Cambodia may have been, on balance, 
coumnnter-producti  ve in terms of th e i r  countr ies '  secur i ty ,  both in 
re la x a t io n  to Indochina and more general ly. In pa r t icu la r ,  the 
Cambnhbodian stalemate, to which ASEAN's pol icy contr ibuted, was 
detrtr.rimental to the secur i ty  of the Associat ion's members in a number 
of w \ways, as the involvement of extra-regional powers in Southeast Asia 
intetcensüfied, the d iv is ion  between communist and non-communist 
Soutujtheast Asia hardened, ASEAN's cohesion was stra ined, and the ASEAN 
govewernments' increased th e i r  defence expenditures in contrast with 
theie^ir e a r l i e r  emphasis on achieving secur i ty  through economic and 
sociccial development.
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INTRODUCTION
The aim of th is  thesis is to investigate how the governments of 
the f i v e  member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(Indonesia, Malaysia, the Phi l ippines, Singapore and Thailand) 
perceived and reacted to the implicat ions fo r  the i r  securi ty  of 
p o l i t i c a l  and m i l i t a r y  developments in Indochina between the f a l l  of 
Phnom Penh to the Khmer Rouge in Apr i l  1975 and the convening of the 
International Conference on Kampuchea in July 1981. The thesis does 
not aim to analyse comprehensively re la t ions between the Indochinese 
states, w i th in  ASEAN, or between regional states and extra-regional 
powers, except where these were d i re c t l y  related to the central theme 
of Indochina as a secur i ty  concern of the ASEAN states. Moreover, the 
pr incipal focus is on the at t i tudes and po l ic ies  of the ASEAN states' 
governments ra ther than on ASEAN as an organization.
This thesis is not, and is not intended to be, an over t ly  
theoretica l piece of work. The subject matter is complex, involving 
in te ract ion between a m u l t i p l i c i t y  of p o l i t i c a l  actors on three 
d i f fe ren t  leve ls :  the f i v e  ASEAN states and the three Indochinese 
states; the major interested extra-regional powers (China, the United 
States and the Soviet Union); and sub-national elements (p a r t i c u la r ly  
fact ions w i th in  the ASEAN states'  governments and bureaucracies, and 
the various Cambodian and Laotian resistance groups). I t  seems highly 
un l ike ly  that any one theory of international re la t ions  could provide 
an adequate framework fo r  explaining how th is  tangled skein of 
re la t ionships produced the ASEAN states' perceptions of ,  and reactions
Tto, security threats from Indochina: in Morgenthau's words, 'the
insuperable resistance of the subject matter would probably triumph'.^ 
The basic methodological approach adopted in the thesis has been 
to treat the subject matter as recent history. As would be expected 
with almost any historical research dealing with re lat ive ly  recent 
events, a major problem with this approach concerns sources. Official 
documentary evidence --  the raw material of tradit ional diplomatic 
history --  is simply not available to the extent that i t  could provide 
the basis for research on the ASEAN states' security policies in the 
1975-81 period. But given the high security classif ication that the 
ASEAN states' authoritarian leaderships have almost certainly assigned 
to such documentary material (for example, Intelligence estimates and 
records of diplomatic communications), i t  seems unlikely that this 
material w i l l  ever be available to foreign scholars. But while other 
sources can never provide the def in i t ive answers which o f f ic ia l  
documents might, in combination they can go a long way towards 
elucidating recent history: this thesis has thus relied to a large
extent on newspaper and radio news reports, supplemented by freely 
available o f f ic ia l  statements. A series of interviews with 
pol i t ic ians, government o f f ic ia ls ,  diplomats, journalists and 
academics conducted in the ASEAN capitals in January-Apri1 1981 also 
contributed to an understanding of what was happening in the region, 
but for obvious reasons extreme discretion was necessary in the use
-  2 -
1 H.J. Morgenthau, 'Common Sense and Theories of International 
Relations', Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 21, no. 1 
(1967), p. 209.
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and citat ion of these sources. I t  is quite l ike ly  that a longer 
histor ical perspective and the ava i lab i l i ty  of fresh evidence wi l l  
lead future researchers to revise some of the assessments made in this 
thesis. But such an admission should not invalidate this early 
attempt to explain the ASEAN states' security concern with Indochina 
in the 1975-81 period.
Although the methodology employed here is basically h istor ical,
' theorizing is an unavoidable, ubiquitous ac t iv i ty  engaged in by all
2who t ry  to make sense of the world in which they l ive '  and, as in any 
other academic wri t ing, various theoretical assumptions are implic it  
in this thesis. In terms of Martin Wight's three categories of
3
po l i t ica l  thinking ( 'Rea l is t ' ,  'Rationalist '  and 'Revolutionary'), 
this is a work in the Realist t radit ion, though tinged with 
Rationalism: while the emphasis is on the 'importance of power and
interest as guiding principles for foreign policy-makers',^ there is 
an impl ic i t  ideal of an international environment in which sel f-
5
interest is 'tempered by an awareness of the interest of others'.
While not, by any means, concentrating exclusively on the 
influence of domestic factors in the making of foreign policy, the
2 John C. Garnett, Commonsense and the Theory of International
Poli t ics (London: Macmillan, 1984), p. 2.
3 Wight delineated these three tradit ions in a series of
unpublished lectures at the London School of Economics in the 
1950s. See Brian Porter, "Patterns of Thought and Practice: 
Martin Wight's ' International Theory'" in Michael Donelan (Ed.), 
The Reason of States: A Study in International Polit ical Theory
(London: George Allen & Unwin, 1978), pp. 64-74.
4 Garnett, p. 35.
5 Ib id . , loc. c i t .
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thesis is essentially 'reductionist '  rather than 'systemic' in its 
approach: there is emphasis on the importance of the role of
'decision-makers, their perceptions, and the organizations to which 
they belong'.^ But the thesis certainly does not deny that the 
structure and organization of international society exerted an 
important influence on the ASEAN stats' perceptions of, and reactions 
to, the communist Indochinese states: this is evinced by, for
example, an acknowledgement of the influence of balance of power 
considerations on the ASEAN governments' policies.^
The ASEAN states' concerns with the security implications of 
Indochinese events in the 1975-81 period did not arise in a vacuum; 
rather, they were crucially influenced by an array of background 
factors. The most important of these factors were the region's 
internal and external historical international relationships, the 
foreign policies of the communist Indochinese states after 1975, the 
major extra-regional powers' policies in relation to Southeast Asia, 
and certain domestic po l i t ica l  and socioeconomic issues in the ASEAN 
states. The four brief chapters comprising Part One of the thesis 
attempt to indicate the relevance of each of these four categories of 
background factors to the ASEAN states' security concerns with 
Indochina.
Part Two, the core of the thesis, consists of three chapters 
presenting a detailed assessment of the ASEAN states' perceptions of 
three important categories of putative threats from Indochina: 
strategic and direct m i l i tary  threats; the Indochinese states' links
7 See section on "Responses to the Emerging Conflict in Indochina, 
1977-78" in Chapter 9, pp. 415-29 below.
.
-  5 -
o
with insurgent communist parties in the ASEAN states; and the flow of 
Indochinese refugees into the ASEAN region. Central to this 
assessment is an investigation of the extent to which the ASEAN 
governments' declaratory evaluations of these ' threats ',  were 
influenced by factors other than objective analysis of the Indochinese 
states' intentions and capabil it ies and the l ike ly  impact of their 
policies on national and regional security in non-communist Southeast 
Asia. In other words, did the ASEAN governments exaggerate or 
manipulate the nature or seriousness of security threats emanating 
from Indochina?
Part Three investigates the ASEAN states' responses to their
security concerns with Indochina. Although one chapter is devoted to
an assessment of the role of the 'Indochina factor' in the ASEAN
states' defence policies, the non-communist Southeast Asian
governments' responses to Indochinese developments were overwhelmingly
g
po l i t ica l  rather than mil i tary  in character. The final two chapters 
of the thesis, covering the 1975-78 and 1979-81 phases respectively, 
investigate these po l i t ica l  responses, with particular emphasis on the 
influence on policy-making of the divergence of views within ASEAN 
concerning the nature and seriousness of security threats from 
Indochina.
8 In addition, Appendix 1 to the thesis provides a detailed 
analysis of the debates within the Communist Party of Thailand 
over strategy and external a f f i l ia t io ns  in the 1975-81 period.
9 Appendix 2 supports the argument that factors other than 
Indochinese developments played crucial roles in the expansion of 
the ASEAN states' armed forces in the late 1970s.
PART ONE
THE INFLUENCE OF BACKGROUND FACTORS ON THE ASEAN STATES' SECURITY CONCERNS WITH INDOCHINA
CHAPTER 1
THE INFLUENCE OF HISTORICAL FACTORS ON THE ASEAN S T A T E S1 SECURITY CONCERNS WITH INDOCHINA
A central issue in relation to the ASEAN states' perceptions of 
Indochina as a security concern after the Vietnam War is the extent to 
which these perceptions were influenced by historical international 
relationships within the region and between regional states and 
external powers. Possible historical influences range from the 
pre-colonial era through to the Vietnam War itself.
The Pre-Colonial Era
With the recession of colonialism from Southeast Asia, a process 
arguably not completed until 1975, a re-emergence of pre-colonial 
patterns of international relations in the region was discernible to a 
limited extent.
China and the Region
Historically, China's attitude towards Southeast Asia was subtle 
and complex. The traditional form of interaction between China and 
most of Southeast Asia took the form of political and commercial 
tributary relationships. Only Vietnam was ever occupied and ruled 
directly by China (from 214 BC to 939 AD); Chinese cultural influence 
did not significantly impinge elsewhere in the region. Only during 
the Mongol dynasty of Kublai Khan and his successors (from 1280 to 
1368 AD) did China try to impose its will on Southeast Asia (apart
-  8 -
from Vietnam) by m i l i t a r y  force. The most ambitious of the Mongol
expeditions was against Java in 1292-93, but th is  was an utter  
fa i lu re .^ -
China's h is to r ica l  re la t ionsh ip  with Southeast Asia undoubtedly
influenced the perceptions of policy-makers concerned with secur i ty
in some of the ASEAN states. According to a highly in f lu e n t ia l
Indonesian analyst and commentator, fear of China 'continues to grip
the Southeast Asian nations because his to ry  has shown that the Chinese
always consider Southeast Asia as th e i r  geographic sphere of 
2
in f luence '.  But assertions such as th is  verged on hyperbole, and
fa i led  to acknowledge that the pol icy of m i l i t a r y  adventurism that 
China pursued in re la t ion  to Southeast Asia almost six hundred years 
previously was both extraordinary and unsuccessful. Nevertheless, the 
ASEAN governments did have other, more s ig n i f ica n t  reasons for
3
regarding China as a threat .
Thai-Vietnamese Relations
For geographical reasons, in teract ion between the p o l i t i c a l  units 
of the Southeast Asian mainland was considerably more important than
1 For more detailed examinations of China's re la t ions with
pre-colonial  Southeast Asia, see D.G.E. Hal l ,  A History of 
Southeast Asia (London: Macmillan, 1955), pp. 70-1, 173-4;
D.J.M. Tate, The Making of Modern Southeast Asia: Vol . 1 - -  The
Conquest (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford Union Press, 1971), pp. 12-3 and
Milton Osborne, Southeast Asia: An Introductory History (Sydney:
George Al len & Unwin, 1979), pp. 29-30, 34.
2 Jusuf Wanandi, Securi ty Dimensions of the Asia-Paci f ic  Region in
the 1980s (J akarta: Central fo r  Strategic and International
Studies, 1979), p. 36.
3 See section "The ASEAN States and Communist China" in Chapter 3, 
pp. 74-91 below.
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that between the region 's  mainland and maritime spheres in pre­
colonial times. For hundreds of years before the European colonial 
impact, mainland Southeast Asia was the cockpit for  numerous and 
complex power struggles between Thai, Lao, Vietnamese, Cham, Khmer and 
Burmese states.
For two centuries before the French subjugation of Indochina in 
the late nineteenth century, the Vietnamese and Thais competed for  
influence in the intervening Khmer state. But Vietnam and Thailand 
did not play para l le l  roles in re la t ion  to the progressively weaker 
Cambodia. Cultural commonality between the Thais and Khmers produced 
s im i lar  opinions on the nature of borders: state t e r r i t o r y  was deemed 
to end where the population was no longer c lea r ly  Thai or Khmer, and 
uncertain, porous f ro n t ie rs  were acceptable. The Thais saw Cambodia 
as essent ia l ly  a buffer zone and there were periods of remarkable 
harmony in Thai-Khmer re la t ions ,  with Thailand often intervening 
m i l i t a r i l y  to protect Cambodia from the Vietnam.
In contrast , the Confucian outlook engendered by a thousand years 
of Chinese occupation led the Vietnamese to stress the importance of 
c lear ly-def ined in te r -s ta te  boundaries and, in consequence, to play a 
more aggressive role than the Thais in Cambodia. By the 1830s, the 
Vietnamese occupied much of lowland Cambodia and were making e f fo r ts  
to eradicate Khmer cu l tu re  with the aim of absorbing the country. 
This encroachment stimulated both Khmer resistance and Thai 
in te rvent ion .  U lt imate ly  the Vietnamese were forced to compromise and 
dual suzerainty with the Thais over the Khmers was formalized in 1845
10 -
under a t r i p a r t i t e  agreement, thus confirming Cambodia's buffer 
4
status.
Unlike Cambodia, Laos as such did not ex is t as a unitary  state 
before the imposit ion of French colonial ru le  on what was, in the mid­
nineteenth century, a mosaic of small, weak states. But Thailand and 
Vietnam did both exercise varying degrees of inf luence over the Lao 
states: Vietnam contro l led  what is now northeastern Laos, large areas
of central Laos were under Thai administrat ion, and Bangkok provided 
advisers to governments in the north and south. So although Thai- 
Vietnamese r i v a l r y  was not manifested so d i re c t l y  as in Cambodia, the
two powers nevertheless each maintained a sphere of influence or 
5
control in Laos.
Although th is  early  h is to r ica l  r i v a l r y  provided a precedent fo r  
la te r  Thai-Vietnamese competi tion in Cambodia and Laos, the degree to 
which i t  ac tua l ly  inf luenced the course of re la t ions  between Thailand 
and Indochina a f te r  1975 is by no means clear.  There were ce r ta in ly  
in te res t ing  pa ra l le ls  between pre-colonial and post-colonial  Thai and 
Vietnamese behaviour in the intervening states, but i t  would be 
misleading to ascribe th is  mainly to some inexorable, h i s t o r i c a l l y -
4 For discussions of pre-colonial Thai-Vietnamese r i v a l r y  in 
Cambodia see Ha l l ,  pp. 168, 397; Tate, pp. 437, 470-2; Mil ton 
Osborne, 'Kampuchea and Vietnam: A H is tor ica l  Perspective',
Pac i f ic  Community, No. 9 (Apr i l  1978), pp. 251-3; Khien
Theeravi t ,  ' Thai-Kampuchean Relat ions: Problems and Prospects' ,
Asian Survey, Vo l . 22, No. 6 (June 1982), pp. 562-3 and Dhavorn 
Sukhakanya, 'Notable Points About Thai-Vietnamese Rivalry from a 
H is to r ica l  Perspective' (Paper presented at the Workshop on 
'Future ASEAN-Vietnam Relat ions ',  In s t i t u te  of Securi ty and 
In ternat ional  Studies, Chulalongkorn Univers i ty , Bangkok, 7-9 
February 1983), pp. 1-3.
5 Tate, pp. 483-91.
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determined pattern of c o n f l i c t  in mainland Southeast Asia. In the
pre-colonial era, the Thais' c o n f l i c t  with the Vietnamese was matched 
by th e i r  struggle with the Burmese. Indeed, in the late eighteenth 
and early  nineteenth centuries, the seriousness of the Burmese threat  
encouraged the Thais to compromise in the i r  r i v a l r y  with the
Vietnamese in order to avoid war on two f ron ts .  But Thai-Burmese 
c o n f l i c t  did not revive on a s ig n i f ic a n t  level in the post-colonial  
period. Moreover, there were phases of cooperation (or at least 
compromise) as well as c o n f l i c t  in Thai-Vietnamese re la t ions both 
before and af te r  the colonial in te rva l .  That Thai and Vietnamese
interests  were not bound to clash was demonstrated by the 1845 
t r i p a r t i t e  agreement on Cambodia, and a century la te r  by the aid given 
by Bangkok to assist the Viet Minh in th e i r  struggle against the
French
The Colonial Impact
The impact of colonial ism in Southeast Asia had several important 
implicat ions fo r  subsequent re la t ions  between the ASEAN states and 
Indochina.
The Ethnic Chinese Factor
Colonial ism transformed Southeast Asia by bringing the region 
in to  the world economy. The resu l ts  of these changes were negative
6 Peter A. Poole, The Vietnamese in Thailand: A H is tor ica l
Perspective (I thaca: Cornell Universi ty  Press, 1970), pp. 38-44.
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for much of the region's population, engendering deep resentment not 
only of colonial rule but also of those classes who did benefit from 
the new economic system. In particular, the benefits accruing to 
Chinese immigrants and their descendants who fu l f i l l e d  the role of
economic middlemen gave rise to enduring bitterness on the part of
indigenous people throughout the region. This strong popular 
undercurrent of anti-Chinese sentiment, when combined with the fears 
generated by communist China's links with local revolutionary
movements, provided the basis for certain Southeast Asian governments' 
concerns with a 'Chinese threat ' .  In turn, such views of China played 
important roles as factors conditioning the ASEAN governments'
security concerns with Indochina after 1975, part icular ly in the
Indonesian and Malaysian cases.
Nationalism and Communism
Colonial rule in Southeast Asia often faced b i t te r  resistance 
from local people, but unti l  the early twentieth century this 
resistance was almost always solely concerned with implementing a 
return to the pre-colonial status quo. But from the 1920s, with the
increasing integration of the region into the world economic and
po l i t ica l  system and the Western education of growing numbers of
Southeast Asians, there emerged a new type of anti-colonialism 
stressing nationalism -- the creation of new states based on the 
existing colonies, rather than a mere reversion to pre-colonial 
po l i t ica l  systems.
From their inception, Southeast Asian nationalist movements
13 -
subsumed a broad spectrum of ideological viewpoints, including 
communism. But only in Vietnam was the major anti-colonial 
nationalist movement led by communists: communism failed to gain 
sufficient support to ensure i ts legitimacy as the ideology of post­
colonial governments elsewhere in the region.
Although the dominant strain of Vietnamese nationalism was 
ideologically at odds with i ts counterparts elsewhere in Southeast 
Asia, there was from the beginning a significant current of opinion in 
Indonesia identifying the independence struggles in the two former 
colonies. Essentially, the Indonesian perception was that Indonesia 
and Vietnam were the only two Southeast Asian countries which had to 
fight wars in order to gain independence, and that the Vietnamese 
people fought for a nationalist cause like the Indonesians, although 
the Vietnamese nationalist leadership was dominated by communists. In 
this view, Ho Chi Minh was a legitimate leader comparable with 
Indonesia's Sukarno and Hatta, while the Emperor Bao Dai was reviled 
as a French stooge comparable with the pro-Dutch rulers who headed the 
'federal states'  established by the Dutch in their attempt to limit 
the Indonesian Republic to Java. Some Indonesian nationalists also 
saw a parallel between Ho's ambition to create an 'Indochinese 
federation' from the terr i tor ies  of former French Indochina and 
Jakarta's claim to the former Dutch East Indies as the geographical 
basis of Indonesia.'7
7 See, for example, Lie Tek Tjeng, 'Vietnamese Nationalism: An
Indonesian Perspective' (Paper presented at the Friedrich Ebert 
Stiftung Round Table Conference on 'Crisis Region Indochina -- 
Causes and Effects' ,  Jakarta, 2-4 March 1981, pp. 1-3.
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Regional Conflicts and Extra-regional Powers' Involvement, 1945-75
The most s ig n i f ic a n t  h is to r ica l  developments in re la t ion  to the 
ASEAN states' perceptions of Indochina af ter  1975 were those which 
occurred from the onset of decolonization at the end of the Second 
World War.
The F i rs t  Indochina War
The c i v i l i a n  Thai governments dominated by Prid i Phanomyong in 
1945-47 opposed the return of French ru le to Indochina fo r  reasons of 
both ideology and national in te res t .  Hence P r i d i 's governments 
cooperated with both the Viet Minh and the Lao Issara (the Laotian
o
na t iona l is t  movement). O f f i c ia l  Thai sympathy fo r  these communist- 
led Indochinese na t iona l is ts  continued even af ter  a m i l i t a r y  coup in 
Bangkok in November 1947, but the Chinese communists' v ic to ry  in 1949 
- -  which brought d i rec t  Chinese m i l i t a r y  aid to the Viet Minh - -  
influenced the Thai regime led by Phibun Songkhram to see the 
Indochinese struggle from an ideological rather than a na t iona l is t  
perspective and to decide in favour of cooperation with the French. 
Thus began Bangkok's association with the anti-communist side in the 
pre-1975 struggle fo r  power in Indochina.
Thai land's anti-communist stance soon involved an al l iance with 
the United States. Not only did American po l icy concur with Bangkok's 
concern over the intentions of communist China and North Vietnam but
8 Corrine Phuangkasem, Thailand and SEATO (Bangkok: Thai Watana
Parich, 1973), p. 6 and Poole, pp. 38-44.
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the Phibun regime also saw Washington as neutral if not sympathetic in 
i ts attitude towards Thailand's conservative domestic political 
system. In return for US military and economic assistance, Bangkok 
supported the American action in Korea, sending four thousand Thai 
troops to fight there.
While Indonesian attitudes towards the First Indochina War were
conditioned by the identification of many Indonesian nationalists with
the Viet Minh's struggle, foreign policy was not a priority for
Indonesian governments in the early 1950s, due to a preoccupation with
internal problems. But the strongly nationalist Sastroamidjojo
government (in power from July 1953 to August 1955) pursued a more
vigorous foreign policy, and was involved in the April 1954 meeting of
g
the 'Colombo powers' which was successful to a limited extent in
influencing the outcome of the Geneva Conference on the Indochina 
Question.^
Although a sovereign state since 1946, the Philippines remained 
highly dependent on the United States in the late 1940s and early 
1950s. While Manila showed a vague interest in Asian events and 
occasionally adopted an 'ant i - imperial is t1 stance in international 
forums, close links with Washington meant that i ts attitudes and 
policies were often out of step with those of other independent Asian 
countries such as Indonesia. After the Geneva settlement the
9 The other participants were India, Pakistan, Burma and Ceylon.
10 Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, Twenty Years Indonesian Foreign Policy 
1945-1965 (The Hague: Mouton, 1973), p. 207.
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Philippines associated i tself  with American efforts to bolster South 
Vietnam.^
SEATO and Indochina
When, a month before the fall of Dien Bien Phu, President
Eisenhower claimed that ' the loss of Indochina will cause the fall of
12Southeast Asia like a set of dominoes', he was airing a view that
was not only to underly American policy in the region for the next
twenty years, but was also to exert a profound influence on attitudes
in what later became the ASEAN countries.
Thailand and the Philippines were both signatories of the Manila
Pact, which the United States established in 1954 to bolster the
region's non-communist states following the concessions forced upon
the West with the crumbling of the French position in Indochina. In
the middle and late 1950s, Bangkok and Manila pursued policies towards
Indochina that reflected their adherence to the West and fear of
Chinese and North Vietnamese communism. The informal nexus between
13the Manila Pact signatories and the Indochinese 'protocol states'
11 Jean-Luc Vellut, 'Asian Policy of the Philippines, 1953-63' (PhD 
thesis,  Australian National University, 1964), pp. 85-6, 211-13.
12 Presidential News Conference, 7 April 1954, in Public Papers of
the Presidents: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1954 (Washington, DC:
Government Printing Office, 1960), p. 383.
13 Under the Protocol to the Southeast Asia Collective Defence
Treaty (usually referred to as ' the Manila Pact '),  aggression 
against Cambodia, Laos and South Vietnam was to be responded to 
in the same manner as aggression against signatories to the 
Treaty. The non-communist Indochinese countries also became 
eligible for economic assistance under the Treaty. Manila Pact 
and Pacific Charter (Bangkok: SEATO, 1968).
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f a c i l i t a t e d  a broad range of o f f i c i a l  and q u a s i -o f f i c ia l  contacts 
between Thailand and the Phi l ippines on one hand and the a n t i ­
communist regimes in South Vietnam and Laos on the other hand.^
In contrast to the act ive anti-communism of Thailand and the 
Phi l ippines, Indonesia denounced the Manila Pact as an attempt to 
bring the Cold War into Southeast Asia and to perpetuate colonial ism. 
Indonesia's a t t i tude  towards Vietnam af te r  the Geneva Conference was 
re f lected in i t s  establishment of an embassy in Hanoi whi le re la t ions 
with Saigon were never elevated to th is  leve l .  Nevertheless, a 
minor i ty  of staunch anti-communists in the Indonesian establishment
remained suspicious of North Vietnam's ideological and cu l tu ra l
15closeness with China. But the fa i l u re  of the Afro-Asian conference 
at Bandung in 1955 to reach a consensus with regard to pacts with the 
West such as SEATO highl ighted the divergence between the pro-Western, 
anti-communist outlook of Thailand and the Phi l ipp ines, and 
Indonesia's non-aligned s tan ce .^
14 V e l lu t ,  pp. 211-12, 251; George Modelski, International
Conference on the Settlement of the Laotian Question (Canberra: 
Austra l ian National Univers i ty , Department of International 
Relat ions, Working Paper no. 2, 1962), p. 115; Man Mohini Kaul, 
The Phi l ipp ines and Southeast Asia (New Delhi: Radiant
Publishers, 1978), p. 141. Unlike the other two non-communist 
Indochinese states, Cambodia under Sihanouk's leadership was not 
amenable to association wth SEATO and repudiated the 'p ro tec t ion '  
granted i t  under the Manila Pact.
15 Agung, pp. 187-88; Lie, p. 4.
16 Agung, p. 238. While the f i f t h  p r inc ip le  acknowledged the r ig h t  
of states to defend themselves 's ing ly  or c o l le c t iv e ly ,  in 
conformity with the Charter of the United Nations' (thus 
apparently acknowledging the r ig h t  of Thailand and the 
Phi l ippines to belong to SEATO), the s ix th p r inc ip le  cal led fo r  
'abstention from the use of arrangements of co l lec t ive  defence 
to serve the pa r t icu la r  in te res t  of any of the big powers' - -  a 
clear condemnation of SEATO amongst other pacts.
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Although the outlook of the Malay nat ional i s t s  who took power on 
independence was fundamentally anti-communist, they were also 
determined that  Malaya would be non-aligned. But while th is  precluded 
membership of SEATO, the Malays accepted the need for a defence 
arrangement with Bri tain pending the end of the communist-inspired 
'Emergency'. Although the resul tant  Anglo-Malayan Defence Arrangement 
continued to operate for many years,  the Malayan government was 
consistent  in maintaining a basical ly non-aligned foreign policy and 
was vehement that  Bri t ish bases in Malaya were not to be used for 
SEATO purposes .^
Indonesia's Relations with China
Despite the antipathy f e l t  towards the local ethnic Chinese 
minority,  there was some admiration amongst early Indonesian 
nat ional i s t s  for both the Kuomintang and Mao Ze Dong's communists. 
From the early 1950s, Indonesia's relat ions with Beijing became 
increasingly cordial ,  pa r t i cu lar ly  af ter  Zhou En- la i ' s  reassuring 
conduct at the 1955 Bandung Coference, and China's support for Jakarta
17 David Hawkins, The Defence of Malaysia and Singapore: from AMDA
to ANZUK (London: Royal United Services I n s t i t u t e ,  1972), pp.
13-5. Nevertheless,  unt i l  the formation of Malaysia in 1963, 
Britain was s t i l l  able to use bases in i t s  colony of Singapore 
for SEATO purposes. Thus Bri t ish forces based in Malaysia under 
AMDA could easi ly have been redeployed in a SEATO role:  some
have seen th i s  as a de facto associat ion of Malaya with SEATO. 
See Chin Kin Wah, The Five Power Defence Arrangements and AMDA 
(Singapore: I ns t i tu t e  of Southeast Asian Studies,  Occasional
Paper No. 23, 1974). p. 9.
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at the time of the American-supported regional rebellions in 1958 and
18again during the West Irian dispute.
As Sukarno led Indonesia's foreign policy towards an 
unequivocally anti-Wetern stance in the early 1960s, Jakarta came to 
rely ever more heavily on China's diplomatic backing. Domestically, 
the PKI (the Indonesian Communist Party, which was receiving 
progressively greater financial support from China) benefited as 
Sukarno manipulated loyalties within the armed forces to serve his own 
ends .^
Although there was no substantive proof of Beijing's involvement 
in the enigmatic, abortive couup of September 1965, the outcome had a 
traumatic impact on Sino-Indonesian relations. The Indonesian army 
and right-wing paramilitary groups used circumstantial evidence of 
Chinese involvement in the attempted coup to just ify the ruthless 
suppression of not only the PKI's members and aff i l iates but also the 
ethnic Chinese population. By April 1966, Beijing and Jakarta were 
exchanging 'sharp and c r i t i ca l '  notes and diplomatic relations were 
suspended in late 1967.
Beijing's alleged role in the events of September 1965 ensured 
that the Suharto regime portrayed China as a serious security threat,  
above all in terms of the subversive potential of Indonesia's ethnic
18 Franklin B. Weinstein, Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemma
of Dependence: from Sukarno to Suharto (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1976), pp. 89-90 and Bruce Grant, Indonesia 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1964), pp. 182-83.
19 See J.A.C. Mackie, K0NFR0NTASI: The Indonesian-Malaysian Dispute
1963-1966 (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1974),
pp. 285-89; J.D. Legge, Sukarno: A Political Biography (London:
Allen Lane, 1972), pp. 373-384.
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Chinese population and the danger of a PKI rev iva l .  As un rea l is t ic  as 
th is  threat assessment might seem, i t  was to have a crucia l impact on 
Indonesian pol icy towards Indochina a f te r  1975.
The Second Indochina War
The intense p o l i t i c a l  and m i l i t a r y  c o n f l i c t  in Indochina from the 
early  1960s u l t ima te ly  involved a l l  the ASEAN states in one or another 
context, and the repercussions of th e i r  roles in what became known as 
the Vietnam War were decisive influences on th e i r  perceptions of 
Indochina af ter  1975.
Thai 1 and
In the early 1960s Thailand sought to involve the United States
more d i re c t ly  in Southeast Asia: th is  was exemplif ied by Bangkok's
e f fo r ts  to secure Washington's support for  the r ight-wing fact ion
during the Laotian c r i s i s  of 1959-62 and also by the Rusk-Thanat 
20communique. But the escalat ing American involvement in Vietnam did 
not receive unconditional Thai support. Although Bangkok was very 
seriously concerned about the " th rea t"  from China and North Vietnam, 
the Thais were more interested in the diversion of Hanoi's attention 
from Laos than with supporting South Vietnam per se. Bangkok's
20 The Rusk-Thanat communique of early 1962 aff irmed that
Washington's SEAT0 obl igations did not depend on the agreement of 
the other part ies to the Manila Treaty but were " ind iv idua l  as 
well as co l le c t ive "  in nature. U.S. Department of State 
B u l le t i n , 26 March 1962, p. 498.
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po l icy  throughout the war was to attempt to minimize d i rec t  Thai
involvement in order to lessen the p o s s ib i l i t y  of provoking communist
action against Thai land, whi le extract ing a high price in terms of
21American aid and commitments fo r  the support that was given.
President Johnson's announcement in March 1968 that America
would seek a negotiated peace in Vietnam came at a thoroughly
inopportune time from Bangkok's viewpoint as Thai involvement in the
war was then at a peak, in terms of both the deployment of Thai troops
in South Vietnam and the US Air  Force's use of bases in Thailand fo r
bombing Indochina. I t  was clear that Thailand might be l e f t  ina
peri lous posi t ion i f  peace negotiations gave the Vietnamese communists
a dominant posit ion in South Vietnam and Laos. President Nixon's July
221969 'Guam doctr ine ' gave an added impetus to successive Thai 
governments to restore some of the country's  t ra d i t io n a l  f l e x i b i l i t y  
in fore ign po l icy .  Thanat Khoman, Bangkok's Foreign Min is ter ,  t r ie d  
to preserve the core of the Thai-American a l l iance (continuing 
m i l i t a r y  assistance and deterrence against d i rec t  communist attack) 
whi le attempting to assuage American fears of a 'new Vietnam' in 
Thailand by negot iat ing an i n i t i a l  withdrawal of US forces from Thai 
t e r r i t o r y  and by lauding the Nixon doctr ine.
21 Charles E. Morrison and Astr i  Suhrke, Strategies of Survival: 
the Foreign Pol icy Dilemmas of Smaller Asian States (St. Lucia: 
Universi ty  of Queensland Press, 1978), pp. 120-21; S.R. Larsen 
and J.L. Col l ins ,  A l l ie d  Part ic ipa t ion  in Vietnam (Washington DC: 
Government Pr in t ing Off ice, 1975), pp. 28-38.
22 The Nixon Doctr ine, set fo r th  by the President on Guam in July
1969, propounded that respon s ib i l i ty  fo r  defence in the region 
would increasingly be taken by Asian states themselves; US 
m i l i t a r y  involvement and aid would recede in importance. See 
United States Foreign Pol icy 1969-1970: A Report of the
Secretary of State (Washington, DC~i US Government Print ing 
Off ice,  1971), pp. 36-39.
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But although the Thai government began in 1970 to scale down i t s
m i l i t a r y  commitment in South Vietnam, and refused to be drawn by
Washington into the Cambodian c o n f l i c t ,  Thailand became increasingly
m i l i t a r i l y  involved in Laos. Bangkok perceived a communist advance
through Laos towards Thai land: a pa r t icu la r  fear was that the Chinese
road-bui lding programme there might f a c i l i t a t e  increased external
23assistance to Thai communist insurgents.
The reduction of Thai involvement in the Indochina c o n f l i c t  
(except in Laos) was paral leled by e f fo r ts  to expand Thai land's 
contacts with the communist powers. Although th is  process contr ibuted 
to the ouster of Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman fo l lowing the November 
1971 m i l i t a r y  coup, the overall  movement away from dependence on 
Washington continued. While using a continuing US m i l i t a r y  presence 
in Thailand as a lever to extract substantial  US m i l i t a r y  assistance, 
Bangkok hoped that the American bases might be bargained away in 
exchanged fo r  North Vietnamese and Chinese promises to respect Laotian 
and Cambodian sovereignty and cease supporting the Thai insurgency.
Unti l  the end of the 1960s, the Thai au thor i t ies  perceived China 
and North Vietnam as two aspects of a single communist th reat , with 
China the greater menace. But by 1969-70 they divined dif ferences in 
the at t i tudes of Bei j ing and Hanoi towards Thai land. The dominant
a t t i tude  in Bangkok, which Thanat carried in to  po l icy ,  was that China 
should be cu l t iva ted in order to contain and iso late Hanoi. There
23 Lester A. Sobel (ed. ) ,  South Vietnam: US-Communist Confrontation
in Southeast Asia (New York: Facts on F i le ,  1973-74), Vol. 5,
pp. 82-3, 98; Marks, pp. 83-5.
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was, however, also an undercurrent of opinion which saw a common Thai
24and North Vietnamese in terest  in containing China. This was an
early ind ica t ion of a controversy which was to come to the fore in
Thailand and other ASEAN countries after  the eruption of open Sino-
Vietnamese c o n f l i c t  at the end of the 1970s.
In the early  1970s th is  nascent debate was resolved easi ly  as
China adopted an increasingly amicable a t t i tude  (as part of i t s  new
strategy of counteracting 'Soviet hegemonism') culminating in the
normalization of re la t ions  with Thailand in July 1975. Hanoi, on the
other hand, saw any detente as l inked to the removal of US bases from 
25Thailand. The deadlock was unbroken u n t i l  March 1975 when the 
apparent i n e v i t a b i l i t y  of the col lapse of non-communist forces in 
Indochina increased the l i k e l y  value fo r  Bangkok of improved re la t ions 
with the North Vietnamese and inspired the Kukri t  administration to 
announce that i t  would attempt to secure the withdrawal of US forces 
by the end of the year. But Thai land's previous deep involvement in 
the US war e f f o r t  and the continuing American m i l i t a r y  presence had 
already prejudiced the communist Indochinese regimes to see the 
Bangkok government in a host i le  l i g h t .
24 Morrison and Suhrke, p. 136. Puey Ungphakorn, former governor of 
the Bank of Thailand and la te r  an important adviser to the Kukri t  
government, was a leading proponent of the l a t t e r  perspective.
25 Dick Wilson, Far Eastern Economic Review (c ited hereafter as 
FEER) , 29 October 1973, p. 17. At th is  time, Thailand s t i l l  
hosted nearly 50,000 US m i l i t a r y  personnel and sever major US a i r  
bases.
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The Philippines
Like Thailand, the Philippines was an ally of the United States 
in the Vietnam War. But although President Marcos claimed in early 
1966 that ' i f  the Reds win in Vietnam, that victory will signal the 
re-activation of communist insurgency all over Southeast Asia, 
including the Philippines' ,  he did not pursue such sentiments to their 
logical conclusion -- a large scale commitment of forces in South
Vietnam and unrestricted American use of bases in the Philippines.
Manila's contribution to the war effort was limited in comparison with 
Thailand's. No more than two thousand Philippine troops were deployed 
in South Vietnam at any one time, and they were restricted to non­
combat roles. Important logistic support was provided by the US bases 
in the Philippines, but (unlike the Thai government) Manila did not 
allow their use for the bombing of Indochina. Domestic political
pressure stemming from discontent over the 'special relationship'  with 
Washington led to the withdrawal of Philippine troops from South 
Vietnam in 1970.^
Although the Philippines was an active ally of the United States 
during the Vietnam War, the relatively limited nature of Manila's
direct involvement, together with the country's isolation from 
mainland Southeast Asia, was to be paralleled after 1975 by a 
continuing detachment from events in Indochina, compared to the roles 
assumed by the other ASEAN states.
26 Larsen and Collins, pp. 52-87; Morrison and Suhrke, pp. 241-2.
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Malaysia
Malaysian po l icy  towards the Vietnam War may be divided in to  two 
main phases. Before 1968 Malaysia broadly supported the war against 
the Vietnamese communists. From 1964 Malaysia trained almost three 
thousand South Vietnamese securi ty personnel in counterinsurgency 
techniques. M i l i t a r y  r e l i e f  and medical supplies were provided to 
Saigon. Although Malaysia avoided any d i rec t  involvement in the war, 
the support given to Saigon was wel1-received by Washington at a time 
when Malaysia needed support in i t s  own Confrontation with 
Indonesi a . ^
With the end of Confrontat ion, the rea l iza t ion  that there was 
probably going to be a communist v ic to ry  in Vietnam, the withdrawal of 
B r i t i s h  forces from the region, the advent of the Nixon doctr ine, and 
the ret irement of the country's pro-Western f i r s t  Prime Minister 
(Tunku Abdul Rahman), Malaysia began a re -or ien ta t ion  of i t s  foreign 
po l icy  towards a more non-aligned stance. In 1970 Tun Razak, the new 
Prime M in is te r ,  elucidated his ideas on regional neu tra l iza t ion ,  which 
came to dominate - -  at least at the declaratory level - -  Kuala 
Lumpur's po l ic ies  towards regional secur i ty  in the early 1970s.
An important aim of the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neu tra l i ty  
(ZOPFAN) proposal was to bolster the Razak government's domestic, 
regional and in te rnational  c r e d ib i l i t y ,  p a r t i c u la r ly  in the aftermath
27 See President Johnson's reaf f i rmat ion  of America's commitment to 
Malaysia's securi ty  in the Joint Communique of President Johnson 
and Tunku Abdul Rahman, 23 July 1964, quoted in Peter Boyce, 
Malaysia and Singapore in International Diplomacy: Documents and
Commentaries (Sydney: Sydney Univers i ty  Press, 1968), p. 163.
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28of the May 1969 r iots .  But the proposal was also an extrapolation
of a widely-held view in the Malay el i te that Malaysia should adjust
i ts foreign policy fundamentally in response to the region's changing
strategic environment. Unlike some of their Thai counterparts,
Malaysian leaders did not in the early 1970s perceive any serious or
immediate security threats if Indochina ' f e l l '  to communism. But like
the Suharto regime, the Razak government was seriously concerned about
the Chinese threat to the region, particularly in terms of Beijing's
links with communist insurgents and ethnic Chinese residents. The
inabili ty of Malaysia and its ASEAN partners to f i l l  the regional
military vacuum left  by the departing British and American forces made
the construction of a balance of power with China based on indigenous
capabilities impossible. As an alternative, the Razak government
hoped to manage the 'Chinese threat'  by using the ZOPFAN proposal to
29integrate China into the regional order.
From Razak's viewpoint, the achievement of ZOPFAN would be 
infeasible without the participation of the Indochinese states.  But 
i t  was clear from the beginning that Hanoi was basically hostile to 
the neutralization idea, seeing ZOPFAN -- like ASEAN -- as an 
American-backed attempt to freeze the regional status quo. Before the
28 See Dick Wilson, The Neutralization of Southeast Asia (New York: 
Praeger, 1975), p. 67.
29 Whether or not the ZOPFAN proposal assisted Malaysia and its 
ASEAN partners in establishing working relationships with China 
is debatable. In view of i ts  concern to compete with Soviet 
influence in the Asian periphery, i t  seems highly likely that 
Beijing would have wished for better relations with the ASEAN 
states even in the absence of the neutralization proposal.
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f a l l  of Saigon, Hanoi's fear seems to have been that the
implementation of ZOPFAN would leg i t im ize American interference in the
region, bo ls ter ing anti-communist South Vietnam and Cambodia and the
30coa l i t ion  regime in Laos. Nevertheless, ZOPFAN's emphasis on the 
need for  in t ra-reg ional  cooperation and detente with the communsit 
powers provided a framework fo r  the new d i rec t ion  in Malaysian foreign 
po l icy ,  including the opening of diplomatic re la t ions  with Hanoi in 
1973, and thus encouraged a f a i r l y  op t im is t ic  Malaysian a t t i tude  
towards post-war communist Indochina.
Singapore
For the f i r s t  year or so a f te r  separation from Malaysia in 1965,
Singapore adopted a neutral posi t ion on the Indochina c o n f l i c t ,  as
part of i t s  pol icy of using 'Afro-Asian stances' to soothe Third World
suspicion of i t s  B r i t ish  m i l i t a r y  bases and Western and Overseas
31Chinese business and cap i ta l .
Although Singapore already in d i re c t ly  assisted the anti-communist 
32cause in minor ways, i t  was not un t i l  a f te r  the B r i t ish  decision in
30 At the time that the Paris peace ta lks began in la te  1972, a 
North Vietnamese spokesman supported establishment of "a zone of 
n e u t ra l i t y " ,  involving the withdrawal of US forces from the 
region, but th is  did not ind icate real support fo r  ZOPFAN. In 
contrast to Hanoi and Saigon (which l ike  i t s  northern adversary 
had a v i t a l  stake in maintaining i t s  alignment to a superpower), 
the Laotian and Cambodian governments were both broadly in favour 
of ZOPFAN. See Wilson, pp. 91-98.
31 Kawin W i la i ra t ,  Singapore's Foreign Pol icy: The F i r s t  Decade
(Singapore: In s t i t u te  of Southeast Asian Studies, Fie ld Report
No. 10, 1975), p. 40.
32 By providing "rest and recreation" f a c i l i t i e s  fo r  US troops and 
by increasing i t s  exports of petroleum products to South Vietnam, 
fo r  example.
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1966 to withdraw from their Singaporean bases that there was any
substantial change of policy. In October 1967 Lee Kuan Yew declared
his unequivocal support of the American role in Indochina, thereby
demolishing Singapore's ' neutral1 position. In Lee's view, not only
would a continuing US military presence be vital to regional security
following the incipient British withdrawal, but America also seemed
the best source for the rapid increase in trade and investment
33necessary to buffer the economic consequences of the withdrawal. 
Singapore's significant diplomatic support for the anti-communist 
struggle in Indochina, and consistent efforts to keep the United 
States poli t ical ly,  mil i tar i ly and economically engaged in the region 
from the late 1960s onwards were an important reason for the mutual 
antipathy between the city state and Indochina's communist regimes 
(especially Hanoi) after April 1975.
Indonesia
Unlike the other ASEAN states,  Indonesia maintained diplomatic 
relations with Hanoi throughout the war; the Viet Cong's Provisional 
Revolutionary Government was also represented in Jakarta whereas 
relations with the anti-communist South Vietnamese regime were broken 
in 1964. Although there was a shift  away from clear-cut support of 
the Vietnamese communists towards more ambiguous policies after the 
fall  of Sukarno in 1966, criticism of the American role remained a 
cornerstone of Jakarta's a t t i tu d e .^  The Indonesian regime was
33 Wilairat, pp. 42-3.
34 Weinstein, pp. 130-50.
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confident that a communist victory in Vietnam would pose little or no
threat to Indonesia's security. Indeed, there was a widespread
feeling that a united communist Vietnam would constitute a more
effective barrier than a divided, war-torn Vietnam against China --
which recent experience had shown to be the main source of external
35threat in the eyes of the Indonesian military leadership.
In the late 1960s and early 1970s Indonesian policy towards 
Indochina tended increasingly to support the status q u o , particularly 
because of Washington's role as Jakarta's major aid donor coupled with 
Indonesian concern over the implications for the regional balance of 
power of the British military withdrawal and the Nixon doctrine. 
Jakarta adopted the stance of potential mediator, but the government 
did not act on army proposals (in 1968 and 1970 respectively) for an 
Indonesian role in US-sponsored 'peacekeeping forces' in South Vietnam 
and C a m b o d i a . ^
The Jakarta government rejected army suggestions of an Indonesian
military role in Cambodia to check outside military intervention in
what the military perceived as part of Indonesia's 'outer defence 
37perimeter', but in April 1970 Vice-President Malik instead took the
lead in arranging an international conference to discuss the Cambodian
crisis. However, the May 1970 Jakarta Conference 'assumed the image
38of an anti-communist gathering', with its communique clearly 
favouring the survival of Lon N o l 's rightist regime.
35 Leiter, p. 130.
36 Weinstein, pp. 135-6; Leiter, p. 133.
37 Leiter, p. 132.
38 Lau Teik Soon, Indonesia and Regional Security: the Djakarta
Conference on Cambodia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian
Studies, Occasional Paper No. 14, 1972), p. 8.
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But despite the criticism which Indonesia's leading role in the 
Jakarta Conference and later Indonesian participation in the 
International Commission for Control and Supervision in South Vietnam 
brought from the Indochinese communists, Indonesia was undoubtedly the 
best prepared of the ASEAN states for the defeat of non-communists 
Indochina in 1975. Jakarta had given l i t t l e  credence to American- 
inspired 'domino' concepts, there had been l i t t l e  sympathy for 
American war aims, and relations with Hanoi and the Provisional 
Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam, though strained, had been 
maintained. Indonesian perceptions of nationalism as the strongest 
ideology led to a disbelief in monolithic communism, and to a vision 
of a united Vietnam as a buffer against a supposed long-term threat 
from China.
Conclusion
It would be erroneous to suggest that other than recent 
historical relationships played a major part as influences on the 
attitudes and policies of the ASEAN states towards communist Indochina 
from 1975 to 1981. But i t  is clear that significant aspects of 
regional relationships in this period were not without precedent in 
Southeast Asia's pre-colonial history. Neither China's quest for 
influence to i ts south nor competition between Vietnam and Thailand in 
the intervening states were new aspects of the region's international 
po l i t ics .
More recent history has, however, greater relevance to the ASEAN 
states'  security concerns after 1975. During the colonial period, the
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immigration of ethnic Chinese provided the basis for  one important 
aspect of Southeast Asian governments' la te r  suspicion of the People's 
Republic of China. The simultaneous growth of revolut ionary 
nationalism in Indonesia and Vietnam la id  the foundations fo r  
Jakarta's r e la t i v e ly  benign view of the Vietnamese communists in la te r  
years.
In the aftermath of the F i r s t  Indochina War, Bangkok and Manila 
committed themselves to the anti-communist side in the Cold War by 
signing the Manila Pact. By way of contrast , Indonesia's ' independent 
and act ive ' foreign po l icy encouraged Jakarta's alignment with China. 
But the alleged Chinese involvement in the 1965 attempted coup 
thoroughly alienated the Indonesian leadership under Suharto from 
Bei j ing .
Most importantly , the at t i tudes and po l ic ies  of what became ' the 
ASEAN states' towards the Second Indochina war had diverged widely, 
ranging from Thailand's more or less consistent (although often 
hesitant) id e n t i f i c a t io n  with the anti-communist cause to Indonesia's 
rhetor ica l  support for  the Vietnamese communists. Moreover, although 
ASEAN had existed fo r  eight years, the organization had not yet been 
used to synthesize any sort of consensus concerning the po l ic ies  of 
the non-communist regional states towards communist Indochina. Within 
a short time, ASEAN was nevertheless to prove a highly important 
mechanism in coordinating the po l ic ies  of the ASEAN states in response 
to the fa r  from s ta t ic  s i tua t ion  in Indochina. However, whi le a 
degree of consensus was to be reached on how best to deal with 
Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, the ind iv idual  national in terests  of the 
f i v e  non-communist states were to remain paramount, and i t  was clear
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that many of the factors that influenced their policies during the 
Second Indochina War and in earlier eras continued to retain their 
dominance through the brief peace and into what was soon to be termed 
'the Third Indochina War'.
CHAPTER 2
THE INFLUENCE OF THE INDOCHINESE STATES' ATTITUDES AND POLICIES ON THE ASEAN STATES'SECURITY CONCERNS WITH INDOCHINA
Following their triumphs in 1975, the Indochinese communists 
faced massive domestic political, social and economic problems. The 
damage caused by the years of war necessitated reconstruction on a 
huge scale. The achievement of national unity was also a prime goal, 
especially in Vietnam where traditional differences between the north 
and south had been accentuated by their development for two decades as 
separate political entities with opposing socioeconomic and political 
systems. Before 1978 the dominant political priority for the 
Indochinese communists was to consolidate their hold on power through 
the rehabilitation of their countries and by coercion (ranging from 
relatively gentle 're-education' in Vietnam and Laos to the wholesale 
extermination of politically suspect elements in Cambodia). 
Nevertheless, the international political dimension was vitally 
important from the beginning, in the senses both of ensuring security 
from external threat and of securing external sources of assistance 
for reconstruction.
Vietnamese Policies Towards the ASEAN States
Vietnam's principal foreign policy concerns in the aftermath of 
the 1975 communist victory were relations with the two superpowers and 
China. Next in importance for Hanoi were relations with the two
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smaller Indochinese states. But despite the relatively low priority 
given to relations with non-communist Southeast Asia, Hanoi did begin 
to pursue a more active policy towards the ASEAN states in 1975.
Hanoi's view of the ASEAN states after the fall of Saigon was 
complex and paradoxical. In part this may have reflected differing 
opinions within the Vietnamese leadership.^- But more importantly, the 
leadership probably recognized that certain of i ts foreign policy 
goals in relation to non-communist Southeast Asia were contradictory. 
Several important factors militated against rapprochement with the 
ASEAN states:  in particular,  the Vietnamese communists' revolutionary 
ideology suggested that Hanoi should support the struggles of local 
communist parties against the ASEAN states'  governments.^ Moreover, 
from the viewpoint of Vietnam's security, Hanoi regarded the region's 
non-communist governments with suspicion because of their record of
1 Although one analyst concluded in 1978 that ' the present
leadership of the SRV appears remarkably stable, cohesive and in 
basic agreement over future objectives' (Carlyle A. Thayer, 'Viet 
Nam's External Relations: An Overview', Pacific Community, Vol.
9, No. 2 [January 1978], p. 213), the defection of former 
Politburo member Hoang Van Hoan to China in July 1979 indicated 
the existence of dissension on certain issues at the highest 
policy-making levels.
2 From 1970, the Vietnamese communist leadership claimed that the
direction of world polit ics was determined by the interplay of 
' three revolutionary currents' :  the strength of the ' social ist
camp', the upsurge of the 'national liberation movement' in the 
Third World, and the workers' struggle in the capital ist  
countries. Repeated Vietnamese statements stressed the necessity 
of building a ‘united f ront ' ,  based on these three currents, 
against 'American imperialism'. See Carlyle A. Thayer, 'Three 
Revolutionary Currents: Vietnamese Perspectives on International
Security' (Paper presented to the Conference on 'Asian 
Perspectives on International Security' ,  Australian National 
University, Canberra, 11-14 April 1983), pp. 18-9.
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support fo r  the Americans and the i r  anti-communist Indochinese a l l i e s  
in the Vietnam War, th e i r  continuing m i l i t a r y  l inks with the United 
States and other Western powers, th e i r  membership of ASEAN (which the 
Vietnamese claimed to see as a th in ly -d isgu ised successor to SEATO) 
and th e i r  backing fo r  Malaysia's ZOPFAN proposal ( in Hanoi's view an 
attempt to iso late Vietnam from i t s  Soviet a l l y ) .
A f ter  i t s  v ic to ry  in 1975 Hanoi continued to c r i t i c i z e  ASEAN 
members in very strong terms whenever i t  appeared that th e i r  po l ic ies  
were running counter to Vietnam's secur i ty  in te rests  or ser iously  
undermining the strength of revolut ionary forces in the region. Thus 
the attempt by Bangkok and Hanoi to improve th e i r  re la t ions in 1975-76 
was undermined by Bangkok's securi ty  l inks with Washington as 
manifested in the continuing presence of US m i l i t a r y  f a c i l i t i e s  in 
Thai land, the American removal of a i r c r a f t  flown to Thailand by 
f lee ing  South Vietnamese p i lo t s  and claimed by the Vietnamese 
communists, and US-Thai naval exercises. In the aftermath of the 
Indonesian invasion of East Timor at the end of 1975, Hanoi condemned 
Jakarta as the 'regional policeman of the US'. The Thai r igh t -w ing 's  
seizure of power in October 1976 c lea r ly  concerned the Vietnamese, and 
prompted Hanoi to condemn Bangkok's m i l i t a r y  cooperation with Malaysia 
against the Communist Party of Malaya in southern Thai land.3 4
3 K. Das, FEER, 4 February 1977, p. 10. According to the 
Vietnamese Communist Party newspaper, Nhan Dan, cer ta in ASEAN 
countr ies '  b i la te ra l  m i l i t a r y  cooperation would ' tu rn  ASEAN into  
a de facto m i l i t a r y  a l l iance in opposition to the Southeast Asian 
peoples' asp i ra t ions ' .  Nhan Dan commentary, 4 August 1977, 
broadcast on Hanoi in te rnational  service in Thai, 0500 gmt,
4 August 1977 (United States Foreign Broadcast Information 
Service, FBIS-APA-77-151, 5 August 1977).
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The Vietnamese made i t  clear that Vietnam's s o c ia l i s t  economy and
iconomic or ienta t ion towards other communist countries made i t
mpossible even to consider jo in ing  the c a p i ta l i s t  Association of
4
loutheast Asian Nations. Indeed, ju s t  before the f i r s t  summit
leeting of ASEAN heads of state in February 1976, Hanoi attacked the 
Association as an organization intended ' to  r a l l y  a l l  pro-American 
'eactionary forces to oppose the revolut ionary movements' in Southeast 
\s ia .^
But Hanoi's version of pro leta r ian international ism and i t s  
:oncern over the secur i ty  impl icat ions of the continuation of close 
> o l i t i c o -m i l i ta ry  re la t ionships between Washington and certa in ASEAN 
states (especia l ly  Thailand and the Phi l ippines) did not dominate 
'ietnamese pol icy towards non-communist Southeast Asia from 1975. The 
'ietnamese leadership's ideological outlook on the ASEAN states was 
glanced by an essen t ia l ly  na t iona l is t  concern with establ ishing 
'ietnam as an in ternat iona l  actor autonomous of the major powers by 
ncreasing i ts  c r e d i b i l i t y  as a leading non-aligned nation.^  Hanoi 
ivident1y saw the ASEAN region as a sphere where i t  would be both
See, fo r  example, interview with Deputy Foreign Min ister Phan 
Hien, FEER, 24 June 1977, p. 19.
Quan Doi Nhan Dan (the Vietnamese People's Army newspaper) 
Commentary, 22 February 1976, quoted by Vietnamese News Agency 
(c i ted hereafter as VNA) broadcast in Engl ish, 0729 gmt, 
22 February 1976 (FBIS-APA-76-39, 26 February 1976).
See Carlyle A. Thayer 'Vietnam's Foreign Pol ic ies (1975-79): 
Implicat ions fo r  Austra l ia '  (Submission prepared fo r  Sub­
committee A [Indochina] , Join t Committee on Foreign A f fa i r s ,  
Parliament of the Commonwealth of Austra l ia ,  20 January 1980), 
pp. 17-9.
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possible and valuable to increase Vietnam's standing by establishing 
diplomatic relationships. Another aspect of Hanoi's nationalism was 
manifested in a desire to achieve international recognition of 
Vietnam's land and sea boundaries: the establishment of working 
relationships with the ASEAN countries held the key to the eventual 
resolution of Hanoi's disputes with Thailand, Malaysia, the 
Philippines and Indonesia over maritime boundaries. Economic issues 
dominated Hanoi's policy-making in the aftermath of victory,^ and 
these provided another reason for better relations with the non­
communist Southeast Asian states, which the Vietnamese saw as possible 
sources of reconstruction aid as well as trading partners.
Hanoi displayed a progressively greater willingness, through the 
1976-78 period, to subordinate i ts  ideological opposition to ASEAN and 
i ts  members' governments, and i ts  suspicion of their  security l inks 
with the West, to short-term instrumental po l i t ica l  and economic 
interests. L i t t le  progress was made in improving relations with the 
ASEAN states in 1975, but 1976 witnessed a major e f for t  by Hanoi to 
expand i ts  regional l inks. One reason for a change in Vietnam's 
att i tude was that although the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 
Southeast Asia and the Declaration of ASEAN Concord produced by 
ASEAN's f i r s t  summit meeting in February 1976 both included references 
to security cooperation, such mutual assistance was to be on a very 
limited, bi lateral basis. Hanoi may have reassessed ASEAN's potential 
as a threatening m i l i ta ry  bloc taking account of this factor. The
7 Douglas Pike, 'Vietnam during 1976: Economics in Command', Asian
Survey, Vol. 17, No. 1 (January 1977), pp. 35, 41.
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Vietnamese maintained their propaganda offensive against ASEAN's 
military overtones, particularly at the Colombo non-aligned summit in 
August 1976, but in July 1976 Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh 
announced a new four-point policy on relations with foreign countries 
which represented the most significant indication thus far that Hanoi 
was willing to cooperate with ASEAN members on a bilateral basis to
o
further national and regional development.
Deputy Foreign Minister Phan Hien's visi ts  to all the ASEAN 
capitals except Bangkok in July 1976 confirmed that Hanoi was 
genuinely interested in expanding links with non-communist Southeast 
Asia. Hien not only discussed the expansion of trade and economic 
cooperation, but also opened diplomatic relations with Manila, despite 
earl ier Vietnamese demands for the closure of US bases in the 
Philippines as a pre-condition for normalization. Hanoi's willingness 
to pursue a more conciliatory line also helped enable a renewal of 
negotiations with Bangkok in mid-19 7 6 after an almost year-long 
hiatus.
Hanoi's bridge-building diplomacy towards the ASEAN states was 
ratif ied by the announcement at the Fourth National Congress of the 
Vietnamese Communist Party in December 1976 of a second five-year 
plan, which involved laying the economic foundations for Vietnam to 
become a modern industrial state within twenty years, a process 
requiring massive injections of foreign capital and technology. Links 
with the ASEAN states were potentially useful both directly and
8 VNA in English, 0700 gmt, 5 July 1976 (FBIS-APA-76-132, 8 July 
1976).
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i n d i r e c t ly .  For example, a f te r  sending a delegation to Vietnam in
Apri l  1977, the Singaporean Chamber of Commerce cal led fo r  the
extension of medium-term cred i ts  to Hanoi. In May 1977 Malaysia
agreed to exchange spe c ia l is ts  in the rubber and palm o i l  industr ies
with Vietnam, and offered assistance with telecommunications and road
g
transport .  But the Vietnamese leadership hoped that the United
States would be the most important source of assistance. By 
demonstrating an a b i l i t y  to behave as a responsible and peaceful good 
neighbour to American's regional a l l ie s  and associates, an improvement 
of Vietnam's re la t ions  with the ASEAN states might help persuade 
Washington to grant dip lomatic recognit ion and economic assistance to 
Hanoi
The in te n s i f i c a t io n  of Vietnam's c o n f l i c ts  with China and
Cambodia‘S  provided an addi t ional  reason fo r  Hanoi to attempt to move
closer to the ASEAN states from late  1977. In b r ie f ,  Hanoi decided
that i t  needed to pre-empt what i t  perceived as the danger of
diplomatic encirclement by China's burgeoning rapprochement with the
ASEAN states: p a r t i c u la r l y  worrying for  the Vietnamese were Be i j ing 's
e f fo r ts  to improve Thai-Cambodian re la t ions  by playing the ro le  of
'honest broker ' .  In December 1977 and January 1978 Foreign Minister
Trinh v is i te d  Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, Manila and Bangkok to present
12Hanoi's view of i t s  c o n f l i c t s  with Bei j ing and Phnom Penh.
—
9 See Thayer, 'Vietnam's External R e la t i o n s ' . . . ' ,  pp. 220-21.
10 See K. Das and Peter Weintraub, FEER, 27 October 1978, p. 9.
11 For a useful c o l lec t io n  of essays on the outbreak of the Third
Indochina War, see David W.P. E l l i o t t  (ed.) ,  The Third Indochina 
Conf1i c t  (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981).
12 Nayan Chanda, FEER, 30 December 1977, p. 6.
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As Hanoi intensi f ied i t s  e f for t s  to improve rela t ions  with the 
ASEAN sta tes  in 1976-78, the Vietnamese adopted progressively more 
accommodating a t t i tudes  towards ASEAN i t s e l f ,  ZOPFAN, the non­
communist s t a te s '  securi ty l inks with the West, and Vietnam's 
re la t ionships  with local communist par t i es .  By August 1977, Hanoi's
view of ASEAN was that  i t  served US in te r es ts  'w i l l y -n i l l y '  rather  
13than by design. In January 1978, Hanoi's Vice Foreign Minister Vo
Dong Giang st ressed that  ASEAN's past was no longer an obstacle to
14bet ter  re la t ions  between Vietnam and the Associat ion's members.
When Prime Minister Pham Van Dong vis i ted Kuala Lumpur and Singapore
in October 1978 he emphasized Hanoi's new view of ASEAN as an economic
15grouping and not as a potential  mil i tary a l l iance.  The Vietnamese 
also made e f for t s  to narrow the difference between thei r  own PIN 
(Peace, Independence and Neutral i ty) idea and ZOPFAN: by January 1978
Foreign Minister Trinh was talking of promoting 'peace, independence, 
freedom and neut ra l i ty '  in the r e g i o n . ^  The fact  that  the 
Phil ippines and Thailand s t i l l  maintained close securi ty l inks with 
the United States,  as did Malaysia and Singapore with Austral ia and
13 Hanoi internat ional  service in English, 1000 gmt, 9 August 1977 
(FBIS-APA-77-154, 10 August 1977).
14 S t r a i t s  Times, 7 January 1978.
15 See reports of press conferences given by Malaysian Prime 
Minister Hussein Onn, Kuala Lumpur internat ional  service in 
English, 0630 gmt, 16 October 1978 (FBIS-APA-78-200, 16 October 
1978) and Pham Van Dong, Singapore domestic service in English, 
1330 gmt, 17 October 1978 (FBIS-APA-78-202, 18 October 1978).
16 'Vis i t  of the Foreign Minister of the Social i s t  Republic of 
Vietnam (January 3-6) ' ,  Text of Joint  Communique, 6 January 1978, 
in Foreign Affairs Malaysia, Vol. 11, No. 1 (March 1978), p. 75.
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New Zealand (and indi rect ly  the US), did not prevent Hanoi from wooing
them diplomatical ly.  In order to convince the ASEAN sta tes  of
Vietnam's goodwill -- par t icu l ar l y  in view of Chinese and Cambodian
al legat ions that  Hanoi was aiming for ' regional hegemony' --  Pham Van
Dong declared that  Vietnam would no longer ass i s t  the Thai or Malayan
communists in any way But despite this  attempt to upstage Beijing
--  which s t i l l  gave at least  moral backing to communist insurgents in
the ASEAN s ta tes  --  Hanoi was unable to gain ASEAN's support in i t s
18disputes with China and Cambodia.
The Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Cambodia, and the 
i ns t a l la t ion  there of a pro-Vietnamese regime at the beginning of 
1979, e f fect ively  nul l i f i ed  Hanoi's e f for t s  to conci l ia te  ASEAN's 
members. Hanoi's p r io r i t y  was to remove what i t  saw as a serious
threat  to Vietnam's securi ty from China's c l i en t ,  the Democratic 
Kampuchea regime. But at the same time, i t  became vi ta l  for the 
Vietnamese to attempt to persuade non-communist Southeast Asian 
governments that  t he i r  in te res t s  were not best served by joining China 
and the West in opposing the Vietnamese-imposed s ta tus  quo in 
Cambodia.
In essence, Hanoi adopted a two-fold strategy towards the ASEAN 
s ta tes  over the Cambodian issue.  F i r s t l y ,  the Vietnamese exerted
17 Dong signed communiques pledging non-interference in Thai and 
Malaysian internal  a f f a i r s .  Bangkok domestic service in Thai, 
0530 gmt, 10 September 1978 (FBIS-APA-78-176, 11 September 1978); 
VNA in English, 0724 gmt, 16 October 1978 (FBIS-APA-78-200, 
16 October 1978).
18 See section on 'Responses to the Emerging Conflict  in Indochina 
1977-78' in Chapter 9, pp. 415-29 below.
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diplomatic and m i l i t a r y  pressure on Thai land, in an e f f o r t  to dissuade
Bangkok from continuing i t s  support fo r  the Cambodian resistance.
Despite Bangkok's protests that Thailand was not a party to the
Cambodian c o n f l i c t ,  Hanoi insisted that the problem could be
ameliorated by negotiat ions between the Vietnamese c l ie n t  regime in
Phnom Penh and the Thai government, and proposed a demi l i tar ized and
19refugee-free zone along both sides of the Thai-Cambodian border.
The second aspect to Vietnam's strategy was an attempt to
maintain a dialogue with a l l  ASEAN's members, p a r t i c u la r l y  by playing 
on the apprehension with which many ASEAN p o l i t i c ia n s  and o f f i c i a l s ,  
especia l ly in Indonesia and Malaysia, regarded ASEAN's cooperation 
with Bei j ing over the Cambodian issue. Hanoi alleged that i t  was 
China rather than Vietnam which threatened not only the secur i ty  of 
Thailand but also 'peace and s t a b i l i t y '  in Southeast Asia as a whole. 
The Vietnamese equated the Khmer Rouge resistance in Cambodia with
' anti-government armed rebel Maoist groups' in the ASEAN countr ies; 
China al legedly posed a 'd i re c t  and long-term th reat '  to the region. 
According to the Vietnamese, Bei j ing had lured Thailand in to a 
'dangerous trap ' and had undermined ' the trend to a dialogue between 
the ASEAN countries and Viet Nam'.^
As a l te rnatives to continuing confrontat ion between the
Indochinese and ASEAN states, in July 1980 Hanoi suggested the signing
19 Memorandum of the Min is try  of Foreign A f fa i rs  of the Soc ia l is t  
Republic of Vietnam, Vietnam News Bu l le t in  (SRV Embassy, 
Canberra), No. 07/80 (10 September 1980), pp. 6-13.
20 Ib id . , pp. 1-5. See also Harish Chandola's interview with 
Vietnamese premier Pham Van Dong, Asiaweek, 30 May 1980, p. 39.
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of non-aggression t re a t ie s  between the Indochinese and ASEAN states
and discussions on the establ ishment of a regional zone of 'peace and 
21s t a b i l i t y 1. Later in 1980, Hanoi suggested ta lks with ASEAN based 
on the July 1980 proposals, the March 1980 Indonesian and Malaysian 
'Kuantan d e c la ra t io n '22 and ZOPFAN.22
Other Vietnamese po l ic ie s  were apparently intended more 
s p e c i f i c a l l y  to c u l t i v a te  a special re la t ionship  with Jakarta and 
Kuala Lumpur. Thus, when Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach 
v is i ted  Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta in mid-1980 he hinted that 
Indonesian and Malaysian observers might be allowed to monitor the 
Thai-Cambodian border s i tu a t io n  or perhaps witness the forthcoming 
Cambodian e lect ions.  Hanoi 's continuing e f fo r ts  to control the 
exodus of 'boat people' were p a r t l y  a response to Malaysian protests . 
While a dispute between Indonesia and Vietnam over maritime boundaries 
remained unresolved, Hanoi showed f l e x i b i l i t y  by renouncing i t s  claim 
to the island of Natuna. Moreover, Hanoi declared that Vietnam and 
Indonesia were 'p lay ing a leading r o le 1 in Southeast As ia ,2  ^
im p l i c i t l y  f l a t t e r i n g  Jakarta by acknowledging i t s  pre-eminenco in 
ASEAN.
21 Statement of the Conference of Foreign Ministers of Laos, 
Kampuchea and Vietnam, Vientiane, 18 July 1980 broadcast by Hanoi 
domestic service in Vietnamese, 1430 gmt, 18 July 1980 (FBIS-APA- 
80-141, 21 July 1980).
22 See section on 'Indonesian and Malaysian Pol icy on Cambodia' in 
Chapter 10, pp. 448-49 below.
23 Nayan Chanda, FEER, 3 October 1980, p. 16.
24 Nayan Chanda, FEER, 23 May 1980, pp. 16-7.
25 Peter Rodgers, FEER, 27 June 1980, pp. 10-1.
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Despite Indonesian and Malaysian d issa t is fac t ion  with ASEAN's 
Cambodian po l icy ,  th e i r  in te res t  in maintaining the Associat ion's 
cohesion prevented them from braking ranks with th e i r  partners. 
Nevertheless, Vietnam's diplomatic i n i t i a t i v e s  helped to maintain 
Indonesian and Malaysian in te res t  in a continuing dialogue with Hanoi 
and put pressure on ASEAN to take i n i t i a t i v e s  i t s e l f  on Cambodia in 
order to maintain ASEAN's un i ty  (as well as in te rnational  backing fo r
p c
Democratic Kampuchea).
But ASEAN's major i n i t i a t i v e ,  the International  Conference on
Kampuchea (ICK) served to h igh l igh t  rather than narrow the fundamental
dif ferences between the Vietnamese and ASEAN outlooks on the Cambodian
issue. The Vietnamese ins isted that the Cambodian issue was a
'regional problem', and in January 1981 the Indochinese foreign
ministers had proposed a regional conference to discuss 'problems of
27peace and secur i ty '  in Southeast Asia. Hanoi's idea seems to have 
been that such a regional conference might be used to neutra l ize 
ASEAN's support fo r  the Cambodian resistance, to gain ASEAN 
recognit ion of the pro-Vietnamese Heng Samrin regime, and to lay the 
foundations fo r  a Southeast Asian 'united f ro n t '  inc luding both the 
Indochinese and the ASEAN states against China, in exchange fo r  a 
pa r t ia l  Vietnamese m i l i t a r y  withdrawal from Cambodia and discussions 
on ZOPFAN. Contrast ingly , ASEAN's proposed ICK was c lea r ly  aimed at
26 See Chapter 10, pp. 442-50 and 457-64 below.
27 Statement of Indochinese Foreign Min is ters '  Conference on Peace, 
S ta b i l i t y ,  Friendship and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, Hanoi, 
28 January 1981, Vietnam News B u l le t in ,  No. 02/81 (15 February 
1981), p. 8.
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breaking the Heng Samrin regime's monopoly of power in Phnom Penh and 
securing a tota l  Vietnamese mi l i ta ry  withdrawal.
oo
Although Hanoi boycotted the ICK in July 1981, the Vietnamese
took a close i n te r es t  in i t s  proceedings. But while Hanoi
acknowledged the difference between the ASEAN and Chinese posi t ions
and ASEAN's e f fo r t s  to take into account Vietnam's securi ty concerns,
the Vietnamese saw the ICK's resolut ions as fur ther  evidence that
ASEAN was colluding with China and the United States to in te r fere  in 
29Indochina.
Neither the ICK nor the i ns t i t u t ion  of a Cambodian res is tance
coal i t ion (including Prince Sihanouk's and Son Sann's forces as well
as the Khmer Rouge) quelled doubts within ASEAN over the Associat ion's
Cambodian pol ic i es .  This was an important incentive for Hanoi to
continue s t ress ing i t s  own al t ernat ives  to the prolongation of the
Cambodian stalemate.  As long as Hanoi's principal  foreign policy
objectives remained survival in the face of the 'Chinese t hr ea t '  and
30the consolidation of Indochina into an a l l iance s t ructure ,  and there 
remained important elements in ASEAN's governments which were chary of 
s t ra tegic  cooperation with China, i t  remained unlikely that  Hanoi
28 Nayan Chanda and Michael Richardson, FEER, 17 July 1981, pp. 
13-4; Nayan Chanda, FEER, 24 July 1981, pp. 13-5.
29 T. Long, FEER, 31 July 1981, p. 12. For an analysis of the ICK, 
see Chapter 10, pp. 461-63 below.
30 Thayer, 'Three Revolutionary C u r r e n t s . . . ' ,  p. 29.
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would abandon i ts policy of seeking a rapprochement, on its own terms,
31with non-communist Southeast Asia.
Laotian P o l i c i e s  Towards the ASEAN States
For the communist regimes in Vientiane and Phnom Penh, like their 
anti-communist predecessors, relations with Thailand were from the 
beginning necessarily an important foreign policy priori ty.  Laos and 
Cambodia both shared long land borders and common cultural
characteristics with Thailand, so although their principal external 
concerns were with their main socialist  al l ies and adversaries (China, 
Vietnam and the USSR) their relationships with Bangkok were also of 
substantial importance.
Vientiane's main foreign policy priori ty was to obtain
reconstruction assistance from other socialist  states,  but for several 
important reasons i t  could not ignore its relations with Thailand. 
Although the upland tribal peoples of Laos (such as the Hmong) were 
ethnically dist inct  from Thais, the lowland Lao were culturally and 
linguist ically very closely related to the population of northeast 
Thailand. During the twentieth century, this ethnic closeness
31 Thus Hanoi continued to stress the possible benefits for the 
ASEAN states of greater cooperation with Indochina. See, for 
example, 'Principles governing the relations of peaceful 
coexistence between the two groups of Indochina and Asian (sic) 
countries for a Southern Asia of peace, s tabi l i ty,  friendship and 
cooperation1 (Document made public by the Delegation of the 
Democratic People's Republic of Laos at the 36th session of the 
General Assembly of the United nations, on behalf of the three 
Indochinese countries, 28 September 1981), Vietnam News Bulletin, 
No. 08/81 (16 October 1981).
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produced both Thai irredentism in relation to Laos and Laotian
32irredentism aimed at northeast Thailand. Historically, Laos had
been dependent on Thailand for its access to the sea: even in 1975,
virtually all Laotian trade was through Thai ports. With the
communist takeover in 1975, mutual suspicion between Thailand and
Laos, and Laotian economic dependence on Thailand were overlaid by
the additional factor of ideological confrontation.
During the Second Indochina War, Thailand had acted as a base for
not only most of the United States' massive air attacks on Laos but
also for large-scale intervention in Laos by anti-communist Laotian
forces and Thai 'volunteers'. In the aftermath of their takeover in
Vientiane, the Pathet Lao were not surprisingly extremely sensitive to
the possibility that Thailand might still pose a security threat.
Although the Pathet Lao leadership recognized that there were
important differences between the military dictatorship which ruled
Thailand before October 1973 and the democratic government in power in
1975, it still had grounds for suspicion even without the realization
of its greatest fear with regard to Thailand -- the restoration of
33right-wing military rule in Bangkok. From Vientiane's viewpoint,
32 During World War Two, Thailand seized "historically Thai" lands 
in Laos (as well as in Cambodia, Burma and Malaya). See J.L.S. 
Girling, Thailand: Society and Politics (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1981), p. 107. On Lao irredentism towards 
northeast Thailand, see C.J. Christie, "Nationalism and the 
Pathet Lao" and Justus M. van der Kroef, "Laos and Thailand: The
Balancing of Conflict and Accommodation", in Martin Stuart-Fox 
(ed.), Contemporary Laos (St. Lucia: University of Queensland
Press, 1982), pp. 64-65, 287-88.
33 See T.D. Allman, Bangkok P o s t , 23 September 1975.
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Laos was threatened by the continuing (though diminishing) American 
m i l i t a r y  presence in Thai land, by Thai use of the Mekong r iv e r  (which 
formed a large part  of the border between the two countr ies) fo r  
m i l i t a r y  a c t i v i t i e s ,  by Thai land's provision of refuge fo r  many 
Laotian r i g h t i s t  leaders and by Thai provincia l m i l i t a r y  commanders'
col lus ion with these ant i-Pathet Lao exi les to promote resistance
34across the Mekong.
The Thai au tho r i t ies  (p a r t i c u la r ly  at the local level in the 
northeast) had th e i r  own fears , especial ly in terms of the possible
impact on the Thai communists' insurgency of the rapid s h i f t  to the
35Left in Vientiane. But Thai behaviour did l i t t l e  to reduce tension
or assuage the Pathet Lao's paranoia. By July 1975 Vientiane had
forced the Thais to close th e i r  three consulates in Laos (which the
Pathet Lao believed were being used fo r  espionage and gun-running) and
in August two Thai m i l i t a r y  attaches were arrested on espionage
charges. As the Pathet Lao tightened i t s  hold on power in
Vientiane, the Thais became increasingly nervous: exchanges of f i r e
across the Mekong began in July, and in November Bangkok closed the
37border a f te r  a p a r t i c u la r l y  serious inc ident.  Thailand's economic 
blockade of Laos not only heightened Vient iane's dependence on Vietnam
34 Martin Stuart-Fox, 'National Defence and Internal Securi ty in 
Laos', in Stuart-Fox (ed.) ,  pp. 222-23.
35 See section on "Vietnam, Laos and the Communist Party of 
Thai land, 1975-78" in Chapter 6, pp. 194-211 below.
36 Bangkok Post, 7 August 1975; Norman Peagam, FEER, 22 August 1975, 
pp. 12-3.
37 Denzil Pe ir is ,  FEER, 28 November 1975, p. 17.
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and the USSR, but may also have hastened the f i n a l  stage in the
38consol idation of the Pathet Lao takeover in December 1975.
Bangkok reopened two border crossings in January 1976 and the
f in a l  US m i l i t a r y  withdrawal from Thailand, coupled with the
determination of the Thai government led by Seni Pramoj to ease
tensions with Indochina, made a l imi ted Thai-Laotian detente possible 
3Qby August 1976. But the October 1976 coup, a f te r  which the Thai
m i l i t a r y  ins ta l le d  the extreme right-wing Thanin regime in power,
real ized the Pathet Lao's worst fears. The new Thai government's
attempts to revive Thai land's a l l iance with the United States, to
bols ter ASEAN s o l id a r i t y  against the Indochinese states and to
escalate support fo r  the Laotian r ight-wing resistance made any
fu r the r  rapprochement in feas ib le  from Vientiane's viewpoint. The
Pathet Lao in te ns i f ied  th e i r  denunciations, not only of Thai-American
col lus ion with Laotian ' reac t ionar ies '  but also of ASEAN as a
threatening, a n t i - s o c ia l i s t  m i l i t a r y  bloc aimed at Indochina. Indeed,
presumably because of i t s  proximity to Thai land, Vientiane's
condemnation of ASEAN - -  ' the adopted ch i ld  of SEATO' - -  was even
40tougher than Hanoi' s.
Because of Thai support fo r  Lao insurgents, Vientiane saw
38 MacAlister Brown and Joseph J. Zas lo f f ,  "Laos in 1975: People's
Democratic Revolution - -  Lao Sty le" , Asian Survey, Vol. 16, No. 2 
(February 1976), p. 199.
39 John Everingham, FEER, 13 August 1976, pp. 20-1; Harvey Stockwin, 
FEER, 20 August 1976, p. 11.
40 Nayan Chanda, FEER, 15 Apr i l  1977, pp. 15-8.
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41Thailand as the main external securi ty  threat a l l  through 1977. But
by early 1978, a combination of factors had led Vientiane to al ign
42Laos with Vietnam against China and Cambodia, with the resu l t  that
the Pathet Lao's outlook on Thailand and ASEAN changed ra d ic a l l y .
Like Hanoi, Vientiane came to see non-communist Southeast Asia as an
important s t ra teg ic  counterweight to China. Vientiane was slower than
Hanoi to a l te r  i t s  view of ASEAN, but by la te 1978 the Laotians were
echoing the Vietnamese l ine  that ASEAN had changed and genuinely
wanted to i n s t i t u t e  a regional zone of peace.^
General Kriangsak's outster  of the Thanin regime in October 1977
had opened the way fo r  a rev iva l of Bangkok's e f fo r ts  at detente with
Indochina and thus f a c i l i t a t e d  a new rapprochement between Thailand
and Laos. In March 1978 Lao Foreign Min ister Phoune Sipraseuth
v is i ted  Bangkok, and as Vietnamese troops ro l led  across Cambodia in
January 1979, Thai Prime Min iste r Kriangsak was in Vientiane promising
44to help turn the Mekong in to  a ' r i v e r  of peace and f r ie n d sh ip ' .  The 
fac t  that both Laos and Thailand had much to gain i f  th is  amelioration 
of re la t ions continued was emphasized when the v i s i t  of Laotian Prime 
Minister Kaysone to Bangkok in Apr i l  1979 resulted in a j o i n t  
communique announcing that both sides would cooperate to prevent the
41 Stuart-Fox, pp. 234-35.
42 See Martin Stuart-Fox, "Laos: the Vietnamese Connection",
Southeast Asian A f fa i rs  1980, pp. 191-209.
43 Asia Yearbook 1979, p. 229.
44 Joint communique signed by Kriangsak and Laotian premier Kaysone 
Phomvihan, Hanoi KPL in Engl ish, 0900 gmt, 8 January 1978 (FBIS- 
APA-79-005, 8 January 1979).
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activi t ies of insurgents using border areas as their sanctuary.^ In 
other words, the withdrawal of Laotian support for the guerilla war in 
the Thai northeast (which had however diminished greatly following 
Vientiane's breach wth Beijing) would be reciprocated by the 
withholding of Thai assistance for the Laotian right-wingers exiled in 
Thailand (including the turning back of refugees trying to flee to 
Thailand). Until the ouster of Kriangsak in March 1980, Bangkok and 
Vientiane were able to maintain a working relationship, including 
mutually beneficial economic t ies,  despite the tension between Vietnam 
and Thailand.
The replacement of Kriangsak by the less flexible Prem resulted 
in a much tougher Thai attitude towards not only the Cambodian issue, 
but also relations with Laos. By mid-1980, there was evidence that 
Sino-Thai collusion to support resistance against the Vietnamese 
presence in Cambodia had been extended to include coordinated backing 
for anti-Pathet Lao groups operating from southern China and northern 
and northeast Thailand.^ From Vientiane's viewpoint, a series of 
incidents on the Mekong leading to the Thai closure of the border in 
July 1980 proved that Laos was threatened by a growing alliance 
between China and Thailand against Indochina. After attempts at 
negotiation failed,  Vientiane threatened that if Thailand did not 
behave as a good neighbour, then Laos would be forced to reactivate
45 Bangkok domestic service in Thai, 1300 gmt, 4 April 1979 (FBIS- 
APA-79-067, 5 April 1979).
46 Stuart-Fox, "National Defence and Internal Security . . . " ,  pp. 
238-39.
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i t s  support fo r  Thai anti-government groups: in early August
Vientiane radio broadcast a statement by the 'Democratic Al l iance of 
Thai land' (apparently a pro-Hanoi sp l in te r  of the Communist Party of 
Thailand) attacking the Thai reg ime.^
Although elements of compromise were s t i l l  discern ib le in the 
Thai-Laotian re la t ionsh ip  in early 1981,^  i t  was clear that Thai 
pressure on Laos through sporadic economic blockade and support fo r  
the anti-Pathet Lao resistance was forc ing Laos into ever greater 
dependence on Vietnam and the USSR. As long as Bangkok remained 
c losely aligned with China, there seemed l i t t l e  p o s s ib i l i t y  that 
Vientiane would downgrade i t s  perceptions of Thailand as a serious 
securi ty  th rea t .
Long shared borders and Laotian economic dependency ensured an
intense, i f  u l t im a te ly  disharmonious, re la t ionsh ip  between Vientiane
and Bangkok. But landlocked Laos had l i t t l e  reason to be concerned
about i t s  re la t ionships with the other ASEAN cap i ta ls .  Although
Vientiane maintained diplomatic contacts with a l l  the ASEAN states and
occasional ly appeared to be taking the i n i t i a t i v e  in maintaining an
49Indochina-ASEAN dialogue, the substance of Laotian foreign po l icy  in
47 Vientiane domestic service in Lao, 0000 gmt, 5 August 1980 
(FBIS-APA-80-152, 5 August 1980.
48 For example, a f te r  Bangkok had closed the border again in January
1981 the Thai Deputy Foreign Min is ter claimed that he and the 
Laotian ambassador had agreed that the border tension was a 
re f le c t io n  of the 'uneasy s i tua t ion  in the region' ( that is ,
rather than of fundamental dif ferences between Laos and
Thailand). Vientiane emphasized that Bei j ing was to blame fo r  
Thai-Laotian tension. John McBeth, FEER, 13 February 1981, p. 6.
49 As when Foreign Minister Phoune Sipraseuth v is i ted  ASEAN Foreign
M in is t r ies  before the ICK in 1981. Joseph J. Zaslof f  and
MacAlister Brown, 'Laos: Coping with Confinement', Southeast
Asian A f fa i r s  1982, p. 227.
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th is  sphere was in r e a l i t y  s t r i c t l y  subordinated to Hanoi's 
p r i o r i t i e s .
Cambodian Po lic ies  Towards the ASEAN States
Foreign re la t ion s ,  p a r t i c u la r ly  with non-communist countr ies,
were a less important concern for  autarkic Democratic Kampuchea than
they were fo r  Vietnam and Laos. But although the Khmer Rouge's
p r i o r i t y  a f te r  the f a l l  of Phnom Penh was the consol idation of a
ra d ica l ly  new social and economic order, foreign pol icy was not
neglected. The Khmer Rouge's pr inc ipal  foreign po l icy aim, even in
1975, was to protect Democratic Kampuchea's independence from
Vietnamese encroachment. To th is  end, the Cambodian communists strove
not only fo r  good re la t ions  with China, but also fo r  a harmonious
50working re la t ionsh ip  with Bangkok. Thailand was also a proximate 
source of raw materials needed by even Democratic Kampuchea. But 
although Thai-Cambodian re la t ions were normalized and cross-border 
trade re-establ ished by November 1975, armed clashes between Khmer 
Rouge and Thai forces continued.
The nature of Thai-Cambodian re la t ions  at the end of 1975 and 
during 1976 may be explained by several fac tors .  Although the 
Cambodians had an in terest  in maintaining reasonably amicable 
re la t ions with Bangkok, the formal reconc i l ia t ion  between the two 
countries owed much to Chinese encouragement as part of Be i j ing 's  
attempts to cement i t s  l inks  with both Cambodia and the ASEAN
50 Peter A. Poole, 'Cambodia 1975: The GRUNK Regime', in Asian
Survey, Vol. 16, No. 1 (January 1976), p. 28.
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countr ies.  Despite th e i r  overt wi l l ingness to pursue better
re la t ion s ,  deep mutual suspicions remained between Bangkok and Phnom
Penh. Apart from the Khmer Rouge's memories of Thai land's ro le in
supporting the anti-communist war e f f o r t  in Cambodia during the Second
Indochina War, groups of Cambodian exiles continued to operate in to
Cambodia from Thailand, apparently with the com p l ic i t ly  of the Thai 
51army. The border clashes might also have been due to the
independent a c t i v i t i e s  of local m i l i t a r y  commanders on both sides. In 
some areas, disagreement over the precise location of the border 
complicated the s i tua t ion .
Nevertheless, during 1976 Phnom Penh continued to support the
f r a g i l e  working arrangement which i t  had evolved with Bangkok. But
the accession of Thanin in October 1976 exacerbated the Khmer Rouge's
s e n s i t i v i t y  regarding border issues. Phnom Penh, unl ike Hanoi and
Vientiane, did not denounce the new Thai regime, ind ica t ing a wish to
maintain some s t a b i l i t y  in the re la t ionship  i f  possible. But clashes
on the Thai-Cambdian border became frequent and intense in 1977, as
the Khmer Rouge attempted to seal the border to prevent internal
dissidents from l ink ing  up with Khmer Serei (Free Khmer) resistance
52groups based in Thailand.
The escalat ion of Cambodia's c o n f l i c t  with Vietnam in 1977 
inspired the Khmer Rouge to attempt to win the support, or at least 
n e u t ra l i t y ,  of the non-communist regional states in th is  in t ra -
51 See section on 'The Khmer Rouge and the CPT, 1975-78' in Chapter 
6, pp. 213-14 below.
52 Ib id . ,  pp. 214-15.
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communist s truggle. Although i t  seemed un l ike ly  that Cambodia would
be able to improve i t s  re la t ionsh ip  with Thailand while Thanin
remained in power, the other ASEAN countries appeared to o f fe r
opportunit ies fo r  Cambodian diplomacy. The Khmer Rouge had
establ ished diplomat ic re la t ions  with Malaysia, the Phi l ippines and
Singapore in 1976, and unl ike the Vietnamese and Laotians had
refrained from c r i t i c i z i n g  ZOPFAN at the August 1976 non-aligned
summit in Colombo. Now Cambodia moved to break out of i t s  re la t ive
diplomatic iso la t io n :  in March 1977 Foreign Minister Ieng Sary
v is i ted  Malaysia and Singapore. Sary propounded Democratic
Kampuchea's po l ic ies  of 'non- in terference' and ' t o t a l  independence':
th is  was an assurance that Cambodia had no in te rest  in jo in ing  an
53Indochinese bloc dominated by Hanoi.
The only s ig n i f ic a n t  Cambodian dispute with an ASEAN state other
than Thailand in the 1975-77 period had been with Indonesia over the
54invasion of East Timor. The Khmer Rouge's a t t i tude  to the Timor 
question was doubtless influenced to a large extent by ideological 
sympathy with the FRETILIN revolut ionary movement, but perhaps also by 
an antipathy towards the Suharto regime engendered by both Jakarta's 
close re la t ionsh ip  with the Lon Nol government in Phnom Penh before 
the Cambodia communists' v ic to ry  and the estrangement between 
Indonesia and China, Cambodia's a l l y .  Nevertheless, Phnom Penh's
53 Singapore domestic service in Engl ish, 1130 gmt, 24 March 1977 
(FBIS-APA-77-57 , 24 March 1977); Kuala Lumpur domestic service in 
Engl ish, 1130 gmt, 26 March 1977 (FBIS-APA-77-59, 28 March 1977).
54 Kenneth M. Quinn, 'Cambodia 1976: Internal Consol idation and
External Expansion', Asian Survey, V o l . 17, No. 1 (January 1977), 
p. 48.
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newly pos i t ive a t t i tu d e  towards the ASEAN region allowed the 
normalization of re la t ions  with Jakarta in August 1978.
Kriangsak's removal of the Thanin regime in October 1977
f a c i l i t a t e d  a renewed Thai-Cambodian dialogue, again encouraged by
China: in 1978 Thai Foreign Minister Upadit Pachariangkul and Ieng
55Sary exchanged v i s i t s .  Perhaps par t ly  as a resu l t  of Sary's v i s i t  
in July, the frequency and severi ty  of attacks from across the border 
in to  Thailand decl ined in la te  1978.
The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and the in s ta l la t io n  of the 
Heng Samrin regime transformed the re la t ionsh ip  between the ASEAN
states and Phnom Penh. Whereas the Thais and the Khmer Rouge had 
demonstrated (except during Thanin's year in o f f ice )  a notable a b i l i t y  
to maintain cor rect ,  i f  not amicable, re la t ions  despite more or less 
constant problems on th e i r  mutual border, Bangkok's implacably host i le  
a t t i tude  towards the usurper regime in Phnom Penh precluded a 
continuing working re la t ionsh ip  between the two countries.
Essent ia l ly ,  the Thais saw the Heng Samrin administrat ion as an 
i l l e g a l l y  ins ta l le d  Vietnamese puppet, recognit ion of which would 
leg i t im ize  Hanoi's aggression against a neighbour which had
h i s to r i c a l l y  provided a buffer against Vietnamese inf luence. Bangkok, 
l i k e  the other ASEAN cap i ta ls ,  continued to recognize only the ousted 
Democratic Kampuchea regime. Of more immediate concern to the new
Cambodian government was ASEAN's connivance with Bei j ing in supporting
55 Richard Nations, FEER, 4 November 1977, p. 14; 10 February 1978, 
pp. 10-1; and 28 July 1978, pp. 11-2.
56 John McBeth, FEER, 8 June 1979, p. 20.
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the Khmer Rouge. Thailand became a haven fo r  the Khmer Rouge: not 
only were they allowed to receive Chinese lo g is t ic a l  support and to 
launch m i l i t a r y  operations in to  Cambodia from Thai s o i l ,  but they were 
also permitted to maintain th e i r  control over a large proportion of 
the Cambodian refugees who had agglomerated on the border.
After  the Khmer Rouge were ousted by the Vietnamese invasion at 
the end of 1978, a central object ive of the Heng Samrin regime's 
foreign po l icy  was to engage Bangkok in negot iat ions, in the hope of 
securing not only Thai agreement to desist from aiding the Khmer Rouge 
but also, by the very fac t  of such contacts taking place, de facto 
recogni t ion of the PRK by the key ASEAN member. But Bangkok was well 
aware of the impl icat ions of d i rec t  ta lks with Phnom Penh and refused 
to cooperate, adhering to ASEAN's l ine  of supporting UN General 
Assembly Resolution 34/22 which cal led fo r  an in te rnational  conference 
on the problem as a prelude to a Vietnamese withdrawal and free 
elect ions in Cambodia. Although ASEAN, in keeping with i t s  growing 
emphasis on pursuing a p o l i t i c a l  solut ion to the problem, made an 
attempt to bring Phnom Penh (through the ru l in g  People's Revolutionary 
Party) in to  the July 1981 International Conference on Kampuchea, 
Chinese pressure ensured that the regime was not inv i ted .  In the view 
of the Heng Samrin regime, ASEAN was s t i l l  acting in col lusion with 
Bei j ing and Washington in th e i r  attempts to reverse an ' i r r e v e rs ib le '  
s i tua t ion  in Cambodia.
Implicat ions fo r  the ASEAN States
The Indochinese states' po l ic ies  towards non-communist Southeast
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Asia influenced the ASEAN states'  security perceptions in several
important senses. Most importantly, Hanoi's frequent declarations of
host i l i ty towards ASEAN and its members in the 1975-77 period,
deriving from both its ideology and its experience of the ASEAN
governments' support for the recent US war effort in Indochina,
reinforced fears in non-communist Southeast Asia that a victorious,
united, communist Vietnam would pose a security threat to the region,
57particularly by lending i ts support to local communist insurgents.
58The close relationship between Hanoi and Vientiane, coupled with 
evidence of Laotian support for the Thai communist insurgents, 
accentuated this concern and encouraged elements in the Thai military 
and government to continue supporting anti-Pathet Lao activity by 
right-wing Laotian exile groups. In contrast, Democratic Kampuchea's 
antipathy towards Vietnam faci l i tated the establishment of a working 
relationship between Phnom Penh and Bangkok, despite continuing mutual 
suspicion and border clashes.
Hanoi's wish to establish Vietnam as an autonomous international 
actor, coupled with an emphasis on the primacy of economic objectives,
57 See section on "Vietnam: A Revolutionary Mainspring?" in Chapter
6, pp. 191-94 below.
58 Although the Pathet Lao did not openly side with Vietnam against
Beijing until February 1979, Vientiane and Hanoi had signed a 
twenty-five year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation as early as 
July 1977. This Treaty was intended to improve links in a broad 
range of fields and included provision for Vietnam to defend Laos 
mil i tari ly.  See Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the Lao People's Democratic 
Republic, 18 July 1977, reprinted as appendix to Joint Committee 
on Foreign Affairs and Defence, Parliament of the Commonwealth of 
Australia, Power in Indochina Since 1975 (Canberra: Australian
Government Publishing Service, 1981), pp. 124-26. Vietnam had 
continued to station 35-40,000 troops in Laos after the Second 
Indochina War. The Military Balance 1976-1977 (London:
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1976), p. 61.
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engendered an increasingly pos i t ive Vietnamese a t t i tude  towards the
ASEAN states in 1976-77. With the outbreak of c o n f l i c t  with Cambodia
and China in 1978, Hanoi and Vientiane had an addit ional reason fo r
seeking a rapprochement with Thailand and the rest of ASEAN. But
these developments were not altogether reassuring for non-communist
Southeast Asia. While the establishment of a diplomatic and economic
modus vivendi with  Hanoi was welcome in the short-term, the prospect
of an economically strong (as well as m i l i t a r i l y  powerful) Vietnam was
worrying to some observers in the ASEAN region, p a r t i c u la r l y  as i t
might be seen by d issa t is f ied  elements in non-communist Southeast Asia
as a v ind ica t ion  of a socioeconomic model d iametr ica l ly  opposed to
59that preferred by the ASEAN governments. Moreover, normalized 
re la t ions  between Hanoi and Washington might imply a s h i f t  in 
America's regional economic in terests  away from non-communist 
Southeast Asia. Although the new wil l ingness in 1978 of the 
Vietnamese and Laotians to cooperate with the ASEAN states yielded 
tangible benef i ts  for  Thailand ( in  the form of the Laotian agreement 
to cease supporting the Thai communists), the non-communist countries 
of the region general ly remained suspicious of the motives behind th is  
con c i l ia to ry  posture.
I t  is conceivable that i f  Vietnam had not u l t ima te ly  invaded and 
occupied Cambodia, the ASEAN governments might have been s u f f i c ie n t l y  
reassured by Hanoi's conc i l ia to ry  gestures in the 1977-78 period, 
inc luding acceptance of ASEAN as an economic grouping (rather than a 
hos t i le  m i l i t a r y  bloc),  gradual accommodation of the ZOPFAN proposal,
59 See Chapter 4, pp. 122-28 below.
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and abandonment of ' f r a te r n a l '  l inks  with local revolut ionary 
movements, to reassess fundamentally the i r  securi ty  concerns in 
re la t ion  to Indochina. These Vietnamese concessions may have 
reinforced Indonesian and, to a lesser extent, Malaysian prejudices in 
favour of rapprochement with Hanoi, but the invasion of Cambodia 
evinced such l i t t l e  concern for  ASEAN (and p a r t i c u la r ly  Thai) 
s e n s i t i v i t ie s  that Jakarta had Kuala Lumpur had l i t t l e  hes i ta t ion in 
jo in ing  th e i r  ASEAN partners in confronting Vietnam over the issue.
Hanoi's p r i o r i t y  was to remove that i t  saw as the threat from 
China's c l i e n t ,  the Democratic Kampuchea regime, but in breaking out 
of one r ing  of perceived stra teg ic  encirclement the Vietnamese 
al ienated the ASEAN governments (as well as aggravating already poor 
re la t ions with Bei j ing and Washington) to the extent of e f fe c t iv e ly  
construct ing another, broader, although perhaps less immediately 
threatening, r ing .  But although the Vietnamese were unable to divide 
ASEAN over the Cambodian issue, Hanoi's continuing po l icy of fos ter ing 
special re la t ionships with Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur in d i re c t l y  
contr ibuted to pressure w i th in ASEAN to search for  possible compromise 
so lu t ions .
I f  the re la t ionsh ip  between Bangkok and the Khmer Rouge had been 
as host i le  as that between Vietnam and Democratic Kampuchea in the 
1977-78 phase, i t  is possible that the Thais would have been less 
w i l l i n g  to lend th e i r  support to Pol Pot 's resistance forces a f te r  the 
Vietnamese invasion. Although the Khmer Rouge' strategy of minimizing 
the p o s s ib i l i t y  of a war on two f ronts  (by c u l t i v a t in g  a working 
re la t ionship  with Bangkok) u l t im a te ly  fa i le d  to prevent the Vietnamese 
from overrunning Cambodia, i t  almost ce r ta in ly  f a c i l i t a t e d  Bangkok's 
decision to back the Cambodian resistance from early 1979.
CHAPTER 3
THE INFLUENCE OF THE MAJOR EXTRA-REGIONAL POWERS ON THE ASEAN STATES' SECURITY CONCERNS WITH INDOCHINA
Southeast Asia was not, in the 1975-81 period, as important a 
priority for the major powers, and particularly the two superpowers, 
as it had been in the previous decade. Nevertheless, the United 
States (with its allies Japan and Australia), China and the Soviet 
Union retained important military, political and economic interests in 
the region after the end of the Second Indochina War in 1975. 
Moreover, the outbreak of the Third Indochina War, and especially the 
conflict over Cambodia, once again boosted the importance of Southeast 
Asia for these powers as they coupled the local conflict to their 
overall strategic perspective.^ So involvement by the major extra- 
regional powers provided a constant backdrop to the ASEAN states' 
perceptions of Indochina as a security concern.
The ASEAN States and the United States
The 'Nixon doctrine', which was first enunciated in 1969 and 
signalled the beginning of American withdrawal from military 
involvement in Indochina, provided the framework for US policy in 
Southeast Asia in the 1970s. Although American strategic and economic
1 See Michael Leiter, Conflict and Regional Order in Southeast Asia 
(London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adel phi
Paper 162, 1980, p. 13.
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in te rests  in Southeast Asia remained substantial ,  the 'Nixon doc tr ine1 
placed the United States' po l icy  towards the region in a more balanced 
perspective a f te r  the excesses of America's Indochinese involvement: 
Washington's real in te res t  was not in Southeast Asia fo r  i t s  own sake, 
but in the reg ion 's  place in the wider Asian and global balances of 
power. Washington remained committed to avert the domination of 
Southeast Asia by China or the Soviet Union, but regional countries 
would have to re ly  p r in c ip a l l y  on the i r  own resources for  the i r
secur i ty .^
The 'Nixon d o c t r in e ' ,  coupled with Washington's detente with
Moscow and more p a r t i c u la r l y  with Bei j ing, had a profound impact on
the ASEAN states ' foreign po l ic ies .  But although the ASEAN
governments increasingly questioned Washington's r e l i a b i l i t y  as an
a l l y  (especia l ly  a f te r  the January 1973 Paris peace agreement which
f ina l ized  the withdrawal of US forces from South Vietnam, the
3
Congressional War Powers Act of the same year, and the 1975 communist 
v ic to r ies )  and simultaneously moved towards improved re la t ions with 
the Indochinese and extra-regional communist powers, they wished to 
re ta in close p o l i t i c a l ,  economic and (more hes i tan t ly )  securi ty
2 See supplement to Bangkok Post, 26 July 1968.
3 The War Powers Act was 'an attempt, via le g is la t io n ,  to control
the a b i l i t y  of the President u n i la te ra l l y  to introduce American 
armed forces in to  s i tua t ions of imminent or actual h o s t i l i t i e s ,  
into the t e r r i t o r y ,  a i r  space or waters of a fore ign nation while 
equipped fo r  combat, or in numbers which "subs tan t ia l ly  enlarge" 
American forces located in a foreign state and equipped fo r  
combat in the absence of a declaration of war or speci f ic  
congressional au tho r iza t ion ' .  Richard Haass, Congressional 
Power: Implicat ions fo r  American Security Pol icy (London:
International In s t i t u te  fo r  Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper 153, 
1979), p. 19.
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re la t ionships with Washington. Thailand and the Phi l ipp ines remained
formal a l l i e s  of the United States, even after the d isso lu t ion of
SEATO in June 1977, through the Manila Pact and b i la te ra l  agreements.
A substantial  American m i l i t a r y  presence remained in the Phi l ippines.
Malaysia and Singapore were l inked to the Western a l l iance system
through the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) with Austra l ia ,  New
Zealand and B r i t a in .  Indonesia, l i k e  Thailand and the Phi l ippines,
received US m i l i t a r y  assistance and a l l  the ASEAN countries were
important customers fo r  US Foreign M i l i t a r y  Sales (FMS).^
ASEAN's long-term goal fo r  regional secur i ty  ostensib ly remained
ZOPFAN. But in the absence of any s ig n i f ica n t  support fo r  th is
id e a l i s t i c  concept e i ther  w i th in or outside the region, the ASEAN
governments general ly supported the idea of a 'balanced great power
5
presence' (rather than regional domination by one major power). But 
in the mid-1970s, China continued to possess a considerable potential  
fo r  influence in the region through local communist part ies and ethnic 
Chinese communities, Soviet influence in the region had increased with 
the Indochinese communist v ic to r ie s ,  and Japan's considerable economic 
ro le in the region was growing apace. Despite a declaratory emphasis, 
p a r t i c u la r ly  in 1975-76, on bui ld ing national and regional
4 Data Management D iv is ion, Comptroller, Defense Security
Assistance Agency, Foreign M i l i t a r y  Sales and M i l i t a r y  Assistance 
Facts December 1980 (Washington DC: Department of Defense,
T980), pp. 7-8, 35-6.
5 Even President Marcos of the Phi l ippines (which continued to host 
American m i l i t a r y  bases) and the extreme anti-communist Thai 
premier, Thanin Kra iv ichien, agreed in a j o i n t  communique that 
such a 'balanced' presence was desirable. Bangkok Post, 
22 December 1976.
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' resil ience'  and increasing contacts with the communist world, the 
prevailing trend of opinion in the ASEAN governments was that 
continued US interest in Southeast Asia remained essential to maintain 
a stable balance of external influences. In particular the residual 
US military presence in the Philippines was reassuring to the ASEAN 
governments.
Moreover, the ASEAN governments' relationships with Washington 
were of central importance in their efforts to secure their hold on 
domestic polit ical power. The communist victories in Indochina posed 
an implicit ideological challenge to the polit ical and socio-economic 
status quo in the ASEAN states,  some of which were already facing 
serious pol i t ical ,  social and economic problems. In these
circumstances, close relations with Washington were important for 
several reasons. US investment, trade and aid were essential for 
continuing economic growth. A sympathetic American attitude towards 
the ASEAN states '  domestic political situations, particularly in terms 
of the effective rejection of polit ical pluralism by some ASEAN 
regimes, was vital to these governments in their struggle to maintain 
domestic legitimacy. In particular,  US military aid and equipment 
sales were of great assistance not only in counter-insurgency 
(especially in the Philippines and Thailand) but also as a means of 
ensuring military support for the regime in power.
Although all the ASEAN states had important reasons for wanting 
close pol i t ical ,  economic and, to a lesser extent, security relations 
with Washington in the 1975-78 period, there was considerable 
scepticism in the region over the re l iabi l i ty  of American security 
commitments. These doubts became particularly pronounced after the
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Carter administra t ion took o f f i c e . ^  The ASEAN governments were 
concerned by Washington's moves in the d i rec t ion  of normalizing 
re la t ions with Vietnam,^ a reduction in US m i l i t a r y  force levels in 
the Asia-Paci f ic  region ( inc luding the p o s s ib i l i t y  of the withdrawal
o
of US forces from the Ph i l ipp ines) ,  and the l inkage of arms transfers  
to p o l i t i c a l  condit ions and human r igh ts  issues. There were fears 
that Washington's economic, p o l i t i c a l  and m i l i t a r y  support fo r  non­
communist Southeast Asia might decl ine to the extent that the ASEAN 
states would be threatened economically as well as m i l i t a r i l y  by 
Vietnam, and would be at the mercy of an American pol icy of delegating 
re s p o n s ib i l i t y  fo r  regional secur i ty  to China and Japan.
From ear ly  1978 Washington was concerned over the implicat ions 
fo r  i t s  a l l i e s  and associates in Southeast Asia of increasing tension 
between the China-Cambodia axis and Vietnam, Hanoi's ever closer 
re la t ionship  with Moscow (epitomized by Vietnam's membership of 
COMECON from June 1978), and the Indochinese refugee c r i s i s .  These 
regional fac tors  coincided with more overt superpower competition in 
the Third World as a resu l t  of the f a i l u r e  of US-Soviet detente to
6 A secret report by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers to ASEAN's second 
summit meeting in August 1977 al legedly stressed that the US 
would no longer be involved physica l ly  in any ' loca l  c o n f l i c t '  in 
Southeast Asia and that the extent of even the American p o l i t i c a l  
and economic commitment was unclear. Michael Richardson, FEER, 
30 December 1977, p. 8.
7 On the ASEAN states'  fears concerning the possible diversion of 
US development aid to Indochina, see David Jenkins, FEER, 24 June 
1977, pp. 15-6.
8 Henry S. A lb insk i ,  The Austral ian-American Security Relat ionship:
A Regional and International Perspective (St Lucia: Queensland
Univers i ty  Press, 1982), p. 39.
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reach f r u i t i o n ,  and transformed the Carter adminis tra t ion 's  equivocal 
a t t i tude  towards Southeast Asia. The administrat ion f o r c e fu l l y
re iterated i t s  in te res t  in the ASEAN sta tes ' securi ty  several times in
g
1978, and shelved plans fo r  reducing US m i l i t a r y  strength in Asia and 
the P a c i f i c . ^
Washington saw the new Indochina c o n f l i c t ,  and p a r t i c u la r l y  the 
Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia at the end of 1978, as e f fec t ing  a 
sea-change in the securi ty  environment of i t s  ASEAN associates. 
Vietnamese troops faced those of Thailand (a Manila Pact a l l y ) ,  and 
from the time of the Sino-Vietnamese border war in early 1979 the 
Soviets used Vietnamese a i r  and naval f a c i l i t i e s ,  enhancing Moscow's 
capab i l i ty  fo r  power project ion in the region. These developments not 
only coincided with a strengthening Soviet m i l i t a r y  posture elsewhere 
in the East As ia-Paci f ic  sphere ,^  but were soon compounded by US 
concern over developments in the Indian Ocean region, p a r t i c u la r l y  
a f te r  the Iranian revolut ion in early 1979, the seizure of American 
hostages in Teheran in November 1979, the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan the fo l lowing month, and the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war
9 See Vice-President Mondale's comments during his v i s i t s  to 
Bangkok, Manila and Jakarta in Apr i l  and May 1978, and Assistant 
Secretary of State Holbrooke's speech to the Boston World A f fa i rs  
Council in November 1978. 'Mondale sows the seeds', FEER, 19 May 
1978, pp. 11-12 and United States Information Service b u l le t i n ,  
20 November 1978.
10 Stephen Barber, FEER, 5 May 1978, pp. 11-12. Moreover, in August 
1978 the US ambassador to Manila announced that America would 
strengthen i t s  forces in Asia over the next f i v e  years with 
advanced nuclear and other weapons systems. 'The Week', FEER, 
25 August 1978, p. 7.
11 For example, in the Kuri les (north of Japan) and in terms of 
expanding naval deployments in the Pac i f ic .
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in 1980. These developments influenced the Carter administrat ion to
increase i t s  p o l i t i c a l ,  economic and m i l i t a r y  support fo r  ASEAN and
i t s  members, in order not only to bolster the Southeast Asian and
12
wider Asian balances of power, but also to maintain ready access to 
the Indian Ocean by way of the US bases in the Phi l ippines and 
Indonesia's s t ra teg ic  s t r a i t s .
The re v i t a l i z a t io n  of Washington's po l ic ies  towards Southeast
Asia in 1978 was heartening to the ASEAN governments. Clear evidence
of the Carter admin is t ra t ion 's  new commitment to Southeast Asian
securi ty  came in December 1978 - January 1979. The conclusion of a
new agreement between Washington and Manila al lowing a continued US
m i l i t a r y  presence in the Phi l ipp ines was soon fol lowed by a reassuring
US response to the invasion of Cambodia. As well as providing staunch
support fo r  ASEAN's e f f o r t s ,  p a r t i c u la r l y  at the United Nations, to
deny in ternat iona l  legit imacy to the Vietnamese-instal led regime in
Phnom Penh and to secure a Vietnamese m i l i t a r y  withdrawal from
Cambodia, Washington helped to ameliorate the impact of the
13Indochinese refugee f low on ASEAN's members, and increased arms 
transfers aimed at improving the c ap ab i l i t y  of th e i r  armed forces to 
meet conventional threats .  Thai land, in p a r t icu la r ,  benefited from
12 According to Holbrooke, 'US po l ic ies  and actions seek to maintain 
the current equi l ibr ium and not allow any single power to achieve 
a prponderance of influence or m i l i t a r y  super io r i ty  in the 
reg ion ' .  Richard Holbrooke, 'America's New Role in As ia ' ,  
Asiaweek, 7 July 1978, p. 23.
13 Peter A. Poole, 'The United States and Southeast Asia: A New
Theme', Current H is to ry , Vol . 77, Whole No. 452 (December 1979), 
pp. 194-6.
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Washington's new a t t i tu d e :  apart from supportive rh e to r ic ,  the Carter
administrat ion provided Bangkok with substan t ia l ly  increased m i l i t a r y
and economic assistance, and worked to secure greater assistance fo r
14Thailand from the World Bank and International Development Agency.
Bangkok was also permitted to increase i t s  purchases under the FMS
scheme; the US Seventh Fleet increased the frequency of i t s  port ca l ls
to Thailand; and there were reports that former US a i r  bases in
Thailand were being reactivated for  emergency use by USAF B-52 heavy
15bombers, as a deterrent to a major Vietnamese cross-border attack.
As Vietnam's c o n f l i c ts  with China and Cambodia in tens i f ied  in
1978, and more especia l ly  a f te r  the invasion of Cambodia, the other
ASEAN states as well as Thailand made i t  clear that they saw America's
revived stra teg ic  in te res t  in the region as benef ic ia l  to th e i r  own
secur i ty .  Pressure from the other ASEAN governments probably 
influenced the Marcos regime to accept a continuing US m i l i t a r y
presence on terms that were less than e n t i re ly  s a t i s f a c t o r y . ^  Marcos 
himself la te r  claimed:
. . .  i t  appears now that there has been a dramatic 
change in American perceptions of i t s  [ s i c ]  defense
commitments and i t s  ro le  in global a f f a i r s .  In the 
la tes t  acts of the United States government we f ind  a 
f i rm and bel ievable resolve to express concern fo r  i t s  
a l l i e s  in more concrete te rm s .^
14 Helen Chauncey, 'Thai land plays the great power game', Southeast 
Asia Chronic le, No. 69 (January-February 1980), p. 4.
15 Robert Whymant, 'US M i l i t a r y  Quiet ly Returning to Thai land',  
Southeast Asia Chronicle, No. 69 (January-February 1980), pp. 
8-9.
16 Sheldon W. Simon, The ASEAN States and Regional Security
(Stanford: Hoover In s t i t u t io n  Press, 1982), pp. 44-5.
17 President Ferdinand E. Marcos, 'The P i l l a r  of our Nation's 
Strength and Secur ity '  (Speech to Phi l ippine M i l i t a r y  Academy 
graduates, Baguio, 18 February 1980), p. 7.
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There were ind ica t ions that in certa in circumstances Malaysia might be
18w i l l i n g  to cooperate m i l i t a r i l y  with Washington, and from early 1981
Kuala Lumpur allowed the Austral ian a ir  force to s ta t ion maritime
reconnaissance a i r c r a f t  (which in d i re c t ly  provided Washington with
in te l l igence  on Soviet naval a c t i v i t y  in the Indian Ocean) at a 
19Malaysian base. Although the Indonesian regime remained opposed to
any notion of i t s e l f  providing m i l i t a r y  bases or f a c i l i t i e s  fo r  any
extra-regional power, even Jakarta gave a condit ional welcome to
Washington's more assert ive regional role from 1979, p a r t i c u la r l y  in
terms of the expanded US naval presence in the Indian Ocean.
Although other concerns, such as Poland and El Salvador, qu ickly
assumed greater p r i o r i t y  in the new administrat ion 's  foreign pol icy,
under President Reagan Washington consolidated the greater concern fo r
Southeast Asia demonstrated in the second ha l f  of the Carter 
20presidency. As a ' f r o n t - l i n e  state'  Thailand benef i t ted from
Washington's sympathetic approach towards America's a l l i e s  and 
associates facing what the Reagan administrat ion saw as the growing
18 For example, in January 1980 the Malaysian government announced 
that  i t  would construct a massive new a i r  base at Gong Kedak in 
Kelantan. The projected size of the base (apparently fa r  beyond 
the foreseeable requirements of the Royal Malaysian A ir  Force) 
suggested that i t  might have been intended as a forward base for  
US a i r  operations in time of c r i s i s .  See K. Das, FEER, 
18 January 1980, p. 30.
19 Department of Defence, Defence Report 1981 (Canberra: Austral ian
Government Publ ishing Service, 1981), pi 4; Michael Richardson, 
'The Inf luence on the ASEAN Community of Australian-American 
Securi ty Relat ions ',  Austra l ian Outlook, Vol. 38, No. 3 (December 
1984), p. 197.
20 According to Secretary of State Haig, Washington considered 
Southeast Asia as being 'a t  the heart and soul of in ternational  
peace'. Bangkok Post, 5 March 1981.
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janger of Soviet expansionism, which included Moscow's alleged use of
proxies such as Vietnam. Under Reagan, Washington's responses to
Bangkok's requests for assistance were not moderated to the same
extent as under Carter by a wish to keep open the possibili ty of
21improved US-Vietnamese relations.
The Indonesian and Malaysian governments were not so enthusiastic
as their ASEAN partners about the Reagan administration's policy
towards Southeast Asia. Whereas US policy towards the Cambodian
problem generally coincided with China's, Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur
feared the growing polarization in Southeast Asia between a Soviet-
influenced Indochinese bloc and an ASEAN manipulated by China.
Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur displayed considerable independence in their
efforts to find a compromise solution which would recognize Vietnamese
22as well as Thai security interests.  Jakarta's at titude towards
23America's revived regional role was tinged with ambivalence and the 
replacement of Hussein Onn by Mahathir Mohamed as Malaysian premier in
21 For example, in October 1979 Assistant Secretary to State
Holbrooke's attempts to secure a Vietnamese withdrawal from 
Cambodia (which would hopefully also lessen Vietnamese dependence 
on the USSR) in exchange for an improvement in US-Vietnamese
relations brought him into conflict with Thai Prime Minister 
Kriangsak. See Derek Davies' interview with Holbrooke, FEER,
16 November 1979, pp. 14-6. Holbrooke subsequently emphasized 
that Washington had no intention of betraying ASEAN interests in 
attempting to disengage Hanoi from i ts  relationship with Moscow. 
See 'The Indochina Situation: A Continuing Threat to Peace',
Holbrooke's address to the Council on Foreign Relations, 2 April 
1980.
22 See section on 'Indonesian and Malaysian Policy on Cambodia' in 
Chapter 10, pp. 442-50 below.
23 In the words of one observer, ' the Indonesian Government would
prefer the least objectionable superpower to be on tap and not on
71 -
July 1981 appeared to presage policies more independent of
24Washington.
Overall, the ASEAN states' strategic alignment with the United
States, especially after the invasion of Cambodia, exercised a crucial
influence on their  views of Indochina as a security concern. In
part icular, the ASEAN governments' po l i t i ca l ,  economic and mil i tary
links with Washington reinforced their adversary relationship with
Vietnam from 1978. In return for fa l l ing  in l ine with US strategic
p r io r i t ies  in the region, the ASEAN states received a good deal more
from Washington than just firmer guarantees in the unlikely event of
large-scale Vietnamese or Soviet aggression.
Close relations with Washington also provided the ASEAN
governments with an alternative to reliance on China in the face of
25what they perceived as a Soviet-backed threat. But as importantly, 
they secured a wide range of benefits not related to their security
concerns with Indochina. From 1978, Washington not only increased 
substantial ly the economic and mil i tary assistance, so v i ta l  to the 
Thai, Philippines and Indonesian governments for the undermining and
top'.  Michael Leifer, Indonesia's Foreign Policy (London: 
George Allen & Unwin for The Royal Inst itute of International 
Af fa irs ,  1983), p. 178. This ambivalence towards the United 
States' regional role was confirmed by personal interviews with 
staff  at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 
Jakarta, Apri l 1981.
24 For example, the Malaysian government's deferral of plans to
build the Gong Kedak air base in 1982 may have been due as much 
to a desire to distance Malaysia from Washington's mil i tary
involvement in the region as to a wish to contain increases in 
defence expenditure.
25 But at times i t  appeared, to the consternation of Jakarta and
Kuala Lumpur in part icular,  that Washington was intent on
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suppression of domestic communist insurgency, but it also largely 
freed this assistance from human rights and other political 
conditions. The beleaguered Marcos regime particularly welcomed this
pcdevelopment. US political support was also extended to Thailand's 
Prem regime when it was challenged by the abortive 'Young Turks' coup 
in April 1981.27
Singaporean encouragement of the United States' role in Southeast
Asian security was doubtless largely due to nervousness that the
regional balance of power might be drastically altered by the
consolidation of communist rule and Soviet influence in Indochina 
28after 1975. Singapore's extreme dependence on external trade and 
investment meant that it was critically important for its government 
to demonstrate a concern with maintaining regional stability. But 
Singapore's enthusiastic relationship with Washington may also be 
partly explained by the government's enduring concern that the 
miniscule city state with its largely ethnic Chinese population was
delegating its role in Southeast Asian security to Beijing. For 
example, the United States failed to support ASEAN in its 
differences with China at the July 1981 International Conference 
on Kampuchea. See Nayan Chanda, F E E R , 24 July 1981, pp. 13-15. 
The possibility of US arms sales to China also caused concern in 
ASEAN capitals. Barry Wain, Asian Wall Street Journal (cited 
hereafter as AWSJ), 23 June 1981.
26 In the words of one official Philippine analysis: 'It can be
expected that the governments of South Korea and the Philippines 
will face less resistance in taking a stronger hand to their 
domestic opponents'. '1980: An Assessment of the Year', From
the Center (published by the President's Center for Special 
Studies), Vol. 2, No. 1 (January 1981), p. 13.
27 Richard Nations, F E E R , 8 May 1981, p. 12.
28 See section on 'Singapore's Globalist Outlook' in Chapter 9, 
pp. 407-11 below.
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uncomfortably sandwiched between two considerably more populous
neighbours (Indonesia and Malaysia) both with largely Muslim Malay
populations. The fear was that racial or religious instabil i ty in
either of these neighbours (including the possibility of radical
Islamic regimes) might threaten Singapore with invasion or internal
s t r i f e .  The Singaporean leadership saw the development of a close
relationship with Washington as an important insurance against such 
29developments.
The security perceptions of some of the ASEAN governments in 
relation to Indochina were influenced not only by the benefits of 
strategic alignment with the United States, but also more directly by 
intense, institutionalized contact between local polit icians,  
officials and military officers on one hand, and US diplomats and 
officers on the other hand. This type of influence was most 
pronounced in Thailand and the Philippines -- America's two formal 
al l ies in the region. Not only were there very large US diplomatic
missions in Bangkok and Manila, but also sizeable contingents of US 
military advisers in daily contact with the military el i tes of both 
countries. One study of the influence of US diplomats in Thailand 
concluded that:
American diplomatic officials in Thailand are 
involved in varying degrees in shaping certain aspects 
of the processes and institutions of the Thai political 
system... These functions do not indicate that the US 
embassy directly controls any polit ical institution,
29 Although this issue was never broached official ly in public, 
numerous personal interviews with diplomats, journalists and 
academics in the ASEAN capitals in January-Apri1 1981 confirmed 
i ts significance.
74
of f ic ia l  or organization in Thailand. However, i t  does 
reveal that the Embassy indirect ly influences a large 
number of po l i t ica l  insti tut ions, o f f ic ia ls  and 
organizations in the kindom.30
The ASEAN States and Communist China
China's proximity and historical links with Southeast Asia meant 
that in some senses the People's Republic could hardly be regarded as 
an 'extra-regional' power. China and the Southeast Asian states were 
necessarily permanent factors in each other's foreign policy 
calculations.
By the late 1970s, China's overriding foreign policy interest in 
relation to the ASEAN states was to restrain Soviet influence in 
Southeast Asia. Other Chinese interests in the region --  the 
promotion of communist revolution, the enhancement of Beij ing's 
po l i t ica l  and economic stake, and the lessening of American and other 
' imperia l ist '  influence --  were secondary to this strategy of 
attempting to deny Moscow the advantages which Washington's diminished 
regional interest and the increasingly close Soviet-Vietnamese 
relationship might confer. Beijing feared that Moscow might use its 
foothold in a reunified Vietnam as part of an attempt to encircle 
China: the 1971 Indo-Soviet treaty and Brezhnev's Asian collective 
security proposal already provided evidence for the Chinese of such a 
Soviet strategy.
30 Frank C. Darling, 'Po l i t ica l  Functions of the United States 
Embassy in Thailand', Asian Survey, Vol. 18, No. 11 (November 
1978), p. 1206.
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These potentially dangerous developments in China's strategic
environment to the south, coupled with a more pragmatic attitude
towards foreign policy after the removal of the 'Gang of Four' in
1976, significantly altered Beijing's attitude towards ASEAN and its
members. In the early 1970s, Beijing had supported certain of the
ASEAN states'  policies,  such as ZOPFAN and the Indonesian-Malaysian
declaration that the Strai ts of Malacca were not international waters,
where these might potentially help to exclude Soviet and American
31influence from the region. But i t  was not until 1975, following the
communist victory in South Vietnam, that China ceased to castigate
32ASEAN as an American-sponsored military alliance. Thereafter,
Beijing adopted a positive attitude towards not only ASEAN but also
33the US military presence in Southeast Asia: the ' three world
theory' was clearly no longer the major determinant of China's foreign
34policy in Southeast Asia or elsewhere. A desire to develop economic 
links with non-communist Southeast Asia as a channel for trade and
31 Bangkok Post, 20 April 1972. See also Michael Yahuda, China's
Foreign Policy After Mao (London: Macmillan, 1983), pp. 120-1.
32 The fall  of Saigon not only raised the spectre of Soviet
influence in a powerful, reunified Vietnam, but also released 
Beijing from i ts  obligation to oppose ASEAN because of some of
its members' support for the anti-communist side in the Second
Indochina War. By August 1975, Beijing was claiming that ASEAN
'has achieved positive results in recent years' .  New China News
Agency (cited hereafter as NCNA) in English, 1700 gmt, 26 August 
1975 British Broadcasting Corporation Summary of World Broadcasts 
(cited hereafter as SWB) FE/4992/A3/1, 28 August 1975.
33 For this reason, the US military presence in the Philippines was 
no obstacle to the establishment of diplomatic relations with 
Mani1 a.
34. According to the ' three worlds' theory, enunciated by Deng Xiao­
ping in 1974, i t  was necessary for the ' third world' (China and
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35investment for the ‘ four modernizations' reinforced Beijing's 
strategic rationale for better relations with the ASEAN governments.
Beijing's new att itude towards the ASEAN countries was 
paralleled, to a greater or lesser degree, by these states' efforts in 
the mid 1970s to improve their relations with China. Several factors 
motivated these e f for ts .  Most important was a widespread recognition 
that with the advent of the Nixon doctrine and Sino-American detente, 
i t  was both unnecessary and unrealistic to persist with policies which 
assumed China to be an immediate security threat. Although as
recently as 1967 a shared fear of China had been a major factor 
inspiring the formation of ASEAN, by the mid-1970s there were 
apparently grounds for hoping that the normalization of relations with 
China might induce Beij ing, which was already displaying moderation in 
i ts  foreign policy, to take action to reduce the threat which the 
ASEAN governments had perceived in its  links with local communist 
parties and ethnic Chinese communities. Some of the ASEAN governments
the other developing nations) to join with the 'second world' 
(the European and other non-superpower developed countries) to 
form a united front against the dominant and oppressive ' f i r s t  
world' (the two superpowers). But although Beijing confirmed 
this theory in 1977 and 1978, from 1977 the Chinese emphasized 
that the USSR was considerably more aggressive than the United 
States, and was therefore the principal adversary to be 
countered. China's recognition that the United States was a
useful associate in the confrontation with Moscow deprived the 
‘ three worlds' theory of much of i ts  c red ib i l i ty .
35 In January 1975, Premier Zhou En-Lai recommitted China to the 
goal of the 'four modernizations' (which he had f i r s t  advanced in 
1964), with the aim of thoroughly reconditioning the 
agricultural,  industr ia l,  defence, and science and technology 
spheres by the year 2000. In the late 1970s, Chairman Hua 
Guo-Feng and Vice-Premier Deng Xiao-Ping made the 'four 
modernizations' their  principal po l i t ica l  goals.
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also antic ipated economic benefi ts as a resu l t  of normalization with 
China. Bangkok also hoped that better re la t ions  with China would help 
counteract possible threats from a united communist Vietnam and from a 
Bei j ing-or iented Democratic Kampuchea. Specif ic  local p o l i t i c a l  
conditions helped to make normalization more feas ib le in the mid-1970s 
than prev ious ly . ^
Although Malaysia, Thailand and the Phi l ipp ines had establ ished 
diplomatic re la t ions  with China by 1975 and Lee Kuan Yew said, during 
his v i s i t  to Bei j ing in May 1976, that Singapore would fo l low su i t  
once Indonesia did the same, there remained much d is t ru s t  of China in 
the region. The ASEAN governments' concern that China s t i l l  
threatened th e i r  securi ty  had several aspects. To some regional 
observers, China's h is to r ica l  attempts to impose i t s  inf luence over 
the region appeared to have a contemporary counterpart in Be i j ing 's  
maritime claims in the South China Sea, which though muted since the 
late 1960s p o te n t ia l l y  placed the People's Republic at odds with the 
Phi l ippines and M a lays ia .^
A more serious concern expressed by the ASEAN governments 
concerned B e i j ing 's  l inks  with local communist part ies and ethnic 
Chinese communities. But although Maoist m i l i t a r y  theory was the
36 For more detai led analyses of the Malaysian, Thai and Phi l ippine
motives fo r  normalizat ion, see Charles E. Morrison and Astr i  
Suhrke, Strategies fo r  Survival (St Lucia: Univers ity  of
Queensland Press, 1978), pp. 134-36, 160-62, 258-59; Sarasin
Viraphol, Direct ions in Thai Foreign Pol icy (Singapore: 
In s t i t u te  of Southeast Asian Studies, Occasional Paper No. 40, 
1976), pp. 21-2; Maxwell Harvey, B u l l e t i n , 31 May 1975, p. 41.
37 For example, an assessment in 1977 by ASEAN's Foreign Ministers 
of recent regional developments expressed 'uneasiness' over 
China's maritime claims. Michael Richardson, FEER, 30 December 
1977, p.8.
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inspiration for communist insurgent tactics in Thailand, Malaysia and 
the Philippines, and these countries' Parties remained oriented 
towards Beijing rather than Moscow or Hanoi, whether or not China 
continued to extend its support was largely irrelevant to their 
ultimate success or failure. Chinese support played an essentially 
subsidiary role in insurgency in the ASEAN region both before and 
after the normalization of relations with Malaysia, the Philippines 
and Thailand. China's backing for insurgency outside Indochina and 
Burma had always emphasized political support and propaganda (rather 
than material assistance), involving broadcasting facilities, asylum 
for exiled Party leaders and training for cadres and guerillas, and 
the insurgents generally used weapons and equipment captured from 
government forces or manufactured by themselves. Nevertheless, while 
communist insurgency arose very largely from local needs and was 
maintained overwhelmingly from local resources, to a greater or lesser 
degree all the ASEAN governments (or at least factions within them) 
found it both reassuring and politically expedient to portray the 
internal communist threat to their rule as probably inspired and 
manipulated from outside rather than as a phenomenon rooted in 
domestic economic, social and political inequities.
Nevertheless, China's refusal to terminate its relations with 
communist parties in the ASEAN countries provided ammunition for those 
in the region who claimed that the People's Republic still represented 
a security threat. Although Beijing wished to reassure the ASEAN 
governments that this was not the case, the Chinese communist 
leadership would not terminate its support for communist parties in 
the ASEAN countries for several reasons. The maintenance of 'party-
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to -par ty '  as well as ' government-to-government' re la t ions in the ASEAN
region provided Be i j ing  with a potential  means of exert ing pressure i f
an ASEAN government adopted po l ic ies inimical to China's in te res ts .
But, perhaps more importantly , a to ta l  withdrawal of support might
have lessened China's status in the divided world communist movement
(where the Southeast Asian communist part ies had been amongst
B e i j ing 's  f i rmest  supporters), undermined Chinese claims to lead the
Third World, and opened the way fo r  Moscow and Hanoi to step in to  the
38breach with assistance fo r  the Southeast Asian Part ies.
Bei j ing was also re luctant to truncate i t s  l inks with the ASEAN
39countr ies'  large ethnic Chinese communities. Since Zhou En-Lai 's 
announcement of a 'good neighbour po l icy '  in 1955, communist China had 
encouraged ethnic Chinese l i v in g  in Southeast Asia to integra te 
themselves with the societ ies in which they l ived ,  in order to assuage 
Southeast Asian governments' doubts concerning the loya l t ies  of the 
'Overseas Chinese' and hence remove, or at lease reduce, an important 
obstacle to improve re la t ions with these governments. But Bei j ing 
reserved the r ig h t  to protect the interests  of those Chinese re ta in ing  
PRC n a t io n a l i t y .  Moreover the Chinese Cultural  Revolution in the 
1960s prec ip i ta ted v io len t  pro-Bei j ing demonstrations by ethnic 
Chinese in some Southeast Asian countries ( inc luding Indonesia in
38 Both Deng Xiao-Ping and Zhao Ziyang, when they v is i ted  the region 
in 1978 and 1981 respective ly, stressed the danger that communist 
movements in the ASEAN countries might f a l l  under Soviet and 
Vietnamese inf luence i f  a l l  Chinese support was terminated. 
Henry Kamm, New York Times, 10 November 1978; Bangkok Post, 
14 August 1981.
39 In 1981, ethnic Chinese were estimated to comprise the fo l lowing 
proport ions of to ta l  population in the ASEAN countr ies: 
Singapore (76.9%); Malaysia (33.1%); Thailand (13%); Indonesia 
(2.8%); Phi l ipp ines (1.5%). See Leo Suryadinata, China and the
ASEAN States:_____The Ethnic Chinese Dimension (Singapore:
Singapore University  Press, 1985), p. 6.
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1967), and the post-Cultural Revolution power struggle in China after 
1969 produced ambiguous policies towards the Overseas Chinese. After 
the fa l l  of the 'Gang of Four' in late 1976, Beij ing's interest in the 
Overseas Chinese increased: the Deng group saw them as an important
source of capital and sk i l ls  for the 'four modernizations'. In 
January 1978, while s t i l l  encouraging Overseas Chinese in Southeast 
Asia to adopt local citizenship, Beijing claimed that Chinese abroad 
'constitute part of the Chinese people and are important l inks in 
helping to develop the friendship between the Chinese people and the 
people of various countries'
Some ASEAN members --  especially Indonesia and Malaysia but to a
lesser extent Singapore as well -- expressed concern that China's
revived interest in Southeast Asia's Overseas Chinese was a potential
security threat, especially after the pl ight of Vietnam's Chinese
community became a central issue in the Sino-Vietnamese dispute in 
411978. These concerns were probably without foundation. In the
f i r s t  place, i t  was highly unlikely that Beijing would be able to
mobilize Southeast Asian Chinese to work for i ts  own goals on a large 
42scale. Moreover, Beijing demonstrated in relation to both Indonesia
40 Renmin ribao editor ia l ,  January 1978, quoted by Michael R.
Godley, 'Pol i t ics  in the Penumbra: Chinese in Southeast Asia',
World Review, Vol. 21, No. 1 (April 1982), p. 86.
41 Suryadinata, pp. 122-26; Straits Times, 5 July 1978.
42 This was largely due to the acculturation and assimilation of
Southeast Asian Chinese, part icular ly  in po l i t ica l  terms. 
Indeed, i t  has been argued that the ethnic Chinese in Southeast 
Asia are not so much useful instruments of Chinese foreign policy 
as hostages for the good behaviour of the People's Republic in 
the hands of the host countries. See Harold C. Hinton, China's 
Turbulent Quest: An Analysis of China's Foreign Relations Since 
1949 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1§72), p. 199.
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and Democratic Kampuchea in the mid and late 1970s that China was
willing to limit severely i ts commitment to defend the interests of
ethnic Chinese residents if this was necessary to cultivate (or
preserve from further damage) an important ' government-to-government1
relationship. The example of China's intervention on behalf of
Vietnam's ethnic Chinese was probably exceptional, with Beijing
viewing the problem as closely linked to the Sino-Soviet dispute and
43therefore the more immediate security of China. But even the
promulgation in 1980 of the PRC's f i r s t  nationality law, which ended
Beijing's recognition of dual nationality and may have been motivated
by a desire to assuage concerns in the ASEAN region as Beijing
endeavoured to maintain ASEAN support for its stance on the Cambodian
44issue, failed to reassure the Indonesian and Malaysian governments.
The ASEAN governments did not have a uniform atti tude towards
Beijing's ambivalent policy of attempting to improve 'government-to-
government' relations while s t i l l  maintaining links with Communist
Parties and ethnic Chinese communities in the ASEAN region.
Successive Thai governments were more accommodating than their ASEAN
45partners of China's policies. Although China continued to provide 
broadcasting fac i l i t i es  for the Thai communists' 'Voice of the People 
of Thailand' (VOPT) until 1979, Beijing reduced markedly i ts links
43 Suryadinata, pp. 34-58.
44. Ibid. , pp. 83-88, 117-18.
45. For example, when he visited Beijing in July 1975 to establish 
diplomatic relations, Thai Premier Kukrit apparently accepted 
Beijing's distinction between two sets of relationships. Straits 
Times, 7 July 1975.
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with the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) in the la te  1970s. By 1977
i t  was evident th a t ,  despite the deteriorat ion in re la t ions  between
Bangkok and Bei j ing which had occurred under the Thanin regime, 'no
serious Thais see China as a th re a t1. ^  The eruption of the Third
Indochina War, culminating in the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia at
the end of 1978, brought fu r the r  reductions in B e i j ing 's  support for
the CPT as China strove to forge a united f ron t  inc luding the Thai
government in opposition to Hanoi's domination of Indochina. In July
471979 the VOPT announced i t s  own 'temporary' closure, and in
September 1980 i t  was reported that the CPT was no longer receiving
48any d i rec t  material support from China. General Prem Tinsulanond,
who became Prime Minister in March 1980, was more suspicious than his
49predecessor Kriangsak of China's continuing l inks with the CPT, but 
Bei j ing had apparently allayed Prem's concern by the time that Chinese
46 US diplomatic source, quoted by Frankl in B. Weinstein, 'The 
Meaning of National Securi ty in Southeast As ia ' ,  The B u l le t in  of 
the Atomic S c ie n t is ts , Vo l . 34, No. 9, (November 1978), p. 21.
47 'Voice of the People of Thai land',  1000 gmt, 10 July 1979 (SWB 
FE/6165/A3/8, 12 July 1979).
48 Limited f inanc ia l  assistance continued, however, according to an 
interview with 'Comrade Paitoon' (a member of the CPT's North­
eastern region committee), FEER, 19 September 1980, p. 47. 
According to Thai o f f i c i a l s  concerned with in ternal securi ty  
interviewed in March 1981, China had continued to send material 
aid to the CPT by way of the Burmese Communist Party. Squadron 
Leader Prasong Soonsir i ,  Secretary-General of Thai land's National 
Securi ty Council claimed that the level of Chinese support fo r 
the CPT was 'very low'. Personal interview, March 1981.
49 Prem's a t t i tude  was probably coloured by his long experience 
f ig h t in g  the CPT in Thai land's northeast. ' I n t e l l i g e n c e ' ,  FEER, 
24 October 1980, p. 9.
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RnPremier Zhao visited Bangkok early in 1981.
The Thai authorit ies'  relatively credulous response to Beijing's
51assertions that i t  did not wish to export revolution was the result
not only of the demonstrable decline in the CPT's fortunes after 
521978 and Bangkok's common interest with China in countering 
Vietnam's domination of Cambodia, but also the fact that Thailand's 
ethnic Chinese community had to a large degree been assimilated into 
the mainstream of Thai society by the 1970s. The Thai military- 
bureaucratic e l i te  no longer saw the ethnic Chinese community as a 
serious security threat; although a large part of the CPT's Central 
Committee was s t i l l  ethnic Chinese, there was otherwise l i t t l e  
correlation between communist activism and Chinese ethnicity, except 
in Southern Thailand.
Chinese support for the Communist Party of the Philippines and 
i ts military arm, the New People's Army (NPA) was never significant 
compared to that given to mainland Southeast Asian communists, but in
50 The issue of China's relations with the CPT was not high on the
agenda for discussion by Prem and Zhao, reportedly having been
'set t led to Thailand's satisfaction'  when Prem visited Beijing in 
1980. Strai ts Times, 31 January 1981.
51 According to Zhao, 'we don't believe that revolution can be
exported'. Straits Times, 3 February 1981.
52 This decline was due principally to r i f t s  within the Party, the
loss of sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia, and to Thai Army
successes, rather than directly because of the decline in Chinese 
support. Nevertheless, if the CPT's insurgency had continued to 
pose as serious a threat as it had in the early and mid-1970s, 
Bangkok might have had far greater doubts about the wisdom of 
entering into closer relations with Beijing.
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53the la te  1970s even th is  l imi ted assistance decl ined. Coupled with
the facts  that  the local ethnic Chinese community was increasingly
assimilated in to  Ph i l ipp ine society and that the NPA had anyway never
drawn p a r t i c u la r l y  on the Chinese community fo r  i t s  membership, th is
made fo r  a relaxed assessment in Manila of China as a securi ty
concern. O f f i c ia l s  emphasized that there had been no evidence of
Chinese interference in the Phi l ippines since the normalization of
re la t ions  and that  Be i j ing 's  preoccupation with the ' four
modernizations' would probably prevent the People's Republic from
54being a threat for  the rest of the century.
The Malaysian government often displayed much greater anxiety
than i t s  Thai and Phi l ipp ine counterparts over China's continuing
l inks with the local communist movement. While the Malaysian Prime
Minister was s t i l l  in Bei j ing in 1974 a f te r  signing an o f f i c i a l
communique estab l ish ing Sino-Malaysian diplomatic re la t ions which
55included a disavowal of subversion the Malayan communists' 'Voice of 
Malayan Revolut ion' (VMR) - -  broadcasting from southern China - -  
claimed that 'peaceful coexistence can in no way replace the
53 According to Ambassador Luz Del Mundo, a senior Min is try  of 
Foreign A f fa i rs  o f f i c i a l  interviewed in March 1981, there had 
been no evidence of Chinese interference in the Phi l ippines since 
dip lomatic re la t ions  were establ ished. Other sources confirmed 
that by 1981 there was cer ta in ly  no evidence of foreign supplies 
reaching the NPA. See, fo r  example, ' I n t e l l i g e n c e ' ,  FEER, 
7 August 1981, p. 9.
54 Personal interv iew with Carlos P. Romulo, Phi l ipp ine Minister of 
Foreign A f fa i r s ,  Manila, 23 March 1981.
55 PRC-Malaysia j o i n t  communique, NCNA in Engl ish, 1328 gmt, 25 May 
1974 (SWB FE/4615/A3/1-2, 3 June 1974).
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56revolut ionary s t ru gg le ' .  Soon afterwards, another VMR declarat ion
claimed that the communique signed by Razak and Chou was, fo r  the
communists, j u s t  a ta c t ic a l  measure l i k e  S ta l in 's  1945 Pact with the 
57Kuomintang. But although Kuala Lumpur had grounds fo r  viewing
B e i j ing 's  continued maintenance of ' p a r ty - to -p a r ty ' as well as
' government-to-government' l inks  as dup l ic i tous ,  there was no evidence
to support the Malaysian government's assert ions that there was a
d i rec t  re la t ionsh ip  between Chinese moral support and the escalat ion
in the CPM's m i l i t a r y  a c t i v i t i e s  in the mid-1970s.^
Although there were indicat ions in 1980-81 that Bei j ing was
59scal ing down i t s  l inks  with the Communist Party of Malaya, probably 
as part of the Chinese e f fo r t  to maintain Malaysian backing fo r  
ASEAN's po l icy  of opposing Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia, the Malay 
p o l i t i c a l  leadership continued to express d issa t is fac t ion  with China's 
refusal to sever t o t a l l y  i t s  connection with the insu rge n ts .^  The
56 'Voice of Malayan Revolution' in Standard Chinese, 0515 gmt, 25 
May 1974 (SWB FE/4610/A3/4-7, 28 May 1974).
57 'Voice of Malayan Revolution' in Standard Chinese, 0515 gmt, 8 
June 1974 (SWB FE/4622/A3/1, 11 June 1974).
58 I t  is  more l i k e l y  that th is  rev ival in ter ror ism sprang from the 
three-way sp l in te r ing  of the CPM in 1974, with the two new 
fac t ions adopting innovatory ta c t ic s .  See section on "Vietnam 
and Communism in Malays ia.. ."  in Chapter 6, pp. 222-27 below.
59 I t  is  doubtful that the 'defect ion ' from China to Malaysia of 
former CPM chairman Musa Ahmad in November 1980 would have been 
possible without at least the t a c i t  compl ic i ty  of the Chinese 
au tho r i t ies .  Moreover, the PRC-based 'Voice of Malayan 
Revolut ion' ceased broadcasting at the end of June 1981. S t ra i ts  
Times, 12 January 1981; Sydney Morning Herald, 9 July 1981.
60 See, fo r  example, the comments by Prime Min is ter Mahathir Mohamed 
and Foreign Minister Ghazali Shafie, S t ra i t s  Times, 9 and 19 
August 1981.
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CRM did not immediately pose a serious securi ty  problem, but the 
secur i ty  author i t ies  in Kuala Lumpur viewed China's continuing l inks 
with local communists as part of a wider 'Chinese th r e a t ' .  A 
widespread view in Malaysian o f f i c i a l  c i r c le s ,  even af ter  the 
Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia heightened Malaysian perceptions of 
Hanoi as a threat ,  was that China remained the pr inc ipa l  long-term 
secur i ty  threat because of B e i j ing 's  potential  a b i l i t y  to destroy the 
fab r ic  of Malaysian society by using i t s  l inks  with not only the CPM 
(which was composed overwhelmingly of ethnic Chinese) but also the 
wider Malaysian Chinese community to provoke rac ia l  c o n f l i c t . ^
Unlike th e i r  ASEAN partners, Indonesia and Singapore did not 
maintain formal diplomatic re la t ions  with China in the 1975-81 period. 
Jakarta suspended i t s  re la t ions  in the wake of the abort ive 1965 coup 
in which the new Indonesian m i l i t a r y  regime attempted to implicate
cp
China and the Bei j ing-or iented PKI (Indonesian Communist Party). 
Although the Indonesian army and Muslim groups had v i r t u a l l y  
eradicated the PKI in 1965-66, the Jakarta regime remained highly 
sensit ive to China as a secur i ty  threat .  There was no act ive 
communist insurgency fo r  China to support, but Bei j ing harboured 
exi led PKI leaders and disseminated propaganda in support of the 
communists. Moreover, Jakarta feared China's a b i l i t y  to exp lo i t  the
61 Personal interviews with Malaysian Min is try  of Foreign A f fa i rs  
o f f i c i a l s  and diplomats, Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok, March-April 
1981.
62 See David Mozingo, Chinese Pol icy Toward Indonesia (I thaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1976), pp. 234-63.
63 As late as May 1975, in the wake of the Cambodian and Vietnamese 
communists' v ic to r ie s ,  the Chinese Communist Party openly ( i f  
u n re a l is t ic a l l y )  encouraged the PKI to overthrow the Jakarta 
regime by armed struggle. NCNA in Indonesian, 0830 gmt, 22 May 
1975 (SWB FE/4914/A3/8, 28 May 1975).
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subversive potential of Indonesia's large ethnic Chinese community,
which included almost a mil l ion people who were formally cit izens of
64the People's Republic.
Within Jakarta's ruling e l i te  there were marked divergences of
opinion over the 'Chinese threat ' .  The 'generation of '45', who s t i l l
dominated the Indonesian m il i tary  leadership, had witnessed increasing
65Chinese influence in Indonesia culminating in the events of 1965. 
But genuine concern over a continuing 'Chinese threat' was 
inextricably confused with the Suharto regime's use of this ' threat' 
as a device for enhancing the domestic po l i t ica l  legitimacy of the 
'New Order'. The Department of Foreign Affa irs, on the other hand, 
was generally less impressed with the idea of China as the main threat 
to security, and as early as 1970 Foreign Minister Malik displayed 
willingness to re-establish diplomatic contact with B e i j i n g . F r o m  
Malik's viewpoint, a thaw in relations with China would balance 
Jakarta's close links with Washington and residual relationship with 
Moscow, lending c red ib i l i ty  to a foreign policy which s t i l l  strove to
64 Justus M. Van der Kroef, Communism in Southeast Asia (London:
Macmillan, 1981), pp. 222-23.
65 The Indonesian m i l i ta ry 's  outlook may also have been influenced
by the experiences of the Burmese and Sihanoukist Cambodian 
regimes in the late 1960s, which provided evidence that China had 
no compunction in continuing to provide staunch backing for local 
communist movements despite establishing inter-governmental 
relations. See van der Kroef, pp. 225-26.
66 Justus M. van der Kroef, 'Before the Thaw: Recent Indonesian
Attitudes Towards China', Asian Survey, Vol. 13, No. 5 (May
1973), p. 519.
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be 'independent' and 'a c t i v e ' . ^
In the 1970s i t  often seemed possible that Sino-Indonesian
re la t ions  would sho r t ly  be normalized, but the suspicions of
Indonesia's army leaders, which were lent some c r e d ib i l i t y  by China's
refusal to cut l inks  with the PKI, remained an obstacle even a f te r  the
Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia involved ASEAN (the main vehicle fo r
Jakarta 's  foreign po l icy)  in close cooperation with Bei j ing to oppose
Hanoi's domination of Indochina. The m i l i t a r y ' s  posit ion was that
normalization should wait u n t i l  the domestic s i tua t ion  in Indonesia
68was 'under complete c o n t ro l ' ,  but the real point was that a restored
diplomatic nexus would undermine the c r e d ib i l i t y  of the 'Chinese
th rea t '  as a j u s t i f i c a t i o n  fo r  many of the Suharto regime's
69author i ta r ian  domestic po l ic ies .
Unlike the Suharto regime, the Singaporean government did not 
view - -  or claim to view - -  China as the main external securi ty  
th rea t .  Although Lee Kuan Yew condemned B e i j ing 's  refusal to sever 
i t s  l inks  with the Communist Party of Malaya (whose ambit included 
Singapore), he saw the USSR as a much more serious threat ,  
p a r t i c u la r l y  a f te r  the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia and the 
Soviet invasion of A fghan is tan .^  Nevertheless, the Singaporean
67 But even Malik claimed that although China was not a threat  in a 
m i l i t a r y  sense, i t  was s t i l l  a source of ' ideo log ica l  and 
p o l i t i c a l  subversion'.  Adam Malik, 'Djakarta Conference and 
Asia's P o l i t i c a l  Future ',  Pac i f ic  Community, Vol. 2, No. 1 
(October 1970), pp. 73-74.
68 Senior Indonesian army o f f ice rs  quoted by Weinstein, p. 21. See 
also Leo Suryadinata, AWSJ, 24 January 1980.
69 van der Kroef, Communism in Southeast Asia, pp. 220-24.
70 S t ra i ts  Times, 4 July 1980 and 12 August 1981.
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government s t i l l  refused to open formal diplomatic re la t ions with
China. The government's main concern was that such a l ink  with
Beij ing was p o te n t ia l l y  dangerous because of the domestic populat ion 's
predominantly Chinese ethnic composition. Aware that Singapore's
existence as a prosperous independent state was pa r t ly  dependent on
the maintenance of equable re la t ions with Indonesia and Malaysia, the
government thought i t  necessary to avoid giving even the s l igh tes t
impression of being open to Be i j ing 's  inf luence. Moreover, the
Singaporean leadership feared that diplomatic re la t ions  with Bei j ing
might generate a renewed enthusiasm fo r  th e i r  ancestral homeland
amongst some of the local Chinese populat ion, possibly rev iv ing the
c o n f l i c t  between English- and Chinese-educated ethnic Chinese which
had dominated Singaporean p o l i t i c s  in the early  1960s.^
But although the Singaporean government stressed, throughout the
1975-81 period, tha t  i t  would not open diplomatic re la t ions with
72Beij ing u n t i l  Indonesia had done so, an informal working
re la t ionship  with China developed apace. Lee Kuan Yew's v i s i t  to
Beij ing in May 1976 brought a reassurance from Chairman Hua that
Singapore's treatment of local communists was i t s  own a f f a i r  and when
Deng Xiao-ping v is i te d  Singapore in 1978 he reassured Lee that Bei j ing
73had no in tent ion  of subverting the loya l ty  of Singaporean Chinese.
71 Personal interviews with academics, diplomats and jo u rn a l is t s ,  
Singapore, January-February 1981. On the f i r s t  po int,  see Lee 
Kuan Yew's comments to Indonesian reporters, S t ra i ts  Times, 
4 July 1980.
72 See, fo r  example, Lee Kuan Yew's comments, S t ra i t s  Times, 4 July 
1980.
73 David Bonavia and K. Das, FEER, 24 November 1978, p. 32.
-  90 -
Economic l inks  also grew between China and Singapore, which throughout
the la te  1970s was Be i j ing 's  most important trading partner in 
74Southeast Asia. By the time of Lee's second v i s i t  to Bei j ing in
1980, Singapore was reaping most of the benef i ts ,  but also some of the 
75disadvantages, that  would have accrued from formalized diplomatic 
re la t ions  with China.
Suspicion of China had a profound inf luence on the ASEAN states' 
secur i ty  concerns with Indochina in the 1975-81 period. In essence 
the most important long-term secur i ty  concern of important elements in 
the Indonesian and Malaysian governments was with an alleged 'Chinese 
threat '  rather than with Vietnam, even a f te r  the Vietnamese invasion 
of Cambodia. To a more l im i ted extent, some f igures in the Thai 
m i l i t a r y  held s im i la r  views, and on occasion even Singaporean leaders 
indicated that they took ser iously the idea that China threatened the 
region in the long-term. These perceptions of a Chinese threat muted 
Indonesian and Malaysian reactions to the reun i f ica t ion  of Vietnam 
under communist ru le  in 1975. More importantly, they made Indonesia 
and Malaysia, and to a lesser extent the other ASEAN states, wary of 
a l ign ing themselves too c lose ly with B e i j ing 's  strategy to break
74 See John Wong, The P o l i t i c a l  Economy of China's Changing
Relations with Southeast Asia (London: Macmillan, 1984), pp. 93-
122. The bulk of Singapore's trade with China, however, resulted 
from the is land 's  ro le as an entrepot. Thus, even in the late 
1970s, about 60% of Singapore's imports from China were for  
re-export ,  mainly to Indonesia and the Middle East.
75 Such as accusations by Hanoi and Moscow that Singapore was acting 
as China's mouthpiece on the Cambodian issue. See, fo r  example, 
Nhan Dan commentary broadcast 15 September 1979 by Hanoi home 
service 1100 gmt, 15 September 1979 (SWB FE/6221/A3/5, 
17 September 1979).
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Hanoi's hold on Cambodia a f te r  the December 1978 invasion. There was 
a widespread view in the ASEAN states ( including Thailand) that 
although, fo r  various reasons, Vietnam's invasion and occupation of 
Cambodia could not be condoned, i t  was not in the in terests  of 
regional securi ty  f o r  Vietnam to be 'bled white'  to force i t s  
withdrawal from Cambodia as the Chinese intended. But whi le the 
preferred ( i f  unrealized) ASEAN solut ion to the Cambodian problem was 
a negotiated sett lement recognizing Vietnamese as well as Chinese and 
Thai secur i ty  in terests  in Cambodia, there would have been severe 
drawbacks to a po l icy  which seriously contradicted Chinese 
i n t e r e s t s . ^  In the absence of a massive commitment by another extra- 
regional power (as undertaken by the United States in the 1960s), 
accommodation of China remained a v i t a l ,  i f  usually unacknowledged, 
element of the ASEAN states'  (and especia l ly  Thai land's) foreign 
p o l i c ie s .
The ASEAN States and the Soviet Union
From Moscow's viewpoint the ASEAN region was of only l im i ted 
i n t r i n s i c  in te res t .  The ASEAN countries were of l i t t l e  economic 
importance to the Soviet Union‘d  and the local revolut ionary movements
76 See section on 'Was there an a l te rna t ive? '  in Chapter 10, 
pp. 487-88 below.
77 Although the USSR obtained almost a l l  i t s  natural rubber from the
ASEAN region, th is  resource could be bought from a l te rna t ive  
sources i f  necessary. See Thomas L. Wilborn, The Soviet Union 
and ASEAN (Car l is le  Barracks, Penn.: US Army War Col lege,
Strategic Issues Research Memorandum, 1980), p. 8.
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w e r e ,  w i t h  m i n o r  e x c e p t i o n s ,  in c o m m u n i o n  w i t h  B e i j i n g  r a t h e r  t h a n 
M o s c o w .
M o s c o w  did, h o w e v e r ,  h a v e  s t r a t e g i c  i n t e r e s t s  in the A S E A N  r e g i o n
w h i c h  w e r e  e s s e n t i a l l y  i n d e p e n d e n t  of its l i m i t e d  p o l i t i c a l  and
e c o n o m i c  i n v o l v e m e n t  in n o n - c o m m u n i s t  S o u t h e a s t  Asia. F r o m  t h e  e a r l y
19 60 s, the p r i n c i p a l  S o v i e t  o b j e c t i v e s  in S o u t h e a s t  A s i a  w e r e  to
c o n t a i n  C h i n e s e  and A m e r i c a n  i n f l u e n c e .  As well as c o m p e t i n g  w i t h
C h i n a  for i n f l u e n c e  in Hanoi d u r i n g  the V i e t n a m  War, M o s c o w  had
a t t e m p t e d  to i n v o l v e  n o n - c o m m u n i s t  S o u t h e a s t  A s i a  in t h e c o n t a i n m e n t
of C h i n a  t h r o u g h  B r e z h n e v ' s  1969 p r o p o s a l  for an A s i a n  c o l l e c t i v e  
78s e c u r i t y  sy s t e m .  T h e  U S S R ' s  a d v e r s a r y  r e l a t i o n s h i p  w i t h  t h e  U n i t e d
S t a t e s  a l so had r e p e r c u s s i o n s  in S o u t h e a s t  Asia. A p a r t  f r o m
s u p p o r t i n g  Hanoi in its s t r u g g l e  a g a i n s t  the A m e r i c a n - b a c k e d  S o u t h
d u r i n g  the V i e t n a m  War, t h is c o m p e t i t i o n  w i t h  the U n i t e d  S t a t e s  for
i n f l u e n c e  was also e v i d e n t  in I n d o n e s i a  in the e a r l y  19 6 0 s .  A
p e r c e i v e d  need to c o u n t e r  p o s s i b l e  US b a l l i s t i c  m i s s i l e  s u b m a r i n e
d e p l o y m e n t s  in the In d i a n  O c e a n  p r o b a b l y  p r o v i d e d  the m a i n  initial
i m p e t u s  f o r an e x p a n d i n g  S o v i e t  naval p r e s e n c e  t h e r e  f r o m  t h e  late 
7919 60s. T h e  d e p l o y m e n t  of th e  S o v i e t  n a v y  to t h e I n d i a n  O c e a n  
i n c r e a s e d  th e  i m p o r t a n c e  of S o u t h e a s t  A s i a n  w a t e r s  to M o s c o w ,  as its
78 D e s p i t e  later S o v i e t  a t t e m p t s  to link t h e i r  p r o p o s a l s  w i t h
A S E A N ' s  Z O P F A N  c o n c e p t ,  t h e r e  was l i tt le e n t h u s i a s m  fo r  the
B r e z h n e v  plan in the A S E A N  r e g i o n .  See G e o f f r e y  J u k e s ,  'The 
S o v i e t  Un io n and S o u t h e a s t  A s i a ' ,  A u s t r a l i a n  O u t l o o k , V o l . 31, 
No. 1 (April 1979), p. 13.
79 See M i c h a e l  M c c G w i r e ,  'S ov iet Naval D o c t r i n e  and S t r a t e g y '  in
D. L e e b a e r t ,  S o v i e t  M i l i t a r y  T h i n k i n g  (London: G e o r g e  A l l e n  &
Un wi n, 1981), pp. 1 2 5- 81.
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ships needed to pass through the region on the i r  way to and from naval 
bases near Vladivostok: the extent of th is  in te rest  was re f lec ted  in 
Moscow's wi l l ingness to jo in  with the United States in opposing the 
Indonesian and Malaysian declarat ion in 1971 that the S t ra i ts  of 
Malacca and Singapore were not international waters.
But despite Moscow's s tra teg ic  in te res t  in non-communist 
Southeast Asia as a re su l t  of the USSR's adversary re la t ionsh ips with 
China and the United States, i t s  re la t ionships with the ASEAN 
governments remained tenuous u n t i l  the mid-1970s. Moscow had long­
standing diplomatic l inks  with Bangkok and Jakarta, and opened
diplomatic re la t ions with Malaysia and Singapore in 1967 and 1968 
80respect ive ly .  Although there were ind ications that some ASEAN
p o l i t i c ia n s  saw Soviet in te res t  in Southeast Asia as a useful
counterweight to the perceived threat of regional domination by 
81China, the Soviet Union's communist ideology and r i v a l r y  with the
United States prejudiced the ASEAN governments against c u l t i v a t in g
very much closer re la t ions  with Moscow. Although the USSR maintained
v i r t u a l l y  no l inks  with local communist part ies in the ASEAN 
82countr ies, Moscow's ideological  dif ferences with the ASEAN
80 Diplomatic re la t ions  with the Phi l ippines were not opened u n t i l  
1976. Asiaweek, 25 June 1976, p. 7.
81 See Dick Wilson, 'Sino-Soviet Rival ry in Southeast As ia ' ,  
Problems of Communism, Vol . 23, No. 5 (September-October 1974), 
p. 40.
82 Except fo r  the PKP in the Phi l ipp ines, which opted (with Moscow's 
approval) to lend i t s  support to President Marcos's 'New Society'  
in 1974. Sheilah Ocampo, FEER, 24 August 1979, p. 34.
-  94  -
governments were re f lec ted  in early Soviet condemnation of ASEAN as an
83American-sponsored, anti-communist grouping l i k e  SEATO.
Nevertheless, as a resu l t  of superpower detente, coupled with 
Soviet anxiety that better  Sino-American re la t ions  and the end of the 
Vietnam War might open the way for closer Chinese l inks  with non­
communist Southeast Asia, Moscow's view of ASEAN and i t s  members 
mellowed by the mid-1970s. At the same time, the ASEAN governments 
wished to expand th e i r  in ternational  l inks as they emerged from what 
had in e f fe c t  been a regional extension of the Cold War. There was a 
general tendency in the ASEAN countries at th is  time to view the USSR 
as the major extra-regional power least able and least l i k e l y  to exert 
inf luence in Southeast Asia. Certa in ly  Moscow was widely seen as less 
of a threat than Be i j ing .  The scene was thus set fo r  a l im i ted ,  but 
noticeable and general improvement in re la t ions  between the USSR and 
the ASEAN governments. Setbacks such as the extreme anti-communist 
po l ic ies  of the Thanin regime in Bangkok in 1976-77, and the arrest of 
prominent Malay p o l i t i c ia n s  on charges of spying fo r  Moscow in 1976^ 
were outweighed by factors such as Thai land's more balanced foreign 
pol icy a f te r  the ouster of Thanin in October 1977, increasingly close 
trading l inks  with Indonesia and Singapore and the opening of 
diplomatic re la t ions  with Manila.
The in tens i fy ing  c o n f l i c ts  between Vietnam, an ever closer 
associate of Moscow, and the China-Democratic Kampuchea axis, combined
83 See, fo r  example, V. Pavlovsky, 'Problems of Regionalism in 
As ia ' ,  In ternational  A f fa i rs  (Moscow), No. 4/1969 (A p r i l ) ,  
pp. 46, 50.
84 Andrei Amalrik, FEER, 31 December 1976, p. 23.
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with fears of a new anti-Soviet alignment between Washington, Tokyo 
and Be i j ing ,  increased the importance of ASEAN and i t s  members to 
Moscow in 1978-79. The key Soviet aims were to persuade the ASEAN 
states to cease th e i r  opposition to Vietnam's ro le in Cambodia and to 
side with Vietnam against China, or at least to adopt a more t r u l y  
neutral posit ion in th is  la t t e r  c o n f l i c t .  Moscow raised i t s  
diplomatic p r o f i l e  in the ASEAN countr ies, with Deputy Foreign 
Min ister Firyubin v i s i t i n g  Manila, Bangkok and Jakarta in November 
1978. But although Soviet commentaries lauded ASEAN, p a r t i c u la r ly  on 
the grounds that i t  had proved that i t  would not be turned into
oc
m i l i t a r y  a l l iance,  and commended what Moscow depicted as the ASEAN 
states' resistance to ' im p e r ia l i s t '  (American) and 'hegemonist'
oc
(Chinese) pressures, i t  was soon clear that Moscow was un l ike ly  to
succeed in i t s  attempt to gain ASEAN's diplomatic support fo r  the
USSR's a l l i e s  in Hanoi and (a f te r  December 1978) Phnom Penh.
The main e f fec t  of Soviet po l icy in Southeast Asia on the ASEAN
governments a f te r  the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia was to heighten
concern over the secur i ty  implicat ions of Indochinese developments.
But although the ASEAN governments a l l  agreed that the close a l l iance
between Moscow and Hanoi which resulted from the new Indochina
87c o n f l i c t  was detrimental to regional secur i ty ,  there was l i t t l e  
consensus on how best to minimize the threat posed by the USSR's new
85 According to the Soviet Ambassador in Kuala Lumpur. 'The Week', 
FEER, 17 November 1978, p. 5.
86 For a typ ica l  Soviet commentary, see Vladimir Melnikov, 'ASEAN 
Dilemmas', New Times (Moscow), No. 35, 1981 (August) pp. 18-20.
87 See section on 'A Soviet Threat?' in Chapter 5, pp. 175-80 below.
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in te rest and increasing m i l i t a r y  presence in the region. Singapore,
Bangkok and, to a lesser extent, Manila argued that Vietnam's
strategic re la t ionsh ip  with the USSR and ro le  in Cambodia were part of
a Soviet po l icy of global expansionism, which could most e f fe c t iv e ly
De countered by jo in in g  forces with China and the West to support the
Cambodian resistance. On the other hand, whi le Jakarta and Kuala
_umpur recognized the dangers im p l i c i t  in the Soviet Union's
increasing influence in Hanoi, th e i r  enduring secur i ty  concern with
China made them uneasy about jo in ing  forces with Bei j ing to force
Vietnam to re l inqu ish i t s  ro le in Cambodia and i t s  a l l iance with
Moscow. In essence, the Indonesian and Malaysian view was that a
compromise solut ion to the Cambodian problem, recognizing Vietnamese
secur i ty  in te res ts ,  would reduce Hanoi's dependence on Moscow and
hence Soviet inf luence over Vietnam, while not weakening Indochina's
ro le  as a buffer against China. But although pressure from Jakarta
and Kuala Lumpur kept a l ive  ASEAN's search fo r  a negotiated settlement
of the Cambodian problem, in pract ice ASEAN po l icy  on Cambodia
continued to defer to Thai land's perceived secur i ty  in te res ts ,
involv ing close cooperation with Bei j ing and the Cambodian resistance
88in opposit ion to Hanoi.
Conclusion
The in te rests  of the three major extra-regional powers in 
re la t io n  to non-communist Southeast Asia underwent fundamental changes
88 For a f u l l e r  analysis of the ASEAN states' po l ic ies  in re la t ion  
to the Cambodian issue, see Chapter 10, pp. 433-91 below.
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n the 1975-81 period, largely as a resu l t  of the po lar iza t ion  and
lt imate c o n f l i c t  between Soviet- and Chinese-supported elements in
ndochina. Broadly speaking, the ASEAN states were not disturbed by
he new pattern of extra-regional forces in the aftermath of the 1975
ommunist v ic to r ie s  in Indochina. A lessened US in te rest  and m i l i t a r y
resence in the region was to le rab le  at a time of ever more relaxed
elat ions between Washington and Bei j ing,  and while superpower detente 
89emained a l ive .  In these circumstances, the ASEAN states f e l t  able 
hemselves to pursue closer re la t ions  with China and the Soviet Union, 
uspicion over Chinese intent ions remained, p a r t i c u la r ly  in Jakarta 
ind Kuala Lumpur, but the Soviet Union was not taken ser iously as a 
.ecuri ty threat in the 1975-77 phase.
Although the eruption of the Sino-Vietnamese and Cambodian- 
'ietnamese disputes in 1977-78 caused the ASEAN states to welcome a 
esurgence in US in te rest  in the region as a balance to the roles 
aken by Bei j ing and Moscow in the new Indochina c o n f l i c t ,  non- 
ommunist Southeast Asia was able to maintain a rough balance in i t s  
relations with the Moscow-Hanoi and Beijing-Phnom Penh axes u n t i l  the 
ietnamese invasion of Cambodia at the end of 1978. But whi le th is  
evelopment caused ASEAN to al ign with China, continuing concern over 
e i j i n g 's  long-term intentions towards the region moderated, to a 
reater or lesser degree, the ASEAN states'  determination to revise
9 For example, in a secret report to th e i r  heads of government in 
August 1977, ASEAN's foreign ministers commented that the 
commencement in June 1977 of negotiations between the United 
States and the USSR on l im i ted naval deployments in the Indian 
Ocean 'adds a new element in the e f f o r t  to keep a balance in 
Southeast As ia ' .  Michael Richardson, FEER, 30 December 1977,
p. 8.
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the Vietnamese-imposed status quo in Cambodia. Nevertheless, concern 
over increasing Soviet interest in the region, the benefits of revived 
strategic alignment with Washington, and the potential hazards 
involved in contradicting Chinese interests, amongst other factors, 
helped to consolidate ASEAN's opposition to the Vietnamese 
occupation.^
90 See Chapter 10, pp. 481-89 below.
CHAPTER 4
THE INFLUENCE OF DOMESTIC POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC FACTORS ON THE ASEAN STATES' SECURITY CONCERNS WITH INDOCHINA
As was true of most governments, the major underlying 
preoccupations of the upper echelons of the ASEAN states' leaderships 
during the 1975-81 period, as at other times, concerned domestic 
political, social and economic issues rather than foreign policy. 
But, as was often the case in the Third World, these domestic concerns 
exerted a profound influence on the ASEAN governments' foreign 
policies, including their perceptions of, and reactions to, 
developments in Indochina.
Problems of Regime Legitimacy
Since the end of the colonial period, the priority for the upper 
echelons of the ASEAN states' political leadership had been the 
promotion of their own security in power. This is not to suggest, 
necessarily, that they wished to tighten their hold on power for 
selfish ends, but rather that, like most Third World leaders, they 
faced severe difficulties in maintaining the continuity of authority 
necessary to govern their countries effectively. In order to secure 
and enhance their political legitimacy, non-communist Southeast Asian 
leaders had focussed their attention on promoting economic development 
and on fostering national unity. Although the ASEAN states were 
superficially 'successful' in terms both of their economic well-being 
relative to the rest of the Third World, and the longevity of their
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ruling regimes (suggesting a high degree of pol i t i ca l  s t a b i l i t y ) ,  at 
the time of the 1975 communist v ic tor ies  in Indochina i t  was clear 
that  the ASEAN governments (with the possible exception of Singapore) 
s t i l l  faced serious problems in resolving what one wri ter  has termed 
the three 'dilemmas of nat ion-bui lding1 2: between economic growth and 
equity; between po l i t i ca l  s t a b i l i t y  and par t i c ipa t ion;  and between 
national integrat ion and ethnic pluralism.'*'
Growth and Development Issues
The economies of all  the ASEAN s ta tes  grew rapidly during the 
1970s. Although they did not match the phenomenal annual growth rates 
of South Korea or Brazil (in the 9-11% range),  the i r  6-9% average 
annual growth rate  in the 1970-78 period was subs tant ia l ly  higher than 
that  achieved by e i ther  the developed industr ial  West or most other 
Third World s ta tes .  But th i s  rapid growth in the ASEAN economies was 
not always matched by a similar success in improving the welfare of 
the mass of ordinary,  impoverished people: in common with many other 
Third World countr ies ,  the ASEAN governments (with the exception of 
Singapore) found that  ' a l l  t h i s  expansion and modernization. . .  
apparently fai led to eliminate many of the worst aspects of poverty. . .
1 Kusuma Snitwongse, ' Internal  Problems of the ASEAN States:  The
Dilemmas of Nation-Building'  (Paper presented to the Conference 
on International  Securi ty in the Southeast Asian and Southwest 
Pacific Region, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian 
National Universi ty,  Canberra, 12-15 July 1982), i i .
2 S ta t i s t i c a l  Office,  Department of International  Economic and
Social Affairs ,  United Nations, S t a t i s t i c a l  Yearbook 1979/80 (New 
York: United Nations, 1981), pp. 681-85.
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or s ig n i f i c a n t l y  to improve l i v in g  standards among the bottom 20% or
3
40% of c i t i z e n s ' .  Table 1 i l l u s t r a te s  the extent of income 
inequa l i t ies  in the four largest ASEAN countries in the 1970s.
Government po l ic ies  to promote economic growth through 
in d u s t r ia l i z a t io n  in the ASEAN countries often accentuated exist ing 
socioeconomic inequi t ies by channelling scarce capita l resources to 
the manufacturing sector and to imports of goods fo r  urban consumers 
(thus starving the peasant sector of much-needed capital  funds) and 
the concentrat ion in urban centres of government spending on publ ic 
in f ra s t ru c tu re .  Furthermore, the re la t i v e ly  high wages paid to the 
small m inor i ty  employed in the urban industr ia l  sector encouraged 
large-scale rural-urban migrat ion. But because the industr ia l  sector 
offered decidedly l im i ted employment oppor tun it ies, th is  migration 
tended to resu l t  in the growth of urban unemployment, slums and shanty
4
towns.
Migration to the c i t i e s  also resulted from worsening conditions 
fo r  large numbers of rura l people. The huge problem of rural 
unemployment and underemployment, generated p r im ar i ly  by rapid 
population growth, was exacerbated by government po l ic ies  encouraging 
dras t ic  changes in ag r icu l tu ra l  modes of production without due regard 
to th e i r  social consequences. Thus the 'green revo lu t ion '  ( involv ing 
the use of h igh-y ie ld ing r ice  var ie t ies  together with chemical
3 Geoffrey B. Hainsworth, "Economic Growth and Poverty in Southeast
Asia: Malaysia, Indonesia and the Phi l ipp ines" ,  Pac i f ic  A f f a i r s ,
Vol. 52, No. 1 (Spring 1979), p. 5.
4 H. Myint, Southeast Asia's  Economy: Development Pol ic ies in the
1970s (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972), pp. 39-40.
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f e r t i l i z e r s  and pest icides)  helped to increase productivity,  but by 
sharply rai s ing the cash outlay required for e f f ic ient  farming tended 
to benefi t  mainly be t t er -of f  farmers, who were able to buy out small 
farmers and evict  tenants.
In very broad terms, by 1975 i t  appeared that  the prevalent 
' t r i ck l e  down' approach to development in the ASEAN region was e i ther  
f a i l ing  or not working fas t  enough to ensure that  economic expansion 
did not entai l  the growth of socioeconomic inequity,^ which one 
analyst characterized as 'probably the most c r i t i c a l  economic problem' 
in the ASEAN region.^ Growing inequal i t ies  cer tainly fuel led 
widespread domestic pol i t ica l  opposition to the four larger ASEAN
g
governments in the mid- and late  1970s. That the governments 
concerned were aware of the problem was demonstrated by the declared 
objectives of various programmes which they implemented with the aim 
of reducing poverty. In Malaysia, the Third Malaysia Plan published
5 See, for example, Brian May, The Indonesian Tragedy (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978), p. 338 and John Girl ing,  
Thailand: Society and Pol i t ic s  (I thaca:  Cornell University
Press,  1981), p. 81.
6 Puey Ungphakorn, former Governor of the Bank of Thailand, and
Rector of Thammasat University at the time of the 6 October 1976 
coup, claimed that  "we have used th is  method for 20-30 years now 
without success".  See his Thailand: Glancing Back, Looking
Forward (Melbourne: Sixth of October Thais'  United Front for
Democracy, 1977), p. 24.
7 Kernial Sandhu, "Stabi l i ty  and Security in the Region in the 
1980s" (Paper presented to the Conference on International  
Security in the Southeast Asia and Southwest Pacific Region, 
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National 
University,  Canberra, 12-15 July 1982), p. 7.
8 See, for example, R. William Liddle,  "Indonesia 1977: The New
Order's Second Parliamentary Elect ion",  Asian Survey, Vol. 18, 
No. 2 (February 1978), p. 176.
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in 1976 proclaimed Kuala Lumpur's intention to take decisive action to
a
"bring about a marked reduction in the incidence of poverty. A land
reform programme was "presented and generally recognized as the most
cr i t ical  component of the New Society blueprint"^ following the
declaration of martial law in the Philippines by President Marcos in
1972. Under the Indonesian New Order's second Five Year Plan,
Jakarta's declared objective "shifted to some degree from pushing
economic growth to improving dist r ibut ion".^ After the fall of
Thailand's military-dominated government in 1973, legislation to
implement land reform was undertaken and an Agricultural Land Reform
12Office was set up in 1975. Leading Establishment figures in the
ASEAN countries often declared their concern over the implications for
13polit ical and social s tabi l i ty of unjust income distribution. But 
i t  was clear that this increased governmental concern with promoting 
social just ice was insufficient to ameliorate significantly the 
phenomenon of widening disparit ies in income within the four larger 
ASEAN countr ies .^
While these general observations on the failure of government 
policies to promote socioeconomic equity as well as growth were valid
10 Hainsworth, p. 22.
11 Ibid., p. 31.
12 Girling, p. 71.
13 See, for example, Jusuf Wanandi, "Political and Social Stability 
in Southeast Asia" (Outline of presentation given at conference 
on "Indochina and Problems of Security and Stability in Southeast 
Asia" Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, 18-21 June 1980) and 
interview with Thai Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanond, Asiaweek, 
2 August 1980, p. 21.
14 Hainsworth, pp. 34-41.
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in varying degrees when applied to the four largest and most populous
ASEAN members, Singapore by no means suffered from such severe
problems: economic growth there in the 1960s and 1970s was even more
15rapid than in the three larger ASEAN states, and this growth was 
more successfully translated into a higher standard of living for the 
population as a whole. The success of Singapore's development 
programme in comparison with its ASEAN partners was largely 
attributable to the relative ease with which a compact ci ty-state with 
a relatively small, almost entirely urbanized, market-oriented, well- 
educated population of considerable ethnic homogeneity could be 
developed compared to the inherent problems of developing, for 
example, a huge archipelagic state such as Indonesia with an enormous, 
fast-growing, poorly educated, ethnically diverse, and essentially 
rural population of predominantly "pre-capitalist" outlook. Singapore 
further benefited from i ts  geographical position (favouring entrepot 
activi t ies) and the availabil i ty of much of the requisite economic 
infrastructure (port, communications, transport and banking
faci l i t i es)  for industrial development. But although these 
advantages, combined with fortuitous circumstances (especially the 
international economic boom of the 1960s and the economic benefits 
accruing to Singapore from the Vietnam War) were crucial ingredients 
in the city states'  successful development, the Singaporean
government's outward-looking and liberal economic strategies and
15 Singapore achieved 8.6% annual average GDP growth in the period 
1970-71, compared to 6.3% - 7.8% in the other ASEAN states. 
United Nations, Stat is t ical  Yearbook 1979/80, pp. 681-85.
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success in ensuring political s tabi l i ty were equally important 
factors . ^
The Politics of National Unity
The ASEAN governments fel t  the problem of developing and 
maintaining national unity on two different levels. First ly,  there 
was the dilemma of "stabil i ty versus participation": the issue of
which group or groups should wield political power, and how this power 
should be exercised. Secondly, there was the issue of how to resolve 
the conflicts caused by ethnic and cultural plurali ty,  involving both 
indigenous and "alien" (especially ethnic Chinese) minorities.
Political Stabil i ty and Popular Participation
By 1975, the ASEAN states had experienced a diverse selection of 
polit ical systems in the post-colonial period. But although popular 
participation in the polit ical process had been by no means tr ivial  in 
some cases, leaders in the region had often found Western-style 
democracy to be "inadequate in managing the conflicts that accompanied
17the modernizing process". In their concern to maintain stabil i ty,  
leaders in the ASEAN region frequently resorted to authoritarian rule 
in various forms.
16 For a succinct analysis of Singapore's economic progress, see 
Amina Tyabji, "The Economy", in Jon S T Quah, Chan Heng Chee and 
Seah Chee Meow (eds.), Government and Politics of Singapore 
(Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 25-44.
17 Kusuma, p. 17.
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In the confused s i tua t ion  fo l lowing the al legedly communist-
backed "attempted coup" of 1 October 1965, the Indonesian army led by
18General Suharto qu ick ly assumed contro l .  Whereas Sukarno had seen
the creation of a cohesive national id e n t i ty  from what he defined as
the dominant Indonesian p o l i t i c a l  streams (national ism, re l ig io n  and
communism) as a necessary prerequisi te fo r  e f fe c t ive  development,
Suharto adopted the motto of "development before p o l i t i c s "  and worked
19towards the e f fec t ive  d e p o l i t i c iza t io n  of Indonesian society. After
the Indonesian Communist Party had been e f fe c t i v e ly  eradicted by
physical violence and le g is la t ion  in 1965-66 and the n a t io n a l is t  PNI
and Muslim Parmusi demoralized by government interference in the
select ion of th e i r  leaders, the strongest opposition to the army's aim
of establ ishing a corporate state based on the Golkar ( " funct ional
groups") came from Nahdatul Ulama (NU), a conservative, rural-based 
20Islamic party. But despite Golkar's overwhelming v ic to ry  (with
62.8% of the vote) in the 1971 e lect ions, the regime fu r the r
emasculated the p o l i t i c a l  part ies by forc ing th e i r  merger in to  two
larger organizations "under leadership large ly  amenable to the
21government's wishes". Moreover, the " f lo a t in g  mass" p r inc ip le
d isq ua l i f ied  the rural population from p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t y  between
18 See Harold Crouch, The Army and P o l i t i c s  in Indonesia (Ithaca: 
Cornell Univers ity  Press, 1978), pp. 135-244.
19 See i b i d .,  pp. 245-72.
20 In the 1971 general e lect ions, NU won 18.3% of the vote despite 
large-scale in t im idat ion  and b a l lo t - r ig g in g  in favour of Golkar. 
Crouch, p. 270; Hamish McDonald, Suharto's Indonesia (Austra l ia :  
Fontana Books, 1980), p. 108.
21 Crouch, p. 271.
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elections. Nevertheless, popular opposition to the Suharto regime
remained widespread in 1975, and the military-dominated Golkar did not 
appear to have the potential to act as a sufficient channel for
popular aspirations and discontents to be expected in a modernizing 
society such as Indonesia.
Thailand was ruled, directly or indirectly, by the military
almost continuously after the armed forces overthrew the absolute
monarchy in 1932. During 1944-47 and 1973-76 there were brief
interludes of "democratic" civilian government, but the armed forces
demonstrated that they remained the ultimate arbiters of the political
process by concluding these interludes with military coups. In brief,
Thai poli t ics after 1932 became "a matter of competition between
22bureaucratic cliques for the benefits of government": within this
23"bureaucratic polity" the armed forces (principally the army) were
preeminent, owing to their monopoly of armed power. The values of a
strongly hierarchical social system, in which patron-client relations
played a central role, helped to sustain the bureaucratic polity.
Partnership between bureaucrats and business interests (both domestic
and foreign), and the legitimizing support of the monarchy and the
24Buddhist clergy were integral to the system. The military leaders
22 David A Wilson, Polit ics in Thailand (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1962), p. 277.
23 This term was f i r s t  used in relation to Thailand by Fred W Riggs
in his Thailand: The Modernization of a Bureaucratic Polity
(Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1966).
24 Girling, pp. 11-2, 78, 91.
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. . .  cemented th e i r  posit ions of power . . .  by convincing 
the people that representat ive government was a luxury 
to be granted only under cer ta in  ideal condit ions. 
There must be no threat of war, l i t t l e  or no domestic 
i n s t a b i l i t y ,  and an expanding, productive economy.25
The events of October 1973, when the regime led by Fie ld Marshals
Thanom and Praphat was overthrown by the combined weight of v i r t u a l l y
a l l  sections of urban society, with students in the vanguard,
represented the culmination of the growing p o l i t i c a l  awareness on the
Pf)part of the new social forces which modernization had created. The
ouster of the m i l i t a r y  regime did not, however, mean that the armed
forces and bureaucracy were reduced to p o l i t i c a l  ins ign i f icance.
Af ter  October 1973, pressure fo r  p o l i t i c a l ,  social and economic change
27continued throughout Thai land, but was resisted by the bureaucratic 
and m i l i t a r y  leadership who co r rec t ly  saw the growth in importance of 
autonomous p o l i t i c a l  part ies and p o l i t i c ia n s  as ser iously threatening 
th e i r  own power and inf luence. This resistance by the forces of the 
Establishment culminated in the October 1976 coup which reimposed 
m i l i t a r y  ru le .
The armed forces also played a v i t a l  ro le  in Phi l ippine p o l i t i c s ,  
though in a less overt manner than in Indonesia or Thai land. During 
President Marcos's f i r s t  term of o f f ic e  beginning in January 1966, the
25 David Morel 1 and Chai-Anan Samudavanija ,  P o l i t i c a l  Conf l ic t  in
Thai land: Reform, Reaction, Revolution (Cambridge, Mass.:
Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, 1981), p. 77.
26 G i r l in g ,  pp. 12-13, 120.
27 Robert F. Zimmerman, "Thailand 1975: Transit ion to Consti tu­
t iona l  Democracy Continues", Asian Survey, Vol . 16, No. 2 
(February 1976), p. 160.
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m i l i t a r y ' s  " c i v i c  act ion" ro le  helped him to bui ld a reputat ion as an
e f fe c t ive  and energetic leader. Although Marcos was re-e lected, with
an apparently large m a jo r i ty ,  a f te r  a b i t t e r  campaign in la te  1969,
the legit imacy of his unprecedented success in winning a second
28pres ident ia l  term did not go unchallenged. Marcos's opponents on
both Left  and Right bypassed const i tu t iona l  channels and challenged
his author i ty  by v io len t  means, providing him with a pretext fo r  the
29declarat ion of mart ia l  law in September 1972. While mart ial  law had 
the immediate e f fec t  of stamping out the lawlessness which had become 
r i f e ,  the advent of the "New Society" also involved an attempt by 
Marcos to d e p o l i t i c iz e  Phi l ipp ine society, with the m i l i t a r y  and
police dismantl ing the free press, c i v i l  r igh ts  and p o l i t i c a l
. • 30p a r t ie s .
Although Marcos's "New Society" was not guided by any e x p l i c i t
ideology, an emphasis on "development" f u l f i l l e d  an analogous ro le .
As in Indonesia a f te r  1966, Phi l ippine "developmentalism" was based on
the view of American-trained technocrats that i t  was necessary to
fu r the r  the in tegra t ion of the country into the world market by
encouraging increased flows of foreign investment and loans, and by
31the rapid expansion of primary exports. Land reform was a highly
28 Judith Stowe, Phi l ipp ines:  The Need for  a New Society (London:
I n s t i t u te  fo r  the Study of Con f l ic t ,  Con f l ic t  Studies No. 37, 
1973), p. 5.
29 I b i d . , pp. 5-6.
30 Robert B. Stauf fer ,  "Phi l ipp ine Authori tar ianism: Framework for
Peripheral "Development", Paci f ic  A f fa i rs ,  Vol. 50, No. 3 (Fal l  
1977), p. 376.
31 I b i d .,  p. 374.
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important component of the Marcos regime's platform af ter  the 
declarat ion of martial  law, but by the late  1970s i t  was clear that  
the New Society had done l i t t l e  to improve the pl ight  of the 
rural  poor. In e f f ec t ,  the regime's hope was s t i l l  that  the benefi ts  
of rapid aggregate growth would " t r ick le  down". But, as elsewhere in 
the ASEAN region, th i s  hope was not f u l f i l l ed .  Oligarchs (large and 
powerful landowners including the President,  his wife and the i r  
r e l a t i ve s ) ,  technocrats and senior mil i tary off icers  made spectacular 
gains in wealth, but at the same time all the indicat ions were that
op
poverty amongst the population as a whole increased af ter  1972.
Moreover, the martial  law regime effect ively deprived the general
population of const i tut ional  out le t s  for thei r  grievances.
While formally a mult i -par ty democracy, Singapore functioned as
v i r tua l ly  a one party s t a te  af ter  i t s  expulsion from Malaysia in 1965.
With the leadership of what was (until  Independence) the main
opposition party e i ther  imprisoned or in exi le,  Lee Kuan Yew's
People's Action Party (PAP) had l i t t l e  d i f f i cu l ty  in capturing and
holding all  pari i amentary seats in all general elect ions between 1965
and 1975. Although coercion (par t icular ly  through preventive
detention) was used to suppress opposition, the effect iveness ,
eff iciency and i ncor rup t ib i l i ty  of Lee's regime made i t  extremely
d i f f i c u l t  for opponents to advance credible a l ternat ive  po l i t i ca l  
33programmes.
32 See Phil ip Bowring, FEER, 27 March 1981, pp. 125-31.
33 See Chan Heng Chee, "Pol i t ical  Part ies" in Quah, Chan and Seah 
(eds . ) ,  pp. 146-72.
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National Unity and Ethnic Pluralism
In Malaysia, the questions of which group should rule and the 
role of ethnic minorities were inseparable. Owing to the racial 
composition of the Malayan Federation, in which the indigenous Malays 
constituted a bare majority and Chinese and Indians large minorities, 
communal issues dominated the political scene to the extent that other 
lines of polit ical cleavage such as class interest were subordinated. 
After independence in 1957, Malayan and later Malaysian polit ics were 
dominated by the Alliance of UMNO (United Malays' National 
Organization), the MCA (Malaysian Chinese Association) and the MIC 
(Malaysian Indian Congress). Although communal interests precluded 
the formation of a poli t ical ly significant non-communal party, they 
were not deep enough to prevent cooperation between these three rather 
conservative parties,  which gained the greatest allegiance in their 
respective racial communities. The 1957 Constitution embodied an 
agreement between UMNO and the MCA involving privileges for the Malay 
community in terms of public service employment, education, land 
ownership, the constitutional role of the Malay rulers and the choice 
of Islam as the national religion. Non-Malays, on the other hand, 
benefited from the relaxation of citizenship regulations, which 
increased their voting strength. More importantly, i t  was implicitly 
allowed that the Chinese could retain their dominance in business free 
from the persecution which similar communities had suffered elsewhere 
in Southeast Asia.^
34 R S Milne and Diane K Mauzy, Politics and Government in Malaysia 
(Singapore: Federal Publications, 1978), pp. 38-9.
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In 1963 the formation of Malaysia, involving the amalgamation of
the Malayan Federation with the British terr i tor ies  of Singapore,
Sabah and Sarawak disrupted the modus vivendi which the 1957
Constitution had achieved. Although Singapore retained an important
degree of autonomy under i ts own PAP government, i ts  relationship with
the Kuala Lumpur administration deteriorated rapidly. The conflict
centred on the PAP's unsuccessful attempt in the 1964 elections to
displace the MCA within the Alliance, and Lee Kuan Yew's subsequent
campaign for a non-communal "Malaysian Malaysia". While the addition
of Singapore's largely Chinese population to that of Malaya was
balanced by the simultaneous absorption into Malaysia of the
indigenous (but largely non-Malay) peoples of the Borneo terr i tor ies ,
there was widespread concern in the Malay community that the Chinese
would dominate a "Malaysian Malaysia" poli t ical ly as well as
economically. In the face of fears of large-scale racial violence,
the Kuala Lumpur government effectively expelled Singapore from the
35federation, less than two years after its formation. But the
separation of Singapore did not prevent violent racial clashes in May 
1969 after the Democratic Action Party (as the Malaysian wing of the 
PAP had been re-named) and other non-Malay parties made significant 
electoral gains.
The May 1969 riots provoked a thorough overhaul of the entire 
Malaysian political system. A Sedition Act placed restrict ions on the 
scope of political discussion, to prevent questioning of the 1957
35 See Charles Richard Ostrom, "A Core Interest Analysis of the 
Formation of Malaysia and the Separation of Singapore" 
(unpublished PhD thesis,  Claremont Graduate School and Universty 
Centre, 1971), pp. 175-256.
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Const i tu t ion ,  p a r t i c u la r l y  in terms of the Malays' "special pos i t ion" .
Under the New Economic Pol icy, f i rm action was taken to improve the
economic posi t ion of the Malays. By the time p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t y
resumed in la te  1970, the range of subjects open fo r  discussion had
been severely reduced. This opened the way fo r  cooperation between
the Al l iance and some of the opposition groups, and the July 1974
general elect ion was won by a s ix -party  "National Front".  The DAP
remained outside the government, but by the mid-1970s pari iamentary
opposit ion became in s ig n i f i c a n t  as the Front expanded to a ten-party
c o a l i t io n ,  winning Federal and State elect ions as a matter of 
36course.
Non-indigenous ethnic minor i t ies were not so p o l i t i c a l l y  
s ig n i f ic a n t  in the other ASEAN states as in Malaysia. In Indonesia, 
Thailand and the Phi l ipp ines,  the local ethnic Chinese communities 
t r a d i t i o n a l l y  f u l f i l l e d  the roles of f inanc ie rs ,  entrepreneurs and 
middlemen, thus gaining a disproport ionate ly  large economic ro le .  But 
these communities were proport iona l ly  much smaller than the i r  
Malaysian counterpart,  and in Thailand and the Phi l ipp ines were well 
integrated in to  society by the 1970s. In Indonesia, however, the 
Chinese rmained a d i s t i n c t ,  as well as economically powerful, 
community. Resentment against Indonesia's Chinese population erupted 
as part of the backlash fo l lowing the abortive coup of 1965, and in 
the 1970s the government t r ie d  without much success to transfe r  a
36 Milne and Mauzy, pp. 196-201. However, PAS (a conservative, but 
popu l is t ,  Malay party emphasizing Islamic values) was expelled 
from the National Front in 1977, and subsequently became a focus 
fo r  Malay opposit ion to UMNO and the Front.
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greater proportion of the economy from Chinese to indigenous control.
Paradoxically, Chinese economic interests were perpetuated
particularly through symbiotic, and allegedly sometimes corrupt,
business links with Indonesian military rulers from the President
down. By the mid-1970s, this collaboration had become a principal
37cause of popular resentment against the Suharto regime.
Virtually all of Singapore's population were immigrants or the
descendants of immigrants. The majority of the population was
ethnically Chinese, but there were minorities of Malays (about 15%)
and Indians (7%). The role of the majority Chinese community was not
a controversial polit ical issue, but the Singaporean government sought
to integrate the Malay minority into the wider community. However, by
every socioeconomic indicator the Malays lagged behind the Chinese
(and Indian) communities: for example, even in 1979 only 2.3% of
38Singaporeans educated to tert iary level were Malays.
As a result of a combination of ethnographic patterns and 
colonial policy, all the ASEAN states except Singapore included within 
their boundaries territorial ly-based ethnic minorities. Some of these 
minorities were unwilling to submit to polit ical domination by distant 
and culturally alien capitals.  Economic disparities between centre
37 For example, although the 15 January 1974 riots in Jakarta were 
precipitated by the visi t  of Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka, 
their  underlying cause was the collusion of foreign (especially 
Japanese) business interests with "Chinese entrepreneurs...  who 
in turn act as powerbrokers and fronts (tjukong) for the business 
interests of the Indonesian military". Justus M van der Kroef, 
Communism in Southeast Asia (London: Macmillan, 1981), p. 101.
See also Peter Sim, Asia Research Bulletin, 31 January 1974, 
pp. 2351-56.
38 Economist, 29 December 1979.
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and periphery, often compounded by growth, tended to accentuate such
separatist  tendencies. In Indonesia, armed separatist struggles in
northern Sumatra, Irian Jaya and (after December 1975) East Timor
39evinced continuing provincial resistance to Jakarta's rule.
In Thailand, inter-cultural host i l i ty and the economic 
deprivation of the periphery contributed to rebellion in three 
regions. In the north, hill t ribes (particularly the Hmong) resented 
the intrusion of land-hungry lowland Thais and provided the original 
bases for the Communist Party of Thailand's insurgency in the region. 
In the northeast, communist-led rebellion was rooted more in regional 
particularism (arising from poor economic and social conditions, and 
pride in local culture and language) than in ideology. The widest 
cultural divergence in Thailand was in the far south, where Muslim 
Malays formed the majority. But the armed separatist groups which 
challenged Bangkok's authority in this region were characterized by 
disunity and general lack of polit ical c re d ib i l i ty .^
In the southern Philippines President Marcos's declaration of 
martial law in September 1972 effectively "precluded any hope for
39 See Justus M van der Kroef, Patterns of Conflict in Eastern
Indonesia (London: Insti tute for the Study of Conflict, Conflict
Studies No. 79, 1977); Keith Suter, West Irian, East Timor and 
Indonesia (London: Minority Rights Group Report No. 42, 1979);
David Jenkins, FEER, 24 June 1977, pp. 29-30; and Peter Hastings, 
"National Integration in Indonesia: the Case of Irian Jaya", in
Lim Joo-Jock and Vani S. (eds.) Armed Separatism in Southeast 
Asia (Singapore: Insti tute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1984),
pp. 129-46.
40 See Girling, pp. 263-67 and Uthai Dulyakasem, "Musiim-Mal ay
Separatism in Southern Thailand: Factors Underlying the
Political Revolt" and Omar Farouk, "The Historial and Trans­
national Dimensions of Malay-Muslim Separatism in Southern 
Thailand", in Lim and Vani (eds.),  pp. 217-57.
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41struggle through peaceful means" by the local Muslim population 
against development stra teg ies which involved the loss of t ra d i t io n a l  
lands. The imposition of mart ial  law prec ip i ta ted an open rebe l l ion  
led by the Moro National Libera t ion Front (MNLF). Despite d iv is ion  
w i th in  the leadership, the MNLF was a fa r  more united and e f fec t ive  
force (numbering about 50,000 armed guer i l las  in 1973) than the Thai 
Muslim groups.
Nowhere in Southeast Asia was the a r t i f i c i a l i t y  of post-colonia l
state forms better i l l u s t r a te d  than in Malaysia, where the Sabah and
Sarawak state governments were allowed to re ta in  considerably more
autonomy than th e i r  peninsular counterparts. Athough peninsular
p o l i t i c a l  part ies had pa ra l le l  organizations in the Borneo states,
essen t ia l ly  non-communal part ies favouring a greater degree of state
autonomy secured a leading ro le  in government, sometimes including a
place in the federal National Front c o a l i t io n .  Ethnic dif ferences and
Borneo's great resource wealth helped to maintain separatist sentiment
42in Sabah and Sarawak.
The Impact of Uncertain Legitimacy on Perceptions 
of and Reactions to Developments in Indochina
The evidence suggests tha t ,  notwithstanding impressive rates of 
economic growth, the ASEAN governments had been by no means uniformly
41 El iseo R Mercado, "Cul ture, Economics and Revolt in Mindanao: 
The Origins of the MNLF and the P o l i t i c s  of Moro Separatism", in 
Lim and Vani (eds.) ,  p. 161.
42 See R S Milne and K J Ratnam, Malaysia - -  New States in a New
Nation: P o l i t i c a l  Development of Sarawak and Sabah in Malaysia
(London: Frank Cass, 1974).
118 -
successful in resolv ing the dilemmas of na t ion-bu i ld ing by the time of 
the Indochinese communists' v ic to r ies  in 1975. For th is  reason, the 
legit imacy of some of the ASEAN regimes was facing increasingly 
serious chal lenges. But rather than implement the p o l i t i c a l ,  social 
and economic reforms necessary to undercut such chal lenges, the ASEAN 
governments commonly responded by t rea t ing  these challenges as threats 
to the 's e cu r i ty '  or ' s t a b i l i t y '  of the s t a t e . ^  This confusion of 
national secur i ty  with regime secur i ty ,  and p a r t i c u la r ly  the absence 
of any sincere ly-held notion of " loyal  opposi t ion" , contr ibuted to 
growing po lar iza t ion  of p o l i t i c a l  c o n f l i c t ,  as ru l ing  groups 
suppressed or co-opted opposit ion elements which had once provided a 
channel fo r  the expression of a l te rna t ive  viewpoints on p o l i t i c a l ,  
social and economic issues. In Malaysia, the ru l ing  coa l i t io n  
frequent ly  absorbed opposit ion part ies .  In Indonesia the Suharto 
regime forced the six main opposition part ies to combine in to  two 
larger and more eas i ly  con t ro l lab le  groupings. Thai p o l i t i c s ,  even in 
the 1973-76 period, offered few opportunit ies fo r  ideological ly-based 
p o l i t i c a l  groups: parl iament became dominated by competing business 
in te res t  groups. The leg is la tu re  in the Phi l ippines was reduced a 
mere "rubber-stamping" assembly. In a l l  f i v e  ASEAN states, rigorous 
in te rna l  securi ty  and "anti -subvers ion" le g is la t io n  fu r the r  res t r ic ted  
p o l i t i c a l  opposit ion. This suppression of opposition in the 1970s
43 In Malaysia, fo r  example, the government held thousands of 
p o l i t i c a l  pr isoners in the mid-1970s claiming that they were a l l  
communists or communist sympathizers. But the fac t  that the 
detainees included prominent members of the opposition Democratic 
Action Party suggested that the ru l in g  co a l i t io n  was defining 
"subversion" so as to re in force i t s  own posi t ion.  Amnesty Annual 
Report 1979 (London: Amnesty In te rna t iona l ,  1979), pp. 174-76.
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fu r the r  undermined governmental legit imacy and so helped to create a
44"v ic ious c i r c le  of i n s t a b i l i t y " .
The most extreme manifestat ion of the uncertain legit imacy of 
some of the ASEAN governments, which showed themselves unwil l ing or 
unable to make the reforms necessary to break th is  cycle, was the 
continuing resort to armed rebe l l ion  by many of those in under­
pr iv i leged regions or classes throughout the region. As well as the 
phenomenon of insurgency by te r r i t o r ia l l y -b a s e d  ethnic separatis t 
movements, communist-led revolut ionary struggle remained an important 
secur i ty  concern fo r  the ASEAN governments.
While the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), previously the most
widely-supported and dynamic p o l i t i c a l  force in Indonesia, was
devastated by the army-inspired purges and massacres which fol lowed
the attempted coup of October 1965, and subsequently los t  v i r t u a l l y
45a l l  sign if icance as an active p o l i t i c a l  organization, elsewhere in 
the ASEAN region communists continued to challenge governmental 
au thor i ty .
Although the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) was e f fe c t i v e ly  
defeated in both m i l i t a r y  and p o l i t i c a l  terms by the B r i t i s h  colonial 
and Malayan au thor i t ies  during the "Emergency" which ended in 1960, 
from the early 1970s there was a revival in the Party 's  m i l i t a r y  
operations. The sp l in te r ing  of the CPM into three fact ions in 1974 in 
some ways strengthened i t s  overal l  impact as the CPM (Marxist- 
Lenin is t )  and CPM (Revolutionary Faction) elements moved towards
44 Kusuma, p. 29.
45 van der Kroef, Communism in Southeast Asia, pp. 191-92; Crouch,
pp. 62-68, 226.
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broader mul t i - rac ia l  recruitment and innovatory t a c t i c s ,  including 
urban guer i l la  warfare .® In Singapore, however, the continuing 
success of the RAP's economic and social programmes undercut support 
for revolut ionary ideology (which in the 1950s had been widespread in 
the i s land) .  By the 1970s CPM act iv i ty  in Singapore had been reduced 
to an ins igni f i cant  level .  But on the Borneo border between Malaysia 
and Indonesia, the North Kalimantan Communist Party also re-emerged as 
a f ight ing force in the early 1970s. ^
From the l a te  1960s, surviving members of the old Communist Party
4ftof the Phi l ippines (CPP), which had led the Huk rebel l ion against 
the Manila government in the early 1950s, were a t t rac ted to a new, 
Maoist CPP and i t s  mi l i tary wing, the New People's Army (NPA). NPA 
guer i l la  ac t iv i t y  was curtai led by the s t r i c t e r  measures avai lable to 
the government, and i t s  pol i t ical  appeal undercut by the implemen­
tat ion of land reforms, following the imposition of martial  law in 
1972. But in the late  1970s the Phil ippine revolut ionaries 
demonstrated a marked resurgence as the New Society ' s  reform programme
46 J Clementson, "Malaysia in the "Seventies: Communist Resurgence
and Government Response", Journal of the Royal United Services 
I n s t i t u t e , Vol. 124, No. 4 (December 1979), pp. 52-53; S Kumar, 
"The Spl i t  within the Communist Party of Malaya --  a Tale of 
Ideologies",  Asian Defence Journal , March/April 1977, pp. 11, 13; 
Richard Sim, Malaysia: Containing the Communist Insurgency
(London: I ns t i tu t e  for the Study of Confl ict ,  Confl ict  Studies
No. 110, 1979), pp. 7-9.
47 Sim, "Malaysia: Containing the Communist Insurgency", pp. 16-7; 
Clementson, pp. 53-4.
48 Huk was an abbreviation for Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan 
(People's Liberation Army), as the Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon 
(People's Army against Japan) or Hukbalahap had been restyled in 
November 1948.
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faltered,  and as the Marcos regime became ever more firmly entrenched
49and unassailable by constitutional means.
Drawing i ts support particularly from regional and ethnic
antagonisms, by 1970 the Communist Party of Thailand was poli t ical ly
and mil i tari ly active in three peripheral regions: in the northeast
amongst the culturally dist inct and Lao-speaking Isan people; in the
north amongst disaffected hi l l t r ibes ,  particularly the Hmong; and in
the south, in cooperation with the CPM and sometimes with Islamic
separatists.  As in the Philippines, erosion of the polit ical middle
ground boosted the communists' strength: the CPT's membership base
was significantly widened by the accretion of students and other
50radicals fleeing Bangkok after the October 1976 coup.
Although the Malayan and Thai Parties began as off-shoots of the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) with their main support among ethnic 
Chinese, and the Indonesian and Philippine Parties were also closely 
associated with the CCP in their early years, the material support 
given by Beijing to these organizations was never very great. To be 
sure, the CCP provided broad political support for communist 
insurgencies in what became "the ASEAN region", including fac i l i t i es  
for propaganda broadcasting. But China donated very l i t t l e  military 
equipment to the guerillas, except to CPT-led hill tribes in northern
49 Alex Turpin, New Society's Challenge in the Philippines (London: 
Insti tute for the Study of Conflict, Conflict Studies No. 122, 
1980), pp. 5-8; Stowe, pp. 12-15; Rodney Tasker, FEER, 21 August 
1981, pp. 17-24.
50 See Girling, pp. 252-68 and Thomas A Marks, Thailand: The
Threatened Kingdom (London: Institute for the Study of Conflict,
Conflict Studies No. 115, 1980), pp. 8-14.
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51Thailand in the early 1970s. Until t he i r  victory in 1975, and even
afterwards,  the Vietnamese communists had even fewer resources to
52spare for supporting revolutionary change outside Indochina. In 
general ,  communists in the ASEAN s ta tes  had to find the i r  own arms 
and, while i t  was sometimes convenient for the ASEAN governments to 
claim that  the communist insurgencies in thei r  countries were 
sponsored by external communist powers (par t i cular ly  the People's 
Republic of China and Vietnam), there is ample evidence that  these 
rebel l ions were rooted almost ent i re ly  in domestic, indeed local ,  
pol i t i ca l  and socioeconomic issues rather  than in any external ly-  
inspired conspiracy to impose communism in the region.
The impact of the evidently f rag i l e  legitimacy of the ASEAN 
governments on thei r  perceptions of, and reactions to,  Indochinese 
developments in the 1975-81 period was essent ia l l y  f ive- fold .
F i r s t l y ,  the ASEAN s t a te s '  chronic domestic problems, of which 
communist insurgency, armed ethnic separatism and rac ia l ly- inspi red 
r io t s  (as experienced by Malaysia in 1969) were extreme symptoms, 
heightened the ASEAN governments' sense of vulnerabi l i ty  in relat ion 
to the emergence of a new po l i t i c a l ,  economic and social order in 
South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. Seen in th is  perspective,  the 
communist successes in Indochina impl ici t ly posed a profound challenge 
to the ASEAN governments. Whereas the ASEAN regimes had demonstrated 
considerable ab i l i ty  in foster ing the creat ion of wealth, they had
51 Girl ing,  p. 269; Jay Taylor,  China and Southeast Asia: Peking's
Relations with Revolutionary Movements (New York: Praeger,
1974), pp. 251-357.
52 See Chapter 6, pp. 192-94 below.
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often failed to distribute this wealth sufficiently equitably to
guarantee the loyalty of all classes and regions. Although the
Indochinese communists' main achievements by 1975 lay in making war
rather than wealth, there was considerable unease in the ASEAN
governments that the Vietnamese communists, in particular,  might
demonstrate the same prowess in economic reconstruction as they had in
their multifaceted war against South Vietnam and i ts American ally.
The proven abili ty of the Vietnamese communists to plan and implement
long-term strategies contrasted with the lack of direction which was
often apparent in some of the ASEAN governments' development policies,
particularly in the case of Thailand. Moreover, the communists'
ideology emphasized the distribution of wealth -- the ASEAN
54governments' weakest point.
Some influential policy-makers in the ASEAN countries stressed
that the United States could play an important role in maintaining
55regional peace by assisting Vietnam's post-war reconstruction. But
53 See, for example, Ali Moertopo, "Future Indonesian-U.S.
Relations: A View from Jakarta", Pacific Community, Vol. 7, No.
4 (July 1976), p. 582. According to Moertopo, Indochina and the 
ASEAN states were in "direct economic competition".
54 Malaysian Minister of Home Affairs Ghazali Shafie appeared to
recognize the implicit socio-economic challenge posed to the 
ASEAN governments' legitimacy by communist Indochina when he 
said: "All societies be they Communist or non-Communist have to
just i fy their validity and their relevance to the people they
serve.. .  Continuing validity and relevance to the society it  
serves is the perpetual goal that the Malaysian polit ical process 
orients i t sel f  towards". "On the domino theory" (radio
broadcast, 6 May 1975), Foreign Affairs Malaysia, Vol. 8, No. 2 
(June 1979), p. 9.
55 See, for example, statement by Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam 
Malik, Antara (the official Indonesian News Agency) in English, 
1010 gmt, 25 April 1975 (SWB FE/4889/A3/8, 28 April 1978).
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more general ly,  the ASEAN s ta te s '  leaders were concerned that  large-
scale American and Japanese aid should not be given to communist
Indochina, as th i s  might both divert  assistance from the ASEAN
countries and help the i r  ideological r ivals  to triumph in what was
widely viewed in the ASEAN s ta tes  as a confrontation between two
56developmental models.
While the ASEAN leaders '  s t ress  on the need for "national 
57res i l ience" evinced t he i r  concern with the implici t  socioeconomic 
challenge posed by the communist victor ies in Indochina, they did not 
publicly s t ress  th i s  aspect of the "threat" to the same degree as, for 
example, the danger posed by the Indochinese communists' alleged links 
with communist insurgents in the ASEAN countries.  There are two 
possible explanations for t h i s .  F i r s t ly ,  the socioeconomic challenge 
of communist Indochina was considerably less tangible and quant i f iable  
compared to the types of "threat" from Indochina which the ASEAN 
governments did choose to emphasize. Secondly, to place, publicly,  
great  emphasis on the socioeconomic vulnerabi l i ty of the ASEAN s ta tes  
would have been tantamount to an acknowledgement by the ASEAN 
governments of t he i r  own f a i l u r e ,  thus fur ther  undermining the i r  
legitimacy and boosting opposition groups.
As i t  happened, concern that  communist Indochina (and Vietnam in 
par t i cular)  would become a model for the development of the ASEAN 
region appeared ext raordinar i ly  ill-founded by the end of the 1970s.
56 This was par t i cular ly  evident in Indonesian thinking.  See David 
Jenkins,  FEER, 24 June 1977, pp. 15-16.
57 See section on "Responses to the Pol i t ical  and Socioeconomic 
challenge of Indochina, 1975-77" in Chapter 9, pp. 362-77 below.
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Indeed, by 1981 the size of Singapore's economy was roughly the same
as that of Vietnam, which had a population twenty times as large. The
aggregate Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the ASEAN countries (whose
total population was about 270 million) was fourteen or fifteen times
that of Vietnam (with a population of 60 million). Thailand's GDP was
58nearly three times that of all Indochina. But Vietnam's post-war
reconstruction had been severely hampered by the cessation of Chinese
aid and the failure of expected US and Japanese assistance to
materialize. Bad weather adversely affected food production and the
Vietnamese communists' peacetime planning and management proved
unexpectedly deficient.  However, these setbacks were essentially
unpredictable in 1975, when the ASEAN governments made clear their
recognition that the Indochinese communist victories presented the
populations of the remainder of non-communist Southeast Asia with the
spectacle of the overthrow of poli t ical ,  economic and social
institutions that frequently had equivalents in their own countries.
The ouster of anti-communist, free enterprise systems, together with
the monarchy in Laos and Cambodia's Buddhist religion demonstrated
59vividly that the established order was not necessarily immutable.
The second way in which the ASEAN governments' domestic 
insecurity affected their attitudes and policies in response to 
Indochinese events was closely related to the socioeconomic challenge 
impicit in the communist victories. In order to maintain their
58 See "Regional Performance Figures", Asia Yearbook 1983 (Hongkong: 
Far Eastern Economic Review, 1983), pp. 6-7.
59 The reactions of the ASEAN governments to the socioeconomic 
threats they perceived in 1975 are discussed in Chapter 9, pp. 
362-414 below.
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legitimacy in the face of the perceived challenge of communist 
Indochina's alternative developmental model, the ASEAN governments saw 
continuing economic growth as vi tal .  There was a pervasive belief in 
the ASEAN capitals that the benefits of growth would "trickle down" to 
relatively deprived classes, regions and ethnic groups, ameliorating 
the social and economic contradictions which might increase the appeal 
of the "Indochinese model" to marginalized elements in the ASEAN 
countries. For continued economic growth, it  was highly important to 
maintain the confidence of both foreign and local investors: this 
required the ASEAN governments not to overemphasize the security 
implications of the communist takeovers in Indochina, while 
simultaneously showing that they were taking prudent measures to deter 
any military threat which might arise from the new situation. But 
military expenditure was limited by the requirement that i t  should not 
become a drain on national resources to the extent that other, 
developmental programmes were jeopardized.
Thirdly, the domestic vulnerabilities of the ASEAN governments 
suggested that they might find some political u t i l i ty  in manipulating 
foreign policy issues for domestic political benefit. It is widely 
recognized that such manipulation of foreign policy issues plays a 
major role in many Third World states as a governmental strategy for 
aggregating power in the face of domestic challenges.^ A government 
may attempt to improve its domestic standing by portraying i tself  as 
the nation's defender against real, or exaggerated, external threats: 
the spectre of such threats can be used to distract the population
60 See W Howard Wriggins, The Ruler's Imperative: Strategies for
Political Survival in Asia and Africa (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1969), pp. 221-38.
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from domestic problems, to ju s t i f y  tightened po l i t ica l  control and to 
ra l ly  disaffected elements which might otherwise be working against 
the government. The regime may also attempt to undermine the
c red ib i l i ty  of domestic opponents by portraying them as agents of the 
external enemy.^
The relat ive absence of po l i t ica l  pluralism in the ASEAN states 
implied not only that their authoritarian governments needed to use 
legit imizing mechanisms other than (or as well as) the electoral 
process, but also that foreign policy would be formulated by narrowly- 
based e l i te  groups. Although there were certainly differences in 
att i tude towards foreign policy issues between various elements in the 
ASEAN governments' bureaucracies, foreign policy-making was influenced 
to a far lesser degree by the "p o l i t i ca l ,  economic, cultural and 
professional pressure groups with an articulated interest and stake in 
foreign policy and with a somewhat well-defined power based in 
society" which played such an important role in Western democracies. 
This relat ive lack of domestic constraints tended to give the top 
level of the ASEAN states' po l i t ica l  hierarchies great lati tude in 
foreign policy-making. In Indonesia and Thailand (and to a lesser 
extent the Philippines) this meant that m i l i tary  perspectives were 
l ike ly  to play a crucial role --  more p lu ra l is t ic  foreign policy­
making processes might have assigned greater importance to economic, 
diplomatic and cultural factors and less weight to mil i tary  and 
ideological issues in assessing the security implications of
61 Ib id ., pp. 221-36.
62 Arnfinn Jorgensen-Dahl, Regional Organization and Order in South-
East Asia (London: Macmillan, 1982), p. 160.
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Indochinese developments and in responding to these assessments.
Fifthly,  issues relating to the ethnic Chinese communities in 
their countries were an important influence on various ASEAN 
governments' often divergent attitudes in relation to the Sino-
Vietnamese conflict from 1978, and hence their policies towards the 
Cambodian conflict.  In particular,  the need for the Indonesian and 
Malaysian governments to demonstrate to their pribumi and bumiputra^  
domestic constituencies that they were intent on resisting any 
expansion of Chinese political influence into Southeast Asia, tended
to moderate their opposition to Vietnam's policies in Cambodia.
These five aspects of the influence which domestic poli t ical ,
social and economic problems exerted on the ASEAN governments'
handling of their security concerns with Indochina were not
necessarily always compatible. For example, a government's wish to
reassure foreign investors that developments in Indochina posed no
serious security threat would contradict the same administration's
attempts to use "the Vietnamese threat" as a just if icat ion for
65tightened domestic political control. Nevertheless, at various 
times, the behaviour of the ASEAN governments in relation to Indochina 
evinced the operation of each of the five factors.
63 See Robert 0 Tilman, The Enemy Beyond: External Threat
Perceptions in the ASEAN Region (Singapore: Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies, Research Notes and Discussions Paper No. 
42, 1984), pp. 24-7.
64 The indigenous inhabitants of Indonesia and Malaysia, 
respectively.
65 On occasion, however, different elements (for instance, the 
Foreign Affairs and Defence Ministries) within one government 
might use these apparently contradictory arguments 
simultaneously.
PART TWO
THE NATURE OF THE ASEAN STATES' SECURITY CONCERNS WITH INDOCHINA
CHAPTER 5
THE ASEAN STATES' PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC AND DIRECT 
MILITARY THREATS FROM INDOCHINA, 1975-81
La rge ly  because i t  prov ided a j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  the American and 
a l l i e d  involvement on the ant i -communist  s ide in the Second Indochina 
War, the idea t h a t  the c o l lap s e  of  the Thieu and Lon Nol regimes ( in  
South Vietnam and Cambodia r e s p e c t i v e l y )  in 1975 would i n e v i t a b l y  
t h re a te n  the s e c u r i t y  o f  the ASEAN sta tes  had cons iderab le  appeal f o r  
many Western observers .  The appeal of  the "domino theo ry "  extended to  
the US leadersh ip ,  w i th  Pres iden t  Ford r e i t e r a t i n g  i t s  v a l i d i t y ^  soon 
before  the f a l l  o f  Phnom Penh and Saigon. To be sure,  the non­
communist Indochinese regimes co l lapsed more or less  s im u l taneous ly .  
But spec ia l  f a c to r s  l i n k e d  the fa te s  of  Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, 
and the s i m p l i s t i c  domino theo ry  was by no means e qu a l l y  a p p l i c a b le  to  
the r e s t  of  Southeast As ia .
In the Cold War atmosphere of  1954 - -  when Eisenhower f i r s t
2
enuncia ted the domino theo ry  - -  the "Free World" was perceived by 
Western po l icy-makers  to  be chal lenged by a m o n o l i t h i c ,  expans ion is t  
communist t h r e a t .  By 1975, though, the communist m ono l i th  was known 
to  have d i s in te g r a te d  a decade and a h a l f  e a r l i e r ,  and the two 
compet ing communist g rea t  powers ( the Sov ie t  Union and China) both 
wished f o r  detente w i th  Washington.
1 P re s id e n t ia l  News Conference, 3 A p r i l  1975, in  Pub l ic  Papers of
the P res iden ts :  Gerald R Ford, 1975, V o l . 1 (Washington DC:
Government P r i n t i n g  O f f i c e ,  1977), p. 414.
2 P r e s id e n t ia l  News Conference, 7 A p r i l  1954, in  Pub l ic  Papers of
the Pres iden ts :  Dwight D Eisenhower, 1954 (Washington DC:
Government P r i n t i n g  O f f i c e ,  1960), p. 383.
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In these circumstances, i t  seemed unlikely that either Moscow or 
Peking would back any overt challenge to the ASEAN region -- an area 
that was clearly an American sphere of interest (through i ts economic, 
polit ical and military links with the West), despite Washington's 
inclination to disengage i tsel f  militarily from the region since the 
Paris peace agreement. It  appeared equally unlikely that Vietnam -- 
the only Indochinese state with human and military resources 
sufficient to represent a direct threat to the ASEAN countries -- 
could make any aggressive moves without considerable support from 
either of the two communist giants. A further indicator against the 
likelihood of Vietnam directing its resources towards terr i tor ial  
expansion was the emphasis that Hanoi might reasonably be expected to 
place on post-war economic and social reconstruction. Furthermore, 
any invasion of the ASEAN region by Vietnam would necessarily be on 
land, by way of Cambodia and/or Laos. Bearing in mind the already 
evident friction between Phnom Penh and Hanoi, i t  seemed unlikely that 
the former would allow the l a t t e r ' s  forces to traverse i ts terri tory 
in circumstances short of war between the two (which did not seem 
likely in 1975). Neither could the security of Vietnamese supply 
lines be guaranteed through Laos, which was not completely under 
communist control until the end of 1975.
Threat Assessments in 1975
Because the ASEAN governments published very few definitive 
statements regarding their threat perceptions, there are profound 
difficult ies in attempting to analyse how they assessed the relevance 
to their countries'  security of the strategic intentions and
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capabi l i t i es  of the Indochinese s ta tes  af ter  1975. Nevertheless,
statements by government pol i t i c ians  in the ASEAN s t a te s ,  though
usually l imited in scope, appeared to indicate an appreciation that
the "domino theory" was unlikely to apply to what remained of non-
3
communist Southeast Asia, at least  in the short  to medium term. 
Moreover, the ASEAN governments real ized that  there was a need to 
assuage the concerns of both the populace and foreign investors with 
regard to the new regional circumstances.  Prophecies of doom could be 
s e l f - f u l f i l l i n g  by encouraging a bel ief  in the i nev i t ab i l i t y  of a 
communist takeover in the general population and by causing the f l i gh t  
of foreign capital  or a slowing of new capital  inflow, with possibly
4
disast rous effects  on national development.
Although the ASEAN governments had good reasons to be confident 
that  communist successes in Indochina would not foreshadow thei r  own 
demise, there was nevertheless unease in the ASEAN capi ta l s  as i t  
became clear that  the communists would win. Even i f ,  object ively,  the 
threat  to ASEAN's members was minimal in the short  to medium term, the 
consolidation of Vietnam as a united communist s t a te  with the largest  
armed forces in the region (strengthened with the capture from
3 For example, Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew noted the
implications of the embryonic Vietnamese-Cambodian dispute at an 
early stage.  Interview with Lee, quote by Singapore home service 
in English, 1330 gmt, 3 May 1975 (SWB FE/4896/A3/8, 6 May 1975).
4 Thus Jusuf Wanandi of the inf luent ial  Indonesian "think-tank"
CSIS (Centre for St rategic  and International  Studies) asserted:  
"An image tha t  Thailand and other ASEAN countries are in a panic 
has to be prevented from developing, both for securi ty and
economic reasons.  Capital f l i gh t  or a slowdown in new capital
inflows may severely hamper national development. . ." Jusuf
Wanandi, Securi ty Dimensions of the Asia-Pacific Region in the 
1980s (Jakarta:  Centre for Strategic and International  Studies,
M ) ,  p. 63.
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Saigon's forces of large quant i t ies  of modern US-supplied equipment) 
const i tuted a dramatic sh i f t  in the regional balance of power.
Thai Perceptions
Thailand,  the only ASEAN s ta te  sharing land borders with
Indochina had more reasons to fear the advent of communist regimes
there than the Associat ion' s  other members. For hundreds of years the
Thais had been sens i t ive  to a threat  from Vietnam. During the Second
Indochina War, Bangkok had backed American pol icies  in Vietnam with
the intent ion of keeping this  t radi t iona l  r ival  divided, while
simultaneously attempting to maintain Thai influence in a part i t ioned
Laos and to cu l t i va t e  f r iendly rela t ions  with Lon Nol's Cambodia. In
1975 t h i s  s t ra tegy had collapsed and Thailand faced a united Vietnam
which not only viewed Bangkok askance for i t s  enthusiast ic  support of
America's role  in Indochina, but which also possibly intended to
5
dominate Thai land's  t rad i t i ona l  buffer zone in Laos and Cambodia.
The rap id i ty  of the communists' successes in early 1975 did 
prompt a degree of panic in Bangkok, with one newspaper claiming that  
"the discredi ted domino theory . . .  already appears to be working".^ A 
specif ic Thai fear  was that  the Vietnamese and Laotian communists had
5 Nevertheless,  Bangkok continued to compete with Hanoi for 
influence in Laos and Cambodia, although on less favourable terms 
than h i ther to .  Soon af ter  the communist takeovers,  Chatchai 
Choonhavan (the Thai Foreign Minister) declared that  Thailand 
would l ike  Laos and Cambodia to remain strong and neutral ,  and to 
continue t he i r  "buffer" role to "prevent aggression against 
Thailand".  S t r a i t s  Times, 31 July 1975.
6 "Can we be the next domino to fa l l?"  (Edi tor ia l ) ,  Bangkok Post , 
1 March 1975.
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ambitions to detach some or a l l  of northeast Thai land. According to 
what was al leged to be a document summarizing a b r ie f ing  given to 
senior North Vietnamese army o f f ice rs  in January 1975, Hanoi aimed to
. . .  create a l iberated area 50-100 km deep along the 
Mekong River, p a r t i c u la r l y  in the v i c i n i t y  of 
Vientiane, which can become a protectorate of both the 
un i f ied Vietnamese nation and Laos.^
The main aim of " l ib e ra t in g "  the west bank of the Mekong would 
ostensib ly be to ensure complete control over a l l  the major dams on 
the r i v e r ,  fo r  hydro-e lec tr ic  power and i r r i g a t io n  purposes. The use 
of d i rec t  m i l i t a r y  force to establ ish the Vietnamese-Laoti an 
"protectora te" was e x p l i c i t l y  prescribed in the document, but i t  was 
predicted that the "maximum object ives" could not be achieved "before
o
the 1976/77 of fens ive".  But although the document may have been 
g
genuine, i t  may have been part of a f e a s i b i l i t y  study rather than a 
re f le c t io n  of f i rm  Vietnamese po l icy .  As i t  happened, no such move 
was made against northeast Thailand in the 1975-81 period, but 
elements w i th in  the Thai government and securi ty  forces were 
frequently  to re i te ra te  th e i r  fears regarding Hanoi's and Vientiane's 
po l ic ies  towards the area - -  more usual ly with the emphasis on th e i r  
l inks  with the Communist Party of Thailand.
The alarmism of early 1975 and subsequently was pa r t ly  inspired 
by the Thai p o l i t i c a l  r ight-wing as part of i t s  struggle to assert
7 Quoted from a document al legedly stolen by a North Vietnamese 
defector to Laos. Pipake, "Document discloses Hanoi's intent ions 
towards Thai land", Bangkok Post, 30 March 1975.
8 Ib id .
9 I t  could have been a fab r ica t ion  of Thai m i l i t a r y  in te l l igence .
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i t s e l f  over the more l iberal  forces that  had entered the Thai 
po l i t i ca l  arena since the overthrow of the mi l i tary regime in October 
1973. In contrast ,  the democrat ically-elected governments in 1975-76 
recognized the importance of ensuring that  a mood of defeatism did not 
prevail  and that  the f l igh t  of foreign capital  was not encouraged. So 
the of f ic ia l  declaratory response from Bangkok attempted to dispel 
fears that  Indochina might become a launching pad for di rect  
aggression against Thailand. In the words of the Bangkok Post , soon 
af ter  the fal l  of Phnom Penh and Saigon:
For f i f teen years,  the mi l i ta ry  government played "the 
boy who cried wolf" with our populace, crying 
"Communist" when they wanted foreign and or fur ther  
power. Today we no longer have to cry wolf: the wolf 
is at our doorl^O
By the end of April 1975 -- a matter of days af ter  the f al l  of
Phnom Penh -- acting Supreme Commander Krit Sivara,  who had ea r l ie r
been reassuring to the extent  only of saying that  the f ight ing in
Vietnam and Cambodia had "not yet reached Thai land" ,^  denied reports
12that  communist forces were poised to invade. Foreign Minister 
Chatchai Choonhavan emphasized that  he foresaw no problems in
10 "The wolf is at the door" (Edi tor ia l ) ,  Bangkok Post , 12 May 1975. 
I ronical ly,  the Bangkok Post had i t s e l f  played an important role 
in supporting the government's cr ies  of "Communist", and 
continued to publish alarmist  a r t i c l es  concerning the "Vietnamese 
threat"  af ter  the 1975 communist v ic tor ies .  See, for example, 
"Could i t  happen here?",  Bangkok Post , 14 December 1975, which 
claimed that  "an invasion across the Mekong could come at any 
t ime".
11 Bangkok home service,  0001 gmt, 23 April 1975 (SWB/FE/4886/A3/11, 
24 April 1975).
12 Bangkok home service,  1300 gmt, 26 April 1975 (SWB/FE/4891/A3/12, 
30 April 1975).
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re la t ions  with Cambodia as long as that  country preserved i t s  
13"neu t r a l i t y " . A month l a t e r ,  af ter  the fa l l  of both Phnom Penh and
Saigon, the Bangkok Post had also moderated i t s  e a r l i e r  posi t ion,
14admitting that  "doom doesn' t  seem to be so close af ter  a l l " .  Even
though exchanges of f i r e  occurred between Thai forces and the i r  Khmer
Rouge and Pathet Lao counterparts as the communists consolidated t he i r
control of Cambodia and Laos, these incidents were played down by 
15Bangkok, with acting Prime Minister Pramarn Adireksan assert ing in
July 1975 that  he did " . . .  not believe that  there will be any violent  
incidents originat ing from the neighbouring c o u n t r i e s " . ^  
Nevertheless,  Bangkok attempted to ensure that  any large-scale  
incursion from across i t s  borders would be repulsed: although the
border i t s e l f  was defended only by Border Patrol Police uni ts ,  these 
were backed by considerable numbers of more heavily-armed army troops 
j us t  behind the bo rde r . ^
The Other ASEAN States '  Perceptions
The other ASEAN governments, more physically di s tant  from 
Indochina and without Bangkok's record of anti-communist intervention 
there,  had less reason than t he i r  Thai counterpart  to fear  any 
immediate, di rect  securi ty threa t  from the new communist regimes. A 
di rec t  Vietnamese attack on any of the other ASEAN countries was
13 Bangkok home service,  0800 gmt, 21 April 1975 (SWB/FE/4886/A3/11, 
24 April 1975).
14 "No room for Cassandras" (Edi t or ia l ) ,  Bangkok Post , 31 May 1975.
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even less l i k e l y  than an onslaught against Thailand, and would have
presented Hanoi's m i l i t a r y  planners with severe lo g is t ic a l  problems.
In 1975, the Malaysian leadership was p a r t i c u la r ly  dismissive of
any d i rec t  securi ty  threat from Indochina. Tun Razak, the Prime
Minister, was adamant that he did not subscribe to the "domino theory" 
18in any form. The Minister of Home Affa i rs  (who had responsibi 1 i t y
fo r  internal secur i ty ) ,  Ghazali Shafie, dismissed the domino concept
as being of " l i t t l e  relevance" but stressed the danger that " in a
climate of despondency the domino theory could well become . . .  a se l f -
f u l f i l l i n g  prophecy", especia l ly  i f  linked with the recent upsurge in
19communist gu e r i l la  a c t i v i t y  in Malaysia. The Deputy Finance
Minister made a s im i la r  po int,  with special emphasis on the need not
20to f r ighten away American investors. Perhaps the most important 
reason for Kuala Lumpur's apparently op t im is t ic  outlook was i ts
15 For example, on 24 Apr i l  there was an exchange of f i r e  between 
Thai and Khmer Rouge forces, which ended with a Thai withdrawal 
- -  "to prevent provocations", according to Bangkok. General K r i t  
claimed that he thought only jun io r  Khmer Rouge o f f ice rs  had been 
in control on the Cambodian side and that ,  anyway, the Khmer 
Rouge " . . .  may only be f i r i n g  to celebrate . . .  v ic to ry " .  Bangkok 
home service, 0001 gmt, 25 Apri l  1975 (SWB FE/4888/A3/6, 26 Apri l  
1975).
16 Bangkok Post ,  14 July 1975.
17 Stra i ts  Times, 25 Apr i l  1975.
18 Interview with Tun Razak, Age, 26 June 1975.
19 Tan Sri M Ghazali Shafie, "On the Domino Theory", Broadcast of 
6 May 1975, in Foreign A f fa i rs  Malaysia, Vol. 8, No. 2 (June 
1975), p. 7.
20 Speech by Tan Sri Chong Hon Nyan, Deputy Minister of Finance, in 
New York, 8 September 1975, Foreign A f fa i rs  Malaysia, Vol. b, 
No. 3 (September 197r ;_ pp. 36-37.
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commitment under Tun Razak to po l i t i ca l  rapprochement across the
region ' s  ideological divide,  as embodied in the Zone of Peace, Freedom
and Neutral i ty (ZOPFAN) proposal. Whether or not i t  genuinely
21believed that  a "policy of neutral i ty" would neutral ize any threat  
from Indochina, the government's c red i b i l i t y  in foreign policy terms 
was staked on an effor t  to promote conci l ia t ion rather  than confronta­
t ion with communist Indochina.
The common view within the Indonesian mi l i tary and pol i t i ca l
e l i t e  that  nationalism rather  than communism was the Vietnamese
leadership ' s  dominant value, coupled with J akar ta ' s  attempt to
maintain an "independent and active" foreign policy predisposed the
Indonesian government to de-emphasize the signi f icance of developments
in Indochina as a securi ty concern in 1975. According to Ali 
22Alatas,  " . . .  many of us were s t ar t l ed  by the speed and the manner in
23which North Vietnam's mil t iary victory came about". But Jakar ta ' s  
declaratory posi t ion at the time was summed up by Adam Malik, the 
Foreign Minister,  when he described the domino theory as an "outdated" 
idea used "to f r ighten the people of Southeast Asia and keep them 
dependent on the USA".^
21 According to Ghazali, th is  was what Malaysia was pursuing. 
S t r a i t s  Times, 15 April 1975.
22 Alatas was Secretary,  Directorate-General of Pol i t ical  Affairs in 
the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1972-73) and 
Ambassador to the United Nations (1975-78).
23 Summary record of proceedings, Seminar on Aspects of the 
Austral ian-Indonesian Relationship (Canberra, 16-20 October 
1979), p. 98.
24 Antara in English, 0907 gmt, 15 April 1975 (SWB FE/4880/A3/1, 17 
April 1975).
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Alatas later claimed that in 1975 there were "some alarmist views
. . .  that Vietnam would now be in a position to move swiftly in
establishing i ts long-cherished aim of an Indochinese federation under 
25its leadership". But Malik claimed that the Vietnamese communists' 
ideology would prevent them from becoming "imperialist forces". 
Certainly, there was confidence in Jakarta that Hanoi had no 
ter r i tor ia l  ambitions beyond the bounds of what was once French
Indochina.^
The Singaporean and Philippine leaders were similarly disposed to
discount fears regarding any direct security threat from Indochina.
Lee Kuan Yew asserted that i t  would be "a long time before the
communist advances in Southeast Asia had any effect on Singapore": in
28his view the domino theory was "old hash". President Marcos claimed
that the fall  of Cambodia and South Vietnam would not pose an
immediate external threat to his country or other regional states:
this was particularly so in the case of the Philippines, which was
29separated from the Southeast Asian mainland by the South China Sea.
25 Seminar on Aspects of the Australian-Indonesian Relationship, 
loc. c i t .
26 Antara in English, 0907 gmt, 15 April 1975 (SWB FE/4880/A3/1, 
17 April 1975).
27 Michael Leiter, Indonesia's Foreign Policy (London: George Allen
& Unwin for the Royal Insti tute of International Affairs, 1983),
p. 161.
28 Straits Times, 3 April 1975.
29 Manila home service in English, 1000 gmt, 28 April 1975 (SWB 
FE/4891/A3/10, 30 April 1975.
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Threat Assessments, 1975-78
In general, the ASEAN governments were restrained and moderate in
their assessments of Southeast Asia's new security environment as the
communist Indochinese governments consolidated their rule in 1975-78.
This attitude complemented diplomatic policies of coming to terms with
the real i ty of the communist ascendancy in Indochina and the United
States'  lessened interest in the region, by attempting to improve
relations with not only the Indochinese states, but also Moscow and 
30Beijing. A commonly held view within the region in 1976-77 was that 
a direct threat from Indochina was unlikely, particularly as Vietnam, 
Laos and Cambodia appeared to be directing their main energies towards 
post-war economic and social reconstruction. According to a leading 
Indonesian commentator:
By 1977 i t  seemed almost clear to many that Hanoi was 
opting for reconstruction and development, as indicated 
by the leaders' move towards normalization with the 
West, in particular with the U.S.31
But there was concern, even in Jakarta, regarding a longer-term 
strategic challenge from Vietnam if Hanoi successfully overcame its 
domestic problems. In the view of one Indonesian general:
We are now witnessing an industrial race between 
Vietnam and the countries of ASEAN. If the race enters 
the belligerent diplomacy phase, the Straits of Malacca 
and South China Sea would increase even further in
30 See Chapter 3, pp. 74-96 above, and section on "Responses to the 
Political and Socioeconomic Challenge of Indochina, 1975-77" in 
Chapter 9, pp. 377-414 below.
31 Wanandi, p. 57.
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strategic importance. If these were to fall  in their 
[Vietnam's] control . . .  Indonesia would face a direct 
threa t .32
As Hanoi moved towards better relations with the West (and
particularly the United States), Jusuf Wanandi thought it
"understandable" that the ASEAN countries should "express concern over
33the prospect of Vietnam being granted massive amounts of aid".
There was much greater sensitivity in Bangkok than the other 
ASEAN capitals to the possibili ty of direct security threats from 
Indochina, even after the ini t ial  panic which had followed the 
Indochinese communists' victories in 1975 had died down. But although 
armed clashes occurred between Thailand and i ts Indochinese neighbours 
more or less continually after the communist takeovers in Cambodia and 
Laos these incidents were essentially the result of ill-defined 
borders, lack of communication between locally opposed forces, and 
complications caused by insurgent groups operating in both directions 
across the borders (that is,  Thai communists from bases in Laos and 
Cambodia, and right-wing Laotian and Cambodian exiles from Thai 
sanctuaries). Nevertheless, the Thai military and political
right-wing exaggerated these local problems, in order to undermine 
both the progress of democratization in Thailand and the Kukrit and
32 Lieutenant-General Widodo, quoted by Antara, 3 March 1977.
33 Jusuf Wanandi, "Politico-Security Dimensions of Southeast Asia --
A Southeast Asian View", in Southeast Asia and the World of 
Tomorrow (Papers presented at the US-Southeast Asia Seminar, 
Bali, 30 May - 1 June 1977) (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and
International Studies, 1977), p. 51.
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Seni governments' attempts to improve re la t ions  with Indochina. 
Typical of th i s  exaggeration was a press report  in December 1975 
claiming that  there were no signs that  the Vietnamese were engaging in 
s igni f icant  post-war reconstruct ion,  that  they wished to "punish" 
Thailand for i t s  role in the Vietnam War, that  the Soviet Union 
(Vietnam's al ly) coveted Thailand's American-built air  bases, and that  
a Vietnamese invasion "could come cross the Mekong at any time" (but 
most l ikely between April and June when the r iver  could most easi ly be 
forded).  The immediate pretext  for such an invasion might be the
"rescue" of the 50,000 "s t ra tegical ly- located"  Vietnamese refugees in 
northeast  Thailand. The a r t i c l e  noted Thailand's mil i tary weakness 
and stressed the need for not only stronger armed forces but also for 
"national u n i t y " . ^
Objectively,  the di rec t  threat  to Thailand remained minimal. 
Although Hanoi's army was, numerically, the f i f t h  largest  in the world 
and began to augment i t s  strength with conscripts from South Vietnam 
in 1976, the main purpose of maintaining such a large force was 
probably part ly related to the need for a massive reservoir  of ski l led 
technicians and discipl ined labour in the early phase of post-war 
r ehabi l i t a t ion .  To be sure,  the Vietnamese forces captured huge 
amounts of American equipment in 1975, but much of this  was 
unserviceable,  or immobilized for lack of fuel ,  spare parts or 
t raining f a c i l i t i e s .  But even if Hanoi had possessed the mi l i ta ry  
capabi l i ty for an invasion of northeast Thailand, i t  would almost
34 Could i t  happen here?",  Bangkok Post , 14 December 1975.
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certainly have lacked the political will.  As one observer remarked at 
a later stage:
One ill-considered act of naked aggression could . . .  
jeopardise the recovery of the spastic economy, 
alienate impoverished millions suffering from battle- 
fatigue and fray the confidence of the capital ist  
investor, the patience of Hanoi's communist friends and 
the tentative goodwill of the world.35
The controversial and possibly dangerous nature of the Thai right- 
wing's claims was balanced not only by the government's generally calm 
approach, but also by some journalists '  more cri t ical  attitude. 
According to one Bangkok newspaper in late 1975:
There seems to be very poor reason [ s i c] for North 
Vietnam to invade Thailand . . .  Press reports should not 
be allowed to create panic among people to the extent 
of stopping business and damaging the economy.36
The military-backed coup d'etat  in Bangkok in October 1976, which 
was just i f ied partly on the grounds that Thailand faced a communist 
threat with an external as well as a domestic dimension, elevated to 
power extreme right-wing politicians and military officers who then 
endeavoured to use the spectre of a security threat from Vietnam to 
bolster both the domestic and the international legitimacy of their 
regime. In early December 1976 the new Interior Minister, Samak 
Sundaravej, resuscitated the claim that Hanoi intended to inspire 
Vietnamese refugees in northeast Thailand to fight amongst themselves 
to provide a pretext for an invasion. According to Samak the invasion
35 Dennis Bloodworth, "Hanoi too hard-hit to fight", Bulletin, 
5 March 1977, pp. 46-47.
36 Daily News (Bangkok) quoted by Bangkok Post, 29 November 1975.
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37would be launched the following February. Although the new r ight -
wing prime minister ,  Thanin Kraivichien,  refuted Samak's alarmism, he
continued to emphasize the imminence of external as well as internal
38communist t h r ea t s .  Other inf luent ia l  conservat ives,  both within and
outside the government, l ikewise stressed Indochina's threat  potent ial
39throughout the Thanin regime's tenure in 1976-77.
Kriangsak's r e l a t i ve ly  moderate regime which replaced the Thanin 
government a f t er  i t s  ouster in October 1977 pursued a revival of 
detente with the communist powers and was correspondingly less 
alarmist  in i t s  assessments of the s t ra tegic  threat  from Indochina. 
For example, in October 1977 a claim that  the Laotian air  force ' s
newly-acquired MiG-21 f ighters  "might be used in an attack on
40 41Thailand" was played down by the government.
37 "Thais: Hanoi Plan Attack", Washington Post , 9 December 1976.
38 Bangkok Post , 12 December 1976.
39 For example, in late  December 1976, former Foreign Minister
Thanat Khoman alleged qui te erroneously that  the Soviet Union had 
bui l t  missi le s i los  in Laos which could be used "against China or
the South". The following September, Deputy Defence Minister
General Lek Naewalee claimed that  Vietnam was "seeking to control 
the Mekong River valley in northeast  Thailand". S t r a i t s  Times, 
30 December 1976; FEER, Asia Yearbook 1978, p. 348.
40 Bangkok Post , 12 October 1977.
41 Thus Foreign Minister Upadit Pachariangkul emphasized that  the
fac t  that  the Laotian MiG-21s might be using aviation fuel bought 
from Thailand was "the internal  a f fa i r  of Laos". Derek Davies, 
FEER, 9 December 1977, p. 22.
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The Vietnamese Invasion and Occupation of Cambodia
The ASEAN s ta tes '  r e l a t i ve ly  sanguine assessments in 1977-78 of
the di rec t  mil i tary threa ts  posed by the Indochinese s ta tes  were
dependent to a large degree on the emergence of an intra-communist
balance of power in Indochina between Vietnam and i t s  al ly Laos
(backed by the Soviet Union) on one side and Cambodia (supported by
China) on the other side.  But although Lee Kuan Yew's claim (made as
early as 1975) that  the conf l ic t  between Cambodia and Vietnam would
42"buy us considerable time" was probably seen as valid by many
policy-makers throughout the ASEAN region, there was also a widespread
appreciation in the region of the f r a g i l i t y  of the intra-communist
balance and of the dangers to non-communist Southeast Asia i f  that
43balance was overturned.
Although the incompatibil i ty of Chinese and Vietnamese i nte res t s  
in Indochina was widely recognized in the ASEAN sta tes  by 1978, there 
is evidence that  a Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Kampuchea was 
deemed unlikely in the near future by well-placed o f f i c i a l s  in the 
ASEAN countries.  For example, in November 1978 (a few weeks before 
the Vietnamese move) a Malaysian Armed Forces Staff  College paper, 
wri t ten by a syndicate of high-ranking mil i tary off icers  and securi ty 
o f f i c i a l s  from Malaysia, the Phi l ippines,  Indonesia and Thailand 
asser ted:
42 Interview with Lee Kuan Yew, quoted by Singapore home service in 
English, 1330 gmt, 3 May 1975 (SWB FE/4896/A3/8, 6 May 1975).
43 See section on "Responses to the Emerging Conflict  in Indochina, 
1977-78" in Chapter 9, pp. 415-29 below.
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Though Vietnam could easily overrun Kampuchea on the 
basis of her military might, and it  is highly suspect 
whether China will indeed retal iate,  Vietnam will not 
do so as yet .44
Thai Reactions
The eventual onslaught by the Vietnamese army and Cambodian
exiles against Democratic Kampuchea was an unpleasant surprise for
ASEAN's members, and particularly for Thailand. Several weeks before
the invasion the Chief of Staff of the Thai Supreme Command had
claimed that Thailand was capable of dealing with any internal or
external security problem "except perhaps for total Cambodian
collapse" -- in other words the very situation faced by Bangkok at the
beginning of 1979. But a month later,  as this worst case scenario was
realized, with Vietnamese forces taking Phnom Penh and advancing
towards the Thai border, Kriangsak asserted that Thailand's armed
forces were "wel1-prepared at all times . . .  to protect the country
46against any form of external aggression". While this extravagant 
claim was probably intended to forestall panic, both domestically and 
amongst foreign investors, Kriangsak nevertheless attempted to use the
44 Syndicate "Kalapati", "National Interest and Foreign Policy in
Southeast Asia: Future Trends" (Unpublished project paper
prepared at the Malaysian Armed Forces Staff College, Kuala 
Lumpur, November 1978), p.24.
45 General Saiyud Kerdphol, address to the Inter-American Defense 
College, 7 December 1978, in Rattha pithak ("Guardian of the 
State") (Bangkok), Vol. 21, No. 3 (July 1979), p. 40.
46 Bangkok Post, 8 January 1979.
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Situat ion to enhance his regime's legit imacy, stressing that
Thai land's un i ty  (and hence securi ty) was based on "the three
in s t i t u t io n s  of the nation, re l ig io n  and monarchy", and c a l l in g  on the
47people to "have confidence in the government".
In the early  stages of the invasion, the Thai government (and
other observers) were unsure of Vietnam's ult imate object ive in
invading Cambodia. Exactly one year e a r l ie r ,  Hanoi's previous large-
scale th rus t  into i t s  neighbour had advanced only 30 km or so before
withdrawing: a s im i la r ly  l im i ted  repeat of th is  "punishment" now
appeared to be a p o s s ib i l i t y .  The Thai deputy defence min iste r stated
in early  January that "we have to wait and see the next move of the
invasion forces - -  whether they w i l l  conquer a l l  of Cambodia or only 
48Phnom Penh". According to Kriangsak, Bangkok warned Hanoi that i t
should not send troops as fa r  as the Thai-Cambodian border "as th is
49would be tantamount to a threat to Thai land". Although Kriangsak
received an assurance from his Vietnamese counterpart (Pham Van Dong)
50that such a s i tua t ion  would not eventuate, by th is  time a 
su rp r is ing ly  rapid advance had taken Vietnamese forces to w i th in  a few 
miles of the border. In the words of one observer: "The Vietnamese 
ro l led  up Cambodia so qu ick ly that the Thais have not yet had time to 
panic"
47 Quoted by Bangkok home service,  1300 gmt, 8 January 1979 (SWB FE/ 
6012/A3/10, 10 January 1979).
48 Bangkok Post, 8 January 1979.
49 Bangkok Post, 17 January 1979.
50 I b id .
51 Nayan Chanda, FEER, 26 January 1979, pp. 12-15; Richard Nations, 
FEER, 26 January 1979, p. 12.
-  148 -
Strategic  Implications for Thailand
The Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia had serious s t ra tegic
implications for Thailand. For the f i r s t  time the kingdom was
bordered to the east  wholly by t e r r i t o ry  which was effect ively
control led by Vietnam. The interjacence of Laos had been lost  by the
end of 1975 with the Pathet Lao's ascendancy and now Thailand's
Cambodian "buffer" against  Vietnam had been removed. Although the
Khmer Rouge victory in 1975 had cancelled Cambodia's role as an
ideological buffer ,  Democratic Kampuchea had const i tuted a mil i tary
52buffer against  Vietnam. There was some nervousness in Bangkok that
Hanoi might now be in a posi t ion to use i t s  preponderance in Indochina
53and superior mi l i tary power to "Finlandise" Thailand: Thai and
Vietnamese forces were v i r tua l l y  in di rec t  contact ,  and some of 
Hanoi's forces were l i t t l e  more than 300 km from Bangkok. From 
Bangkok's viewpoint, the s t ra tegic  threat  represented by long-term 
Vietnamese domination of Cambodia was so serious that  i t  was deemed 
necessary to challenge Hanoi's occupation by giving succour to the 
Cambodian res is tance forces.  But th i s  policy carr ied with i t  the risk 
of border incidents tr iggered by Vietnamese "hot pursuit" of Khmer 
Rouge guer i l las  across the Thai border, with the pos s ib i l i ty  of
52 More alarmist  Thai commentaries stressed the danger posed to the 
national ident i ty and independence of Laos and Cambodia in the 
long-term by the movement of Vietnamese s e t t l e r s  into these 
countr ies .  See Justus M van der Kroef, "The Indochina Triangle: 
Elements of Conflict  and Compromise", Asian Survey, Vol. 20, No. 
5 (May 1980), p. 479.
53 Nayan Chanda, FEER, 19 December 1980, p. 37.
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escalation to a broader and more open conflict between Thailand and 
Vietnam.
A Vietnamese Invasion of Thailand?
From the time of the Vietnamese invasion there was much
speculation -- particularly in the ASEAN capitals -- on whether or not
Vietnam would seek to extend its hegemony beyond the borders of
Indochina into Thailand. Although many observers agreed with the
subsequently much-quoted view of a former Thai prime minister (Kukrit)
that "only Bangkok's t raff ic  jams stood between the Vietnamese forces
54on the border and the Thai capital" the situation was actually 
considerably more complicated.
In early 1979, the Thai armed forces apparently considered that a
direct Vietnamese assault on Thailand could take one of three forms:
a thrust through the Wattanakorn pass (just north of the Thai town of
Aranyaprathet); an invasion across the Mekong to separate Thailand's
northeast from the rest of the country; or a more gradual "nibbling"
55encroachment into the northeast. Although the f i r s t  of these
54 Quoted by Astri Suhrke, "ASEAN: Adjusting to New Regional
Alignments", Asia Pacific Community, No. 12 (Spring 1981), p. 13.
55 Robert Whymant, Guardian Weekly, 11 February 1979. The Thai
army's assessment of the threat to northeast Thailand was 
expounded in more detail in December 1979 when a senior officer 
alleged that intelligence reports in September had indicated that 
Vietnam and the Soviet Union had plans to invade northeast 
Thailand, seizing the sixteen provinces claimed by Laos for 
inclusion in the "Indochina federation". The plans allegedly
called for the deployment of 39 Vietnamese divisions, and were 
based on optional five, eight or ten year timescales. While this 
intelligence seemed to confirm the Thai mil i tary's fears
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scenarios was a direct product of the occupation of Cambodia, those 
relating to the Thai northeast had been current since 1975. However, 
the techniques used by the Vietnamese in the invasion of Cambodia 
appeared to support the Thai mil i tary's claim that the Vietnamese 
might use a Laotian-based "United Front" of disaffected Thais to 
provide legitimacy for any move against the northeast.
When examined closely, none of the Thai mil i tary's scenarios were
particularly convincing: objectively, Vietnam s t i l l  appeared to lack
both the military capability and the polit ical will for a large-scale
military assault on Thailand. Although Thailand's 145,000 strong army
was small compared to Vietnam's, which numbered one million personnel,
Hanoi almost certainly lacked sufficient military resources to invade
and occupy even Thailand's northeastern provinces. About 200,000
Vietnamese troops were tied down on the border with China, and another
40-50,000 in Laos. Resistance to communist rule continued even within
Vietnam i t se l f ,  and this security problem absorbed more of Hanoi's
military potential.  The 150-200,000 Vietnamese troops in Cambodia
56were preoccupied with fighting the Khmer Rouge. In the event of a 
Vietnamese invasion of Thailand, the Cambodian resistance would have
55 regarding Vietnamese intentions towards the Thai northeast, there 
was every reason to regard i t  with as much sceptiscism as earl ier 
allegations. If these plans really existed, they were probably 
contingency plans and thus by no means a reliable forecast of 
Vietnamese intentions, particularly as the total strength of the 
Vietnamese army in 1979-80 amounted to only 39 divisions. See 
Lieutenant-General Abhichart Dhiradhamrong, "Political-Military 
Dimensions of Southeast Asian Security" (Paper presented at 
Conference on New Foundations for Asian and Pacific Security, 
Pattaya, Thailand, 12-16 December 1979), p. 147; Military Balance 
1980-81 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies,
1980), p. 76.
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severely threatened the invading force's lines of supply. Indeed, an 
invasion of Thailand could have over-extended Vietnam's forces to the 
extent that the Khmer Rouge might have regained control of much of 
Cambodia.
Vietnam's existing military commitments were a strain on Hanoi's
limited economic resources and were distractions from post-war
reconstruction and development. Although Moscow supplied substantial
economic and military aid to Hanoi, perhaps in the order of US$2-3m a 
57day by 1981, this support was intended to bolster Vietnam against 
China. As commitments elsewhere, particularly in Afghanistan and 
Poland, became more burdensome from 1980, i t  appeared ever less likely 
that the Soviets would be willing to underwrite any large-scale 
Vietnamese military adventure outside Indochina. The idea of Vietnam 
garrisoning even northeast Thailand appeared economically, as well as 
mil i tari ly and poli t ical ly,  infeasible.
The opposition which might be encountered in an invasion of 
Thailand would be of a very different quality to that faced during the 
onslaught against Democratic Kampuchea, which had been internally weak 
and internationally isolated (apart from its relationship with China). 
The Vietnamese army included large numbers of apparently unwilling 
conscripts from the former South Vietnam, whose morale probably would 
not have matched that of Thai troops who would be fighting in defence
56 Military Balance 1979-1980 (London: International Institute for
Strategic Studies, 1979), pp. 72-73; Parliament of the 
Commonwealth of Australia, Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
Power in Indochina Since 1975 (Canberra: Australian Government
Publishing Service, 1981, p. 60.
57 U.S. government figures quoted by Suhrke, p. 17.
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of their own country's terr i tory.  Also, from 1976 the Thai armed 
forces had been going through a modernization programme, and were less 
concerned than previously with countering the CPT, which had receded 
as a threat as i t  lost its sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia. 
Moreover, Thailand could expect varying degrees of physical support 
from the United States, China (perhaps to the extent of a second 
"lesson" being taught to Hanoi) and other ASEAN members in the event 
of large-scale Vietnamese aggression.
Objectively, Hanoi s t i l l  lacked not only the military capability 
but also a rationale for invading even northeast Thailand. There were 
certainly no obvious counterparts to the motives which had 
precipitated the invasion of Cambodia. So the presence of Vietnamese 
forces in Cambodia did not pose a serious direct threat to Thailand's 
security in the short term at least.  Even if the Vietnamese succeeded 
in eradicating the Khmer Rouge and consolidated their position in 
Cambodia, there would s t i l l  be numerous factors restraining Hanoi from 
open and unprovoked aggression against Thailand. The "Fin!andisation" 
of Thailand might become more likely, but an invasion would remain a 
remote possibili ty.
While the Thai government's outwardly calm response to the 
"Vietnamese threat" from the beginning of 1979 was undoubtedly 
motivated partly by a desire to allay popular panic and prevent 
capital f l ight ,  it  also almost certainly reflected an appreciation of 
the factors which constrained Vietnam from moving against Thailand. 
For example, in August 1979 General Charoen Pongpanich (the Thai 
Deputy Supreme Commander) asserted that Vietnam would not invade 
Thailand under "the present circumstances" -- at least not within the
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next five years. According to Charoen, a successful invasion would
require strong "advance", "follow-up" and "supporting" forces. In
Charoen's view, the Communist Party of Thailand (the advance force)
was weak and fragmented, Vietnam i tself  (which would provide the
follow-up forces) was inundated with other problems, both internal and
external (including a possible Chinese threat) and the supporting
58force (the USSR) would not risk backing an invasion. Likewise,
Premier Kriangsak strenuously denied reports that he had claimed that
59Vietnam posed a threat to the Thai northeast.
The Cambodian Resistance and Vietnamese Incursions
Bangkok's efforts to pre-empt the possible long-term strategic 
implications of Vietnam's control of Cambodia by allowing the 
Cambodian resistance to use Thai terri tory for resupply and refuge was 
accompanied by the immediate risk that Vietnamese forces would carry 
the war into Thai terr i tory.
Despite reports by mid-1979^ of Vietnamese incursions into 
Thailand by Vietnamese troops in "hot pursuit" of Cambodian resistance 
fighters,  Hanoi maintained that its forces were "under s t r ic t  orders 
to stay away from the border"^ and that there was no possibility of
58 Bangkok Post, 10 August 1979.
59 Bangkok home service, 1300 gmt, 19 January 1979 (SWB FE/6023/A3/ 
6-7 23 January 1979).
60 See, for example, Bangkok Post, 2 June 1979.
61 Interview with Phan Hien, Vietnamese Deputy Foreign Minister, by 
the Thai magazine Thai Nikorn, quoted by Bangkok Post, 5 November 
1979.
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c p
Vietnamese troops crossing in to  Thailand. Nevertheless, the Thai 
government's concern was aroused as Vietnamese troops moved into 
posi t ion fo r  a series of pincer attacks against Khmer Rouge forces
C O
pinned against the Thai border in November 1979, with Bangkok's
Foreign Min is te r  Upadit Pachariyangkul warning of the danger that the
f ig h t in g  might s p i l l  in to  Thailand i f  i t  in tens i f ied  any fu r the r ,
necessi tat ing a Thai m i l i t a r y  response.^ Indeed, according to the
Thai au tho r i t ies  there were seven incursions by "fore ign forces"
between mid-November 1979 and mid-February 1980, invo lv ing up to 2000
intruders at a time, with penetrations to a depth of 3 km into
Thailand. Thai t e r r i t o r y  was also frequent ly  shel led from across the
65border, and Thai airspace was vio lated several times.
In la te  December 1979 the Supreme Command put the Thai armed
forces on f u l l  a l e r t , ®  moved addit ional armoured and in fan t ry  units
67closer to the border the fo l low ing January and soon afterwards began
C O
construct ion of a 100 km long "ant i - tank d i tch " .  But Kriangsak had
62 Statement by Nguyen Co Thach, Vietnamese Secretary of State for  
Foreign A f fa i r s ,  at press conference in Bangkok, Bangkok Post, 
21 October 1979.
63 Bangkok Post, 17 November 1979.
64 The Times, 21 November 1979.
65 Thai M in is t ry  of Foreign A f fa i r s ,  The Vietnamese Acts of
Aggression against Thai land's Sovereignty and T e r r i t o r ia l  
I n te g r i t y  (Bangkok: Thai Government, 1980).
66 J M Chandran, "Southeast Asia in 1980: A Diplomatic and
Strategic Overview", Southeast Asian A f fa i rs  1981 (Singapore: 
In s t i t u te  of Southeast Asian Studies, 1981), p. 18.
67 Lau Teik Soon, "ASEAN and the Cambodian Problem", Asian Survey, 
Vol . 22, No. 6 (June 1982), p. 551.
68 Michael Richardson, Age, 22 March 1980.
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invested considerable energy in improving relations with Hanoi after
the hiatus caused by the Thanin regime, and s t i l l  hoped for a
69negotiated solution to the Cambodian problem. Moreover, although it  
was unlikely that Hanoi could mount a successful large-scale military 
action against Thailand, i t  was conceivable that Vietnamese forces 
might emerge victorious from a small-scale border incident. This the 
Thai military regime wished to avoid as it  might seriously damage the 
armed forces' polit ical as well as military credibili ty; the Kriangsak 
government's responses to the problem of frequent, small-scale 
Vietnamese border incursions therefore emphasized diplomatic protest 
rather than military confrontation.^
It was not until late June 1980 that Vietnamese forces made a 
substantial incursion into Thailand. The attack involved about 900 
Vietnamese troops and was precipitated by Bangkok's announcement that 
over 100,000 Cambodian refugees might be repatriated from holding 
centres in Thailand. The Vietnamese and their al l ies in Phnom Penh
71saw this as an attempt to bolster the strength of the Khmer Rouge as
72i t  intensified i ts struggle. The Thai authorities were almost 
certainly aware that the Vietnamese might react strongly to the
69 See section on "The Evolution of Thai Policy on Cambodia" in 
Chapter 10, pp. 437-41 below.
70 For example, in late February 1980 Bangkok protested to the 
United Nations over allegedly repeated violations of Thai 
terr i tory by Vietnamese and Heng Samrin regime forces. Neik 
Kelly, Sydney Morning Herald, 27 February 1980.
71 Phnom Penh international service in English, 1200 gmt, 21 June 
1980 (FBIS-APA-80-122, 23 June 1980).
72 Michael Richardson, Age, 20 June 1980.
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re pa t r ia t ion ,  although in the event probably less than 10,000
73Cambodians were sent back.
According to Nguyen Co Thach, the Vietnamese Foreign Min is ter ,
Thailand de l ibe ra te ly  timed the repatr ia t ion  to provoke a Vietnamese
incursion which would force ASEAN to consol idate behind the Thai
posit ion on Cambodia at the annual ASEAN Foreign Min is ters '  Conference
74which commenced on 26 June. The Vietnamese Foreign M in is t ry 's
o f f i c i a l  explanation of the Vietnamese incursion into Thailand was
less Machiavell ian, but s t i l l  emphasized that i t  had been provoked by
75the "Chinese and American-supported" re pa t r ia t ion .  Nevertheless,
the fac t  that the ASEAN ministers were about to meet may have been an
addit ional fac to r  in a Vietnamese calcu la t ion that i t  was time to
impress Thailand and i t s  associates with a show of strength on the
Cambodian i s s u e r ^  the Vietnamese may have hoped to provoke a more
open disagreement w i th in  ASEAN over Cambodia.
Although the Vietnamese attack included she l l ing along an 80 km 
77
stretch of border, the incursion i t s e l f  was physica l ly  aimed at the 
Nong Chan land bridge and the sprawling shanty towns dominated by the 
Khmer Serei (non-communist Cambodian resistance) which had grown up
73 Will iam Shawcross, The Quali ty  of Mercy: Cambodia, Holocaust and
Modern Conscience (London: Andre Deutsch, 1984), p. 317.
74 Age, 27 June 1980.
75 Min is try  of Foreign A f fa i r s ,  Soc ia l is t  Republic of Vietnam, 
Statement on Kampuchean-Thai Border Tension, 27 June 1980.
76 Sydney Morning Herald, 25 June 1980.
77 Ib id . ,  24 June 1980.
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around i t ,  rather than at the points on the border where the
repatriation of predominantly Khmer Rouge-controlled refugees was
taking place, about 15 km to the south. The repatriation may have
triggered the incursion, but the Vietnamese military action had
broader aims -- indeed, i t  was not an isolated incident but the
culmination of escalating Vietnamese military activity along the
border over the previous month, aimed at sealing the frontier.  So
78although the Vietnamese incursion did halt the refugee repatriation,
i t  also brought other benefits to Phnom Penh: in particular the
incident seemed to convince tens of thousands (over 100,000 by the end
of 1980) of refugees that l i fe in the Cambodia interior,  under the
Heng Samrin government and Vietnamese occupation, was better than
79their dangerous existence in the border agglomerations. Moreover,
cross-border trade along a cri t ical  50 km stretch of the frontier was
80severely disrupted, and the cross-border feeding programme conducted
by UNICEF and the International Committee of the Red Cross at Nong
81Chan was immediately suspended. A desire to disperse the
agglomerations and disrupt the "land bridge", both of which were
78 Keyes Beech, Age, 4 July 1980.
79 Milton Osborne, "Kampuchean Refugees: The Continuing Evolution
of a Humanitarian and Political Problem", in Milton Osborne, 
Beverley Male, Gordon Lawrie and W J O'Malley, Refugees: Four
Political Case Studies (Canberra: Australian National
University, University of Internaional Relations, Canberra 
Studies in World Affairs No. 3, 1981), p. 8.
80 Michael Richardson, Australian Financial Review, 3 July 1980; 
Keyes Beech, Age, 4 July 1980; Paul Vogle, Australian, 
26 September 1980.
81 Shawcross, pp. 343-44.
158 -
detrimental to political and economic control over the Cambodian
population, may have been an important factor in the Vietnamese
decision to send troops into Thailand. Another effect of the
incursion, presumably hoped for by the Vietnamese, was the casualties
82incurred by the pro-Sihanouk Moulinaka resistance group. But if the 
Vietnamese attack had been partly intended as a show of force to 
persuade Thailand and i ts ASEAN associates to adopt a more 
conciliatory stance towards the Cambodian issue, or to bring out into 
the open divisions between the Association's members, it signally 
failed,  as i t  had the effect of strengthening ASEAN's resolve to bring 
about a Vietnamese withdrawal.
The Thai military response to the June 1980 incursion
demonstrated Bangkok's wish to avoid a direct,  large-scale military
confrontation with Vietnam. The Vietnamese attack came as Thai army
units on the border were being rotated: the area was thus only
lightly defended. Colonel Prachak Sawangjit, the officer responsible
for the defence of the violated sections of the border, was in Bangkok
83and did not return until 36 hours after the incident began. By 
delaying their counter-attack until the Vietnamese intruders were 
withdrawing, the Thai military ensured that their response avoided the 
possibility of a Thai humiliation of the bat t lefield.  When the Thais
82 James Gerrand, "Behind Vietnam's Thai Excursion", National Times, 
6-12 July 1980, pp. 14-15. The Vietnamese claimed that 118 Khmer 
Serei were killed and about 300 "suspects" detained in the 
incursion. Operations Centre for Displaced Persons, Thai 
Ministry of the Interior,  Too Long to Wait: Displaced Persons
from Kampuchea in Thailand (Bangkok: Thai Government, 1980,
p. 34.
83 Shawcross, p. 317.
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did eventually respond mil i tari ly,  i t  was in a disorganized and
mil i tari ly unimpressive manner which reflected the Thai armed forces'
lack of competence in conventional warfare. The f i r s t  Thai ar t i l lery
84barrage hit the centre of the Nong Chan refugee agglomeration;
according to the one source, "about 400 refugees were killed and 900
85were wounded" in the crossfire. Nevertheless, air strikes raised
the number of Vietnamese dead to at least 72, for 45 Thai soldiers
8fikilled and two aircraft  shot down.
Thai Threat Assessments after the June 1980 Incursion
Despite the events of June 1980 the Thai military leadership 
often appeared confident in the following months that there was no 
serious, direct military threat from Vietnam, either immediately or in 
the near future. Very soon after the June incursion, the Thai Supreme
Command Chief of Staff asserted that it would take a ten-year
Vietnamese build-up to create a serious invasion force for the
conquest of Thailand.87 Although the divisional commander on the
border (Major General Arthit Kamlang-Ek) was, as a front-line field 
commander, understandably more cautious than his colleagues on the 
Staff,  warning that Vietnam s t i l l  had a "plan to annex part of
84 Gerrand, p. 14.
85 Shawcross, Joe. c i t .
86 Paisal Sricharatchanya, Focus (Bangkok), Vol. 1, No. 5 (January 
1981), p. 11.
87 Interview with General Saiyud Kerdphol, Washington Post, 5 July 
1980.
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Thailand for its Federation of Indochina", even he thought that three 
or four years might elapse before a further "large-scale" Vietnamese 
intrusion.
Such real ist ic threat assessments were obscured at times by more
alarmist prognostications. In part this was a reflection of divergent
interpretations (of the putative threats) between various elements of
the Thai armed forces and bureaucracy. But perhaps more importantly
i t  indicated a recurring conflict between two governmental aims. The
f i r s t  aim was to play down the threat in order to reassure both the
Thai public and foreign investors that the government was able to cope
with any threat that might arise, thus forestalling defeatism at home
and disenchantment with Thailand as an investment prospect. In
contrast,  the second aim was to emphasize -- and at times exaggerate
-- the threat as a just if icat ion for authoritarian rule and as a
distraction from socioeconomic inequity at home. The threat of
external aggression provided a useful means by which the Prem
government could divert public attention from the painful economic
real i t ies  of high inflation and a stagnation in industrial production.
It may also have intended to direct the energies of elements in the
army such as "the Young Turks" (a group of field commanders -- mainly
Colonels -- with polit ical ambitions) away from polit ical matters
(such as the protests in August and September 1980 over the extension
89of the Prime Minister's tenure as army commander), and towards their
88 Sydney Morning Herald, 30 June 1980.
89 John McBeth, FEER, 12 September 1980, pp. 14, 16.
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military role. Moreover, Bangkok's emphasis on the Vietnamese threat 
was an indispensable means of securing poli t ical ,  economic and 
military support from the West, particularly in terms of US military 
assistance. The advent of the more overtly anti-Soviet Reagan 
administration in early 1981 increased the potential dividends for the 
Thai regime of emphasising Thailand's credentials as a "front-line 
s ta te" .
Typical of the Prem government's periodic exaggeration of the
Vietnamese threat was the way in which it  linked the Vietnamese
incursion across the Cambodian border with an incident a week earlier
on the riverine border with Laos in which a Thai naval officer was
killed. Bangkok asserted that the two occurrences were together part
of a wider Vietnamese plan of aggression against Thailand, and closed
the border with Laos for two months. In August air raid dr i l l s  were
held in Bangkok: according to the Supreme Commander, these exercises
(which were unprecedented since the Second World War) were
"necessitated by the situation on the eastern and northeastern 
90borders". In September, October and November 1980, Hanoi increased
its  order of battle within 20 km of the Thai-Cambodian border to nine 
91divisions. As had happened at the time of the June incursion, the
Thai government made the most of this build-up to win domestic and
international support, with Prem reiterating the claim that Hanoi had
92expansionist designs on northeast Thailand.
90 General Serm Na Nakorn, quoted by Bangkok Post, 5 August 1980.
91 Michael Richardson, Age, 24 September 1980; Paisal, p. 11.
92 Speech delivered by General Prem Tinsulanond, Prime Minister of 
Thailand, Foreign Correspondents' Club of Thailand, Bangkok, 10 
September 1980, p.4.
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Border incidents involving Vietnamese and Thai forces in early
Q "3
1981 prompted the Thai au thor i t ies  to complain again that " . . .
Vietnam's occupation of Kampuchea and subsequent deployment of some
120,000 of i t s  troops along the Thai-Kampuchean border poses a serious
94secur i ty  threat to Tha i lan d . . . " .  But interviews at th is  time with
senior Thai o f f i c i a l s  confirmed that underlying the concern expressed
about the Vietnamese threat was a more op t im is t ic  assessment. One
95senior Thai government securi ty  analyst claimed that although 
Thailand was "ser ious ly  threatened" by two Vietnamese armoured 
d iv is ions  ju s t  across the Cambodian border from the Thai town of 
Aranyaprathet, Thai land's forces would be able to counter a large- 
scale incursion i f  necessary, owing to fundamental weaknesses in 
Vietnam's s t ra teg ic  posture. S im i la r ly ,  the Secretary-General of the 
National Securi ty Council, whi le claiming that the 250,000 Vietnamese 
troops in Cambodia and Laos were the pr inc ipa l  near-term threat  to 
Thai land's secur i ty ,  also asserted that:
We must compare the overa l1 balance of forces. I t  is 
often said that "Vietnam is the strongest m i l i t a r y  
power in the region, but Thailand is weak". Vietnam is 
only strong due to Soviet support. Vietnam is 
economically and soc ia l ly  weak. There is armed 
resistance w i th in  Vietnam. True, Vietnam has 58
93 S t ra i ts  Times, 27 January 1981; Bangkok Post, 3 March 1981, 
7 March 1981, 20 March 1981 and 28 March 1981.
94 Voice of Free Asia (Bangkok) in English, 1100 gmt, 6 March 1981 
(SWB FE/6688/A3/4-5, 9 March 1981). The Voice of Free Asia acted 
as a mouthpiece fo r  the Thai Min is try  of Foreign A f fa i rs  (see 
Bangkok Post, 7 March 1981).
95 Personal interv iew with senior o f f i c i a l ,  National Economic and 
Social Development Board, Bangkok, March 1981.
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divisions against only 12 Thai divisions. . .  but we 
can' t  compare these figures in isolation. We must 
compare the total populations of the two countries: 
there are 50 million Vietnamese against 47 million 
Thais -- but we must bear in mind the quality of Thai 
people. Furthermore, the Thai forces have large 
reserves.. .96
In this o f f i c ia l ' s  view, there was "no indication at the present time" 
that Vietnam was planning another large-scale incursion into Thailand.
The Other ASEAN States'  Assessment of the Vietnamese Threat, 1979-81
Although the putative military threat from Vietnam after the 
intervention in Cambodia was not such an important issue elsewhere in 
the region as i t  was in Bangkok, all the other ASEAN governments were, 
to a greater or lesser extent, concerned over the strategic 
implications of the new regional balance of power.
Singapore
Although Lee Kuan Yew had been dismissive of the "domino theory"
in 1975 he had also intimated that this was at least partly due to an
appreciation that disharmony between the Vietnamese and Cambodian
97communists would provide a respite for the ASEAN states.
96 Personal interview with Squadron Leader Prasong Soonsiri, 
Secretary-General, National Security Council, Bangkok, 20 March 
1981.
97 Interview with Lee Kuan Yew quoted on Singapore home service in 
English, 1330 gmt, 3 May 1975 (SWB FE/4896/A3/8, 6 May 1975). 
According to Nayan Chanda of Far Eastern Economic Review, Lee's 
prediction of future disharmony between Vietnam and Cambodia was 
based partly on the worries that the Chinese leadership expressed 
(over the implications for Chinese security of Soviet influence 
in a unified Vietnam) when Singaporean Foreign Minister 
Rajaratnam visited Beijing in March 1975.
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Singapore's po l i t i c a l  relat ionship with Vietnam was characterized by
98tension and mis t rus t  throughout the 1975-78 period and in late  1978 
Lee r e i t e r a ted  the value of the intra-communist dispute in Indochina 
for the ASEAN s t a t e s . ^
Although the Singaporean leadership apparently anticipated that  
Hanoi might take dras t ic  mil i tary action against Cambodia, i t  was not 
expected that  the Vietnamese would occupy all  of Cambodia 
i n d e f i n i t e l y . ^  Nevertheless,  the Vietnamese mi l i ta ry  intervention 
in Cambodia and the ouster of the Khmer Rouge regime appeared to 
confirm the Singaporean leadership ' s  fears regarding Vietnam. From 
then onwards Lee and Rajaratnam propounded the most consistent ly 
"hawkish" views within ASEAN on the Vietnamese t hr ea t .
Considering the Singaporean leadership ' s  early appreciation of 
the intra-communist schism in Indochina and the poss ib i l i ty  of 
forceful  Vietnamese mi l i ta ry  action against Cambodia, there was a 
notable element of sensationalism in the response of Lee and his
98 See sect ion on "Singapore's Globalist  Outlook" in Chapter 9, 
pp. 407-11 below.
99 Lecture given by Lee Kuan Yew at the 26th World Congress of the 
Internat ional  Chamber of Commerce, Orlando, Florida,  5 October 
1978, reported in S t r a i t s  Times, 7 October 1978.
100 In November 1978, Goh Keng Swee (Singapore's Deputy Prime 
Minister and Minister of Defence) drafted a conference paper 
which "predicted the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea... but not 
the manner in which i t  was carried out".  Goh had, perhaps 
un r ea l i s t i c a l l y ,  expected the Vietnamese to follow the "more 
prudent" option of destroying or dispersing the Khmer Rouge army 
without occupying the whole country. Goh Keng Swee, "Vietnam and 
Big-power Rivalry",  in Richard H. Solomon (ed. ) ,  Asian Security 
in the 1980: Problems and Policies for a Time of Transit ion
(Cambridge, Mass.: Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, 1980), pp. 148-
51.
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government to the new s i tua t ion :  the Prime Min ister described the 
Vietnamese move as "so s ta r t l i n g ,  so unexpected, so audacious that i t s  
s ign if icance and impl icat ions are only gradual ly being grasped" and 
claimed:
Other countries in the region have always known that 
there was nothing in Southeast Asia that could stop 
the armed forces which the Vietnamese have b u i l t  over 
30 years of war, b u t . . .  they had never imagined that 
they would be used d i r e c t l y . . .  Most m i l i t a r y  analysts 
are convinced there is no combination of forces in 
Southeast Asia that can stop the Vietnamese on the 
mainland of A s ia . . .  We are a l l  th ink ing what were 
previously the unthinkables. ^ 1
Whereas the most important aspect of the Vietnamese threat fo r
Thailand was the fac t  that Hanoi had demonstrated i t s  wi l l ingness to 
use d i re c t  m i l i t a r y  force to intervene in and occupy a neighbouring 
s ta te, the Singaporean viewpoint stressed - -  to a greater degree than 
that of the other ASEAN countries - -  Vietnam's l inks with the Soviet 
Union and the threat posed not only to the region but to the non­
communist world as a whole by "communist imperial ism". This view
found d e f in i t i v e  expression in the Singaporean Min is t ry  of Foreign
A f fa i r s '  booklet From Phnom Penh to Kabul, which l inked the Vietnamese
ro le  in Cambodia and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan as the
102"forerunners" of a Soviet "empire".
101 Lee Kuan Yew interviewed by the BBC, reported on Singapore home 
service in Engl ish, 1330 gmt, 8 February 1979 (SWB FE/6040/A3/15, 
12 February 1979). Goh Keng Swee echoed th is  assessment, 
claiming that Vietnamese m i l i t a r y  super io r i ty  over the ASEAN 
states prevai led " in  almost every aspect" and that in any 
m i l i t a r y  contest "the outcome would be quick and decis ive".  Goh, 
p. 163.
102 Min is t ry  of Foreign A f fa i r s ,  Singapore, From Phnom Penh to Kabul
(Singapore: M in is t ry  of Foreign A f fa i r s ,  1980).
166 -
Apart from object ive assessments, several factors  influenced
Singapore's th reat  perceptions after  the Vietnamese invasion of
Cambodia. F i r s t l y ,  although the Singaporean leadership may not have
objected to a strong, united Vietnam exercising i t s  inf luence
throughout Indochina, i t  did object to the d i re c t ,  m i l i t a r y  means used
by Vietnam to take Cambodia under i t s  wing. There was apparently a
genuine concern over the implicat ions of the Vietnamese in tervention
fo r  Singapore's securi ty  - -  not in the present or the immediate
103fu tu re ,  but ten or twenty years hence - -  i f  the Vietnamese action 
went unprotected. This concern may have gone beyond a fear of
Vietnamese aggression to the possible precedent that the in tervention
might set fo r  Malaysia or Indonesia v is -a -v is  miniscule, vulnerable
c . 104Singapore.
Singapore's economy, being almost t o t a l l y  dependent on foreign
investment and trade, required fo r  i t s  continued success as stable and
105secure a regional environment as was possible. For th is  reason,
since the la te  1960s, the Singaporean government had str iven to 
encourage the United States to maintain i t s  in te res t  and m i l i t a r y  
presence in the region, even a f te r  the col lapse of non-communist 
Indochina. One obvious means of achieving th is  aim was to emphasize
103 Personal interview with a S t ra i ts  Times leader w r i te r  close to 
the Singaporean leadership, Singapore, January 1981.
104 Alone among Jakarta's ASEAN partners, Singapore had refused to 
condone Indonesia's annexation of East Timor in 1976.
105 Personal interview with See Chak Mun, Director (P o l i t i c a l  
A f fa i r s ) ,  M in is t ry  of Foreign A f fa i r s ,  Singapore, 7 February 
1981.
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the relationship between regional events and the global balance of 
power hence the stress on Vietnam's alleged role as a proxy for
the USSR in Southeast Asia. But i t  could be argued that Singaporean 
alarmism had the potential to undermine the confidence of foreign
investors, although no evidence of this had appeared by mid-1981.
Another reason for the Singaporean attitude towards the 
Vietnamese threat was perhaps the government's wish to consolidate 
national unity and the legitimacy of the People's Action Party (PAP) 
as not only the ruling party, but also the only party represented in 
Parliament. Opposition to a relatively distant communist "threat"
represented a safer way to convince Singapore's culturally diverse 
society to unite behind the PAP than a campaign stressing the official 
threat potentially posed by the city s ta te ' s  two ASEAN neighbours, 
Malaysia and Indonesia. Moreover, opposition to communism came 
naturally to the PAP, which had risen to power in the context of an 
anti-communist struggle within Singapore. But the fact that 
Singapore's population was predominantly ethnic Chinese effectively
meant that the People's Republic of China could not be vil i f ied as a 
serious threat,  although the few remaining Singaporean communists 
(members of the CPM) were undoubtedly oriented towards Beijing.
Indeed, the leadership may have seen its anti-Vietnamese and anti- 
Soviet line as a useful device with which to placate otherwise 
frustrated pro-Chinese sentiment amongst much of the population.
106 Within days of the invasion of Cambodia, Rajaratnam warned that 
"if the rest of Southeast Asia is taken over, directly or 
indirectly, not just the balance of power in this region is 
upset, but also the world balance". Singapore home service in 
English, 1130 gmt, 19 January 1979 (SWB FE/6022/A3/16, 22 January 
1979).
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The Philippines
Although the invasion of Cambodia altered the Philippine 
government's perception of Vietnam as a security t h r e a t , ^  Manila's 
view was not as alarmist as Bangkok's or Singapore's. The Philippines 
was physically and psychologically separated from events in mainland 
Southeast Asia by the South China Sea, and was virtually guaranteed 
American protection against direct external threats -- particularly 
from Vietnam or the USSR -- under arrangements which were 
satisfactori ly renegotiated a few days before the Vietnamese moved 
into Cambodia. Unlike Singapore, the Philippines was not potentially 
threatened by larger regional powers which could take the Cambodian 
case as a precedent if i t  was not contested. Thus, as Vietnamese 
forces were occupying Cambodia, although the Philippine Foreign 
Minister asserted that the events in Indochina could potentially have 
serious consequences for the rest of Asia, he also indicated that the 
ASEAN states had l i t t l e  or nothing to fear from the Vietnamese 
intervention. Indeed, Romulo interpreted the continuing struggle in
Indochina as showing that "the dominoes are falling the other
108way". In a speech in February 1980, President Marcos made it  quite 
clear that although the Cambodian problem posed "a very real threat to 
Thailand", he did
107 Personal interviews in Manila, 23 March 1981, with Carlos P. 
Romulo, Philippine Foreign Secretary, and Hazel P. Gacutan, 
Director for Research, The President's Center for Special 
Studies.
108 Manila radio in English, 2330 gmt, 10 January 1979 (SWB FE/6015/ 
A3/9, 13 January 1979).
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. . .  not believe that Thailand w i l l  be attacked. The 
threats to i ts  security are the expected ones which 
develop when one is neighbour to a nation in the midst 
of conf l ic t .  There w i l l  be moments of extreme 
precariousness... but I do not believe this w i l l  result 
in outright aggression against Tha i land .109
Manila's moderate stance in relation to the direct implications 
for Thai, Philippine and regional security of the Vietnamese 
occupation of Cambodia was paralleled by the Philippines' po l i t ica l  
response to the issue --  that is, somewhere between the "hardline" 
Thai and Singaporean position and the more concil iatory Indonesian and 
Malaysian approach.
Maiaysia
The essential premise on which Malaysian and Indonesian 
evaluations of Vietnam as a direct threat were based after the 
invasion of Cambodia was the continuing relevance of China as their 
principal security concern. But the new situation did cause 
rethinking of this concern with China, part icular ly  in Kuala Lumpur. 
Nevertheless, various elements of the Malaysian bureaucracy expressed 
divergent views on the seriousness of the Vietnamese threat. The 
Ministry of Foreign Affa irs ' l ine that Vietnam posed no serious threat
109 President Ferdinand Marcos, "The PMA Graduates: The P i l la r  of
our Nation's Strength and Security", Speech on graduation day at 
the Philippine Mil i tary Academy, Baguio, 18 February 1980, p. 4.
110 See section on "Philippine Policy on Cambodia" in Chapter 10, 
pp. 455-57 below.
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to the ASEAN region111 continued to dominate Malaysian po l icy  even
a f te r  the refugee c r i s i s  of 1978-79 and the invasion of Cambodia, both
of which were seen in some Malaysian quarters as highly deleter ious to
national and regional securi ty.  O f f i c ia l  statements continued to
re i te ra te  Foreign A f fa i r s '  be l ie f  that Vietnam had no plan " to  overrun
11?weak nations in Southeast Asia".
In contrast , the Ministry  of Home A f fa i rs  and the Defence
M in is t ry  took the idea of a Vietnamese threat more ser iously . Ghazali
Shafie, the Home A f fa i rs  Minister (with re sp o n s ib i l i t y  fo r  internal
secur i ty )  did not envisage a d i rec t  Vietnamese threat to Malaysia, but
was nevertheless concerned that Hanoi would intervene in northeast 
113
Thailand. In Ghazal i's view, any serious Vietnamese aggression
towards Thailand seemed sure to a f fec t  Malaysia adversely - -  
p a r t i c u la r l y  as i t  would imply the diversion of Thai land's m i l i t a r y  
at tent ion away from i t s  southern border, where cooperation between the 
two countr ies '  armed forces against the Communist Party of Malaya's 
gue r i l las  was essential from Kuala Lumpur's viewpoint.
Although the Defence Minister claimed in the wake of the invasion 
of Cambodia that "the s i tua t ion  in Indochina did not pose an immediate
111 Personal interview with senior o f f i c i a l ,  M in is t ry  of Foreign 
A f fa i r s ,  Kuala Lumpur, Apri l  1981.
112 According to Foreign Minister Rithauddeen, 4 Apr i l  1980, reported 
by Agence France Presse (Hong Kong) in Engl ish, 1153 gmt, 4 Apri l  
1980 (FBIS-APA-80-068, 7 Apri l  1980).
113 Ghazali made th is  e x p l ic i t  in a speech in Apr i l  1979. See 
Ghazali Shafie, "The ASEAN Countries and Indochina" (Text of an 
address at Conference on Southeast Asian Banking and Finance 
organized by The Financial Times, Singapore, 19 Apr i l  1979), 
p. 19.
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114threat to Malaysia", la te r  declarat ions by senior Malaysian
m i l i t a r y  f igures tended to re f le c t  less op t im is t ic  assessments. In
mid-1980 the Chief of Armed Forces Staff  described the region 's
p o l i t i c a l  s i tua t ion  as "uneasy" and asserted that "external dangers"
ar is ing  from p o l i t i c a l  upheavals in Southeast Asia were a challenge to
115be ranked with the country's in ternal securi ty  problem.
The armed forces may, however, have exaggerated th e i r  concern - -  
which included preparations fo r  "any e v e n t u a l i t y " ^  - -  in order to 
support th e i r  demands fo r  increased defence expenditure with which to 
finance large-scale expansion and modernization.
Indonesia
The Indonesian government saw less danger than any of i t s  ASEAN
counterparts as a resu l t  of the invasion of Cambodia. I t  seemed clear
to the Indonesian leadership that at i t s  present stage of development
Vietnam could not threaten Indonesia even i f  i t  wanted to,
p a r t i c u la r l y  in view of Hanoi's extremely l im i ted capab i l i ty  fo r
117maritime warefare. In the view of Al i  Murtopo, the powerful
114 Datuk Abdul Taib, quoted by Kuala Lumpur in English fo r  abroad, 
0830 gmt, 14 January 1979. (SWB FE/6020/A3/9, 19 January 1979).
115 General Sany, quoted by Asian Defence Journal, No. 6/80 
(November-December 1980), p. 14.
116 According to Brigadier-General Datuk Mohamed Ngah Said, Deputy 
Chief of the Royal Malaysian Air Force, Asian Defence Journal, 
No. 6/80 (November-December 1980), p. 14.
117 Personal interview with Dr Kird i  Dipoyudo, Head, Department of 
International Relat ions, Centre fo r  Strategic and International 
Studies, Jakarta, 7 Apr i l  1981.
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Information Minister, the invasion of Cambodia was a continuation of 
"the independence struggle. . .  aimed at establishing a greater 
Indochina with Hanoi at its centre" rather than the manifestation of a 
desire to dominate the whole region. Henceforth, "Vietnam would be 
busy with its domestic affairs",  precluding any possibili ty of Vietnam 
launching aggression against neighbouring countries, including 
ASEAN.118
As the Cambodian problem persisted through 1979, Jakarta seemed
to be taking the issue more seriously. In December, the Director of
the Centre for Strategic and International Studies declared that
although an open invasion of Thailand was unlikely, Vietnam's pressure
on the Thai border and i ts links with a faction of the CPT made i t  the
119most immediate external threat to the region. But Wanandi's use of 
the term "immediate" was significant,  indicating that China was s t i l l  
seen as the most serious external threat to the security of the ASEAN 
region, particularly in the longer term.
A Soviet Threat?
As a result of factors which were objectively beyond Moscow's 
control -- Vietnam's conflicts with Cambodia and China, and the West's
118 Jakarta home service, 1200 gmt, 10 January 1979 (SWB FE/6014/A3/ 
12, 12 January 1979). Suharto himself expressed a similar view 
in an interview with Asian Wall Street Journal, 21 February 1981.
119 Jusuf Wanendi, "Dimensions of Southeast Asian Security" (Paper 
presented at Conference on New Foundations for Asian and Pacific 
Security, Pattaya, Thailand, 12-16 December 1979), p. 131. 
Wanandi's views were widely acknowledged as reflecting, or at 
least coinciding with, Murtopo's.
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v i r tu a l  cessation of economic aid to Hanoi - -  from 1978 the Soviet 
Union was able to develop an unprecedentedly close re la t ionsh ip  with 
Vietnam. Although the re la t ionsh ip  included an important economic 
dimension, most attention in the ASEAN region was concentrated on the 
p o l i t i c a l  and m i l i t a r y  aspects of the Moscow-Hanoi nexus: the
apparent id e n t i ty  of s t ra teg ic  in te rest  and the in tens i fy ing  securi ty  
re la t ionsh ip  between the USSR and Vietnam was seen in some quarters as 
compounding the Vietnamese stra teg ic  threat  to non-communist Southeast 
Asia.
Between 1975 and 1978 the ASEAN governments general ly saw the
Soviet Union as much less of a threat than China to regional secur i ty .
Unlike China, the USSR was physical ly  d is tant  with l i t t l e  capacity fo r
pro ject ing m i l i t a r y  power into Southeast Asia; there was no ethnic
minor i ty  in the region which might act as a Soviet " f i f t h  column"; and
Moscow's l inks with communist part ies in the region were minimal.
Indeed, re la t ions between the ASEAN countries and Moscow general ly
improved in the 1975-78 period as Southeast Asia emerged from what had
e f fe c t i v e ly  been, u n t i l  1975, a regional extension of the Cold War.
In p a r t icu la r ,  economic l inks  were in te ns i f ied .  Even the Singaporean
government, which since the early  1970s had expressed suspicion of the
USSR's growing regional presence and inf luence, strove to develop
commercial re la t ions with Moscow. An important aspect of the
burgeoning Soviet-Singaporean economic re la t ionsh ip  was the repair of
Soviet ships, including naval a u x i la i r ie s ,  at the Singaporean
1 ?0government-owned Keppel Shipyard.
The p o l i t i c a l  re la t ionships between the ASEAN states and the USSR 
were not always so co rd ia l .  The extreme anti-communist Thanin regime
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disrupted the relat ionship between Bangkok and Moscow in 1976-77. 
Moscow's refusal  in 1976 to supply Jakarta with spare parts for 
Soviet-supplied mil i tary equipment may have been a manifestation of 
Soviet disapproval of the Indonesian invasion of East Timor. The 
death of the pro-neut ra l i s t  Malaysian Prime Minister,  Tun Razak, in 
January 1976 and the subsequent ar res t  of some of his closest  
associates on espionage charges clouded Moscow's rela t ions  with Kuala 
Lumpur. In pol i t i ca l  terms, the Singaporean government remained
extremely cautious of the USSR. Although Manila's pol i t i ca l  relat ions 
with Moscow apparently blossomed in 1976-78 th i s  phenomenon was 
largely a ref lec t ion of the Marcos regime's e f for t s  to secure a 
favourable outcome to the simultaneous negotiat ions with Washington 
over the future of the American mil i ta ry bases in the Phil ippines.
There was, however, l i t t l e  concern over the Soviet Union as a
mi l i ta ry  t h r ea t .  The prevailing view in the ASEAN region that  the
USSR posed a much lesser  securi ty threa t  than China did not
subs tant ia l ly  change until  the in tens i f i ca t ion of Soviet-Vietnamese
links in 1978-79. Vietnam joined the Soviet-dominated economic
community, COMECON, in June 1978 and entered into a Treaty of
121Friendship and Cooperation with Moscow the following November.
120 S t ra i t s  Times, 4 November 1978. The Singaporean government's 
i n t e r es t  in developing commercial l inks with the USSR clearly 
confl icted with s t ra tegic  considerations in this  instance: as 
early as 1973, Lee Kuan Yew had called for the creation of a 
j o in t  US, West European, Australian and Japanese naval task force 
to counter the growing Soviet naval presence in the region. 
S t ra i t s  Times, 12 May 1973.
121 Art icle 6 of the Treaty, which was clear ly intended by Hanoi to 
provide a degree of s t ra tegic  insurance against an attack by 
China, committed Moscow and Hanoi to "immediately begin mutual 
consul tat ions for the purpose of removing that  threat" i f  ei ther  
was attacked or threatened with at tack.  See Treaty of Friendship 
and Cooperation between the Union of Soviet Social i s t  Republics 
and the Social i s t  Republic of Vietnam, reprinted in International 
Affairs (Moscow), 1/1979 (January), pp. 146-47.
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Soviet mi l i ta ry  and economic aid to Vietnam increased dramatically in
1221979 --  possibly by a factor of twenty. Soviet aid, par t i cular ly
in terms of arms supplies,  made possible both the Vietnamese invasion
of Cambodia at the end of 1978 and Vietnam's defence of i t s  northern
provinces against the Chinese invasion in early 1979.
In return for this  broad economic and po l i t i ca l  support,  Moscow
was able to secure a mil i tary toehold in Southeast Asia for the f i r s t
time. In March 1979, soon af ter  the eruption of the Sino-Vietnamese
war, a Soviet naval task force vis i ted the Vietnamese naval bases at
Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang. Ninety-one Soviet naval vessels used these
123f a c i l i t i e s  over the next year.  Soviet Tu-95 Bear reconnaissance
a i r c r a f t  also began regular v i s i t s  to Da Nang in 1979 and by 1981
Soviet elect ronic intel l igence and f l ee t  communications f a c i l i t i e s
124were operating at Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang.
The idea that  the Soviet-Vietnamese securi ty relat ionship might
be used as a base for regional adventurism by the Soviet Union was not
expressed with uniform vigour throughout the ASEAN region. The
Singaporean and Thai governments apparently took the Soviet threat
most ser iously.  Singapore was more hos t i le  than any other ASEAN state
towards Soviet policy in the region. By mid-1978 the Singaporean
government's declaratory l ine depicted Hanoi as a c l i ent  of Moscow and
125the Cambodia-Vietnam confl ict  as a Sino-Soviet proxy war.
122 Asian Security 1981 (Tokyo: Research Ins t i tu t e  for Peace and 
Securi ty,  1981), p. 55.
123 Nayan Chanda, FEER, 14 November 1980, pp. 26-27; Asian Security 
1981, p. 57.
124 Austra l ian, 8 July 1981; Asian Securi ty 1981, p. 57.
125 Peter Weintraub, FEER, 4 August 1978, pp. 10-11.
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A c c o r d i n g  to Lee K u an Yew, if the U n i t e d  S t a t e s  and its a l l i e s  did not 
m a k e  e f f o r t s  to b a l a n c e  the g r o w i n g  S o v i e t  naval p r e s e n c e  in the 
r e g i on, the A S E A N  s t a t e s  m i g h t  be f o r c e d  to t a k e  s i d e s  in t h is 
re gi o n a l  e x t e n s i o n  of the S i n o - S o v i e t  d i s p u t e  w i t h  the d a n g e r  t h at 
t h e y  c o u l d  b e c o m e  " F i n l a n d s "  by f a l l i n g  u n d e r  S o v i e t - V i e t n a m e s e  (or 
C h i n e s e )  i n f l u e n c e . ^
B a n g k o k  was not so o v e r t l y  h o s t i l e  as S i n g a p o r e  t o w a r d s  the U S SR
in 1979, o w i n g  to a c o n s c i o u s n e s s  of the d a n g e r  of o v e r - r e l i a n c e  on
C h i n a  and the e f f e c t  this m i g h t  h a v e  on I n d o n e s i a n  and M a l a y s i a n
s u p p o r t  for Thai p o l i c y  on C a m b o d i a .  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  T h a i l a n d ' s  p a rt ial
127a c c o m m o d a t i o n  of M o s c o w  did not p r e v e n t  B a n g k o k  f r o m  d e m o n s t r a t i n g  
its c o n c e r n  over the i n c r e a s e d  S o v i e t  naval p r e s e n c e  in the Gulf of 
T h a i l a n d  by j o i n i n g  w i t h  th e  o t h e r  A S E A N  m e m b e r s  in d e c l i n i n g  
p e r m i s s i o n  for a vi s i t  b y  S o v i e t  w a r s h i p s  and b y  r e f u s i n g  to a c c e p t  a 
S o v i e t  naval attache.
D e s p i t e  J a k a r t a ' s  l o n g - s t a n d i n g  s e c u r i t y  c o n c e r n  w i t h  C h i n a  and 
pr i d e  in a v a g u e  " s pe cia l r e l a t i o n s h i p "  w i t h  V i e t n a m ,  af te r t h e  e v e n t s  
of 1 9 7 8 - 7 9  the I n d o n e s i a n  r e g i m e  w a s c o n c e r n e d  to p r e v e n t  t h e S o v i e t  
Un io n f r o m  b e c o m i n g  m o r e  d e e p l y  i n v o l v e d  in the I n d o c h i n a  c o n f l i c t ,  as 
this m i g h t  in v o l v e  S o v i e t  d e m a n d s  for m o r e  p e r m a n e n t  m i l i t a r y  b a s e s  in
126 S t r a i t s  T i m e s , 24 O c t o b e r  1979.
127 T h is a c c o m m o d a t i o n  was e v i d e n t  in K r i a n g s a k ' s  vi s i t  to M o s c o w  in 
M a r c h  1979 and la t e r  by B a n g k o k ' s  initial w i l l i n g n e s s  to a l l o w  
S o v i e t  use of Thai a i r s p a c e  for c a r g o  f l i g h t s  to H a n o i .  R o d n e y  
T a s k e r ,  F E E R , 23 M a r c h  1979, pp. 13-14; " I n t e l l i g e n c e " ,  F E E R , 
18 M a r c h  1979, p. 7.
128 John M c Be th, F E E R , 24 A u g u s t  1979, p. 29.
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Vietnam, transforming the USSR "from being a second-class to a f i r s t -
129class power" in the region.
The invasion of Afghanistan at the end of 1979 apparently
heightened perceptions of the Soviet threat in the ASEAN region. This
was most obvious in Singapore, where Foreign Minister Rajaratnam
linked the invasions of Cambodia and Afghanistan as elements of "the
s tra teg ic  offensive of World Communism under th e . . .  leadership of the 
1 30Soviet Union". Lee Kuan Yew claimed that "the Soviet Union and
Vietnam have got enormously more m i l i t a r y  muscle than China to bring
131to bear on Southeast Asia". Dhanabalan, the Senior Minister of
State fo r  Foreign A f fa i r s ,  went so fa r  as to assert that Moscow might
be w i l l i n g  to escalate the c o n f l i c t  in Southeast Asia (even i f  th is
involved "a severe setback fo r  Vietnam") as a means of deflect ing
"demands to re t rea t  from Afghanistan". By Apri l  1981, Dhanabalan was
claiming that "we see...  the Soviet Union...  as the biggest threat to
132peace in the region". One concrete Singaporean response was to ban
133Soviet naval a u x i l ia r ie s  from Singapore's ports and dockyards. 
Bangkok s im i la r ly  stressed the connection between the occupations of
129 Jusuf Wanandi, Securi ty Dimensions of the As ia-Paci f ic  Region in 
the 1980s, p. 8.
130 Speech by Rajaratnam at the opening ceremony of the International 
Conference on Regional Securi ty, Development and S ta b i l i t y  in 
Southeast Asia, Singapore, 26 March 1980. Singapore Government 
Press Release, Ref. 09-1/80/03/26.
131 Lee Kuan Yew, interviewed by Derek Davies, FEER, 26 September 
1980, p. 14.
132 S t ra i ts  Times, 14 November 1980; S. Dhanabalan, interviewed by 
Wayne Morrison, Mir ror  (Singapore), 15 Apri l  1981.
133 S t ra i ts  Times, 15 July 1980.
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Afghanistan and Cambodia, and re-emphasized the threat posed by the
Soviet naval presence in the r e g i o n . ^  Manila made increasingly more
strident complaints to Moscow over repeated Soviet violations of
Philippine airspace and the suspicious activi t ies of Soviet naval and
merchant vessels. Carlos Romulo, the Philippine Foreign Minister,
argued that "the West" should act quickly to prevent the spread of
135Soviet influence in Southeast Asia. One explanation for Manila's
increasingly tough line on Soviet activities in the region may have
been a desire to just ify to a domestic audience the continued presence
of US military bases in the Philippines.
Although the invasion of Afghanistan involved the violation of a
fellow Muslim country, the Indonesian and Malaysian response was
muted. This was partly because of a fear that protests against the
occupation of Afghanistan might be used by domestic Islamic opposition
groups to arouse Muslim feelings on other issues -- including
13fiAmerica's role in Southeast Asia. But it  was also because Jakarta 
and Kuala Lumpur were not as interested as Singapore, Bangkok and 
Manila in engaging in "linkage diplomacy" by coupling events in
134 Sydney Morning Herald, 20 February 1980. Thailand protested 
loudly when a Soviet f lo t i l l a  including the aircraft  carrier 
Minsk appeared in the Gulf of Thailand in November 1980. 
International Herald Tribune, 4 November 1980. Prasong Soonsiri, 
Secretary-General of the National Security Council then claimed 
that the USSR posed "a direct threat to Thailand and the region". 
Bangkok Post, 8 November 1980.
135 Straits Times, 15 July 1980; Agence France Presse (Hong Kong) in 
English, 0328 gmt, 2 September 1980 (FBIS-APA-80-171, 2 September 
1980).
136 K. Das, FEER, 25 January 1980, p. 15; David Jenkins, FEER, 
25 January 1980, pp. 17-18.
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Southeast Asia to developments in other regions of more direct 
importance to Western security as a means of maintaining Western (and 
particularly American) poli t ical ,  economic and military support. 
Nevertheless, important elements within the Indonesian security 
establishment were increasingly concerned that the continuing conflict 
in Indochina was pushing Vietnam into ever greater dependence on the 
USSR, increasing the Soviets' political influence in Hanoi and 
providing an opportunity for Moscow to heighten its regional military 
prof i le .137
Although the security relationship between Moscow and Hanoi -- 
particularly the Soviet use of Vietnamese naval and air f ac i l i t i e s  -- 
injected an important new element into the Southeast Asian military 
balance, objectively i t  did not pose a serious direct threat to the 
ASEAN states.  The Vietnamese faci l i t i es  were of considerable use to 
the USSR in peacetime, most importantly by providing
__ a modest power-projection role in Southeast Asia
and much greater f lexibi l i ty for extended operations 
for Soviet naval forces operating in the South China 
Sea area, the Straits of Malacca and the eastern Indian 
Ocean... continuous intelligence coverage of US
surface, submarine and air assets based in the
Phil ipp ines .138
137 Nayan Chanda, FEER, 19 December 1980, p. 30. According to one 
source, there was unease within the Indonesian navy's leadership 
at the Soviet navy's power projection role in Southeast Asia. 
See Justus M. van der Kroef, "Soviet Policies in Southeast Asia: 
Patterns of Security Perceptions", Strategic Studies, Vol. 4, No. 
4 (Summer 1981), pp. 14-15.
138 Paul Dibb, "The Interests of the Soviet Union in Southeast Asia
and the Southwest Pacific: Implications for Regional Security"
(Paper presented at Conference on International Security in the 
Southeast Asian and Southwest Pacific Region, Australian National 
University, Canberra, 12-15 July 1982), p. 29.
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But there was no evidence to support the claims of commentators
in the West, which were echoed in the ASEAN region (particular ly by
the Singaporean and Thai governments), that Moscow's naval and air
prsence in Southeast Asia would be of use in the interdiction of
shipping in the Malacca Straits and in the operations against American
139forces in the region, including their  bases in the Philippines. 
Even i f  the Soviet Union's forces in the South China Sea were assigned 
these roles, i t  is almost certain that the regionally preponderant US 
naval and air forces (not to mention the increasingly sophisticated 
capabil i t ies of the ASEAN states and Australia) would have l i t t l e  
trouble in neutralizing the re lat ive ly small Soviet presence and its  
vulnerable and log is t ica l ly  isolated Indochinese fa c i l i t ie s .
Maritime Issues of Contention
A rather dif ferent aspect of the threat that ASEAN governments 
perceived to come from Vietnam arose from confl ic t ing maritime claims 
between themselves and Hanoi in the South China Sea. With the 
increasing recognition of the importance of regional waters in 
economic and strategic terms, and the evolution of new law of the sea 
c o n c e p t s , t h e  interest of l i t t o ra l  states in securing control over
139 One Thai general, for example, claimed that "the Soviet naval 
presence may be able to cope with the US 7th Fleet thus 
diminishing the chances of US support for regional a l l ies" .  
Lieutenant-General Abhichart, pp. 142-44.
140 The th ird United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea at 
Caracas in August 1974 had confirmed the right of states to 
enforce 200 mile maritime Exclusive Economic Zones.
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islands (and hence surrounding sea areas) increased signficantly in 
the 1970s. Offshore o i l ,  which research in the late 1970s showed to 
be present in substantially greater quantities than previously 
believed, was important for l i t t o ra l  states both as an energy source 
and as a balance of payments input. The South China Sea was also one 
of the world's richest f ishing areas, with f ish providing 70% of the 
rapidly growing regional population's animal protein. The Sea's 
natural resources were part icular ly  important to Vietnam in i ts  post- 
1975 drive for reconstruction, and Hanoi in it ia ted a major sc ient i f ic  
programme involving oceanography and martitime resources (including 
f isheries).  As well as viewing the South China Sea as their  last 
major resource f ron t ier ,  the ASEAN states were aware of i ts  potential 
strategic importance. A large proportion of the world's crude oi l and 
oil  products was shipped through the Sea, mainly in transit to Japan 
and South Korea, and the important Hong Kong-Singapore shipping route 
passed through the Paracel Islands. Bases on the South China Sea 
l i t t o ra l  were increasingly important as forward staging posts for 
reinforcing the superpowers' naval presence in the Indian Ocean.
Although the main conf l ic t  in the South China Sea was between the 
claims of Beijing and Hanoi (involving principal ly the Gulf of Tonkin, 
the Paracels and the Spratly Islands), there were also disputes 
between Vietnam and all the ASEAN states except Singapore. While the 
People's Republic had occupied all the Paracels since January 1974 
(when the Chinese ejected South Vietnamese forces from several of the 
islands), various of the Spratlys were occupied by Taiwan (whose 
claims more or less paralleled Beij ing's),  the Philippines and (from 
May 1975) Vietnam. Compared to the Chinese and Vietnamese claims, the
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Phi l ipp ine claim to the Spratlys was weak, being based more on the
is lands'  proximity  than on any real h is to r ica l  precedent.
Nevertheless, seven islands were occupied by Phi l ippine forces between
the la te  1960s and 1976, when Manila gave approval to a Swedish
consortium to begin d r i l l i n g  for  o i l  in the Reed Bank area of the
141Spratlys,  provoking angry reactions from Hanoi and Be i j ing .  By
early 1978 the Phi l ipp ine m i l i t a r y  presence in the Spratlys had been
b u i l t  up to a strength of a thousand marines, and an a i r s t r i p  was 
142being b u i l t .  The Phi l ipp ine m i l i t a r y  build-up in the Spratlys
fol lowed the construct ion by Vietnam of f o r t i f i c a t i o n s  on Pugad, only
5 km from the nearest Phi 1ippine-occupied i s l a n d . ^
Although the Phi l ippine government attempted to signal to i t s
r i v a l s  the seriousness of i t s  claims in the Spratlys by maintaining a
small m i l i t a r y  presence in the islands, there was unease in Manila at
144the prospect of an armed clash there with Vietnam. As i t  became 
c learer in the la te  1970s that the offshore petroleum potentia l  in the 
area was sub s tan t ia l ly  greater than had o r ig in a l l y  been thought, and 
in view of the huge balance of payments burden imposed on both Hanoi
141 Choon-Ho Park, "The South China Sea Disputes: Who Owns the 
Islands and the Natural Resources", Ocean Development and 
In ternat iona l  Law Journal, Vo l . 5, No. "I (1978), pT 4"* David 
Jenkins, FEER, 7 August 1981, p. 32.
142 Rodney Tasker, FEER, 24 February 1978, pp. 11-12.
143 Michael Richardson, Age, 2 June 1976.
144 H o s t i l i t i e s  with Bei j ing over the Spratlys appeared extremely 
un l ike ly  in the foreseeable fu tu re ,  p a r t i c u la r ly  because of 
China's probable unwil lingness to r isk  combat outside i t s  a i r  
cover.
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and Manila by their oil imports, such a clash appeared slightly more 
145likely. Although Manila's navy was larger than Hanoi's, the
Philippine military leadership apparently fel t  that their forces were
not sufficient to defend their country's claims in the Sprat lys."^
Furthermore, Washington had indicated that its security guarantees to
Manila did not extent to helping the Philippines fight a war over the
Spratlys, by excluding the subject from discussions on mutual defence
problems^ prior to the drawing up of new security arrangements
between the two countries at the end of 1978.
But the latent dispute over the Spratlys did not prevent Hanoi
(like Beijing) from actively promoting improved links with Manila, and
in 1980 President Marcos made it  known that the Vietnamese had
indicated a wish to resolve the problem by negotiation in the near
f u t u r e . W i t h  the effective (if perhaps temporary) defusing of the
dispute with Vietnam, Manila apparently became more immediately
concerned with its maritime problems with Taipei -- particularly the
149Taiwanese garrison on Itu Aba in the Spratlys.
Vietnam's maritime dispute with Indonesia involved an area of
220,000 km on the potentially oil-rich continental shelf north of the
146 Franklin B. Weinstein, "The Meaning of National Security in 
Southeast Asia", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 34, 
No. 9 (November 1978), p. 20.
147 Lim Joo-Jock, Geo-strategy and the South China Sea Basin
(Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1979), p. 75.
148 Personal interview with senior Australian diplomat, Manila, March 
1981.
149 David Jenkins, FEER, 7 August 1981, p. 26.
184 -
Natunas Islands.  However, both Hanoi and Jakarta took a f a i r l y
measured approach to the problem from the time of the reuni f icat ion of
Vietnam, and there never appeared to be any Indonesian concern that
the dispute would escalate  to armed conf l ic t .  Nevertheless,  from
Jakar ta ' s  viewpoint the Vietnamese appeared impl ici t ly  to be
150questioning Indonesia's archipelagic doctr ine.  The Indonesian
regime seemed keen to remove what could become an impediment to the
"special relat ionship" between the two countr ies .  But although
negotiat ions began in June 1978, the issue f lared up in December 1979
when Jakarta granted oil and natural gas concessions in the disputed
151area, leading to Vietnamese protes ts .
Although there was some speculation that  Vietnam's a t t i tude
towards i t s  maritime boundary dispute with Indonesia would be
152influenced by ASEAN's pol icies  towards the Cambodian problem, by 
May 1981 i t  appeared that  the disputed sea area could be reduced 
(af ter  perhaps one more round of negotiat ions) to 3300 km?, with 
the Indonesian author i t ies  being largely sa t i s i fed  that  known gas and
150 Jakar ta ' s  archipelagic declarat ion of December 1957 claimed all
waters "surrounding, between and connecting" Indonesia' s  islands 
as being "under the exclusive sovereignty of the Indonesian 
s ta te" .  The declarat ion ref lected J akar t a ' s  concern over 
Indonesia's vulnerabi l i ty  owing to i t s  physical and ethnic 
fragmentation, and in 1973 the "Archipelago outlook" was 
confirmed as a guideline of s ta te  pol icy.  Michael Leifer,  
Indonesia's Foreign Policy (London: George Allen and Unwin for
the Royal I ns t i tu t e  of International  Affairs ,  1983), pp. 48-50, 
143-7.
151 Agence France Presse (Hong Kong) in English, 1046 gmt, 6 December 
1979 (FBIS-APA-79-238, 10 December 1979).
152 Guy Sacerdoti ,  FEER, 12 December 1980, p. 19.
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153oil resources were secure. Hanoi -- perhaps anxious to improve
relations with the least hostile ASEAN member -- did not explicitly 
link these bilateral negotiations to Cambodia, although i ts deferral 
of a final maritime settlement may have been intended as an incentive 
for Indonesia to maintain i ts relatively sympathetic approach on the 
Cambodian issue. But in any event, senior Indonesian military 
officers were apparently worried by the prospect of sharing a 
confirmed, direct maritime boundary with Vietnam for the f i r s t  
time.154
Kuala Lumpur's maritime dispute with Hanoi began in 1978, when
Malaysian officials visited and claimed several islands in the south
of the Spratly group, north of Sabah -- probably with an eye to
155future oil exploration and exploitation in the area. In 1979, new
Malaysian maps claimed ter r i tor ial  rights over the continental shelf
surrounding the country -- including Amboyna and other small islands
in the southern Spratlys. But Kuala Lumpur did not maintain a
physical presence on these islands, whereas a few months after
Malaysia had claimed i t  in 1978 Hanoi (which claimed all islands in
156the group) had sent troops to occupy Amboyna. Kuala Lumpur
de-emphasized the issue, however, and although i t  was discussed by the 
Malaysian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister with their Vietnamese
153 "Intelligence", FEER, 15 May 1981, p. 9.
154 Personal interview with senior Australian diplomat, Jakarta, 
April 1981.
155 "Fighting over flyspecks", FEER, 7 August 1981, p. 30.
156 Canberra Times, 28 February 1980.
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counterparts when the l a t t e r  vis i ted Malaysia in October 1978 and May 
1571980 respect ively no agreement was reached on e i ther  occasion. 
Vietnam was in the secure posit ion of physical ly occupying Amboyna and 
probably saw no point in pressing for Malaysian recognition of i t s  
claim, par t i cular ly  as i t  wished to win Malaysia's sympathy over the 
Cambodian problem. Malaysia was wary of emphatically pursuing a claim 
of doubtful legitimacy, which might not be supported by i t s  ASEAN 
associates ,  bearing in mind the number of l a tent  t e r r i t o r i a l  disputes 
between the Associat ion' s  members themselves. Presumably, neither 
side saw an in te res t  in taking the matter any fur ther  at that  time.
According to the Vietnamese document al legedly confirming Hanoi's 
nefarious intent ions towards northeast Thailand, Hanoi also intended 
to "obtain a favourable agreement (from Thailand) over the sea areas
I C O
f a l l ing  under our national sovereignty". But l i t t l e  more was heard
of th is  aspect of Thai-Vietnamese re la t ions  unt i l  1978 when Bangkok
and Hanoi announced that  thei r  rival claims to part  of the Gulf of
Thailand would be "set t led on the basis o f . . .  equitable
159pr inciples" .  Although l i t t l e  movement was subsequently made
towards a solut ion,  equally the issue was not used by e i ther  side to 
exacerbate thei r  confrontation over Cambodia from the beginning of 
1979. Before the Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia, Bangkok was
157 Agence France Presse (Hong Kong) in English, 1517 gmt, 8 May 1980 
(FBIS-APA-80-092, 9 May 1980).
158 Pipake, "Document discloses Hanoi's intent ions towards Thailand", 
Bangkok Post , 30 March 1975.
159 David Jenkins, FEER, 7 August 1981, p. 25.
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also in dispute with Phnom Penh over overlapping areas of the Gulf. 
But by 1981 i t  was s t i l l  not clear what policy the Vietnamese-backed 
Heng Samrin regime would adopt towards the problem, although the fact 
that Democratic Kampuchea had also been in conflict with Hanoi over 
maritime boundar ies^ probably militated against an early reassertion 
of Cambodia's claims.
Thus a military threat from Vietnam owing to maritime disputes 
was perceived only in Indonesia and the Philippines, and in both these 
cases i t  was expressed more or less privately by armed forces leaders, 
rather than in public government statements. Furthermore, there was 
l i t t l e  comparison between these worries and Thai fears of a major 
Vietnamese military onslaught across the border with Cambodia, 
although a defeat at sea -- even in a minor clash -- could have had 
unfavourable repercussions on the credibil i ty of Marcos's New Society 
or Suharto's New Order. But direct Vietnamese aggression against any 
of the ASEAN states in the South China Sea seemed an unlikely prospect 
while Vietnam was seeking to neutralize their opposition to i ts role 
in Cambodia. Objectively, a far more likely prospect was that 
Sino-Vietnamese rivalry could be extended to armed conflict over the 
Paracels and Spratlys (perhaps as part of a second Chinese "lesson" to 
Vietnam), in which case some or all of ASEAN's members might be 
involved wil ly-ni l ly.161
160 Ibid.,  loc. c i t .
161 This particular possibility was not stressed by the ASEAN 
governments, but was apparently subsumed in their more 
generalized concern over the impact of intensified Sino- 
Vietnamese conflict on regional security.
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Conclusion
Objectively, the communist Indochinese states posed no serious, 
direct military threat to the ASEAN countries in the 1975-81 period. 
The ASEAN governments generally appeared to recognize that their 
Indochinese counterparts (most importantly, Hanoi) lacked both the 
political will and the military capability to embark on expansion 
beyond Indochina, in the short to medium term at least.  Moreover, the 
ASEAN governments wished to reassure both domestic and international 
audiences that there was no serious threat from Indochina, in order to 
bolster an image of s tabil i ty as a means of forestalling panic and 
defeatism at home and concern amongst foreign investors. Furthermore, 
the "regionalist" approach of the Indonesian and Malaysian governments 
to security problems in Southeast Asia predisposed them to emphasize 
conciliation rather than confrontation in relation to Hanoi even after 
the invasion of Cambodia, and their concern (particularly in 
Indonesia's case) with a long-term threat from China caused them to 
view the advent of a unified and mil i tari ly strong Vietnam in a less 
unfavourable light than other non-communist governments in the region.
Nevertheless, official and semi-official commentators in the 
ASEAN states quite frequently expressed alarm over alleged direct 
military threats from Indochina. On occasion -- notably at the time 
of the Indochinese communist victories in April 1975 and again when 
Vietnam was occupying Cambodia in December 1978 and January 1979 
-- such alarmism was probably at least partly a sincere reaction to 
dramatic changes in the regional balance of power, although these 
developments did not immediately pose serious security threats.  
Similarly, the June 1980 Vietnamese incursion was a violation of Thai
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t e r r i t o r y  which was unprecedented in modern times: i t  was not
surpr is ing that some commentators were genuinely shocked by th is  
fo rce fu l  remainder that Thailand could no longer re ly  on a buffer  zone 
to protect  i t  from Vietnam.
But in general - -  and to some extent even at the time of the
1975, 1978-79 and June 1980 crises - -  much of the alarmism which
p o l i t i c ia n s ,  o f f i c i a l s  and senior m i l i t a r y  men in the ASEAN region
expressed over the d i rec t  m i l i t a r y  threat  from Indochina ( p a r t i c u la r l y
Vietnam) was not inspired by stra ight forward concern fo r  national or
regional secur i ty . Although i t  was necessary to reassure both the
populace and foreign investors that the external challenge was not so
severe and immediate that the government could not cope with i t ,  the
"Vietnamese threat" was f requent ly  used both to enhance the domestic
legit imacy of the regime in power (p a r t i c u la r ly  in the face of
p o l i t i c a l  dissent and economic problems) and to secure p o l i t i c a l ,
economic and m i l i t a r y  support from the West, especia l ly the United
States. A stress on the l inkage between Vietnam's ro le  in Southeast
Asia and the Soviet Union's supposed global ambitions was often used
16?to help achieve the l a t t e r  ob ject ive.
162 There is also evidence that armed forces' leaders in the ASEAN 
region exaggerated the threat to j u s t i f y  increased m i l i t a r y  
expenditure. See Chapter 8, pp. 333-61 below.
CHAPTER 6
INDOCHINA AND COMMUNIST INSURGENCY IN 
THE ASEAN STATES 1 9 7 5 -1 9 8 1
A f t e r  the c o l la p s e  in 1975 of  the ant i -communist  regimes in 
Indoch ina ,  the governments of  the ASEAN c o u n t r ie s  - -  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
Tha i land - -  f r e q u e n t l y  expressed concern over the d i r e c t  m i l i t a r y  
t h r e a t  posed by t h e i r  communist neighbours in  the reg io n .  But equal ,  
i f  not  g re a te r ,  a t t e n t i o n  was paid by the governments of  Southeast 
A s ia ' s  non-communist s ta tes  to the i n d i r e c t  t h r e a t  t h a t  they saw (or 
purported to  see) f rom the r e la t i o n s h ip  between communist Indochina 
and r e v o lu t i o n a r y  movements in  the ASEAN c o u n t r ie s .
Tha i land ,  Malaysia  and the P h i l i p p in e s  were in 1975 a lready  
coping w i th  communist in su rgenc ies ,  and there  were res idua l  
underground communist movements in Indonesia and Singapore.  Despi te 
the ASEAN s ta te s '  economic success r e l a t i v e  to  most o ther  Th i rd  World 
c o u n t r i e s ,  la rge  segments o f  t h e i r  popu la t ions  remained impoverished 
by any s tandard.  Widespread socioeconomic i n e q u a l i t y ,  o f ten  
compounded by m a la d m in is t ra t i o n  and o f f i c i a l  c o r r u p t i o n ,  impl ied th a t  
communism had an inhe ren t  appeal to  many people in  the ASEAN reg ion .
There were several  aspects to the ASEAN governments' concern 
regard ing  communist insurgency in r e l a t i o n  to  events in Indochina. In 
the f i r s t  p lace there  was a widespread fea r  t h a t  the v i c t o r i e s  of the 
V ie t  Cong, Khmer Rouge and Pathet Lao would encourage communism in the 
r e s t  o f  Southeast Asia:  the f a l l  of Indoch ina 's  r i g h t - w in g  regimes, 
c lose  to  home, might be in te rp re te d  by loca l  r e v o lu t i o n a r i e s  as 
demonstrat ing t h a t  the es tab l ished  order could be overcome. I t  was
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also feared that North Vietnam and the new communist regimes in 
Indochina would give d i rec t  assistance to regional revo lu t ionar ies ,  in 
the form of arms,^ t ra in ing  and, in Thai land's case, sanctuaries 
across the country's long eastern borders with Laos and Cambodia.
Vietnam: A Revolutionary Mainspring?
On one level i t  seemed that the Vietnamese communists, at the
time of th e i r  v ic to ry  in 1975, were doing a great deal to encourage
communist insurrect ion in the ASEAN region. Hanoi ce r ta in ly  took a
grand view of Vietnam's new in te rnational  ro le ,  with Party Secretary
Le Duan assert ing that "our nation was joined the ranks of the
vanguard nations of the world" with the potentia l  to become "an
inv io lab le  bastion of national independence, democracy and socialism
2
in Indochina and Southeast Asia". At the Fourth Non-Aligned
Conference in Lima in la te  August 1975, the North Vietnamese avowed,
in what was interpreted in some ASEAN cap i ta ls  as a clear encourage-
3
ment to regional insurgents:
1 Although there was concern w i th in  the ASEAN administrat ions that 
the f a l l  of Phnom Penh and Saigon would resu l t  in the transfe r  of 
large quant i t ies of arms (o r ig in a l l y  supplied by the United 
States) to local insurgents, th is  anxiety centred on the 
a c t i v i t i e s  of commercial gun-runners rather than the Indochinese 
regimes. New S t ra i ts  Times, 9 May and 22 November 1975; 
Economist, 6 December 1975.
2 Speech by Le Duan, Vietnamese News Agency (c i ted hereafter as 
VNA) in Engl ish, 0812 gmt, 15 May 1975 (SWB FE/4906/A3/7, 17 May 
1975).
3 See, fo r  example, Lau Teik Soon, "ASEAN, North Vietnam and the 
Communist Challenge", Southeast Asian A f fa i rs  1976 (Singapore: 
I n s t i t u t e  of Southeast Asian Studies, 1976), pp. 72-79.
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We, the Vietnamese people, always consider our struggle 
and v ic to ry  as part of the struggle and v ic to ry  of the 
revo lu t ionary movement of the wor ld 's people in general 
and of the national l ibe ra t ion  movement in pa r t icu la r  
. . .  We have always persisted in our s o l id a r i t y  with 
the s o c ia l i s t  countr ies, the non-aligned countr ies, 
with a l l  forces struggl ing fo r  independence, democracy, 
peace and social progress.. .4
In February 1976 a rather more spec i f ic  declarat ion by Le Duan 
cl aimed:
The Vietnamese people f u l l y  support the ju s t  sure-to- 
win cause of the peoples of the countries of Southeast 
Asia fo r  peace, national independence, democracy and 
social progress and contribute actively to helping the 
nations in Southeast Asia really  become independent, 
peaceful and neutra l. . .  The Vietnamese people f u l l  
support the Thai people's struggle fo r  a re a l ly  
independent and democratic Thailand without the US 
forces and m i l i t a r y  bases.. .5 [Emphasis added]
But although Vietnamese leaders issued broad declarat ions in 
support of revolut ionary change throughout Southeast Asia, these were 
essen t ia l ly  de r igueur fo r  a regime wishing to maintain a 
revolut ionary image domestically and in international communist 
c i r c le s .  While Hanoi c e r ta in ly  saw the emergence of a s o c ia l i s t  
Indochina as having very important impl icat ions fo r  the future of non­
communist Southeast Asia, the evidence suggests that the Vietnamese 
leadership was not re a l l y  c a l l in g  fo r  revolut ionary warfare throughout 
the region or attempting to become the main sponsor of Southeast Asian 
communist insurgency.
4 VNA in Engl ish, 0734 gmt, 1 September 1975 (SWB FE/4997/A1/1, 
3 September 1975).
5 Speech by Le Duan, 7 February 1976, quoted by VNA in Engl ish, 
1537 gmt, 8 February 1976 (SWB FE/5131/A3/1, 11 February 1976).
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In the f i r s t  place, Vietnamese spokesmen made it  clear in the 
mid-1970s that they judged that "prospects for the success of broad- 
based polit ical efforts directed against imperialism were good, while 
the prospects for armed struggle were not",^ in view of the virtual 
destruction of the Indonesian Communist Party a decade before, and the 
subsequent failure of the Thai, Malayan and Philippine communist 
insurgencies to make significant headway. Hanoi emphasized the 
potential role of the ASEAN societies'  "upper strata",  who wanted 
economic development, prosperity and regional peace, in influencing 
the ASEAN governments to adopt "anti-imperialist" foreign policies. '6 7 
There were no Vietnamese calls for the people of the ASEAN states to 
overthrow their governments.
Secondly, given Vietnam's massive domestic problems, and its 
burgeoning difficult ies in i ts  relations with the United States, China 
and Cambodia, i t  seems unlikely that Hanoi would have wished to take 
on additional international burdens by actively promoting 
revolutionary upheavals in the ASEAN countries. Any really 
substantial escalation of insurgency in the region carried with it  the 
risk that the residual US military presence in the region might be 
built  up again.
Thirdly, while in the long-term i t  might well have been useful to 
Hanoi for Indochina to be surrounded by communist sa te l l i te  states
6 Gareth Porter, "The Vietnamese Perspective on Thailand" (Paper 
presented at the Workshop on Future ASEAN-Vietnam Relations, 
Insti tute of Security and International Affairs, Faculty of 
Political Science, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, 7-9 
February 1983), pp. 6-7.
7 Ibid. , pp. 7-9.
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toeing a pro-Vietnamese line, i t  was clear that the pro-Beijing 
orientation of the communist movements in the ASEAN countries implied 
that in the mid- or late 1970s further communist successes in the 
region could have meant a drastic weakening of Vietnam's position in 
relation to China.
But although Hanoi was more interested in encouraging political 
change in the ASEAN region through the development of "democratic 
forces" rather than revolutionary insurgency, declarations which might 
be (and often were) construed as supporting regional revolutionaries 
were probably seen by Vietnam's leaders as a useful bargaining counter 
as they made efforts to develop working relationships with the ASEAN 
states.  Indeed, Hanoi possessed no other significant lever on the 
ASEAN governments.
Vietnam, Laos and the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT),
1975-78
The Thai government expressed considerably more concern than its 
ASEAN partners over the possible impact of the Indochinese communist 
victories on domestic communist insurgency. Not only did Thailand 
share extensive land borders with Laos and Cambodia, but the Communist 
Party of Thailand (CPT) already maintained important relationships 
with the Vietnamese and Laotian communists.
Although the CPT grew originally from roots in Thailand's large 
Chinese community, in the northeast of the country the Party always 
drew a large part of i ts external support from the communist movements 
in Vietnam and Laos. In part this reflected the contiguity of these
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countr ies with the northeastern provinces, but i t  was also the resu l t  
of ethnic t ies  - -  not only between Lao-Thais and th e i r  kin across the 
border, but also between the ethnic Vietnamese in the northeast and 
th e i r  ancestral homeland. Indeed, the Vietnamese par ty 's  connection 
with Thailand could be traced back to the la te 1920s, when Ho Chi Minh 
v is i te d  the northeast secret ly  as a Comintern representat ive and 
helped to form a communist organization (as part of the Indochinese 
Communist Party) among the Vietnamese community there. During 1931-33 
the Indochinese party moved i t s  headquarters temporari ly to northeast 
Thailand to avoid the French colonial  au tho r i t ies '  e f fo r ts  to repress
o
i t .  A fter  World War Two the Viet Minh again used Thailand as a
g
sanctuary during th e i r  continuing struggle against the French. At 
the same time large numbers of Vietnamese f led  to Thailand from the 
f ig h t in g  in Indochina: some of these refugees were p o l i t i c a l l y
oriented towards Hanoi. In the 1950s and 1960s - -  long before Hanoi's 
formal break with Peking - -  i t  was no doubt a sensible and e f f i c ie n t  
arrangement fo r  a l l  concerned that Thai communists should go to North 
Vietnam (as well as China) fo r  t ra in in g .  Unti l  1975 a school at Hoa 
Binh near Hanoi reportedly tra ined at least 70 to 80 (and perhaps 
several hundred) Thais each year, along with revo lu t ionar ies from 
Laos, Cambodia and Malaysia. But unl ike s im i la r  t ra in ing  centres in 
China, i t  seems that the Hoa Binh school was run p r in c ip a l l y  by cadres
8 Communist Suppression Operations Command, Communist Insurgency in 
Thai 1 and (Bangkok: Thai Government, White Paper, 1973), pp. 1-2.
9 Robert F. Zimmerman, "Insurgency in Thai land", Problems of 
Communism, Vol . 25, No. 3 (May-June 1976), p. 19.
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of the national communist part ies  in question (although the centre was 
under the overall control of the Vietnamese p a r t y ) . ^
The CPT began i t s  armed struggle in 1965. Despite evidence that  
the Thai communists were backed by Beijing and Hanoi, i t  seems that  
the insurgency was not in i t i a t ed  as a resu l t  of prompting by the 
Chinese or North Vietnamese, but quite independent ly.^  Until the 
la te  1960s there was no evidence that  the CRT's guer i l las  had 
received s igni f icant  supplies from ei ther  China or North Vietnam: 
only about half a dozen Soviet and Chinese weapons had been
ip
captured. But in July 1968 the CPT mounted several attacks on US
air  bases in Thailand: perhaps impressed by the role that  the Thai
communists might thus play in disrupting the American war e f for t ,
13Hanoi and Beijing stepped up thei r  material support for the CPT.
Almost all Vietnamese material aid for the CPT was channelled through
Laos by way of the Laotian left-wing movement, the Pathet Lao, which
also allowed the establishment of t raining camps for CPT gueri l las  in
14the t e r r i t o ry  that  i t  control led.  Moreover, the CPT Central
Committee establ ished i t s  headquarters in the Laotian province of
10 "No, they haven' t  changed" (Edi tor ia l ) ,  Bangkok Post , 21 October 
1974; John McBeth, FEER, 19 September 1980, p. 43; Interview with 
Hoang Hun Quynh, a veteran Vietnamese cadre who was a refugee in 
France by January 1980, quoted by Thai Quang Trung, 'L'enjeu 
Cambodien dans l ' equ i l i b r e  du Sud-Est Asiat ique ' ,  Pol i t ique 
Etrangere, Vol. 46, No. 3 (September 1981), p. 343; Personal 
interview with Nayan Chanda of Far Eastern Economic Review, 
Canberra, 16 December 1982.
11 See George K Tanham, Trial  in Thailand (New York: Crane, Russak,
1974), pp. 33-35. Tanham was formerly the State Department
Special Assistant  for Counter-insurgency at the US Embassy in 
Bangkok.
12 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 27072 (14-20 April 1975).
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Sayaburi,  although i t  had transferred to Nan province in northern
Thailand by 1977.16
Although the relat ionship between the CPT and the Pathet Lao was 
e s sen t i a l ly  subordinate to that  between the Thai and Vietnamese 
communists, Lao cadres could move in and out of Thailand's northeast  
at wi l l ,  passing themselves off as Thai-Lao. The presence of 
Vietnamese cadres might have been counterproductive,  due to the lack 
of h i s t or ic a l  and cul tural  a f f i ni ty  between Vietnamese and Thais. But 
the Pathet Lao's close associat ion with the Vietnamese communists was 
i t s e l f  apparently suf f ic ient  to provoke suspicion within the CPT's 
Central Committee. CPT cadres were quick to correct  any "dangerous 
tendencies" towards pan-Laoism in s t i l l ed  in r ec ru i t s  from Thailand's 
northeast  by Pathet Lao i n s t r u c t o r s . ^
Vietnamese and Pathet Lao Support for the CPT from 1975
Vietnamese communist and Pathet Lao backing for the CPT continued 
in the immediate aftermath of thei r  own triumphs in 1975, despite a
15
13 Ib id . , l oc . c i t . But at least  one commentator has claimed that  
the at tacks on US bases in Thailand were carr ied out by the 
Vietnamese communists themselves, against the wishes of the CPT. 
Porter ,  p. 13.
14 Support for the southern division of the CPT's northeast  command 
was provided by way of Cambodia from 1973.
15 Zimmerman, p. 27.
16 Interview with a CPT defector,  Daily Time (Bangkok), 30 January 
1977 (FBIS-APA-77-21, 1 February 1977).
17 Martin Stuart-Fox, "Factors influencing re la t ions  between the 
Communist par t ies  of Thailand and Laos", Asian Survey, Vol. 19, 
No. 4 (April 1979), pp. 335-36, 347, 349.
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downgrading of Hanoi's declaratory support for the Thai communists'
armed struggle af ter  the "spontaneous uprisings" by non-communist
18progressive forces against the Thai mi l i ta ry  regime in October 1973.
Although Hanoi placed greater emphasis in the 1974-76 period on the
signif icance of pol i t i ca l  st ruggle by non-Party forces in Thailand,
and despite growing ideological di fferences between the s teadfas t ly
Maoist and Beij ing-oriented CPT Central Committee and the increasingly
19pro-Soviet stances of Hanoi and Vientiane, Vietnamese and Laotian
20material aid for the CPT increased from 1975. Indeed, Vietnam was 
reportedly the CPT's major external source of arms and other supplies 
throughout the 1975-78 pe r i o d . ^
I t  seems unlikely,  however, that  Vietnamese communist and Pathet 
Lao support for the CPT const i tuted part  of a concerted drive to 
des tabi l i ze ,  l e t  alone dismember, Thailand as mil i tary elements in 
Bangkok frequently alleged.  Rather, this  assistance to the CPT served
18 Porter ,  pp. 13-5.
19 See Stuart-Fox, p. 339. But a s i gni f i cant  proportion of lower 
level cadres,  many of whom had been t rained by the Vietnamese and 
some of whom were ethnic Vietnamese, in the CPT's northeast  
command were oriented more towards Hanoi. Zimmerman, p. 22.
20 Hanoi repudiated claims that  i t  was sending arms into Thailand as 
"shop-worn slanders" used as a pretext  for repression of the 
"pat r io t i c  movement" and Vietnamese res idents  in Thailand. VNA 
in English, 1701 gmt and Hanoi home service,  0200 gmt, 17 June 
1975 (SWB FE/4933/A3/1, 19 June 1975); Hanoi in English for 
abroad, 1600 gmt, 19 June 1975 (SWB FE/4936/A3/4, 23 June 1975). 
The Pathet Lao also denied supplying arms to the CPT. Statement 
by Laotian Information Minister,  Thao Srichana Srisane,  Bangkok 
Post , 20 February 1976.
21 John McBeth, FEER, 8 June 1979, p. 19. See also R Sean Randolph
and W Scott Thompson, Thai Insurgency: Contemporary Developments
(Beverly Hi l ls :  Sage Publicat ions,  Washington Papers No. 81,
1981), pp. 41-42.
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more limited political purposes for Hanoi and Vientiane in the 1975-78 
period.
In the f i r s t  place, Hanoi and Vientiane may have attempted to use
their increased abili ty to support the CPT (allowed by the increased
security of sanctuaries in, and supply routes through, Laos and the
greater availabili ty of military resources once the anti-communist
forces in their own countries were no longer a problem) to undermine
22the pro-Beijing orientation of the Thai communists. Certainly this 
aid was welcome to the CPT, as Chinese assistance had virtually ceased 
after the opening of diplomatic relations between Bangkok and Beijing 
in July 1975. There were other possible reasons for the continuing 
phenomenon of indirect Vietnamese backing for the CPT from 1975. 
Until July 1976 Thailand continued to host important US Air Force 
units and intelligence-gathering fac i l i t i es ,  and until June 1977 was a 
member of the US-sponsored regional defence organization, SEATO. In
1975 Hanoi strenuously resisted Thai proposals that the US bases could 
be "bargained away" against Vietnamese support for the CPT and the 
American military presence in Thailand. But the opening of diplomatic 
relations with Bangkok, and agreement to a "non-interference" 
principle as part of the basis for this new relationship, in August
1976 suggested an implicit bargain had been struck even if Hanoi was 
unwilling to admit i t .
Apart from the closeness of relations between the Pathet Lao and 
Hanoi, continuing Thai support for anti-Pathet Lao resistance groups 
and other diff icul t ies on the Thai-Laotian border provided an
22 Stuart-Fox, pp. 339-40.
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important reason fo r  the maintenance of Laotian involvement with the
CPT. In th e i r  o f f i c i a l  pronouncements, the Pathet Lao adopted much
the same a t t i tude  as Hanoi towards the CPT, claiming that the Thai
people "w i th . . .  the sincere support and assistance o f . . .  fra terna l
countries i n . . .  the s o c ia l i s t  bloc" would "carry  th e i r  struggle to
23complete the f in a l  v ic to ry " .  Since the early  1960s successive Thai
governments had seen i t  in th e i r  in te rests  to intervene m i l i t a r i l y  in
Laos in support of anti-communist p o l i t i c a l  elements. The Thai
m i l i t a r y ,  in pa r t i c u la r ,  found th is  habit d i f f i c u l t  to discard af ter
the Pathet Lao f i n a l l y  gained the upper hand in Laos in 1975. They
apparently saw continuing resistance to communist ru le  in Laos as a
valuable way of preventing the threat to Thailand which might emanate
from Laos i f  the Pathet Lao (and by associat ion, Hanoi) were allowed
to consol idate th e i r  contro l .  They may also have seen continuing
support fo r  Laotian rebels as a potentia l  bargaining counter against
Vietnamese and Laotian backing fo r  the CPT.
In July 1975 the Thai M in is t ry  of Foreign A f fa i r s  reportedly
opposed a m i l i t a r y  plan to use r ight-wing Laotian General Vang Pao's
CIA-trained Meo tribesmen as a "bu f fe r "  force against "communist
24incursions" from Laos. But despite th i s ,  and the expulsion of
25several senior Lao r i g h t i s t  leaders from Thailand la te r  in the year, 
some elements of the Thai m i l i t a r y  - -  notably in the Internal Security 
Operations Command (ISOC) - -  apparently continued to support (or at
23 Pathet Lao radio, 0345 gmt, 26 Apr i l  1975 (SWB FE/4890/A3/10, 
29 Apri l  1975).
24 Bangkok Post, 15 July 1975.
25 Bangkok Post, 11 September 1975.
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least acquiesce in) armed operations across the border by Laotian 
anti-communist groups. Vientiane's concern over what i t  saw as Thai- 
sponsored subversion in Laos was indicated in the way i t  forced the 
closure of Bangkok's three consulates in Laos (which the Pathet Lao 
alleged were being used for espionage and gun-running to rebels) and 
the arrest in August 1975 of two assistant military attaches from the
p c
Thai embassy on charges of spying. The temporary occupation of
eight Thai villages by 200 Vietnamese and Pathet Lao troops in October
1977 was part ial ly motivated by a desire to ascertain the location of
Laotian rebels, according to villagers interrogated by the cross- 
27border intruders.
Combined with confusion over where exactly the Thai-Laotian
boundary lay, particularly along the Mekong River where some (but not
28all) islands close to the Thai bank belonged to Laos, the reciprocal 
support of Laos for the CPT and of some Thai military elements for 
Laotian rebels resulted in an incessant low intensity border conflict.  
Thailand and Laos each maintained an indirect and inexpensive means of 
harassing each other, which neither side appeared willing to 
relinquish unless the other did likewise. In July 1976, for example, 
the Thai military claimed that two Pathet Lao regiments stationed 
across the Mekong posed a "grave threat" to Thailand's 2nd Region
26 Norman Peagam, FEER, 22 August 1975, pp. 12-13.
27 Bangkok Post, 11 October 1977.
28 In an effort to defuse tension on the border in late 1975, Thai 
Prime Minister Kukrit Pramoj blamed the problem on the legacy of 
the French "imperialist-colonialists".  Bangkok Post, 20 November 
1975.
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Army, although the Pathet Lao claimed (not unreasonably) that th is
deployment was intended to prevent i n f i l t r a t i o n  by Lao r i g h t i s t s  from 
29Thailand. S im i la r ly ,  the Thai Foreign Minister (Major-General
Chatchai Choonhavan) declared that Thailand was ready to terminate i t s
Mekong f l o t i l l a ' s  "special operations" - -  which f requent ly  aggravated
the tense s i tua t ion  on the r i v e r  - -  i f  Laos would cooperate in
30eradicating the f low of i l l e g a l  weapons to the CPT.
In August 1976 Thai Foreign Min ister Pichai Rattakul v is i ted
Vientiane and Hanoi in the hope of improving re la t ions  with Laos and
opening formal re la t ions  with communist Vietnam. In each capital a
j o in t  communique was signed by Pichai and his local counterpart.  Laos
and Thailand agreed to " respect . . .  each o ther 's  r ig h t  to ex is t without
interference or coercion from outside and wi thout in te r fe r in g  in each
other's  internal a f f a i r s "  and to refuse " to le t  other people use the i r
respective t e r r i t o r y  in any form as a base fo r  in te rvention aggression
31or threat against other countr ies". Vietnam and Thailand opened
diplomatic re la t ions  with each other on the basis of four p r inc ip les ,  
the f i r s t  of which was:
Respect fo r  each other's  independence, sovereignty and 
t e r r i t o r i a l  i n te g r i t y ,  mutual non-aggression, non­
interference in each other's  in te rna l  a f f a i r s ,  
equa l i ty ,  mutual interests  and peaceful co-existence.32
29 Bangkok Post, 13 July 1976.
30 Bangkok Post, 21 November 1975.
31 Vientiane home service, 1105 gmt, 3 August 1976 (SWB FE/5278/A3/ 
1, 5 August 1976).
32 Hanoi home service, 1100 gmt, 6 August 1976 (SWB FE/5280/A3/6, 
7 August 1976).
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Taken at their face value, these statements appeared to imply a 
disavowal by Laos and Vietnam of their support for the CPT. But in 
practice, there was not a noticeable decline in their backing for the 
CPT after August 1976.
The most likely explanation for this apparent duplicity on the 
part of Vietnam and Laos is related to the Thai mil i tary's coup in 
October 1976 and the subsequent installation of the extreme anti­
communist Thanin regime. The new Thai government's words and actions 
(including continued support for right-wing Laotian rebels operating 
from Thai terr i tory,  and an attempt to revital ize Thailand's security
relationship with the United States) exacerbated the tensions in the
33Thai relationship with Indochina. In these circumstances it  is not 
altogether surprising that Hanoi and Vientiane should have sought to 
maintain or even increase their influence over the CPT, which could be 
used as a response to -- or implicit bargaining counter against -- 
Bangkok's increased pressure on Laos and links with Washington. 
However, the advent of the more moderate Kriangsak regime in October 
1977, coupled with the impact of the widening Sino-Vietnamese r i f t ,  
were soon drastically to change the Vietnamese and Laotian 
relationships with the CPT.
33 Hanoi's intensified security concerns after the October 1976 coup 
in Thailand were encapsulated in a Quan Doi Nhan Dan art icle in 
early 1977. Quoted by Hanoi radio in Thai, 0500 gmt, 15 February 
1977 (SWB FE/5441/A3/1, 17 February 1977).
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Thai Views of the CPT's Links with Vietnam and Laos
The fact that the CPT received assistance from its Indochinese
(and Chinese) counterparts by no means implied that the Thai
insurgency was engineered from outside Thailand. External support
could be increased or decreased, but the evidence shows clearly that
the CPT's insurgency was rooted firmly in Thailand's internal social,
economic and political contradictions.^4 That the CPT was thriving on
profound defects in Thai society was acknowledged by a minority of
officers in the Thai military establishment, but the majority
portrayed the insurgency as either the criminal disruption of society
or as a type of invasion, dependent on support from external communist 
35sources. This dominant military group thought principally in terms 
of a military solution to the communist problem, combining counter­
insurgency drives within the country with an attempt to seal 
Thailand's borders against infi l t rat ion of communist personnel and 
suppli es .
Some senior military officers may have been sincere in their 
belief that the communist insurgency was an alien phenomenon best 
dealt with by an overwhelmingly military response (although this 
approach had failed during the Second Indochina War), but this
34 See Kevin J Hewison, "Revolutionary Warfare in Thailand",
Australian Outlook, Vol. 34, No. 2 (August 1980), pp. 197-208. 
Hewison's article was a rejoinder to a piece by Martin Stuart-Fox 
which stressed the role of external factors in the CPT's 
development. See "Tensions within the Thai Insurgency",
Australian Outlook, Vol. 33, No. 2 (August 1979), pp. 182-97.
35 David Morell and Chai-anan Samudavanija,  Political Conflict in
Thailand: Reform, Reaction, Revolution (Cambridge, Mass.:
Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, 1981), pp. 85-86.
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attitude also served their own interests. In the f i r s t  place, i t
implied that those (particular ly the upper echelons of the mil i tary 
and their  business associates) who benefited from Thailand's economic, 
po l i t ica l  and social status quo need not relinquish any of their
privileges as part of a solution to the problem of insurgency. 
Secondly, this atti tude towards the insurgency meant that the 
externally- and/or criminally-caused ' th rea t1 could be used as a 
jus t i f ica t io n  for the repression of human and po l i t ica l  rights 
(including the elimination of l e f t i s t  and l iberal opposition groups) 
in the interests of "security", while simultaneously legitimizing the 
very important role of the mil i tary  in Thai po l i t ics ,  even during the
O f
democratic interlude of 1973-76. Thirdly, the adoption of an
overwhelmingly mil i tary (rather than developmental) approach to the 
problem provided the armed forces with a seemingly v i ta l  role and
ensured the continuing large-scale diversion of the country's
resources to the mil i tary ,  allowing senior off icers to maintain and 
enhance their  prestige, influence and wealth. A supposedly
externally-manipulated "communist threat" was also a useful device for 
obtaining US mil i tary aid. For all these reasons, i t  is important to 
regard with caution the Thai m i l i ta ry 's  claims on the subject of the 
CPT's l inks with Indochina.
36 For example, the spectre of "externally-sponsored subversion" was 
used to ju s t i fy  the retention of martial law in many Thai 
provinces and discouraged voters in the northeast from returning 
left-wing candidates in the April 1976 elections. See Charles E 
Morrison and Astri Suhrke, Strategies of Survival: the Foreign
Policy Dilemmas of Smaller Asian States (St Lucia: University of
Queensland Press, 1978), p. 141 and Frank C Darling, "Thailand in 
1976: Another Defeat for Constitutional Democracy", Asian
Survey, Vol. 17, No. 2 (February 1977), pp. 120-21.
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During Thai land's 1973-76 period of democratic ru le ,  both
c i v i l i a n  p o l i t i c ia n s  and some elements in the armed forces attempted
to reduce the m i l i t a r y  component in Bangkok's handling of the CPT
insurgency. In Apr i l  1975 both Prime Min ister Kukri t  and Foreign
Ministe r Chatchai Choonhavan asserted that the CPT should be allowed
to par t ic ipa te  openly in p o l i t i c s ,  i f  i t  ceased i t s  underground 
37operations. The Kukri t  government also in i t i a t e d  projects to tackle
the basic socioeconomic causes of insurgency inc luding rural poverty
38and lack of local p o l i t i c a l  pa r t ic ipa t ion .  But the Thai r igh t-w ing,
backed by Washington, placed the blame for  the increasing CPT a c t i v i t y
squarely on Thai land's eastern neighbours. For example, in early  1975
an a r t i c le  in the Bangkok Post claimed that the CPT in the northeast
and north was supported by a jo i n t  Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese
organizaion run from Hanoi with operating units in Laos. The main
ro le  of th is  "Combined Command" was al legedly to provide the CPT with
safe routes fo r  supplies and personnel moving between Thailand and
Laos, North Vietnam and China. A secondary ro le  was to provide
39t ra in in g  f a c i l i t i e s  fo r  the CPT. I t  was also reported that Hanoi
37 Bangkok home service, 0001 gmt, 17 Apri l  1975 (SWB FE/4882/8/1-2, 
19 Apri l  1975) and 0001 gmt, 26 Apr i l  1975 (SWB FW/4889/A3/9, 
28 Apri l  1975).
38 Sarasin Viraphol, Direct ions in Thai Foreign Pol icy (Singapore: 
In s t i t u te  of Southeast Asian Studies, Occasional Paper No. 40, 
1976), pp. 53-54.
39 "How the Communists get th e i r  support", Bangkok Post, 6 Apr i l
1975. This a r t i c le  was based on a de -c la s s i f ie d , but o r ig in a l l y  
secret, report prepared by the In te l l igence s ta f f  of the US Army 
Paci f ic  Command in la te  1973 and en t i t led  "The 35th PL/95th NVA 
Combined Command: External Support to the Thai Insurgency".
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40referred to Thailand as "war zone D": this allegation (apparently
originating with the US Embassy in Vientiane) appeared to correlate
with alleged evidence that the Vietnamese and Laotian communists had
plans for the annexation of Thai terri tory on the west bank of the 
41Mekong. But i t  would be unwise to take these reports at face value.
These details were f i r s t  "revealed" by the US Army in early 1975 in an
42effort to make the Kukrit government "face up to the problem", at a
time when domestic polit ical pressure was forcing the Thai authorities
to take measures to end the US military presence in the country.
While there is no clear-cut evidence to suggest that Washington
mounted a disinformation exercise, the US military and Thai right-wing
may have over-emphasized links between the CPT and Hanoi to just ify a
continuing US military presence in Thailand, particularly in terms of
intel 1igence-gathering fac i l i t i e s .
Throughout 1975, the Thai military continued to exaggerate the
implications of Vietnamese and Laotian links with the CPT. Major-
General Pramarn Adireksan, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of
Defence, voiced concern over reports that some of the "terrorists" on
43the border with Laos were actually North Vietnamese troops. A 
senior officer in the field -- Nakhon Phanom provincial Police
40 "Intelligence", FEER, 28 February 1975.
41 Pipake, "Document discloses Hanoi's intentions towards Thailand", 
Bangkok Post, 30 March 1975.
42 "Intelligence", FEER, 28 February 1975.
43 Bangkok home service, 1300 gmt, 15 April 1975 (SWB FE/4880/A3/2, 
17 April 1975).
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Commissioner, Pol ice Lieutenant-General Sanan Narinsorasak - -  echoed
Pramarn's concern in early  June when he alleged that Pathet Lao and
North Vietnamese troops had crossed the Laotian border in to  Thailand
44to support local CPT insurgents. Acting Supreme Commander General
K r i t  Sivara declared that the CPT had been "re inforced from abroad"
45with heavy weapons such as reco i l less  r i f l e s  and RPG rockets, and
the Thai Border Patrol Police alleged that large consignments of
"high-powered war weapons" were being f i l t e r e d  across the Mekong into
Thailand fo r  use by "hard-core Vietnamese refugees" and communist
46insurgents in a "major attempt to ' l i b e r a te '  Thai land's northeast".
According to the o f f i c e r  commanding the Thai navy's Mekong
F l o t i l l a ,  there had been a "considerable increase" in the i n f i l t r a t i o n
of both arms and personnel to the CPT in the three months since the
Pathet Lao e f fe c t iv e ly  took control in Vientiane in early June 1975,
with "many Thai communists... crossing the Mekong to undergo p o l i t i c a l
and m i l i t a r y  t ra in ing  in North V ie tnam".^  In the view of many Thai
p o l i t i c a l  and m i l i t a r y  commentators th is  apparently increasing support
fo r  the CPT was l inked to Vietnamese and Laotian plans to sever some
48or a l l  of Thai land's sixteen north-eastern provinces. But la te r ,
44 Bangkok home service, 0800 gmt, 10 June 1975 (SWB FE/4972/A3/5, 
12 June 1975).
45 Bangkok home service, 1300 gmt, 14 Apr i l  1975 (SWB FE/4880/A3/2, 
17 Apri l  1975).
46 Bangkok Post, 15 June 1975.
47 Joel Henri, Indonesian Times, 12 August 1975.
48 See, fo r  example, Democrat Party leader Sawasdi Kamprokab's 
warning, Bangkok Post, 25 November 1975.
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new evidence suggested that the CPT was generally as anxious as the
Thai government to keep Vietnamese and Laotian troops off Thai
terr i tory,  and that the CPT had extracted a pledge from Hanoi that
Thai guerillas undergoing training in Vietnam would not be subjected
49to polit ical indoctrination.
The Thai press frequently served the interest of elements in the
military wishing to maintain the spectre of Vietnamese and Laotian
subversion and expansionism. The Bangkok Post greeted Le Duan's
speech of 7 February 1976 with an editorial asserting that this "call
for regional revolution" made i t  clear that Vietnam and Laos would not
tolerate a non-communist system in Thailand and could be expected to
50intensify their material and moral support for the CPT. Reporting
tended to be uncritical and based largely on dubious sources and
circumstantial evidence. For example, in July 1976 the Post reported
that an "officer of the former Laotian neutralist  army who worked
closely with the Pathet Lao for 10 months" (and who was by then a
refugee in Thailand) had revealed that the Laotian town of Paksane
near the Thai border had recently become "an important logistical
base" and that the next dry season "could be a hot period for 
51Thailand". There was no firm evidence to support these claims.
The most blatant manipulation of the issue of Vietnamese support 
for the CPT came during the military-sponsored backlash against
49 "Intelligence", FEER, 16 June 1983, p. 11. This report was based 
on the testimony of a Thai communist who spent three years in 
Vietnam.
50 Bangkok Post, 16 February 1976.
51 Ibid., 14 July 1976.
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democratic rule in October 1976, when the right-wing press and radio
claimed, to incite support for the attack on Thammasat University,
52that the National Students' Centre of Thailand (NSCT) was composed
53of Vietnamese-supported communists set on destroying the monarchy.
Ultimately, the NSCT1s alleged indirect link with Vietnam through the
CPT was used to just ify the military coup that followed the assault on 
54Thammasat.
In the year following the coup, the extreme right-wing regime 
under Thanin Kraivichien frequently reiterated exaggerated claims of 
Vietnamese and Laotian support for the CPT. While this may have 
reflected a genuine concern that Vietnam would take advantage of the 
impetus received by the CPT after the October 1976 coup as several 
thousand students and intellectuals fled Bangkok to escape persecution 
by the new regime, i t  also represented an attempt to just ify the 
suspension of Thailand's democratic experiment owing to external as 
well as internal threats.  For example, a month after the coup it  was 
reported that over 400 students had crossed into Laos, f i f ty of whom 
had been selected by the Pathet Lao for training in Vietnam. Some of 
the students were alleged to have formed a "Thailand Liberation
52 The NSCT was a left-wing grouping, centred on Thammasat 
University in Bangkok, pressing for greater political freedom, a 
more equitable socio-economic system, and a non-aligned foreign 
policy. The organization had played a key role in the overthrow 
of military rule in October 1973.
53 L W Simons, Washington Post, 7 October 1976.
54 Text of statement by the Administration Reform Party, Bangkok 
home service, 1200 gmt, 6 October 1976 (SWB FE/5331/B/6, 
7 October 1976); Bangkok Thai Television Radio in Thai, 0348 gmt, 
6 October 1976 (FBIS-APA-76-195, 6 October 1976).
211 -
55Movement" to cooperate with Laos and Vietnam against Thai land. A
week l a t e r ,  the Governor of Tha i land 's  Nakhon Phanom province 
56claimed tha t  a Thai "government- in -ex i le "  had been formed in Laos.
In ea r ly  1977, Bangkok reported j o i n t  attacks by Thai communists and
57Pathet Lao troops. Later in the year,  a Thai m i l i t a r y  in te l l i g e n c e
o f f i c e r  asserted tha t  Vietnamese and Laot ian m i l i t a r y  o f f i c e r s  were
being taught Thai by renegade Thai students in southern Laos. The
same o f f i c e r  also claimed tha t  a "combined b a t ta l io n "  of 50
Vietnamese, 100 Laotians and 300 Thai communists was operat ing across
58the Laot ian border with Tha i land 's  nor theast .
The Khmer Rouge and th e  CPT, 1 9 7 5 -7 8
In the f i r s t  eighteen months a f te r  the f a l l  of Phnom Penh to the
Khmer Rouge an ambivalent re la t io n s h ip  developed between Thai land and
Cambodia. Despite p ro tes ta t ions  of f r ie n d sh ip ,  the opening of
d ip lomat ic  re la t io n s  and the resumption of trade across the border,
there were frequent armed clashes on land and sea between the two
59coun t r ies '  fo rces. Both Phnom Penh and Bangkok had an i n te re s t  in
55 Bangkok Post, 11 November 1976.
56 In te rv iew with Phisan Mulasatsathan, Governor of Nakhon Phanom 
province, quoted by Bangkok home serv ice , 0001 gmt, 18 November 
1976 (SWB FE/5369/A3/2, 20 November 1976).
57 Bangkok Post, 13 February 1977.
58 Statement by Lt Col Thanit  Wasaphuti, deputy ch ie f  of 
I n te l l i g e n c e ,  Second Army Region, Bangkok domestic serv ice in 
Thai ,  1300 gmt, 23 August 1977 (FBIS-APA-77-165, 25 August 1977).
59 See, f o r  example, Bangkok Post, 13 June 1975; 26 June 1975; 
13 December 1975.
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maintaining reasonably amicable re la t ions  with each other: Thailand 
was a proximate source of raw materials that  even autarkic Democratic 
Kampuchea needed, and the Thais had an in te res t  in maintaining 
Cambodia's independence in rela t ion to Vietnam. But the formal 
reconci l i a t ion  between the two capi ta l s  owed much to Chinese pressure 
(or at l eas t  to Chinese wil l ingness to ass i s t  the process) as part 
both of Bei j ing ' s  aim to block potent ial  Vietnamese expansion by 
detente with Bangkok and i t s  drive to cement l inks with Phnom Penh. 
Despite t he i r  overt wil l ingness to pursue bet ter  r e l a t i ons ,  Thailand 
and Democratic Kampuchea remained deeply suspicious of each other.
Unlike the Vietnamese and Laotian communists, the Khmer Rouge had 
not maintained po l i t i c a l l y  or operat ional ly s igni f icant  relat ionships 
with the CPT before 1975. But Vietnamese communist forces based in 
Cambodia to ass i s t  the Khmer Rouge in thei r  st ruggle against the Lon 
Nol regime had also supported the CPT, and Khmer Rouge backing for the 
CPT probably began when the Cambodian communists took over thei r  
erstwhi le Vietnamese a l l i e s '  role in supporting the Thai communists' 
northeast  region' s  southern sector through the so-cal led "Headquarters 
303" camp in Cambodia's Northern Phra Viharn province sometime in late 
1975 or early 1976.^  According to the Thai Border Patrol Police 
(BPP), cooperation between the CPT and the Khmer Rouge was
60 "How the Communists get t he i r  support", Bangkok Post , 6 April 
1975; "What Ramasoon can t e l l  us", Bangkok Post , 23 May 1976. 
"Headquarters 303" reportedly moved to Cambodia from the Pathet 
Lao-controlled Laotian province of Champassak in la te  1973. 
According to Nayan Chanda (Diplomatic Correspondent of the Far 
Eastern Economic Review), when interviewed in February 1981 CPT 
o f f i c i a l s  confirmed to him that  operational l inks between the 
Cambodian and Thai communists did not exist  until  1976. Personal 
interview with Chanda, Canberra, August 1982.
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subsequently conducted through the medium of the so-cal led "Siam 
Organization". For example, in July 1976 the BPP alleged that  300 
Thais had been trained ear l ie r  in the year at two Siam Organization 
schools in Cambodia and had i n f i l t r a t ed  back into Thai land .^
There is no clear  evidence suggesting why the Khmer Rouge opted 
to support the CPT, but several suggestions seem plausible.  Apart 
from the Cambodian communists' memories of Bangkok's recent 
intervention in t he i r  country during the Second Indochina War, seven 
or more groups of anti-communist Cambodian (Khmer Serei or Free Khmer) 
exi les (numbering over 2000 armed personnel) remained act ive on the 
Thai-Cambodian border engaged in mil i tary a c t i v i t i e s  such as mine-
r p
laying and intel l igence-gather ing.  According to one repor t ,  these 
Khmer Serei groups were:
. . .  bound up with the nether world of the [Thai]
Insurgency Suppression Operations Command (IS0C), where 
secret  budgets and lack of any clear  command and 
control s t ructure e f fect ively  allow agents to run thei r  
own covert projects with almost no accountabi1i t y .63
61 The Siam Organization was never referred to by the CPT on the 
"Voice of the People of Thailand", prompting speculation that  i t  
was not connected with the Thai communists and was possibly 
e i ther  a Vietnamese-controlled grouping intended to prevent a 
Thai-Cambodian al l iance (according to some Thai intel l igence 
off icers)  or a "ploy" by Bangkok's IS0C "to create confusion in 
the progressive movement" (according to some Thai l e f t i s t s ) .  But 
majority opinion in both Thai inte l l igence and radical c i rc les  
supported the assessment that  the Siam Organization was a joint  
CPT-Khmer Rouge venture.  See "Second thoughts on the ' th i rd  
par ty ' " .  FEER, 5 May 1978, pp. 14, 17.
62 "Thailand 75" supplement, FEER, 17 October 1975, p. 4; S t ra i t s  
Times, 15 January 1977.
63 Richard Nations, FEER, 28 July 1978, p. 12. IS0C actual ly stood 
for Internal Security Operations Command.
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As on the Laotian border it seemed that the Thai military was 
finding it  d if f icul t  to give up its habit of sponsoring (or at least 
sanctioning) cross-border interference. Although Phnom Penh wished 
for a working relationship with Bangkok, the Thai mil i tary's continued 
connivance at Khmer Serei operations threatened the security of 
Democratic Kampuchea's western border. The Cambodian leadership may 
have decided that support for the CPT would be a useful bargaining 
counter for "trading off" in the future against Thai backing for
subversion the other way across the border. Ironically, Thai support 
for the Khmer Serei may have been based on a similar, but 
mirror-image, premise.
A second important reason for the Khmer Rouge's backing for the 
CPT may have been pressure from Beijing, at a time when China was
Cambodia's only significant external source of support (particularly 
in the Khmer Rouge's burgeoning conflict with Vietnam), to do so,
perhaps in competition with Laotian and Vietnamese backing for the 
Thai communists. Although Beijing had reduced its support for the 
Thai communists very substantially as i t  strove for closer relations 
with the civilian government in Bangkok in 1974-75, the Chinese would 
not have wished Vietnam to take over as the principal external ally of 
the CPT, which remained the most important Party in non-communist 
Southeast Asia.
The problems in the frontier zone were exacerbated by the
conflicting ter r i tor ia l  claims of Bangkok and Phnom Penh to fairly 
substantial areas of land and sea. Throughout 1976 and until late 
1977 the main immediate cause of the border problems appeared to be an 
attempt by the Khmer Rouge to extend a cordon sanitaire (already 20 km
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deep on the Cambodian side) to the Thai side of the border along the
140 km stretch of ill-defined and relatively featureless frontier
terrain from the border town or Aranyaprathet north to Ta Priya
64dis t r ic t  at the foot of the Banthat mountains. Such a buffer would
have reduced the security threat perceived from internal dissidents'
attempts to link up with the Thai-based Khmer Serei and from Thai
efforts to exert sovereignty over disputed border areas. Naturally,
this policy met s t i f f  resistance from the Thai armed forces, and there
65were fierce armed clashes between Thai and Cambodian troops. The 
accession to power in Bangkok of the Thanin regime after the October 
1976 coup hastened the breakdown of restraint  on the border, and 
increased the Cambodian communists' interest in backing the CPT in 
order to compensate for the loss of Democratic Kampuchea's diplomatic 
influence in Bangkok.^
Although the frontier conflct intensified in the aftermath of the
October 1976 coup,^ during 1977 there was l i t t l e  mention of any CPT
role in the Thai-Cambodian frontier st r i fe:  this may have been
because the Siam Organization was working so closely with the Khmer
Rouge that its involvement was camouflaged. Perhaps this was a
deliberate policy on Phnom Penh's part as i t  attempted to break out of
i ts diplomatic isolation by improving relations with the ASEAN
countries. Ieng Sary averred, when visiting Malaysia and Singapore in 
68April 1977, that the Khmer Rouge had no interest in promoting
64 Richard Nations, FEER, 14 July 1987, p. 17.
65 Bangkok Post, 22 February 1976; 30 June 1976, 1 August 1976.
66 Richard Nations, FEER, 5 August 1977, pp. 13-14.
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revolut ion outside Cambodia. Another possible explanation is that  the
Siam Organization was building up i t s  strength and assimilat ing the
new r ec ru i t s  that  i t  had gained after  the October 1976 coup in
Thailand, in preparation for the offensive that  began in late  1977.
Certainly i t  appeared that  cross-border sanctuaries in Cambodia, as
well as in Laos, became more important for the CPT af ter  the coup.
In contrast  to the previous two years,  in 1978 the principal
trouble on the border appeared to resul t  d i rec t ly  from a CPT (rather
than Khmer Rouge) i n i t i a t i v e .  By the beginning of the year over a
thousand armed Thai communists were reportedly act ive on the Thai- 
69Cambodian border, which the Siam Organization divided into three
"Operation Zones ' ' . ^  CPT ac t i v i t i e s  were supported by base camps and
t raining schools up to 25 km inside Cambodia.^ From late  1977 cross-
border attacks on Thai vi l lages shifted from the Aranyaprathet-Ta
Priya section to the northern s t retch of the Thai-Cambodian 
72f ron t ie r .  According to defectors and captured documents, the CPT 
was anxious to " l ibe r at e" ,  by 1979, Lahan Sai and Ta Priya, two Thai
67 For reports of typical f ront ie r  clashes,  see Bangkok Post , 
5 November 1976; 25 November 1976; 2 December 1976; 29 December 
1976; 21 January 1977. At the end of January 1977, 34 Thais were 
massacred in what appeared to be the most determined Khmer Rouge 
ef for t  so far  to depopulate in Thai border region by demoralizing 
i t s  inhabi tants ,  Bangkok Post , 31 January 1977.
68 Nayan Chanda, FEER, 29 April 1977, p. 11.
69 Bangkok Post , 14 February 1978.
70 Ibid.,  14 March 1978.
71 Richard Nations, FEER, 28 July 1978, p. 12; John McBeth, FEER, 
8 June 1979, p. 19.
72 Richard Nations, FEER, 14 July 1978, p. 17.
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provinces at the foot of the Banthat range. Not only would th is  give
the CPT bases inside Thailand, but i t  would also secure supply l ines
through the Banthat mountains in to  Thailand's central p la ins. In turn
th is  was apparently part of a wider Thai communist plan to l ink  the
northern and southern arms of the CPT's m i l i t a r y  s t ruc ture ,  giving the
73communists s t ra teg ic  m ob i l i ty  inside Thailand.
In 1978 the Cambodian border area accounted fo r  42 per cent of
74a l l  insurgency-related " inc idents" in Thai land. February saw the
f i r s t  of a series of mass kidnappings by the CPT, assisted by the 
75Khmer Rouge, when 350 v i l lage rs  were abducted and taken to a
t ra in in g  camp at the extreme south of the Thai-Cambodian b o rd e r . ^
In the fo l lowing weeks there were several s im i la r  ra ids ,  and by July
77 781978 at least 1200 Thais (and perhaps many more) had been seized.
73 I b id .,  Joe. c i t . Stuart-Fox argued that th is  CPT thrust  into
Thailand from Cambodia "represented an attempt by the Chinese, 
working through the Kampucheans in much the same way as the
Vietnamese worked through the Lao, to challenge Vietnamese
inf luence w i th in  the northeastern insurgency". (Stuart-Fox,
"Tensions w i th in  the Thai Insurgency", p. 193.) Undoubtedly, 
there was act ive debate between Hanoi- and Bei j ing-or iented
elements in the CPT, but to a t t r ib u te  the strategies of d i f fe re n t  
regional CPT commands to manipulation by Vietnam and China seems 
far - fe tched.
74 John McBeth, FEER, 8 June 1979, p. 19.
75 On request, the Khmer Rouge's 755th Regiment provided the CPT
with manpower back-up fo r  these operations. John McBeth, FEER, 
8 June 1979, p. 19.
76 Bangkok Post, 14 February 1978. See also Bangkok Post, 16
February 1978 and 20 February 1978; New York Times, 21 February 
1978; Age, 7 March 1978.
77 Up to 5000, according to John McBeth, FEER, 8 June 1979, p. 19.
78 Richard Nations, FEER, 28 July 1978, p. 13.
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According to Mao Ze Dong "the guerilla must be to the population as
l i t t l e  fishes in the water". A CPT cadre interviewed several years
after the kidnappings claimed that the bizarre objective was to bring
the "water" (that is,  a mass base) to the Siam Organization "fishes"
79across the border in Cambodia. Contemporary reports in the Thai
press, based on the evidence of some who later escaped from their
80captors referred to the indoctrination and training of villagers.
Apart from the objective of rapidly creating a mass base before 
driving into the Banthat range, Thai analysts also thought the 
kidnappings were aimed at creating a CPT-control1ed cordon sanitaire 
along a part of the border, particularly along the Thai communists' 
main supply and infi l t rat ion routes into the Banthats. The CPT had 
some success in achieving this objective: an official estimate put at
25,000 the number of villagers who moved from the border to more 
secure areas .^
Although the Thai authorities intensified their counter­
insurgency efforts (including strikes across the border by the air
force and special forces) in the sensitive areas bordering northern
82Cambodia from March 1978, Kriangsak (who had become Prime Minister 
after Thanin's ouster in October 1977), apparently judged that 
aggressive Thai military action across the border -- which he had
_____________
79 According to CPT cadres interviewed by Nayan Chanda, February 
1981. Personal interview with Chanda, Canberra, August 1982.
80 Bangkok Post, 14 and 29 March 1978.
81 Richard Nations, FEER, 28 July 1978, p. 13.
82 Ibid., p. 14; John McBeth, FEER, 8 June 1979, p. 19.
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threatened in July 1977 -- might work against Thailand's broader 
interests,  as well as exacerbating the local problem. In early 1978 
Democratic Kampuchea already appeared to be dangerously at Hanoi's 
mercy: Kriangsak probably saw l i t t l e  sense in further weakening
Thailand's eastern neighbour, which played a continuing role as a 
buffer against Vietnam.
Kriangsak emphasized diplomatic means in attempting to ameliorate 
the border situation. But visi ts by Thai Foreign Minister Upadit 
Pachariangkul to Phnom Penh in February 1978 and by his Cambodian 
counterparts, Ieng Sary, to Bangkok in July did not achieve decisive 
results.  While both sides were highly conciliatory in their 
declarations, they skirted around the central issue -- Khmer Rouge 
support for the CPT (and to a lesser extent, Thai backing for the 
Khmer Serei). Upadit was careful not to blame the continuing st r i fe 
on Cambodian support for the Thai communists, suggesting instead that 
a "third force" was behind the problem.^ Similarly, although it  was 
agreed to upgrade Thai-Cambodian diplomatic relations when Sary 
visited Bangkok, negligible progress was achieved on the border 
question. Some Thai observers speculated that the Khmer Rouge 
intended to wait until the CPT had vacated their Cambodian bases 
before commencing serious talks on the issue. Phnom Penh would then
83 Richard Nations, FEER, 10 February 1978, pp. 10-11. Kriangsak 
had already suggested that a "third force" on the border was 
attempting to disrupt Thai-Cambodian relations. Straits Times, 
30 January 1978. The Prime Minister persistently stressed the 
role of the CPT -- rather than that of the Khmer Rouge -- in the 
Siam Organizations. "Second thoughts on the ' third party'",  
FEER, 5 May 1978, pp. 14, 17.
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have been in a much better posit ion to argue that Thailand should 
cease i t s  support fo r  Cambodian rebel groups.®^
In October 1978, Ieng Sary asserted in Manila that Cambodia was 
not supporting the CPT, but at the same time expressed sympathy fo r
on
"people's l ibe ra t ion  movements abroad". There may have been at 
least an element of s in c e r i t y  in th is  denial of support fo r  the Thai 
communists. Increasingly threatened in te rn a l ly  by prov incial  
rebe l l ion  and ex te rna l ly  by the Vietnamese army, the Khmer Rouge 
regime may have decided to discourage the CPT from aggressive 
operations along the Thai border. Moreover, the CPT reportedly 
decided that abduction was not "an e f fec t ive  mass mobil izat ion
oc
technique". In any event, from Bangkok's viewpoint there was a 
marked improvement in the border s i tua t ion  from September 1978. But 
by the end of the year, Hanoi's subjugation of Cambodia rendered 
speculation on the subject redundant.
Thai Views of the CPT-Khmer Rouge Relat ionship
The re la t ionsh ip  between the Thai and Cambodian communists was 
apparently less alarming to governments in Bangkok during the 1975-77 
period than Vietnamese and Laotian support fo r  the CPT. Unlike 
Vietnam, Cambodia was not a major m i l i t a r y  power and, although there
84 Richard Nations, FEER, 28 July 1978, p. 12.
85 Bangkok Post, 21 October 1978.
86 John McBeth, FEER, 8 June 1979, p. 19.
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were disagreements between Bangkok and Phnom Penh over border
demarcation, these disputes were minor compared to Vient iane's alleged
irredentism in re la t ion  to the northeast Thai land.
But nether the fac t  that Khmer Rouge l inks  with the CPT were not
coupled in Thai perceptions to a wider th rea t ,  nor Bangkok's in terest
in fos te r ing  a working re la t ionsh ip  with Democratic Kampuchea in order
to maintain Cambodia in i t s  t ra d i t io n a l  ro le  as a buf fer  state in
re la t ion  to Vietnam, prevented elements in the Thai m i l i t a r y  from
exaggerating the dangers of the Cambodian border s i tua t ion .  Such
exaggeration was p a r t i c u la r l y  evident under the Thanin regime in 
871977; constant i n s t a b i l i t y  on the f r o n t ie r  served to j u s t i f y
domestic p o l i t i c a l  repression and increased defence expenditure.
Moreover, there was evidence that local f i e l d  commanders, such as the
'Young Turk' leader Lieutenant-Colonel Prachak Sawangjit, may have
been purposely provocative in order to enhance th e i r  prospects fo r  
88promotion.
Vietnam and Communism in Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia 
and the Philippines, 1975-78
Although concern was greatest in Bangkok, there was also 
considerable unease in the other ASEAN capi ta ls  concerning the impact
87 For instance, in la te  July 1977 the Deputy Supreme Commander 
General Kriangsak Chomanon, threatened to "destroy Cambodia's 
d ign i ty "  i f  the f r o n t ie r  problems continued. New York Times, 
27 July 1977.
88 Richard Nations, FEER, 5 August 1977, p. 14.
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that  the communist successes in Indochina in 1975 might have on
domestic insurgencies, despite the i r  physical distance from Indochina
and the h is to r ic a l  lack of contact between local and Indochinese 
89communists. The fac t  that  no delegates from the Malayan, Indonesian
or Phi l ipp ine communist part ies were inv i ted to the Vietnamese
Workers' Party congress in late 1976 was ind ica t ive  of the lack of
90importance attached to these part ies by Hanoi.
Maiaysia
O f f i c ia l  discomfi ture was p a r t i c u la r l y  evident in Kuala Lumpur, 
although the only evidence of Vietnamese involvement in the insurgency 
of the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) was the l a t t e r ' s  use of new 
booby trap and ambush techniques, which was seen by some informed 
sources as confirming that some CPM cadres had received t ra in ing  in 
North Vietnam in the la te  1960s and early 1970s.^ Insofar as the CPM 
received any substantial  external assistance, th is  came from Beij ing 
rather  than Hanoi or other Indochinese communist sources. But in any 
case th is  support was overwhelmingly moral rather than materia l.
89 But in the 1930s a Vietnamese, Lai Tak, became General Secretary 
of the CPM. I t  was la te r  discovered that Lai Tak was also a 
B r i t i s h  agent, thus con tr ibu t ing  to the phenomenon of repeated 
purges in the CPM.
90 Nayan Chanda, FEER, 14 January 1977, pp. 16-17. A delegation 
from the CPT was inv i te d .
91 Austra l ian Financial Review, 24 June 1975; Richard Sim, Maiaysia:
Containing the Communist Insurgency (London: In s t i t u te  for  the
Study of C o n f l ic t ,  Con f l ic t  Studies No. 110, 1979), p. 8. Former 
Vietnamese cadre Hoang Huu Quynh claimed that CPM members were 
tra ined at the Hoa Binh school. See Thai Quang Trung, p. 643.
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Whereas the Thai insurgency had been of some in te rest  and usefulness
to Hanoi during the Vietnam war, the CPM's insurrect ion had not.
Despite th is  apparent lack of common in te res t  between the CPM and
i t s  Indochinese counterparts, the CPM's radio s ta t ion ,  the Voice of
the Malayan Revolution (VMR) (based in southern China) was quick to
claim that  "the disasters of the Lon Nol and Thieu cl iques were also
92defeats fo r  the Razak and Lee Kuan Yew c l iques" .  But the CPM's
pro-Bei j ing or ienta t ion was clear from the way that i t  contrasted the
"great , consistent and e f fec t ive  assistance" that the Cambodian
revolu t ion had received from China with Moscow's "co l lus ion"  with Lon 
93Nol. Nevertheless, at a declaratory level re la t ions with Vietnam 
were s t i l l  cord ia l :  in the words of the Vietnamese Workers'
(Communist) Party's greeting to the CPM on i t s  45th anniversary, Hanoi 
was
. . .  convinced that with our long-standing re la t ions ,  
and with mutual support and encouragement in the course 
of our revolut ionary s truggle, these close re la t ions 
w i l l  be fu r the r  consol idated.94
This exercise in mutual congratulat ion coincided with a d i s t i n c t  
upsurge in CPM a c t i v i t y :  on 1 Apr i l  1975 rockets were f i re d  at the 
Kuala Lumpur a i r  base and bombs exploded near several army camps.
92 Voice of the Malayan Revolution (c i ted hereafter as VMR) in
Standard Chinese, 1330 gmt, 29 March 1975 (SWB FE/4867/A3/5, 
2 Apr i l  1975).
93 VMR, 1330 gmt, 22 Apri l  1975 (SWB FE/4887/A3/11, 25 Apr i l  1975).
j  94 VNA in English, 0243 gmt, 30 Apr i l  1975 (SWB FE/4892/A3/8,
1 May 1975).
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Over the next few months there were frequent serious incidents, with
so ld ie rs  being ambushed and k i l l e d  and Special Branch detect ives
assassinated. The campaign climaxed with the bombing of Kuala
Lumpur's National Monument (commemorating the defeat of the CPM in the
1948-60 Emergency) on 26 August and an attack on the Pol ice Field
95Force headquarters in the capita l a week la te r .  S u p e r f ic ia l ly ,  i t
seemed that there was a l ink  between events in Indochina and th is  new
CPM campaign: indeed, the Malaysian Prime Min is te r ,  Tun Razak, seems
to have believed th is  at f i r s t ,  asserting in mid-Apri l  that " . . .
communist elements in our country have stepped up th e i r  a c t i v i t i e s  as
96a re s u l t  of communist successes in Vietnam and Cambodia". A more
sanguine view was taken by the Min ister of Home A f fa i r s ,  Ghazali
Shafie, who was responsible fo r  internal secur i ty  and was in a better
pos i t ion  to assess the s i tua t ion  accurately: he described the most
recent t e r r o r i s t  incident as a "temporary setback having no real
97connection with the war in Indochina". By the time that Razak next 
expressed an opinion on the issue i t  seemed that he had been properly 
br ie fed fo r  he claimed that there was "no connection" between the 
t e r r o r i s t  upsurge in Malaysia and the col lapse of the Phnom Penh and 
Saigon reg im es .^
The escalat ion in the CPM1s g u e r i l la  a c t i v i t i e s  was probably
95 K Das, FEER, 5 September 1975, pp. 28-29 and 12 September 1975,
pp. 10-11.
96 S t ra i t s  Times, 16 Apr i l  1975.
97 Kuala Lumpur home service in Engl ish, 1400 gmt, 14 Apri l  1975 
(SWB FE/4879/B/2, 16 Apr i l  1975).
98 S t ra i t s  Times, 5 May 1975.
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la rge ly  due to a fac tor  quite independent of events in Indochina.
99Several years e a r l ie r ,  a three-way s p l i t  and occurred in the Party. 
This schism had i t s  or ig ins in a purge ordered by the CPM's North 
Malayan Bureau (which believed that the Party was i n f i l t r a t e d  by 
government agents), resu l t ing  in the execution of two hundred 
re v o lu t io n a r ie s . ^ ^  Elements in the CPM's 8th Regiment and the 2nd 
D i s t r i c t  of the 12th Regiment, under powerful local commanders, 
resisted the purge and hived themselves o f f  from the Party, forming 
(respectively) the CPM (Revolutionary Faction) and the CPM (Marxist- 
Lenin is t )  Unlike the "orthodox" CPM, which favoured a class ic
Maoist "long war" strategy of gradual ly working towards the domination 
of rura l areas to encirc le the towns, with an eventual upris ing by a 
united f ro n t  of peasants and workers, the CMP(RF) and CMP(M-L) 
appeared to favour a more urban-oriented s ty le  of "anomic te r ror ism".  
The establishment of diplomatic re la t ions  between the Chinese and 
Malaysian governments in May 1974 may have exacerbated the 
d issa t is fac t ion  of some CPM cadres with the par ty 's  pro-Bei j ing 
o r ien ta t ion .
I t  wa r n the CPM and the subsequent move towards
98 S t ra i ts  Times, 5 May 1975.
99 J Clementson, "Malaysia in the Seventies: Communist Resurgence
and Government Response", Journal of the Royal United Services 
I n s t i t u t e , Vol. 124, No. 4 (December 1979), pp. 52-53.
100 Sim, p. 8.
101 "How real is the Red Threat?", Asiaweek, 24 Apri l  1981, p. 31; 
Sim, p. 8.
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urban a c t i v i t y  by the sp l in te r  groups that were the main reason fo r
the eruption of revolut ionary violence that made 1974 and 1975
Malaysia's most troubled years in terms of in ternal securi ty  since 
1021958. There may even have been an element of competition as the
CPM's fact ions strove to outdo each other: the attack on the National
103Monument was a t t r ibu ted to the CPM (M-L) while the assassinations
of Special Branch o f f ic e rs  were believed to have been carr ied out by
104the "orthodox" CPM. The communist successes in Indochina may have
been a contr ibu tory fac to r  to the CPM violence of 1975, but the fact
105that there had also been an upsurge in CPM a c t i v i t y  in 1973-74, 
beginning almost two years before the f a l l  of Phnom Penh and Saigon 
seems to confirm that the pace of the insurgency was determined 
la rge ly  by factors independent of the s i tua t ion  in Indochina. 
Although in te l l igence sources subsequently al leged that small 
consignments of arms that may have or iginated in Indochina were 
reaching the CPM in 1975, there was no evidence to suggest anything 
l i k e  the expected f lood of weapons from former US stockpi les abandoned 
in Vietnam. Indeed, a large proport ion of CPM weapons captured in the 
la te  1970s dated back to the Emergency.^  Those arms which could
102 Clementson, p. 53.
103 South China Morning Post, 11 September 1975.
104 K Das, FEER, 1 Apr i l  1977, pp. 18-20.
105 This upsurge in g u e r i l la  warfare was concentrated against the 
pol ice Special Branch, and culminated in the assassination of the 
Inspector-General of Pol ice in June 1974. See Harvey Stockwin, 
FEER, 17 June 1974, pp. 14-16.
106 Clementson, p. 56.
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have come from Vietnam might alternatively have been supplied by the 
Khmer Rouge, or more likely, by Thai smugglers and gun-runners. Apart 
from Chinese-supplied funds and facilities for radio broadcasting, 
external aid to the CPM appeared minimal throughout the late 1970s. 
Nevertheless, Hussein Onn, the Malaysian Prime Minister, reacted quite 
adversely to Le Duan's speech of February 1976 (which could be 
construed as expressing support for regional communist i n s u r g e n t s ) . ^
Singapore
The CPM did not recognize Malaysia and Singapore as separate
political entities, and still worked towards the eventual
establishment of a People's Republic of Malaya, comprising peninsula
Malaysia and Singapore. But an easily-policed society, an efficient
Special Branch, and the success of the People's Action Party's
economic policies had undermined most local support for the communists
in Singapore by 1975. The most important incident relating to
Singaporean communism in that year was the arrest of six members of a
108clearly Chinese-oriented "Mao Tse Tung Thought League" linked to 
the CFM. The Singaporean leadership was thus not greatly concerned 
with tie impact that the Indochinese communist victories might have on 
the island republic's internal security situation. There was 
nevertheless a profound concern with the domestic stability of 
Thailand and Malaysia, as any changes there might have important
107 Kuala Lumpur domestic service in English, 1030 gmt, 7 March 1976 
(FBIS-APA-76-46, 8 March 1976, 01).
108 "Communist Patterns in the South-East Asian Rim", Asian Defence 
Journal, No. 6/1976, p. 9.
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repercussions in Singapore. But even here, no immediate problem was 
envisaged - -  in Lee Kuan Yew's opinion:
. . .  Thailand has ample time to work out what is in her 
best in te res ts .  The North Vietnamese w i l l  take many 
years to mend a war-shattered Vietnam before 
under tak ing ,^ fu r the r  adventures in helping Thai 
insurgents .1
Lee la te r  revealed that in 1975 he was th ink ing in terms of a ten to
f i f t e e n  year in te rval  before the Vietnamese would have enough spare
capacity "to spread revolut ion to a l l  the unenlightened, c a p i ta l i s t
countr ies around t h e m " . ^  But Lee's Foreign Min is ter ,  Rajaratnam,
nevertheless warned Hanoi against in te r fe r in g  in the ASEAN
countr ies'* '^ a f te r  Le Duan's February 1976 declara t ion. Lee showed
considerable prescience in postulat ing that Chinese-influenced
Cambodia might come into  c o n f l i c t  with Vietnam - -  and thus act as a
"bu f fer "  to Vietnamese expansion - -  and could "buy us considerable 
112t ime". But he was less accurate in warning that the "vast
quant i t ies  of weapons - -  many of the la tes t  US design - -  now in the
possession of the Vietnamese government" might become a source of
11 ?" inca lcu lab le  mischief" fo r  the rest of Southeast Asia.
109 S t ra i ts  Times, 8 Apr i l  1975.
110 I b id . , 7 October 1978.
111 "The Week", FEER, 12 March 1976, p. 5.
112 Singapore home service in Engl ish, 1330 gmt, 3 May 1975 (SWB 
FE/4896/A3/8, 6 May 1975).
113 S t ra i ts  Times, 2 May 1975.
229
Indonesia
Soon a f te r  the Indochinese communist v ic to r ie s  President Suharto
claimed that he expected the Indochinese regimes to "encourage the
local communists and indeed assist them to go fu r th e r " ,  possibly by
114t rans fe r r ing  surplus weapons. But Suharto's claims were probably
more a re f le c t io n  of a wish to cap i ta l ize  on recent events in
Indochina as a means of securing increased m i l i t a r y  assistance from
Washington, than of the Indonesian m i l i t a r y ' s  threat  assessments.
Indeed, the events of 1965 (when Beij ing was al legedly implicated in a
communist attempt to seize power in Jakarta), the pro-China
or ien ta t ion  of not only the ma jor i ty  of surviv ing Indonesian Communist
Party members but also the few remaining communist insurgents in
Kalimantan, and a continuing comparison by the "generation of 
116'45" of Indonesia's revolut ion with Vietnam's, meant that i t  was 
China rather than Vietnam which was usual ly seen in Jakarta as the 
main vector of communist subversion.
Jusuf Wanandi, Executive Director of the in f lu e n t ia l  CSIS " th ink -  
t a n k " ^  argued that even i f  Hanoi decided to support subversion in 
the ASEAN countr ies,
114 Interview with Lee Kuan Yew, quoted by Hamish McDonald, National 
Times, 28 July 1975.
115 The "generation of '45" was composed of senior Indonesian 
m i l i t a r y  f igures - -  inc luding President Suharto - -  who had 
part ic ipated in the war of independence and who now dominated 
Indonesia's armed forces and government.
116 CSIS (Centre fo r  Strategic and International Studies), whi le 
o f f i c i a l l y  independent of the government, was widely recognized 
as re f le c t in g  the views of Lieutenant-General A1i Murtopo, deputy 
head of BAKIN, the Suharto regime's in te l l igence  coordinating 
body.
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. . .  i t  should be noted that a l l  communist part ies in 
the South-east Asian region s t i l l  lean towards Peking 
and not towards Hanoi. ' Thus, whatever aid the
Vietnamese might grant them would have only l im i ted 
impact.117
118Another o f f i c i a l  Indonesian commentary pointed out that i t  was 
expected that "the communists" would step up th e i r  "subversive 
a c t i v i t i e s "  outside Indochina, but that th is  should not be seen as 
part of a Vietnamese po l icy  of expansion: such an upsurge in
communist a c t i v i t y  (as was "already f e l t  in Malaysia") would more 
l i k e l y  be sponsored by Bei j ing  as a way of l im i t in g  "Moscow-supported 
Hanoi's sphere of in f luence".
But the Jakarta regime's claims that the communist v ic to r ie s  in
Indochina might encourage, d i r e c t l y  or in d i re c t ly ,  the Indonesian
communist movement, should be regarded with due scepticism. The upper
echelons of the Indonesian m i l i t a r y  had a range of vested in te res ts ,
in both domestic and in ternat iona l  spheres, in the continuing
existence of an external ly-supported "communist th rea t " .  As well as
helping to secure p o l i t i c a l ,  m i l i t a r y  and economic support from the
West (and especial ly the United States), the threat of a communist
reviva l provided a j u s t i f i c a t i o n  fo r  the continued repression of
119p o l i t i c a l  and human r ig h ts .
117 Jusuf Wanandi, "P o l i t i co -S e cu r i ty  Dimensions of Southeast Asia - -
A Southeast Asian View", in Southeast Asia and the World of 
Tomorrow (Papers presented at the U.S. - -  Southeast Asia Seminar, 
Ba l i ,  30 May-1 June 1977). (Jakarta: Centre fo r  Strategic and
International Studies, 1977), p. 149.
118 Jakarta home service, 1200 gmt, 12 Apr i l  1975 (SWB FE/4878/A3/10, 
15 Apri l  1975).
119 See Justus M van der Kroef, "Hanoi and ASEAN: A New
Confrontation in Southeast Asia", Asia Quarterly , 1976/3, 
pp. 263-64.
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The Philippines
There was probably less concern in Manila than in any other ASEAN
capital regarding the likely impact of the new situation in Indochina
on local communist insurgency. Although President Marcos warned
against the danger of "massive infiltration" in support of domestic
insurrections, he was also "confident" that the Philippines was
effectively insulated from events in Indochina by the interjacence of
120the South China Sea. There was apparently some anxiety in Manila
that surplus arms from Indochina should not find their way to the
communist New People's Army (NPA) or the Muslim separatist 
121guerrillas, but the indisputably indigenous origins of the NPA
coupled with the Philippine armed forces subservience to civilian
authority in matters of foreign policy meant that there was generally
no attempt to blame the country's current communist insurgency
problems on Vietnamese interference. Marcos instead stressed the need
122for a developmental approach to internal security, although this 
rhetoric was not always matched with practical efforts in the years 
that fo l low ed .^
As early as 1975, a CPP Central Committee plenum reportedly 
displayed a wish to move the party towards greater independence of
120 Manila home service in English, 1000 gmt, 6 May 1975 (SWB FE/ 
4899/B/3, 9 May 1975); South China Morning Post, 29 April 1975.
121 Straits Times, 23 July 1975; 20 December 1976.
122 Ibid.,  29 January 1976.
123 See, for example, Michael Richardson, "How not to mount a 
counter-insurgency campaign", Pacific Defence Reporter, May 1982, 
pp. 56-58, 64.
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China when it decided to delete the phrase "Mao Ze Dong thought" from
124the movement's full title. This move may have been spurred by the 
successes of the Vietnamese communists -- who were increasingly 
autonomous of Beijing -- but no conclusive evidence is available.
The Impact of the Sino-Vietnamese Rift and the Third Indochina War on Communist Parties in the ASEAN States
Thai 1 and
The communist parties of the ASEAN states, like the governments 
of these countries, saw it as in their interests to avoid taking sides 
in the intensifying dispute between Hanoi (and to a lesser extent, 
Vientiane) and the Beijing-Phnom Penh axis in the 1976-78 period. 
This was particularly so in the case of the CPT which, while not 
dependent on external assistance, valued the support that it received 
from all three Indochina countries, especially as Chinese material 
assistance had diminished since the opening of relations between 
Bangkok and Beijing in 1975. Although the CPT's international line 
emphasized support for China and opposition to the Soviet Union (which 
it had regarded as "revisionist" since the late 1960s), in the 
northeast the Thai communists received important backing from Hanoi 
and Vientiane, both of which became oriented increasingly away from 
Beijing and towards Moscow from 1975. The CPT's ability to maintain
124 Personal interview with Philippine academic, University of the 
Philippines, Manila, March 1981.
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amicable re la t ions  with both sides of the growing Beijing-Hanoi r i f t  
was exempli fied by the continuing t ra n s i t  of i t s  cadres to and from 
Bei j ing  by way of Laos and Vietnam. But, perhaps pa r t ly  because of a 
concern that too close a re la t ionsh ip  with Vietnamese and Laotian 
communism might jeopardize the independence of the CPT (or a 
communist-ruled Thailand in the fu tu re ) ,  as well as fo r  ideo log ica l ,  
h is to r ic a l  and ethnic reasons, the CPT's top level leadership - -  even 
in the northeast - -  remained p o l i t i c a l l y  oriented towards Bei j ing 
rather than Hanoi.
However, there is substantial evidence that the CPT was 
increasingly r iven with c o n f l i c t  over issues of ideology, strategy and 
external l inks  in the la te  1970s. A debate over revolut ionary 
strategy which fol lowed the success of the student- led uprising in 
Bangkok in October 1973 was exacerbated by the large numbers of urban 
radicals  who f led  the capita l to jo in  the CPT af te r  the October 1976 
coup ended Thai land's democratic experiment. After  the CPT refused an 
o f fe r  of d i re c t  Vietnamese and Laotian assistance to help " l ibe ra te "  
northeast Thailand in la te  1977, Hanoi and Vientiane apparently had 
few qualms about e f fe c t i v e ly  disavowing th e i r  l inks  with the Thai 
communists. The September 1978 Thai-Vietnamese communique was 
fol lowed by Thai-Laotian accords in January and Apri l  1979: these
three agreements deprived the CPT of not only Vietnamese and Laotian 
moral and material support, but also i t s  sanctuaries in Laos. 
Simultaneously, the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia deprived the CPT 
of i t s  other safe havens in Indochina. Vietnamese and Laotian
attempts to improve re la t ions  with Bangkok by disowning the CPT were 
matched by a substantial  cut in Chinese assistance to the Thai
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communists as Bei j ing strove to involve Thailand in the s t ra teg ic  
encirclement of Vietnam.
The combination of b i t t e r  internecine debate and drastic  cuts in 
the CPT's external assistance seriously damaged morale w i th in  the 
Party, and enabled the Thai government to implement a new counter­
insurgency campaign (emphasizing an amnesty fo r  CPT defectors) with
125great success in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
1 pc
Soon a f te r  the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia i t  was reported 
that  the Thai au tho r i t ies '  immediate fear was that Hanoi would use i t s  
newly consol idated control of t e r r i t o r y  along the length of Thai land's 
eastern border to increase dramatical ly  i t s  assistance to the CPT. 
But in the l i g h t  of the Vietnamese and Laotian disavowals of support 
fo r  the CPT ( in  September 1978 and January 1979 respectively) and 
Hanoi's obvious wish to procure Thai acquiescence in i t s  occupation of 
Cambodia i t  seems un l ike ly  that th is  was t r u l y  a pressing worry fo r  
Bangkok. To be sure, elements w i th in  the Thai m i l i t a r y  wished to
exp lo i t  fears concerning the re la t ionsh ip  between Thai communism and 
Indochina, ju s t  as they manipuated a putat ive threat of d i rec t  
invasion by Vietnam. But when interviewed in early 1981, the 
Secretary-General of the National Securi ty Council asserted that 
although the CPT was cur ren t ly  receiving only neg l ig ib le  amounts of 
material aid from the People's Republic of China, and was making
125 For a deta i led account of the debates w i th in  the CPT over 
revolut ionary strategy and external al legiances in the la te  
1970s, see Appendix 1, pp. 518-44 below.
126 Will iam Chapman, Washington Post, 20 January 1979.
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e f f o r t s  to be more s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t ,  i t  remained oriented towards
127Bei j ing  and essent ia l ly  Maoist in outlook. And despite Bangkok's 
continuing concern over Vietnam's ro le in Cambodia, in 1980 the Thai 
Prime Min is te r ,  Prem, ranked the mainstream CPT as "Thai land's No. 1 
enemy".
A desire to manipulate the threat probably provided part of the
motivat ion fo r  the emphasis given by Thai m i l i t a r y  sources to the
dangers posed by the sp l in te r ing  of a pro-Vietnamese fac t ion  from the 
129CPT from 1979. According to Thai m i l i t a r y  in te l l igence  a new Thai
communist party cal led the Thai Northeastern Liberat ion Party (TNLP)
130 131was formed in Laos in 1979. Another Thai securi ty  source
claimed that the new "party" was merely a component of an "Indochinese
Communist Party" which had been set up in March 1979. But both
sources asserted that the new organization 's  goal was to gain control
of Thai land's northeast, as part of Hanoi's strategy fo r  extending an
127 Personal interview with Squadron Leader Prasong Soonsir i ,  
Bangkok, 20 March 1981.
128 S t ra i ts  Times, 26 January 1981.
129 For example, the Supreme Command Chief of S ta ff  (Lieutenant- 
General Thuanthong Suwannathat) claimed that Thailand might have 
to face "enemies on two f ronts"  - -  that  is ,  from both "pro- 
Chinese" and Vietnamese-influenced communist movements. Nation 
Review (Bangkok), 12 June 1979.
130 Martha Winnacker, "Another view of the c r i s i s " ,  Southeast Asia
Chronicle, No. 69 (January-February 1980), p. 19; Santi
Mingmongkul, "Thai resistance caught in the c ro ss f i re " ,  Southeast 
Asia Chronicle, No. 79 (August 1981), p. 15.
131 Colonel Sangiam Rattanasmakon, spokesman fo r  the 2nd Army Region, 
reported by Agence France Presse in Engl ish, 0942 gmt, 21 June 
1979 (SWB FE/6149/A3/8, 23 June 1979).
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"Indochina Federation". Unlike the CPT, the TNLP (or "Isaan
132Liberation Movement") was al legedly wil l ing to allow Vietnamese
forces to play a s igni f icant  role in " l iberat ing" the northeast .
133According to one senior Thai army of f icer  the new insurgent
movement backed by Vietnamese forces could be expected to move against
the northeast  in two or three years '  time - -  a f ter  Hanoi had
consolidated i t s  gains in Cambodia. In September 1979 the Director of
the Information Office of the Thai Supreme Command claimed that  a
" f i r s t  batch" of 60 TNLP members had i n f i l t r a t ed  into Thailand from 
134Laos. After General Prem Tinsulanond came to power in February 
1980, Thai mil i tary and in te l l igence  sources often emphasized the 
continuing threat  allegedly posed by Vietnamese and Laotian support 
for the TNLP. Indeed, Prem himself asserted:
. . .  the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea is part  of an 
expansionist  campaign l ike ly to be extended to the 
sixteen provinces of Northeast Thailand proclaimed as 
future targets  for the so-cal led Liberation Movement 
who aim to detach these provinces from Thailand and 
join them...  to the "Federation of Indochina".135
However, the highest levels  of the Thai po l i t i ca l  and securi ty 
establishment apparently recognized that  the Thai communist
132 Chatchai Yenbamrong, S t r a i t s  Times, 21 January 1981.
133 Quoted by Robert Whymant, Guardian Weekly, 11 February 1979.
134 Statement by Lieutenant-General Som Khattaphan, Bangkok home 
service,  0530 gmt, 20 September 1979 (SWB FE/6229/A3/8, 
26 September 1979).
135 Speech delivered by General Prem Tinsulanond, Thai Prime 
Minister,  at dinner hosted by the Foreign Correspondents'  Club of 
Thailand, Bangkok, 10 September 1980.
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insurgency's only s ig n i f ic a n t  external l inks from 1979 were with
Be i j ing .  In September 1979 Kriangsak dismissed as "nonsense" rumours
136concerning a Vietnamese-backed Thai communist movement. According
to the Ch ie f -o f -S ta f f  of the Thai Supreme Command, General Saiyud
Kerdphol, pro-Vietnamese Thai communists were "too weak" to form a
137r iv a l  party to the CPT. Saiyud la te r  stressed that although
"Vietnamese-fostered insurgency" was a more l i k e l y  threat to Thai
securi ty  than a conventional invasion by Vietnam, i t  was s t i l l  not a
138major securi ty concern fo r  Bangkok. The Secretary-General of the
National Security Counci l, Squadron Leader Prasong Soonsir i ,  asserted
in early 1981 that there was "no fear of a pro-Vietnamese fac t ion  of
the CPT supported through Laos and Kampuchea", and stressed that the
so-cal led TNLP was composed only of former students and p o l i t i c ia n s
139and did not f i e l d  f ig h t in g  troops.
Unlike the CPT, the communist part ies in the ASEAN countr ies 
other than Thailand were not profoundly affected by the renewal of 
c o n f l i c t  in Indochina from 1978. But the consol idation of Vietnam's 
control over a l l  Indochina did re-awaken concern in these countr ies '  
securi ty establishments that Hanoi might attempt to in te n s i fy  i t s  
l inks with local communist movements.
136 Winnacker, p. 19. Kriangsak's apparent cynicism may be explained 
by his wish to maintain a moderately con c i l ia to ry  pol icy towards 
Hanoi, despite Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia.
137 Hong Kong Agence France Presse in Engl ish, 1535 gmt, 12 June 1979 
(FBIS-APA-79-116, 14 June 1979); "The Week", FEER, 22 June 1979, 
p. 7.
138 Interview with General Saiyud Kerdphol, Washington Post, 5 July 
1980.
139 Personal interview with Prasong, 20 March 1981.
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Malaysia
In October 1978, Pham Van Dong pledged in Kuala Lumpur that
Vietnam would re f ra in  from interference in Malaysia's internal
a f f a i r s , ^  implying a renunciat ion of support fo r  the Communist Party
of Malaysia (CPM). As was the case with Dong's s im i la r  promise in
Bangkok a few weeks previously, th is  assurance appears to have been
aimed at improving Vietnam's image in the region compared with
B e i j in g 's .  In view of the Malay establ ishment's t ra d i t io n a l  suspicion
of China, the Vietnamese leadership may have thought that i t  would be
p a r t i c u la r l y  worthwhile to stress Vietnam's supposedly peaceful
intentions towards Malaysia. In Kuala Lumpur, Dong went so fa r  as to
lay a wreath at the National Monument commemorating government
secur i ty  force personnel k i l l e d  f igh t ing  the CPM in the 1948-60 
141"Emergency".
In pract ical  terms, Dong's assurances to the Malaysian 
au thor i t ies  were made at l i t t l e  cost to Vietnam: Hanoi's l inks  with
the CPM had never been more than tenuous. Unl ike the CPT, which did 
not openly and unambiguously attack Hanoi u n t i l  the middle of 1979, 
the CPM's response to Dong's assurances to Hussein Onn was both soon 
in coming and v i t r i o l i c ,  asserting that "Dong's despicable behaviour" 
was "the inevitab le outcome of the expansionist po l icy  that is being
140 See text of j o i n t  statement by Dong and Hussein Onn, 15 October 
1978, VNA in Engl ish, 0724 gmt, 16 October 1978 (SWB FE/5944/ 
A3/13, 17 October 1978).
141 K Das and Peter Weintraub, FEER, 27 October 1978.
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carried out abroad by the Vietnamese authorities". But the CRM 
lost virtually nothing as a result of this move by Hanoi to appease 
Kuala Lumpur. The three CPM factions were highly self-sufficient in 
terms of their material needs: in particular they had never used 
sanctuaries in Indochina like the CPT. The 'rump' or orthodox CPM 
remained ideologically loyal to Beijing. Although the CPM(RF) and 
CPM(M-L) factions were less tied than the mainstream CPM to a Maoist 
strategy, i t  would have been extremely diff icul t  for even these 
splinter groups to develop an anti-Chinese, pro-Vietnamese 
orientation, due to their largely Chinese ethnic composition."^
Despite their knowledge that the CPM was essentially a Beijing- 
oriented movement, the Malaysian authorities were unconvinced that 
Hanoi could be trusted not to support insurgent groups in the region, 
particularly in the light of the Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia. 
According to Ghazali Shafie, the Malaysian Minister of Home Affairs 
(responsible for Kuala Lumpur's internal security policy), the 
installation by Hanoi of the Heng Samrin regime in Phnom Penh 
confirmed that:
. . .  whatever assurance was given to the states in ASEAN 
there is always that nagging suspicion that when and if 
Vietnam decided to pursue the creation of a Comecon in 
Southeast Asia, in line with the aim of Vietnamese 
Southeast Asian hegemony, Vietnam would have no 
compunction in directing all her energies towards 
producing cadres who would be the creatures tasked to 
subvert the ASEAN s ta tes . 1^ 4
142
142 Voice of the Malayan Revolution, 1330 gmt, 28 October 1978 (SWB 
FE/5963/A3/8-9, 8 November 1978).
143 See K Das, FEER, 8 dune 1979, pp. 20-1.
144 Ghazali Shafie, The ASEAN Countries and Indochina Text of address 
to Conference on Southeast Asian Banking and Finance organized by 
The Financial Times, Singapore, 19 April 1979) (Kuala Lumpur: 
Malaysian Government, 1979), p. 21.
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145According to one jo u rn a l i s t ,  Ghazali feared that the Hanoi- 
oriented TNLP might foment rebe l l ion  in Thai land's northeast, sett ing 
the scene fo r  Vietnamese m i l i t a r y  in tervention there. The consequent 
divers ion of Thai m i l i t a r y  attention away from Thailand's southern 
border might have a serious e f fec t  on e f fo r ts  to contain the CPM.
O f f i c i a l  concern in Kuala Lumpur that the new c o n f l i c t  in 
Indochina might necessitate a weakening of m i l i t a r y  pressure on the 
CPT became apparent by mi d-1 9 7 9 . I t  seemed possible that the Thai 
Fourth Army (which deployed only one d iv is ion  to assist the Border 
Patrol Pol ice in securing Thailand's seventeen southernmost provinces 
against the CPM, CPT, Muslim separatists and bandits) might be 
required by Bangkok to redeploy some of i t s  forces to the border with 
Cambodia fo l low ing the Vietnamese occupation of that country. The 
Malaysian armed forces already had the new re sp o n s ib i l i t y  of 
p a t ro l l i n g  the east coast to detect landings by seaborne refugees from 
Vietnam and would be overstretched i f  they were obliged to compensate 
fo r  the withdrawal of Thai forces from the border area.
I f  the various CPM fact ions had planned to take advantage of the 
Thai and Malaysian securi ty  forces' new commitments to in te ns i fy  th e i r  
armed a c t i v i t i e s  they were to be disappointed. The Thai-Cambodian 
border and refugee s i tua t ions never became so serious as to d ive r t  the 
at tent ion of Bangkok's and Kuala Lumpur's forces from th e i r  primary 
counter-insurgency ro le ,  and the Malaysian secur i ty  forces were able
145 Personal interview with K Das, Malaysian correspondent of Far 
Eastern Economic Review, Kuala Lumpur, 14 Apri l  1981.
146 See K Das, FEER, 8 June 1979, p. 21.
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147to i n f l i c t  serious casual t ies  on the CPM in the 1979-81 period.
The CPM was thus unable to make any signi f icant  advances as a resul t  
of the renewed regional i n s t ab i l i t y .
Singapore
In October 1978, Pham Van Dong and Singapore's Prime Minister,
Lee Kuan Yew, agreed on a pledge of mutual non-interference similar to
those Dong had recent ly signed in Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur . ^  While
149Dong's promises were welcomed by the Singaporean leadership,  i t
seemed that  i t  would be some time before Hanoi's recent ly mi l i tant
150revolutionary rhetor ic  was forgot ten.  But in Lee's view the
conf l i c t  in Cambodia between the Vietnamese-backed Heng Samrin regime
and the Khmer Rouge would provide a respi te  for Thailand and the other
ASEAN countries from the threa t  of Vietnamese-supported insurgencies.
151Lee asserted that  once "mopping-up" operations by Vietnamese and 
Heng Samrin regime forces in Cambodia had been completed, increased 
communist insurgency in the ASEAN countries would become a 
probabi l i ty.  His view that  the Khmer Rouge would act as a buffer for 
the ASEAN s ta tes  against  Vietnamese expansionism had thus changed
147 See, for example, "Malaysia claims 36 ki l led in war against 
guer r i l l a s" ,  Sydney Morning Herald, 17 July 1980.
148 Text of j oin t  statement by Pham Van Dong and Lee Kuan Yew, VNA in 
English, 1815 gmt, 17 October 1978 (SWB FE/5946/A3/1, 19 October 
1978).
149 S t ra i t s  Times, 17 October 1978.
150 K Das and Peter Weintraub, FEER, 27 October 1978.
151 Interview with Lee Kuan Yew, S t r a i t s  Times, 9 February 1979.
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l i t t l e  since 1975. Lee bel ieved (or purported to bel ieve),  in classic
"domino theory" fashion, that a continuing c o n f l i c t  in Cambodia would,
by absorbing Vietnam's supposedly adventurist energies, "buy time" in
which the ASEAN countries (p a r t i c u la r l y  Thailand and Malaysia) could
work to el iminate the domestic weaknesses which provided the basis for
152exte rna l ly  exp lo i tab le communist insurgency. But the Singaporean 
leadership probably had u l t e r i o r  motives in adopting a "hawkish" 
pos i t ion on the "Vietnamese th rea t " .  These included concern over the 
impl icat ions of Vietnam's d i re c t  m i l i t a r y  in te rvention in Cambodia for  
the securi ty  of small states such as Singapore, the need to promote a 
cl imate of confidence amongst foreign investors, and a wish to 
consol idate national un i ty  and maintain the legit imacy of the People's 
Action Party.
Indonesia
Lacking a major act ive communist problem of i t s  own, Jakarta was
less concerned than the other ASEAN governments over the p o s s ib i l i t y
of Vietnamese support fo r  regional insurgencies in the 1978-81 period.
But the invasion of Cambodia did seem to resu l t  in greater Indonesian
concern. Jusuf Wanandi, who had argued in 1977 that Vietnam could not
exert more than l im i ted inf luence over regional communist part ies even
153i f  i t  wished to ,  was by the end of 1979 propounding that although
152 See Lim Joo-Jock, "How Singapore sees the Vietnam th rea t " .  
Paci f ic Defence Reporter, Vol. 8, Nos. 6/7 (December 1981/ 
January 1982), p. 56.
153 Jusuf Wanandi, "Dimensions of Southeast Asian Security" (Paper 
presented at Conference on New Foundations fo r  Asian and Pacif ic  
Securi ty, Pattaya, Thai land, 12-16 December 1979), p. 131.
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an open invasion of Thailand was "u n l ik e ly " ,  Vietnam's m i l i t a r y  
presence on the Thai border and i t s  " l inks  with the CRT" made i t  the 
most immediate external threat to the region. By th is  stage, of 
course, Hanoi was able, with s in ce r i ty ,  to deny any l inks with the 
CPT. There were ind ications of a small Hanoi-oriented Thai communist 
s p l in te r  group, but there was no evidence that i t  f ie lded any f ig h t in g  
forces or posed any tangible threat to Thailand. I t  is probable that 
Wanandi was attempting to emphasize the g rav i ty  with which Jakarta 
viewed the regional secur i ty  s i tua t ion .  From the Indonesian viewpoint 
the continuing c o n f l i c t  in Cambodia appeared as a des tab i l iz ing  
inf luence on the rest of Southeast Asia, l i k e l y  to lead to renewed, 
and unwelcome, great power intereference in the region. In the longer 
term, China was s t i l l  seen as the most important external threat  to 
the ASEAN region.
The Phil ippines
The avai lable evidence points to a debate in the Communist Party 
of the Phi l ipp ines (CPP) and i t s  m i l i t a r y  arm, the New People's Army 
(NPA) a f te r  the outbreak of the Third Indochina War, which was 
comparable in scope and duration to that which occurred simultaneously 
in the CPT. The CPP was establ ished in late 1968 "on the foundation 
of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Ze Dong thought", a f te r  the or ig ina l  
Phi l ippine communist party , the pro-Soviet PKP, had decided to 
cap i tu la te  to the Phi l ipp ine government in order to work wi th in a 
legal p o l i t i c a l  framework. In the f i r s t  months a f te r  the Vietnamese 
intervention in Cambodia, in appeared that the CPP was adopting a
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strongly pro-Chinese pos i t ion ,  as would be expected from the par ty 's
decade-long record of opposition to the Soviet Union (and hence
Vietnam, which was apparently seen as a Soviet a l l y ) .  Ang Bayan (The
People) , which voiced the CPP Central Committee's opinions, published
a r t i c le s  in January and February 1979 which blamed Moscow fo r
launching the attack on Cambodia and endorsed China's reasons fo r
154launching i t s  subsequent attack on Vietnam. But there was no
d i re c t  attack on Hanoi in these commentaries: the Vietnamese
leadership was said to have been "enticed" by the Soviets in to  the 
November 1978 fr iendship t re a ty ,  which the CPP argued "was nothing but 
a th in ly -d isgu ised  m i l i t a r y  pact designed to abet soc ia l - im p e r ia l is t  
trouble-making in th is  part of the world".
1 55An a r t i c le  by a "F i l i p in o  a c t i v i s t "  in a le f t -w ing US journal
was more d i r e c t l y  c r i t i c a l  of Hanoi. Vietnamese and Laotian moves
against the CPT were seen as a "be traya l" ,  and " l ib e ra t io n  movements"
in the region were now said to be asking "what is to prevent Vietnam
from t re a t in g  them the way i t  did Kampuchea". Hanoi was accused of
applauding the Marcos regime's counter-insurgency successes and the
pro-Soviet PKP of cooperating with the Phi l ippine government to the
extent of sending cadres " to  accompany Marcos' m i l i t a r y  in search of 
156NPA g u e r r i l l a s " .  Hanoi's l inks with the PKI were al legedly
154 Quoted by Sheilah Ocampo, FEER, 8 June 1979, pp. 21-22.
155 "Le t te r  from Southeast Asia", Southeast Asia Chronicle, No. 79 
(August 1981), pp. 2-5.
156 I b id . ,  p. 4.
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confirmed by the v i s i t  to Vietnam and Cambodia of Jose Lava, a member
157of the PKP Central Committee.
The CPP did not, however, adopt an unambiguously pro-Chinese
stance.  Like the CPT, the Phil ippine party s t i l l  saw "US imperialism"
and local "exploi tat ive classes" (rather  than Soviet "hegemonism" and
158Vietnamese "regional hegemonism") as i t s  principal enemies,
although the Phil ippine people were urged by the CPP to beware of
159"soc ia l - imper ia l i s t  schemes". Within the Party leadership,  there
was growing disenchantment with China's internat ional  pol icies --
i finespecial ly af ter  Deng's return to power in 1977. Bei j ing' s  new
pol ic ies ,  pa r t i cu lar ly  i t s  "al l iance with the US", were "to say the
lfill eas t ,  confusing". As Chinese assistance to the CPP declined in
1 fi?the la te  1970s, there was increasing pressure from cadres who 
thought that  the Party should not take sides in the Sino-Soviet 
conf l ic t .  A number of such cadres who were generally sympathetic to 
Vietnam's defiance of China formed the People's Liberation Movement 
(PLM).163
157 VNA in English, 1543 gmt, 10 October 1978 (SWB FE/5941/A3/6,
13 October 1978).
158 "Letter  from Southeast Asia", p. 5; Ang Bayan, quoted by Ocampo, 
FEER, 8 June 1979, p. 22.
159 Ibid .
160 Personal interview with academic close to the CPP leadership,
University of the Phi l ippines,  Manila, March 1981.
161 "Letter from Southeast Asia", p. 5.
162 Personal interview with academic close to CPP leadership.  By
August 1981 there was apparently no evidence of any foreign
supplies reaching the NPA. "Intel l igence",  FEER, 7 August 1981, 
p. 9.
163 Personal interview with academic close to CPP leadership.
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The Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia appeared to exacerbate
d iv is ions  w i th in  the CPP. Immediately a f te r  the invasion, there was a
sharp exchange of messages between the CPP and the Vietnamese Workers'
Party, with the Phi l ippine Party denouncing Hanoi in Chinese terms,
such as "regional hegemonist", "Trojan Horse", and "Cuba of the 
164east".  But then, CPP commentary on the Indochinese c o n f l i c t  ebbed,
apparently due to disagreement with the Central Committee on the
165correct l ine  to take. In early  1981, one informed observer in
Manila described the Central Committee as "ramshackle"
Bearing in mind the potentia l  threat posed by the US bases in the 
Phi l ippines to Vietnam, Hanoi's pr inc ipal  foreign pol icy object ive 
with regard to Manila was probably to secure the removal of these 
f a c i l i t i e s .  The emergence of a fac t ion  of "Hanoi-1 iners" in the CPP 
appeared to present an opening fo r  Vietnamese inf luence over the 
Party, or at least part of i t .  But by mid-1981, there was no 
ind ica t ion that Hanoi had taken advantage of th is  opening to exert 
control over a revolut ionary movement with the potential  to topple the 
Marcos regime and expel the US m i l i t a r y  presence. Several reasons may 
be suggested fo r  th is .  In the f i r s t  place, the Vietnamese leadership 
had adopted a strategy of attempting to convince the ASEAN countries 
that i t  posed less of a threat than Be i j ing .  Although th is  may have 
been a short-term device aimed at lessening opposition to i t s  ro le  in
164 I b id .
165 Ib id .
166 Personal interview with senior U.S. diplomat, Manila, 31 March 
1981.
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Cambodia, i t  precluded active support for regional insurgencies. 
Secondly, the PLM, and Hanoi-oriented factions remaining within the 
CPP, were probably small and weak relative to the majority opinion 
within the party which was s t i l l  loyal to Beijing. Thirdly, the 
Vietnamese leadership may have thought that i ts best chance of 
influencing the Philippines' revolutionary potential lay through the 
semi-legal activi t ies of the already anti-Chinese PKP.
In early 1981, President Marcos claimed that " . . .  the principal
threat against Southeast Asian countries is not outright aggression
but the export of wars and subversion". ^  But as Marcos was aware,
the Philippines' relative isolation from the rest of Southeast Asia,
coupled with efforts by both Beijing and Hanoi to win ASEAN support on
168the Cambodian issue, implied that internal economic, social and
political conditions dictated the progress of communist insurgency 
within his country -- probably to an even greater extent than in the 
other ASEAN countries. Marcos's threat assessment was relevant to the 
situation in Thailand (and perhaps Malaysia), but not to the 
Philippines -- except in the sense that he may have wished to 
exaggerate the external threat to the Philippines' security as a 
partial just if icat ion for the continuation of martial law.
167 Bulletin Today (Manila), 28 March 1981.
168 The Philippines tended to occupy a position in the middle of the
spectrum of the ASEAN governments' public positions on the 
Cambodian issue from 1979: Manila was neither as "hawkish" as
Bangkok or Singapore, nor as conciliatory towards Hanoi as 
Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur. See section on "Philippine Policy on 
Cambodia" in Chapter 10, pp. 455-57 below.
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Conclusion
After the communist victories in Indochina in 1975, communist
parties in the ASEAN countries looked to Vietnam for political and
material support, to supplement the assistance that they received from
China. By 1979 the same parties faced a Vietnam that was openly
169hostile to these "bands of armed Maoist terrorists".
The breach between Vietnam and the communist parties in the 
region's remaining non-communist countries resulted from two separate, 
but related, phenomena. As Vietnam's disputes with China and 
Democratic Kampuchea deepened in 1978, Hanoi and Beijing both 
attempted to win the support of their mutual ideological enemies, the 
ASEAN governments. For both of the communist powers this effectively 
necessitated the disavowal of support for communist parties in the 
ASEAN region. China's links with the CPT, CPM, PKI and CPP were deep- 
rooted and far-reaching: rather than abandon these useful allies
completely, Beijing adopted the ingenious strategy of attempting to 
divorce its "party-to-party" relations from its "government-to- 
government" links. This was seen as duplicitous by the ASEAN 
governments and provided propaganda opportunities for the 
V i e t n a m e s e , ^  but it did result in a noticeable reduction of aid to 
Southeast Asian communist parties, including the closure of the CPT 
and CPM radio stations in China. Hanoi went even further in
169 Santi, p. 16.
170 For example, in August 1980 Quan Dpi Nhan Dan alleged that every 
year several thousand overseas Chinese from South and Southeast 
Asia went to China for training as "dissidents". Sydney Morning 
Hera l d , 13 August 1980.
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renouncing i t s  nexus with the CPT and CPM, but in both cases i t  had 
less to renounce than Be i j ing .
The schism between the communist part ies of the ASEAN region and 
Vietnam was also a re su l t  of the desire of the former fo r  greater 
independence and freedom of act ion. This was p a r t i c u la r l y  so in the 
case of the CPT: indeed, i t  appears that the CPT's refusal to 
subjugate i t s  revo lu t ionary strategy to Hanoi's plans, or to to le ra te  
d i rec t  Vietnamese m i l i t a r y  intervention on i t s  behalf,  contr ibuted to 
i t s  eventual expulsion from i t s  Laotian sanctuaries. More general ly, 
communist part ies in the ASEAN region viewed the Vietnamese 
in tervention in Cambodia - -  another communist country - -  as an 
ind ication of Hanoi's intolerance of autonomous revolut ionary 
movements in Southeast Asia.
The breach between Hanoi and i t s  former communist a l l i e s  in the 
ASEAN states did not re su l t  in greater Chinese inf luence over regional 
revolut ionary movements. In fac t ,  the renewal of c o n f l i c t  in 
Indochina stimulated l i v e l y  debate, p a r t i c u la r ly  in the CPT and CPP, 
not only on the question of in ternational  al legiances, but also on 
revo lut ionary st ra tegy. The radical changes in China's foreign po l icy 
since the mid-1970s were disturb ing to many Southeast Asian 
communists, who continued to view local c a p i t a l i s t  regimes, US 
imperial ism, and the ASEAN bloc as the i r  pr inc ipal  enemies - -  whereas 
China's f i r s t  p r i o r i t y  was opposition to the Soviet Union and i t s  
a l l ie s  (notably Vietnam). To th is  end, Bei j ing had pursued f r ie n d ly  
re la t ions with Washington, the ASEAN governments, and p u b l ica l ly  
approved of ASEAN i t s e l f .  Paradoxically, questioning w i th in  Southeast 
Asian communist part ies of the relevance of Maoist revolut ionary
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doctrines to local conditions was assisted by the concurrent Chinese 
moves away from Maoism. But the general tendency after the crises of 
1978-79 was for communist parties in the ASEAN countries to 
concentrate more on issues of local or national importance and become 
less committed to international allegiances.
There was some evidence after the events of 1978-79 of the 
emergence -- particularly as a result of infighting in the CPT and CPP 
-- of "pro-Vietnamese" splinter groups of expellees and renegades, and 
"Hanoi-1iner" factions within the parties'  leaderships. But there was 
no evidence that,  in the then prevailing circumstances, Vietnam was 
willing to further tarnish its image in the region by lending 
substantial support to these factions. Hanoi possibly would move to 
support ideologically sympathetic insurgent or subversive groups once 
the supposed legitimacy of i ts  role in Cambodia had been recognized by 
ASEAN and the world, but in the meantime, significant Vietnamese 
assistance for such groups did not, objectively, appear likely. In 
any case, neither the TNLP (in the case of Thailand) or the PLM (in 
the case of the Philippines) appeared to command support from a mass 
base, which would be vital if they were to pose serious security 
threats to Bangkok and Manila.
In 1977, a secret joint report on Indochina was reportedly
prepared by the five foreign ministers of the ASEAN s t a t e s ^  for
circulation at the second summit meeting of ASEAN's heads of
government in Kual a Lumpur in August of that year. While
171 Australian Financial Review, 29 December 1977; Michael 
Richardson, FEER, 30 December 1977, p. 7.
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acknowledging Vietnam's preoccupation with reconstruction and
polit ical consolidation, the report stressed Hanoi's strong
ideological support for regional revolutionary movements, i ts  huge 
weapons stocks, and the ease with which insurgency in the ASEAN 
countries could be supported from outside. None of these points can 
be refuted, but at the same time they did serve to stress that,  with 
the important exception of Hanoi's links with the CPT, the 
relationship between Vietnam and regional insurgency was very much 
potential rather than actual. Nevertheless, it  did appear reasonable 
that the ASEAN governments should be concerned over this potential for 
mi schief.
Pham Van Dong's promises in September and October 1978 not to
interfere in regional countries'  internal affairs may have appeared
less than convincing to observers in the ASEAN countries following
Vietnam's intervention in Cambodia and the installation of a client
172regime there at the end of the year. Moreover, the Vietnamese were 
now physically in an excellent position to support insurgency in 
Thailand across the entire length of that country's eastern border.
After the crises of 1978-79 and the accompanying transformation 
of Hanoi's attitude towards ASEAN and i ts members, influential voices
172 Some Vietnamese representatives went out of their way to stress 
the qualitative difference between Vietnam's intervention in 
Cambodia and assistance to subversion in the ASEAN region. See, 
for example, the statement given to the Antara news agency and 
the weekly magazine, Tempo, by Tran My, the Vietnamese ambassador 
in Jakarta. Antara in English, 0712 gmt, 9 January 1979 (SWB 
FE/6012/A3/13, 10 January 1979). Indeed, the Vietnamese equated 
the Khmer Rouge with "anti-government armed rebel Maoist groups" 
in the ASEAN states. Memorandum of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Part I -- "Where
does the threat to the security of Thailand and to peace and 
s tabi l i ty in Southeast Asia come from?", Vietnam News Bulletin, 
No. 07/80, p. 9.
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in the ASEAN countries continued to warn of the danger that Vietnam 
might attempt to destabilize regional countries through support for 
communist insurgencies. But these claims were seldom based on any 
rea l is t ic  rationale or tangible evidence. In the 1975-78 period, 
Thailand (and to a very limited extent, Malaysia) could claim that 
Hanoi was exacerbating the domestic communist insurgency problem. But 
after the events of 1978-79, o f f ic ia l  talk in the ASEAN countries of 
the possib i l i ty  of Vietnamese support for local communist insurgencies 
seems to have been motivated largely by a wish to win support for the 
regimes in power in the ASEAN region both domestically and 
internationally.
Although some poli t ic ians, o f f ic ia ls  and mil i tary  leaders in the 
ASEAN countries were undoubtedly and not altogether surprisingly 
sometimes t ru ly  alarmed by the "Vietnamese threat" (whether this was 
seen in terms of possible direct m i l i tary  action, or support for local 
revolutionary movements), i t  is also true that at other times -- and 
even at the same time -- the spectre of such a threat was manipulated 
to enhance regime rather than national security. Bearing in mind that 
these two types of security seemed frequently to be confused --  or 
viewed as identical --  by ASEAN leaders, this process of manipulation 
could take place unconsciously, without any conspiracy to deceive 
either the populace or outside observers.
In fact, the Third Indochina War gave the ASEAN states, and 
Thailand in part icular, an almost total respite from external support 
for their domestic insurgencies. Although there was a marked decline 
in CPT operations from across the Cambodian border in the last few 
months of 1978 as the Khmer Rouge attempted to improve their  relations
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with Thailand (in view of the imminence of an all-out conflict with
Vietnam), the Thai-Cambodian border accounted for 42 per cent of all
173armed incidents involving the CPT in 1978. The Vietnamese
intervention in Cambodia removed the CPT problem on the Cambodian 
border altogether -- a fact that was not mentioned in official Thai 
commentaries.
The Third Indochina War effectively provided an interlude during 
which the ASEAN governments could tackle their communist insurgencies 
in a vacuum -- that is, while the communists were essentially cut off 
from external support. If official claims are to be believed, at 
least the Thai government was highly successful in i ts counter­
insurgency drives in the 1979-82 period. But any conclusive victory 
over the communists remained unlikely in the extreme. As well as the 
physical problems involved in counter-insurgency in the difficult  
terrain of the ASEAN states'  peripheral regions, basic socioeconomic 
and political inequities remained deeply entrenched throughout the 
ASEAN region. There also seemed l i t t l e  chance that the ASEAN 
countries could escape unscathed as the global economy entered its 
deepest recession for f i f ty  years. The morale of regional communist 
parties had been weakened by bi t ter  internecine ideological conflict,  
but this did seem to have the result of forcing the evolution of 
revolutionary doctrines more attuned to the needs of the Southeast 
Asian societies in question.
173 John McBeth, FEER, 8 June 1979, p. 19.
CHAPTER 7
INDOCHINESE REFUGEES AS A SECURITY CONCERN OF THE ASEAN STATES, 1975-81
From 1975 a wide range of policy-makers in the ASEAN countries 
perceived as emanating from Indochina a security threat that was quite 
distinct from, although perhaps related to, the alleged dangers of 
invasion and insurgency. The declarations and policies of the ASEAN 
governments reflected an enduring concern with the security 
implications of the multitudes who fled Indochina after the fall of 
the non-communist regimes there. The "security threat" posed by the 
refugees was perceived in the ASEAN region as having several distinct 
aspects: these may be summarized as the impact of the influx on 
relations with the Indochinese countries; the danger of subversion; 
and the socioeconomic burden, which included a particularly strong 
ethnic dimension.
Effect on Relations with Indochina
The first wave of refugees to leave Indochina after the communist 
victories consisted principally of people who had been closely 
connected with the ousted regimes or the US military. Like the 
continued US military presence in Thailand, this initial outflow was 
seen in the ASEAN region (where most of the refugees sought asylum in 
the first instance) as an embarrassment threatening the post-war 
normalization of relations with communist Indochina rather than a 
security threat as such. But the ASEAN governments undoubtedly
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thought that the establishment of working re la t ionships with the
communist regime in Indochina would minimize the secur i ty  threat from
that  d i rec t ion .  In p a r t icu la r ,  Bangkok probably saw the establishment
of cordia l l inks  with Laos and Cambodia as a means of counteracting
Hanoi's inf luence in th is  h is to r ica l  area of r i v a l r y  between Thais and
Vietnamese. Moreover, accommodation w i th in  the region between
communist and non-communist Indochina remained a cornerstone of most
ASEAN p o l i t i c ia n s '  hopes fo r  the region's fu tu re .  While the Zone of
Peace, Freedom and Neu t ra l i ty  proposal (which was o f f i c i a l l y  ASEAN's
b luepr in t  for  the fu ture of the region 's in ternat iona l  re la t ions)  did
not receive unanimous support wi th in the ASEAN states, i t  was widely
regarded as a preferable, i f  probably unattainable,  ideal to the
d iv is ion  of the region in to  two mutually antagonist ic blocs.
For th is  reason the ASEAN governments were circumspect in the i r
treatment of the f i r s t  waves of refugees to leave Indochina, between
1975 and 1978. In May 1975, Manila imposed a 72-hour l im i t  on the
presence of Vietnamese in t ra n s i t  at US bases in the Phi l ipp ines. Lee
Kuan Yew s im i la r ly  made i t  clear that Singapore could only be regarded
as a t ra n s i t  po in t .^  Many of the refugees leaving Vietnam and
Cambodia in May 1975 had f led  (especia l ly  to Thailand) in ships and
a i r c r a f t  that had been supplied by the United States to the former
2
regimes but which were now claimed by the v ic to r ious  communists. At 
f i r s t ,  the Thai government did i t s  best to p rop i t ia te  the new
1 FEER, 9 May 1975, p. 14.
2 See, fo r  example, statement by the People's Revolutionary 
Government of the Republic of South Vietnam Foreign Min is t ry ,  
"L iberat ion Radio", 1415 gmt, 6 May 1975 (SWB FE/4898/A3/9, 
8 May 1975).
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Indochinese regimes on th i s  issue.  Foreign Minister Chatchai
Choonhavan promised that  his government would hand over to the new
Cambodian author i t i es  the weapons, a i rc raf t  and ships that  f leeing
3
troops of the Lon Nol regime had brought to Thailand. A similar
promise was made to Vietnam, but i t  soon became clear  that  Bangkok had
l i t t l e  pract ical  control over the US bases where most of the a i r c r a f t
had landed: within days the Americans had removed the more modern and
4
valuable a i r c r a f t . '  This episode cer tainly complicated Bangkok's 
re la t ions  with the Vietnamese and Cambodian communist regimes.
At a l a t er  stage i t  was reported that ,  at l east  in Malaysia's 
case, the government became anxious to avoid giving " f i r s t  asylum" to 
large numbers of Vietnamese seaborne refugees as th is  might provide 
fuel for the anti-communist lobby which wished to thwart the
5
government's ambition of bet ter  rela t ions with Hanoi.
Thai land's long borders and ethnic links with Laos and Cambodia 
provided another aspect of Bangkok's concern over the implications of 
the Indochinese refugees for Thailand's re la t ions  with these two 
countr ies .  In 1975 the Thai government was concerned to avoid a 
Palest inian-type s i tuat ion in which refugees would launch mil i ta ry 
operations from Thai t e r r i t o ry  against communist Indochina. Chatchai 
asserted that  "Thailand would not allow Cambodians and Vietnamese 
refugees to take permanent refuge for fear that  they might take action
3 Bangkok home service,  0800 gmt, 21 April 1975 (SWB FE/4886/A3/11, 
24 April 1975).
4 Michael Morrow, FEER, 16 May 1975, pp. 20-21.
5 Peter Weintraub, FEER, 16 December 1977, pp. 31-32.
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against Thai land's neighbours".^ Bangkok's "c lea r -cu t  pos i t ion" was 
that " i t  would not allow other n a t io n a l i t ie s  to set up armed forces 
w i th in  Thailand to f ig h t  th e i r  own governments as they had done in the 
past" .^  But w i th in  months Bangkok was to face Vietnamese accusations 
that  Thailand was sheltering "reactionary henchmen" amongst the 
refugees i t  had taken in, and that the United States was involved in
g
the m i l i t a r y  t ra in ing  of Laotian refugees in the Thai northeast.
Some of these Vietnamese al legations probably had a basis in
fa c t .  In contrast to the preponderant view in the central Thai
government (and p a r t i c u la r ly  the Foreign M in is t ry  at th is  time) that
the country's in te res t  would be best served by eschewing involvement
with anti-communist resistance groups in Laos and Cambodia, i t  seems
that at a local level o f f i c i a l  Thai support was indeed given to such
g
forces a f te r  the communist v ic to r ie s .  During the Second Indochina 
War, the Thai m i l i t a r y  had supported and sponspored anti-communist 
forces in both Laos and Cambodia, and i t  appeared that such a c t i v i t y  
was s t i l l  seen by some m i l i t a r y  o f f ice rs  (p a r t i c u la r l y  in the Internal 
Securi ty Operations Command) and local o f f i c i a l s  as leg it imate .  I t  
seems u n l ike ly  that these Thais re a l l y  hoped to overthrow the Pathet
6 Bangkok home service, 1300 gmt, 1 May 1975 (SWB FE/4894/A3/19, 
3 May 1975).
7 I b id .,  1315 gmt, 17 Apr i l  1975 (SWB FE/4882/A3/6, 19 Apr i l  1975). 
See also Norman Peagam, FEER, 20 June 1975, p. 21.
8 Michael Richardson, Age, 28 October 1975.
9 See Astr i  Suhrke, Pasuk Pongphaicit, and Zakaria Haji Ahmad,
Indochinese Refugees: The Impact on F i r s t  Asylum Countries and
Implicat ions fo r  American Pol icy (Study prepared fo r  the use of 
the Jo in t Economic Committee, 96th Congress of the United States, 
2nd Session, 25 November 1980) (Washington DC: Government
Pr in t ing  Off ice ,  1980), p. 14.
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Lao and Khmer Rouge regimes. Rather, support fo r  the anti-communist 
resistance had become a habit that was d i f f i c u l t  to abandon, 
pa r t icu la ry  as i t  may have been connected with involvement in 
luc ra t ive  cross-border smuggl ing.^  Moreover, some m i l i t a r y  elements 
were interested in using the resistance groups fo r  gathering 
in te l l ig ence  and as a form of buffer (or perhaps as potential  
bargaining chips) against cross-border i n f i l t r a t i o n  by Communist Party 
of Thailand (CPT) insurgents from Laos and Cambodia.^
For these reasons, e f fo r ts  were made by Thai m i l i t a r y  elements to
12use some of the more than 200,000 Indochinese refugees who f led  to 
Thailand between 1975 and 1978 as a resource base fo r  supporting the 
a c t i v i t i e s  of Lao and Cambodian resistance groups. The overwhelming 
major i ty  of Indochinese refugees reaching Thailand before 1979 came 
from Laos, consist ing of both lowland Lao (who had very close ethnic 
a f f i n i t y  with many of the inhabitants of northeast Thai land), and 
Hmong and other upland people. Many of these refugees had fought, 
under Thai and US sponsorship, against the Pathet Lao before 1975. By 
the end of 1975 i t  was apparent that armed groups of Laotian refugees 
were f i l t e r i n g  back across the Mekong into th e i r  homeland to undertake 
g u e r i l la  operations against Pathet Lao m i l i t a r y  posts and transport 
f a c i l i t i e s .  Exiled r i g h t i s t  Lao p o l i t i c ia n s  and o f f ice rs  (presumably
10 Norman Peagam, FEER, 11 February 1977, p. 10.
11 John Everingham, FEER, 23 Apr i l  1976, p. 22; John Burgess, FEER, 
26 May 1978, pp. 21-22.
12 Figure extracted from Table 2-A in Operation Centre fo r  Displaced
Persons, Thai M in is t ry  of In te r io r ,  Too Long to Wait: Displaced 
Persons from Indochina in Thailand (Bangkok: Thai Government,
1980), p. 21.
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with the acquiescence of the local Thai secur i ty  forces) were reported
to keep t ig h t  control over th e i r  fe l low refugees in the Nong Khai
refugee camp, acting as re c ru i t in g  o f f ice rs  for  a resistance group
13known as the "21/18" Front. Similar a c t i v i t y  was reported on the 
Thai-Cambodian border, where up to 2000 Khmer Serei guer i l las  - -  
la rge ly  recru ited from the refugee population in Thailand 
operated J 4
During the year-long period of ru le by the extreme a n t i ­
communist Thanin regime, from October 1976 to October 1977, there was 
ev idently  greater harmony between the at t i tudes of the central Thai 
government and local m i l i t a r y  au thor i t ies  towards the sponsoring of 
armed interference in Laos and Cambodia. Thai manipulation of the 
refugee population at th is  time may have contr ibuted to a 
de ter io ra t ion  in re la t ions with the two eastern neighbours. According 
to the deputy commander-in-chief of the Thai army, Khmer Rouge
displeasure at the large number of refugees f lee ing to Thailand was
15one reason fo r  the frequent border incidents. When a US
Presidential Commission v is i te d  Vientiane in March 1977, the Laotians 
complained about Thai aid to the anti-government re s is ta n c e .^  But 
Thanin and his more r ight-wing colleagues did not appear excessively
13 " In te l l ig e n ce " ,  FEER, 5 December 1975, p. 5; John Everingham, 
FEER, 23 Apri l  1976, p. 22 and 22 Apr i l  1977, p. 14.
14 Norman Peagam, FEER, 11 February 1977, p. 10; Richard Nations, 
FEER, 10 February 1978, p.10
15 Bangkok Post, 20 February 1977.
16 Report of the President 's Commission's V is i t  to Vietnam and Laos, 
16-20 March 1977, US Department of State B u l le t i n , 18 Apr i l  1977.
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concerned at the prospect of de ter io ra t ing  re la t ions with Indochina,
although the more moderate Supreme Commander, General Kriangsak
Chomanan, attempted to res t ra in  the regime's po l ic ies .
A f te r  Kriangsak seized power in October 1977, re la t ions  with Laos
improved, pa r t ly  due to s t r i c t e r  Thai control over the a c t i v i t i e s  of
Laotian resistance groups operating amongst the refugees in Thailand.
But the s i tua t ion  on the border with Cambodia was more complicated,
and the Thai m i l i t a r y  appeared unable - -  and perhaps, especia l ly in
view of the evidence of cooperation between the Khmer Rouge and the
CPT, unw i l l ing  - -  to control the Khmer S e r e i . ^  One report claimed
that in the la t t e r  part of 1978, Cambodian refugees were also being
"dragooned in to  service" fo r  use as sold ie rs , guides and in te l l igence -
gatherers by Thai Special Forces units in the border area, fo r
18operations against the Khmer Rouge and CPT.
Thailand, the Cambodian Refugees and the Cambodian 
Resistance, 1979-81
The Vietnamese m i l i t a r y  intervention in Cambodia profoundly 
changed the in terests  underlying Thai att i tudes towards the securi ty  
implicat ions of providing sanctuary fo r  Cambodian refugees.
O f f i c i a l l y ,  Thailand maintained a pol icy of n e u t ra l i t y  on the 
Cambodian issue and denied aiding the anti-Vietnamese resistance 
through the refugee presence. According to the M in is t ry  of the 
In te r io r :
17 See section on "The Khmer Rouge and the CPT, 1975-78" in Chapter 
6, pp. 213-14 above.
18 Brian Eads, Age, 10 January 1979.
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The granting of refuge to large numbers of p o l i t i c a l  
refugees has created the impression to our neighbours 
tha t  we are in te r fe r in g  in th e i r  internal a f f a i r s .  The 
fa c t  that we are accused of giving sanctuary to 
resistance forces and supports [ s i c ]  through the 
displaced persons' program means that our humanitarian 
e f f o r t  [ s i c ]  are causing us to lose t ru s t  and
c r e d i b i l i t y  with our ne ighbours.^
But such denials could not disguise the fac t  that Bangkok nevertheless
strove to ensure the continued existence of armed opposition to the
new regime, in accordance with what was general ly assessed in o f f i c i a l
Thai c i rc le s  as a basic national in terest  in keeping Cambodia free (or
at least substan t ia l ly  autonomous) of Vietnamese domination. The
problem lay in reconci l ing th is  desire to maintain the Cambodian
resistance as a f ig h t in g  force - -  which could be accomplished to a
large extent by al lowing Khmer Rouge forces and c i v i l i a n s  control led
by them to use Thai t e r r i t o r y  fo r  sanctuary, t r a n s i t  and resupply
purposes - -  with an equal ly strong wish to avoid the development of a
Palest in ian- type s i tua t ion  in which more or less permanent encampments
of Cambodian refugees would represent leg it imate targets fo r  s tr ikes
into  Thailand by Vietnamese and Cambodian government (Heng Samrin)
forces, perhaps p rec ip i ta t ing  a fu l l - s c a le  Thai-Vietnamese war. Even
in the short term, the Thai m i l i t a r y  was concerned at the danger posed
to securi ty  in the border areas by large scale population movements
20and armed a c t i v i t y  by the Cambodian resistance.
19 Too Long to W a i t . . . , p. 11.
20 See Mil ton Osborne, "Kampuchean Refugees: the continuing
evolut ion of a humanitarian and p o l i t i c a l  problem", in Mil ton 
Osborne, Beverley Male, Gordon Lawrie and W J O'Malley, Refugees: 
Four P o l i t i c a l  Case Studies (Canberra: Austra l ian National
Univers i ty , Department of International Relat ions, Canberra
Studies in World A f fa i r s  No. 3, 1981), pp. 12-13.
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The dilemma in which the Cambodian refugee situation placed
Thailand was reflected in disagreement within the Thai government over
how best to deal with the problem. There was no single, cohesive
"official Thai attitude" towards the issue, which was used as an
instrument in competition within the political and bureaucratic el i te .
Although there was quite wide official acceptance of Kriangsak's
attitude that i t  was in Thailand's interest to give temporary refuge
to "displaced" Cambodians, as they provided a "buffer" against the
Vietnamese forces in Cambodia, his government's relatively liberal
f i r s t  asylum policy was crit icized by a group of politicians led by
Thanat Khoman (the Democratic Party leader and former Foreign
Minister) who urged in a July 1979 National Assembly report that all
21the Cambodians should be repatriated immediately. In the view of
some informed observers, Kriangsak's refugee policies may have been a
22factor contributing to his fall  from power in February 1980. By
1981 the Secretary General of the National Security Council, Squadron
Leader Prasong Soonsiri, was also calling for large-scale repatriation 
23to the border. Some high-ranking army officers crit icized Air
Marshal Siddhi Savetsila, who was retained as Foreign Minister in Prem
Tinsulanond' s governments, for being too "pro-American" (that is,
overly influenced by humanitarian considerations) on the refugee 
24issue. In fact ,  under both Kriangsak and Prem, Siddhi consistently
21 Suhrke, Pasuk and Zakaria, p. 30.
22 Ibid. , loc. c i t .
23 See Barry Wain, Asian Wall Street Journal (cited hereafter as 
AWSJ), 12 June 1981.
24 Suhrke, Pasuk and Zakaria, p. 30.
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fostered an approach under which Cambodian refugees were allowed 
sanctuary when th is  helped to increase Bangkok's leverage over the 
p o l i t i c a l  and m i l i t a r y  s i tua t ion  across the border by bolstering the 
Cambodian resistance: at times th is  pol icy coincided with
humanitarian considerat ions.
Soon a f te r  the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia i t  became evident
that the Thai au tho r i t ies  were assist ing, or at least acquiescing in ,
the resupply of the Khmer Rouge resistance by China. But, at th is
early stage the Thai government was profoundly re luctant  to allow
Khmer Rouge troops and c iv i l i a n s  to enter Thailand, even temporari ly .
But by la te  Apr i l  1979 the Khmer Rouge was in a c r i t i c a l  pos i t ion ,
with Vietnamese forces aiming e f fe c t iv e ly  to destroy the resistance
before the onset of the wet season made th is  impossible. For the
Khmer Rouge, the use of Thai t e r r i t o r y  to reach safe base areas in
mountainous southwest Cambodia was v i t a l  to avoid a disastrous defeat.
Ul t imate ly, i t  was not clear whether the fac t  that about 80,000 people
under Khmer Rouge control ( inc luding 50,000 c i v i l i a n s  who appeared to
be prisoners o f,  rather than w i l l i n g  par t ic ipants  in, the resistance)
were allowed to pass through Thailand on the i r  way to the Kao Loeng
25mountains between 22 and 26 Apr i l  was the resu l t  of a d e f in i te  Thai 
decision or the sheer weight of numbers involved.
Less than a week before the evacuation occurred, Kriangsak and 
Prem had issued apparently contradic tory  statements on the Cambodian 
refugee issue with the Prime Minister asserting that Thai pol icy was
25 Richard Nations, FEER, 4 May 1979, p. 11 and 11 May 1979, pp. 
8-9; Bangkok Post, 1 May 1979.
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Pfis t i l l  not to push refugees back into Cambodia against the i r  will and
his Commander-in-Chief warning the UN High Commissioner for Refugees
that  Thailand would not be pressured into accepting refugees against
27i t s  will and that  the Cabinet had approved a tougher policy.  At
the same time, the Supreme Command ordered the army to prevent any
Cambodians entering Thailand. Five or six thousand c iv i l ians  under
Khmer Rouge control who entered Thailand were forced out of the
28country by the Thai army. I t  seems l ikely that  the sheer size of
the main Khmer Rouge contingent compelled the Thais to change thei r
a t t i tude  towards the provision of safe t r an s i t  f a c i l i t i e s .  A bargain
was probably struck with the Khmer Rouge by the Thai author i t ies  --
that  the refugee "army" would be allowed onto Thai soil  only on
condition that  they l e f t  at another point on the border as soon as
possible.  To speed up the process,  the Thai army even transported
296000 Cambodians by truck through Thailand.
If the Thais had not accepted such a compromise, i t  is possible 
that  the Cambodians would have forced thei r  way into Thailand 
regardless (perhaps carving out permanent sanctuaries,  according to
26 This was despite one recent report  which alleged that  Cambodian 
refugees arr iving in Thailand on an independent basis ( that  i s ,  
not under Khmer Rouge control) had been shot or turned back. 
William Shawcross, AWSJ, 25 March 1979.
27 Acje, 23 April 1979.
28 International  Herald Tribune (ci ted hereafter  as IHT), 21-22
April 1979. Richard Nations, FEER, 4 May 1979, pp. 10-11. This
action was apparently coordinated with the tough stance that
Thailand was simultaneously adopting with regard to seaborne
refugees from Vietnam.
29 Bangkok Post , 1 May 1979.
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one Thai off icial) :  this would probably have been possible, bearing
in mind the weakness of the Thai army's order of battle (two
30battalions) in the Aranyaprathet sector of the border at this time.
The Thais could have reinforced their military presence on the border,
but this might have provoked a strong political (and perhaps military)
response from Hanoi. In any case, if the Thais had repulsed the
influx of Cambodians they might have condemned them to annihilation
at the hands of the Vietnamese. Such an outcome would effectively
have ended any hope of keeping alive a substantial guerilla
opposition to Vietnamese domination of Cambodia. One longer term
consequence of this attempt to manage the refugee situation in the
interest of Thailand's security was that there may have been an
increased risk of "hot pursuit" by Vietnamese troops attempting to
neutralize the Khmer Rouge threat before the guerillas reached safer
havens in the Cambodian southwest. This led Kriangsak to warn that
Thailand would respond mil i tari ly to any intrusion by foreign 
31forces. But, like much of the rhetoric uttered by Thai (and other 
ASEAN) politicians regarding security aspects of the refugee 
situation, this declaration may have been aimed as much at convincing 
a domestic audience that the government was in control as at deterring 
Vietnamese aggression.
As i t  became evident to Thai policy-makers that sanctuary (rather 
than just transi t  f aci l i t i es )  in Thailand was vital for the continued 
existence of the Cambodian resistance as a fighting force, so i t
30 m_, 27 April 1979; Richard Nations, FEER, 4 May 1979, pp. 10-11.
31 Bangkok Post, 27 April 1979.
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became increasingly clear that this factor would henceforth be the
principal determinant of Bangkok's policy on the issue, despite the
risk of Vietnamese military incursions. At the beginning of May the
International Committee of the Red Cross agreed to provide food and
medical assistance to Cambodians crossing into Thailand (thereby
relieving Bangkok of a large part of the socioeconomic burden of the
exercise) providing none of the refugees would subsequently be
forcibly repatriated. As a result of this agreement, Bangkok almost
immediately allowed large numbers of two main classes of refugees to
enter Thailand. 40,000 Khmer Rouge troops and civilians were
permitted to stay in Thailand, 27,000 of them keeping their weapons
and later returning to Cambodia when the Vietnamese threat had
32subsided with the onset of the rainy season. But 40,000 or more 
largely ethnic Chinese civilians who arrived in Thailand at the same 
time were not so fortunate. The Thai authorities clearly feared that 
if these refugees, who were termed "illegal immigrants" by Bangkok to 
underline the fact that it saw no moral obligation to provide
sanctuary for them, were allowed to remain in Thailand this would 
encourage the movement across the border of very large numbers of 
Cambodians not under Khmer Rouge control and therefore constituting a 
burden that would be of no use in the fight against the Vietnamese. 
The fact that the ASEAN countries were at this time adopting very 
harsh attitudes towards seaborne Vietnamese refugees may have made it 
easier for Bangkok to adopt an equally tough position on the Sino-
32 John McBeth, F E E R , 22 June 1979, pp. 18-20; Straits T i m e s , 16 
July 1979; "The Week", FEER, 17 July 1979, p. 7; John McBeth, 
F E E R , 17 August 1979, p. 18.
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Cambodians. In early June they were forcibly repa t r ia ted;  an unknown,
but probably large,  number died as they were pushed down the c l i f f
path at Preah Vihear --  the area was heavily mined. According to
UNHCR o f f i c i a l s ,  th i s  was the "worst case of forcible  repat r ia t ion"  in
33the t h i r t y  year existence of the body. A widespread internat ional
outcry ensured that  th i s  was the las t  time that  the Thai author i t i es
would forcibly r epa t r ia te  Cambodian refugees.
Althugh other factors  (including a sincere humanitarian impulse
as famine ravaged Cambodia, and a desire to avoid the type of
internat ional  c r i t ic i sm that  had followed the June repa t r ia t ion)  may
34have influenced Kriangsak's announcement in October 1979 of an "open
door" policy towards Cambodian refugees, this  decision only came when
70,000 Khmer Rouge personnel were grievously threatened by Vietnamese
35forces at the beginning of the dry season. Immediately, 30,000
civ i l i ans  control led by the Khmer Rouge were allowed into Thailand,
and were very quickly t ransfer red to a "holding centre" at Sa Kaeo, 60
36km from the border. According to one observer, Sa Kaeo "played a
major part in the r ehab i l i t a t i on  of the Khmer Rouge's f ight ing 
37abi l i ty " .  These c iv i l i an s  were quickly followed by about 40,000
33 John McBeth, FEER, 22 June 1979, pp. 18-19; Economist, 21 July 
1979, p. 21; Newsweek, 25 June 1979.
34 Bangkok Post , 20 October 1979.
35 Bangkok Post , 11 September 1979.
36 Barry Wain, AWSJ, 14 November 1979.
37 Milton Osborne, "The Indochinese Refugee Si tuat ion:  A Kampuchean
Case Study" (Paper presented for the Academy of the Social 
Sciences in Aus t ra l ia ' s  symposium, "Refugees: The Challenge of
the Future",  Canberra, 1981), p. 28.
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Khmer Rouge troops,  who l a t e r  re-entered Cambodia fur ther  south on the 
border
The Thai au thor i t i es  used their  refugee pol ic ies  not only to help 
the Khmer Rouge to survive,  but also to build up the strength of non­
communist Cambodian opposition groups. In th is  way Bangkok hoped to 
increase the c r e d i b i l i t y  of the anti-Vietnamese res i s tance both 
amongst the Cambodian people and internat ional ly .  Bearing in mind 
Thailand's problems with the Democratic Kampuchea regime (par t i cu l ar ly  
in terms of the l a t t e r ' s  cooperation with the CPT) during the 1975-78 
period,  i t  was also in Thailand's in te res t s  to provide the potent ial  
basis for a future coal i t ion regime in Cambodia, in which 
non-communist elements might exert a moderating influence.  Thailand's 
role in bolster ing the Khmer Serei (as these non-communist groups were 
s t i l l  co l l ec t ive ly  referred to in the f i r s t  months af ter  the 
Vietnamese invasion) was f ac i l i t a t ed  by the l inks that  the Thai 
mi l i ta ry had developed with various Cambodian anti-communist fact ions 
on the border over the years,  par t i cular ly  since 1975. The f i r s t  
substantive evidence of continuing cooperation af ter  the invasion came 
in early April 1979 when 1700 Cambodian refugees,  who had entered
Thailand independently of the Khmer Rouge, were handed over to Khmer 
39Serei control .
From early 1979, the Thai authori t ies allowed black market t rade 
to develop across the border,  as a means of wresting some of the
38 Bangkok Post, 25 October 1979.
39 IHT, 26 April 1979.
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Cambodian population away from the control of the Heng Samrin regime. 
As the famine in Cambodia worsened from mid-1979, the Khmer Serei 
extended th e i r  p o l i t i c a l  influence by attaching themselves to the 
refugee agglomerations that grew up on the border in response to the 
d is t r ib u t io n  of in te rnational  food aid at the Nong Chan "land bridge". 
From th is  pos i t ion ,  the Khmer Serei fact ions were able to control the 
trade of r e l i e f  and black market goods with the in te r i o r .
By November 1979, perhaps as many as 700,000 refugees (more than
10% of the surv iv ing Cambodian population) were l i v in g  in the border
agglomerations,^  under the control of neither the Heng Samrin regime
nor the Khmer Rouge. This border population represented a po ten t ia l ly
extremely valuable resource in the struggle fo r  inf luence in Cambodia,
p a r t i c u la r l y  as i t  included a disproport ionate ly large number of the
country 's  surv iv ing bourgeoisie, whose education and s k i l l s  would be
41highly important in rebui ld ing th e i r  homeland. But by th is  time the 
Thai Supreme Command was becoming alarmed at the corruption (and hence 
loss of morale) that the black market was causing amongst local Thai 
o f f i c i a l s  and army o f f ic e rs .  The various Khmer Serei groups fought 
against each other,  and against the Thai m i l i t a r y  when i t  t r ie d  to 
restore order. Khmer Serei groups led by "Prince" Norodom Soriavong, 
Van Saren, In Sakhan and Moon Seri rap id ly  f e l l  out of favour with the
40 Richard Nations, FEER, 7 December 1979, p. 14.
41 A pre l iminary  survey by the United Nations High Commissioner for  
Refugees (UNHCR) in January 1980 of refugees who had been 
evacuated from these Khmer Serei dominated areas to the Khao-I- 
Dang holding centre found that 14% of the sample were students, 
6% businessmen, 17% professionals or m i l i t a r y  o f f ice rs  and 11% 
c le rks ,  technicians or m i l i t a r y  non-commissioned o f f ice rs .  
Osborne, "The Indochinese Refugee S i t u a t io n . . . " ,  p. 40.
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Thai m i l i t a r y ,  leaving only the group led by Son Sann and Dien Del as
42re l ia b le  in Bangkok's view.
Faced with a border securi ty  s i tua t ion  that was rap id ly  gett ing
out of hand, and which might provoke a Vietnamese m i l i t a r y  s t r i k e ,  the
Supreme Command urged refugees to move from the Khmer Serei dominated
border area north of Aranyaprathet to a holding centre at Khao-I-Dang,
11 km inside Thai land. This evacuation was opposed by some Khmer
Serei leaders who saw i t  as an attempt to undermine th e i r  p o l i t i c a l  
43base. Nevertheless, the Thais had concentrated 120,000 Cambodians
in Khao-I-Dang by early  1980. The Thai m i l i t a r y  then attempted to use
th is  v i r t u a l l y  captive population to bolster " re l ia b le "  non-communist
resistance groups. For example, an e f f o r t  was made to encourage
former Lon Nol troops to leave Khao-I-Dang and l ink  up with KPNLF (Son
44Sann-Dien Del) forces at Ban Sa Ngae, very close to the Cambodian
border - -  but th is  ta c t ic  was only p a r t i a l l y  successful.
Having achieved i t s  most important object ives, the "open door"
was closed in February 1980: Thai po l icy  was then directed towards
45moving Cambodians from holding centres to the border agglomerations. 
The Thai strategy of manipulating the refugee s i tuaion to strengthen 
the Cambodian resistance carr ied with i t  a continuing r isk  of cross-
42 Richard Nations, FEER, 7 December 1979, p. 14.
43 Ib id . ,  pp. 15-16; IHT, 4 December 1979.-------  -----
44 Osborne, "The Indochinese Refugee S i t u a t io n . . . " ,  p. 14.
45 Wil l iam Shawcross, The Quali ty of Mercy: Cambodia, Holocaust and
Modern Conscience (London: Andre Deutsch, 1984), pp.251-52,
304-5.
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border attacks by Vietnamese forces. Although i t  was impossible fo r
Bangkok to secure the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force on the
border (as th is  would have required a Security Council vote, which
would c e r ta in ly  have been vetoed by the USSR), the Thais encouraged a
bui ld-up of the UN's c i v i l i a n  presence (that  i s ,  UNHCR and UNICEF
representat ion) as a deterrent against Vietnamese attack. ® The Thais
also strengthened th e i r  in-place border defences but only to the
extent of serving as a " t r ip w i re "  against accidental incursions:
there was no desire to engage in a fu l l -b lown m i l i t a r y  encounter with
the Vietnamese. The spec i f ic  reasons fo r  the Vietnamese incursion
into  Thailand in June 1980 remain unclear. But i t  seems l i k e l y  that
i t  was tr iggered by the repa t r ia t ion  of refugees from Thai holding
47centres to the control of resistance groups across the border, 
against a background of accumulated Vietnamese f ru s t ra t io n  with 
Thai land's attempts to undermine Phnom Penh's inf luence over a 
s ig n i f ic a n t  proport ion of the Cambodian population through the Nong 
Chan "land br idge", and the succour given to both communist and non­
communist resistance groups.
Although Hanoi emphasized the pe r i l  posed to Thai secur i ty  by the 
p o s s ib i l i t y  of a re pe t i t io n  of the June incursion, the Vietnamese 
m i l i t a r y  action had confirmed Thai fears concerning the dangers of 
Hanoi's ro le in Cambodia, so there was no end to the pract ice of 
repa t r ia t ing  refugees from holding centres to border agglomerations
46 I b id .,  pp. 247, 252.
47 This repa t r ia t ion  by the Thai m i l i t a r y  had begun in March 1980. 
Michael Richardson, Sydney Morning Herald, 28 March 1980.
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controlled by the Khmer Rouge or the KPNLF. Between October 1980 and
June 1981 about 9000 Cambodians were transported by the Thai army,
48under UNHCR auspices, to the border. It might be argued that for a
49broad range of reasons, Bangkok could not continue to support a 
large refugee presence on Thai soil, and that voluntary repatriation 
to the border was the most satisfactory solution for both the refugees 
and Thailand. But there were other options, although these were not 
so satisfactory from Bangkok's viewpoint. Resettlement in third 
countries of "new Khmers" (Cambodians who had fled their homeland 
since the Vietnamese invasion) was generally opposed by the Thai 
authorities for several reasons, although it did take place on a small 
scale from mid-1980 when it became clear that only a minor proportion 
of the Cambodians wished to return to their homeland in the prevailing 
circumstances. There was concern in Bangkok that the resettlement in 
third countries of some Cambodians would discourage others, also 
hoping for such resettlement, from returning to their homeland -- or 
at least the border -- under Khmer Rouge or KPNLF control. Secondly, 
the Thai authorities thought that other classes of Indochinese 
refugees should be resettled first, as these were less likely than the 
"new Khmers" to return home. From a security viewpoint, the most 
important reason was that the large proportion of skilled and educated 
Cambodians in the refugee camps constituted one of Cambodia's most
48 Bangkok P ost, 16 January 1981; John McBeth, F E E R , 1 May 1981, p. 
22 and T2 June 1981, pp. 12-13; Osborne, "Kampuchean 
Refugees...", pp. 17-18. However, many of these refugees may 
later have returned to the Cambodian interior.
49 See section on "The Socioeconomic Impact of the Refugees", pp. 
300-3 below.
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important resources and was thus vital for the country's long-term
survival as an independent entity, which was Bangkok's central 
50concern.
Another option for Thailand would have been to arrange a major
repatriation directly to the Cambodian interior. Although the Thai
government was concerned that this would have implied recognition of
51the Heng Samrin regime as Cambodia's legitimate government, it was
still an alternative which would probably have resulted in a more
52relaxed situation on the border. Thus the continuing danger of
Vietnamese military action across the border was principally the
result of the Thai government's decision to continue its support for
armed resistance to the Vietnamese-imposed status quo in Cambodia.
This may well have been a sensible strategic decision, but it was
highly misleading for Bangkok to assert that the refugee presence in
53itself was sufficient to precipitate a Vietnamese attack.
50 Peter W Janssen, Focus (Bangkok), February/march 1981, p. 23.
51 Michael Richardson, A g e , 21 January 1981; John McBeth, F E E R , 
1 May 1981, p. 22.
52 By mid-1981, a third option, involving repatriation by way of a 
third country, was being canvassed by Squadron Leader Prasong 
Soonsiri, Secretary-General of Thailand's National Security 
Council. John McBeth, FEER, 1 May 1981, pp. 22-23 and 12 June 
1981, pp. 12-13.
53 Typical of official Thai misprepresentation of the issue was this
claim: "because senior military and civil service officials have
claimed "political" ayslum in our country there is the 
possibility that forces from a neighbouring country might violate 
our sovereignty in order to take back these people". Too Long to 
W a i t ..., p. 12.
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Thailand, the Laotian Refugees and Resistance, 1979-81
The Thai manipulation of the refugee s i tua t ion  on the Cambodian 
border af ter the Vietnamese m i l i t a r y  in tervention was not paral leled 
by s im i lar  po l ic ies  on the Thai-Laotian border, where 150,000 Laotians 
were accommodated in Thai refugee camps by August 1979.^  Although 
anti-communist groups had been supported fo r  many years across the 
Mekong, th is  assistance was perhaps surpr is ing ly  not in tens i f ied  from 
1979. The improvement in Thai-Vietnamese re la t ions  that had been
evident in 1978 was reversed by the invasion of Cambodia. But the 
amelioration in Thai-Laotian re la t ions  climaxed in early 1979, with 
Prime Ministers Kriangsak and Kaysone exchanging v i s i t s .  Probably the 
most s ign i f ica n t  resu l t  of these diplomatic moves was the two sides' 
agreement not to support cross-border subversion - -  and, indeed, to 
take posi t ive act ion to suppress such a c t i v i t y .
Even before the Thai-Laotian accords of 1979, Thai support fo r  
the Laotian resistance had been less than wholehearted, p a r t i c u la r ly  
a f te r  Kriangsak seized power in Bangkok in October 1977. The Thai 
strategy appeared to be one of placing s t r i c t  l im i t s  on the weapons, 
ammunition and sanctuaries allowed to the gu e r i l las .  In th is  way, 
the Thai government probably hoped to maintain the resistance as an 
i r r i t a n t  fo r  t r a d in g -o f f  against Vient iane's support fo r  insurgency
54 Br ief ing by Morton I Abramowitz, US Ambassador in Bangkok to 
Study Mission of the US House of Representatives, in The 
Indochinese Refugee S i tua t ion ,  August 1979 (Report prepared fo r  
the use of the Committee on Foreign A f fa i r s ,  96th Congress of the 
United States, 1st Session, 16 September 1979) (Washington DC: 
Government P r in t ing  O f f ice ,  1979), p. 8.
275  -
in Thai land. At the same time, the Thais did not wish the resistance
to be so successful as to p rec ip i ta te  an increase in the Vietnamese
55m i l i t a r y  presence and a c t i v i t y  in Laos, perhaps to the extent of 
cross-border raids against Laotian refugee camps. Although Bangkok 
used i t s  economic re la t ionsh ip  with Laos as an instrument fo r  
maintaining i t s  inf luence, there was no o f f i c i a l  Thai in terest  in 
overthrowing the Pathet Lao regime by force.  Unl ike the Heng Samrin 
administrat ion, the Pathet Lao government had not been imposed by 
Vietnamese force of arms. This made fo r  a s ig n i f ic a n t  dif ference 
between Thai land's a t t i tudes to the p o l i t i c a l  status quo in the two 
countr ies .
The Laotian resistance probably gained strength during the
1978-81 period. But th is  was not due to Thai assistance. The
Laotian expulsion of the CPT's Northeast regional command and
subsequent moves against Thai communists remaining in the border area
was matched by a marked decline in a c t i v i t y  by Thai-based Laotian 
57insurgents. But at least one notable resistance fac t ion  was allowed 
to maintain i t s  headquarters in the Nong Khai refugee camp - -  th is  was 
the Pak Lao Ku Sa (National Salvation Party - -  NSP).
55 "Vietnam's rebe l l ious 'Colony '" ,  FEER, 18 August 1978, pp. 21-23.
56 For example, in August 1979 a senior Lao communist defector 
estimated that 2-3000 Pathet Lao troops had defected to Thailand 
or the resistance (over an unspecified time period). This claim 
was supported by "Thai-based in te l l igence  agencies". John 
Mcbeth, FEER, 24 August 1979, pp. 10-11.
57 Martin Stuart-Fox, "Laos: The Vietnamese Connection", Southeast
Asian A f fa i rs  1980 (Singapore: I n s t i t u te  of Southeast Asian
Studies, 1980), p . ?03 .
58 Marcel Barang, FEER, 7 November 1980, p. 37.
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In June 1980 the Thai au thor i t ies  closed the border a f te r  a
shooting inc ident.  Vientiane alleged that th is  move was part of a
wider Thai attempt, inc luding the repa t r ia t ion  of Cambodian refugees,
59to destab i l ize  Indochina. As well as closing the border, in the 
fo l low ing months the Thais appeared to give greater re in to the Lao 
resistance. The NSP's Nong Khai-based radio broadcast an appeal to 
Laotians to cross in to  Thai land. An apparently typ ica l  cross-border 
foray was executed in la te  September, when 30-40 guer i l las  crossed 
from Thailand to attack a Pathet Lao troop encampment.60
Although Prem seemed to have reversed Kriangsak's po l icy of 
t ry in g  to minimize Laotian involvement in the wider regional c o n f l i c t ,  
Bangkok had not t o t a l l y  abandoned caution. The Thai government
probably had two main aims in closing the border: to signal Vietnam
i t s  displeasure over the incursion across the Cambodian border; and to 
attempt to force Laos in to  reassessing i t s  close re la t ionsh ip  with 
Vietnam.6’*' There was no desire to exacerbate the border secur i ty
s i tua t ion :  the Cambodian border was causing problems enough. Thus
the general pattern of only very l im i ted Thai support fo r  the Laotian 
resistance continued: the guer i l las  had increasingly to look to
C O
China fo r  assistance.
59 Nayan Chanda, FEER, 18 July 1980, pp. 10-11.
60 Barang, lo c . c i t .
61 In fac t ,  closing the border fo r  an extended period probably 
forced the Laotians to lessen th e i r  economic dependence on 
Thailand, and to in te n s i fy  th e i r  l inks with Vietnam.
62 At the end of 1980 i t  was reported that China had trained and 
armed up to 5000 anti-government guer i l las  in northern Laos, and 
was channelling suppl ies to the resistance in southern Laos by 
way of the Khmer Rouge. See John McBeth, FEER, 19 December 1980,
p. 9.
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The Indochinese Refugees and Subversion
Apart from concern over the possible impact of providing 
sanctuary for Indochinese refugees on relations with the Indochinese 
countries, there were widely-expressed fears in the ASEAN region over 
the subversive potential of the refugees themselves. Although it was 
clear that the overwhelming majority of the refugees were fleeing 
communism rather than acting as communist agents, against a background 
of local communist activity or insurgency many politicians and 
officials in the ASEAN countries believed or purported to believe that 
the Indochinese states (particularly Vietnam) were placing agents 
amongst the refugees. To a limited extent these fears were 
understandable, particularly in view of the lack of information
navailable concerning the backgrounds of the refugees and the
presence of increasing numbers of communist cadres (who claimed
disillusionment with the socialist regimes in Indochina) in the 
64influx. Moreover, such fears were not confined to the ASEAN
leadership: at the height of the seaborne refugee exodus from
Vietnam in May 1979, Robert Oakley, the US Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State of East Asian Affairs claimed that Vietnam wanted to build up
65a "fifth column" in other countries by way of the refugees. The 
screening measures employed by Western countries in which Indochinese
63 According to the Malaysian Prime Minster (Hussein Onn), "we don't 
know exactly who is coming in...". Michael Richardson, FEER, 
26 May 1978, p. 22.
64 Straits Times, 5 July 1979.
65 Ibid., 17 July 1979.
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refugees were resettled gave some degree of security against the 
infi l t rat ion of undesirable elements: the ASEAN countries, in 
providing "f i r s t  asylum" for the refugees, were not allowed the luxury 
of such choices. There was inevitably a fear that they might be left  
with not only those refugees who were of no interest to the West 
because of their social or economic deficiencies (such as lack of 
skil ls or relatives already in the proposed resettlement country), but 
also those who were security r i s k s . ^
Refugees from the First Indochina War in Thailand
The refugees reaching Thailand after 1975 were the latest  of 
several waves to flee Indochina over the preceding several hundred 
years. In the early stages of the f i r s t  Indochina War a succession of 
l ef t i s t  civilian governments in Bangkok allowed 50,000 or so ethnic 
Vietnamese, who had fled across the border into the northeast from 
Laos and Cambodia in 1946, to stay in Thailand and organize support 
for the Viet Minh.^ For both pragmatic and ideological reasons, Thai 
elder statesman Pridi Phanomyong and his governments were anxious to 
see French colonial power removed from Indochina.
66 For example, the US Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) 
would not consider for resettlement anyone who had fought against 
the United States. Other communist officials who had sought "the 
violent overthrow of the US government" were also usually 
rejected by the INS. John McBeth and Paisal Sricharatchanya, 
FEER, 24 July 1981, p.19.
67 See Peter A Poole, The Vietnamese in Thailand: A Historical
Perspective (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970), pp. 36-42;
E Thadeus Flood, "The Vietnamese Refugees in Thailand: Minority
Manipulation in Counter-insurgency", Bulletin of Concerned Asian 
Scholar^, Vol. 9, No. 3 (July-September 1977), p. 36.
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The ousting of civilian rule by a military coup in November 1947 
set Thailand's foreign and domestic policies firmly on an ant i­
communist course. In line with this new approach, the Vietnamese 
refugees were increasingly seen as a security risk because of their 
strong links with the Viet Minh. Despite the fact that the refugees' 
revolutionary enthusiasm had been directed entirely towards changing 
the polit ical situation in their homeland, with no evidence that they 
were involved in revolutionary actions against the Thai state,  
Bangkok's attitude was that the refugees -- because of their potential 
to act as a "fifth column" -- should be repatriated to Vietnam as soon 
as possible.
An agreement was reached between Hanoi and Bangkok in 1959, and 
about half of the total number of refugees (whose numbers had 
increased to 70-80,000) had been resettled in North Vietnam by mid- 
1964, when the repatriation programme was ended by the escalation of 
the Vietnam war.**®
Thereafter, the Vietnamese refugees remaining in Thailand existed
in limbo: neither Hanoi nor Saigon would accept them for
resettlement, and the Thai authorities claimed that they were too
vulnerable to communist influence to be assimilated into Thai 
69society. Although Flood's work on the subject does not claim to be 
an impartial account, he makes some valid criticisms of the 
conventional view'7*“* of the Vietnamese refugees in Thailand as a f i f th  
column or communist hot-bed.
68 Poole, pp. 65-66; Flood, pp. 38, 45.
69 Poole, pp. 65-66; Flood, pp. 38, 45.
70 See, for example, Poole, pp. 122-27.
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The alleged "clannishness" and apparent unwillingness of the 
Vietnamese refugees to integrate into wider Thai society may at least 
pa r t ia l ly  be explained by the many restrictions imposed on them from 
the time of the m il i tary  takeover in 1947, the part icular ly  after 1947 
when General Sarit seized power. The refugees were restricted to 
residence in nine provinces of northeast Thailand, needed 30 days 
prior permission before moving from their residential d is t r i c t ,  and 
were usually denied permission to marry Thais. Like their parents, 
children born of refugees in Thailand were denied Thai cit izenship and 
entry to Thai schools.^
There is evidence that in the period between the fa l l  of non­
communist Indochina in 1975 and the ending of Thailand's short-l ived 
period of democratic rule (which had begun in October 1973) in October 
1976, the Vietnamese refugee issue was manipulated by elements within 
the Thai establishment which were opposed to the Foreign Ministry's 
policy of attempting reconcil iation with Vietnam. To this end, some 
right-wing poli t ic ians, bureaucrats and mil i tary  off icers exaggerated 
the "Vietnamese threat", working through the Thai media and with some 
assistance from US mil i tary  sources, who were concerned at the threat 
posed by the new regime's policies to the continued presence of US 
mil i tary fa c i l i t ie s  — part icular ly  those with an intell igence­
gathering r o l e . ^
71 Flood, p. 38.
72 For example, a secret study prepared by the intell igence staf f  of 
the US Army Pacific Command entit led "External Support to the 
Thai Insurgency -- the 35 PL/NVA Combined Command" was "leaked" 
to the Bangkok Post. Personal correspondence in October 1982 
with a person involved in the leak confirmed these details.
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Nawaphon, a r igh t-w ing p o l i t i c a l  organization l inked to the Thai
Internal Securi ty Operations Command, may have inst igated
demonstrations demanding the expulsion of Vietnamese residents in
Sakon Nakhon province in May 1975; th is  was admitted by Pramarn
Adireksan, the Defence M in is te r ,  even though he had himself made an t i -
73Vietnamese statements. The centrepiece of the campaign against the
Vietnamese was an attempt by Thai r i g h t i s t s  to portray th e i r  presence
in border provinces (where they were confined by the Thai au thor i t ies)
as a vanguard fo r  Hanoi's al legedly planned invasion of northeast
T h a i la n d .^  There were more r io t s  against the Vietnamese in November 
751975, soon a f te r  i t  was reported that two Vietnamese residents had 
been arrested on espionage charges.^  In February 1976 m i l i t a r y  
spokesmen claimed that several groups of Vietnamese residents had been 
trained in sabotage in North Vietnam and had i n f i l t r a t e d  back into 
Thailand. Rather absurdly, the army commander-in-chief attempted to 
blame these Vietnamese "sappers" fo r  the "unusual ly high number of 
f i r e s  in Bangkok and elsewhere r e c e n t l y " . ^
The v i s i t  by Hanoi's deputy foreign min ister to Bangkok in July 
1976 appeared to galvanize the opponents of normalized Thai- 
Vietnamese re la t ions ,  inspired by Vice-Minister of the In te r io r  Samak
73 Norman Peagam, FEER, 13 June 1975, p. 13; Flood, p. 39.
74 Flood, pp. 39-40. The Bangkok Post of 4 July 1975 al leged that 
the Vietnamese refugees were "being watched c lose ly"  as they 
might be used by Hanoi as a " f i f t h  column".
75 Age, 26 November 1975.
76 Bangkok Post, 21 November 1975.
77 Bangkok Post, 19, 20 and 21 February 1976.
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Sundaravej, into intensified activity. There were violent attacks by
right-wing Thai groups on Vietnamese settlements in the northeast, and
16,000 Vietnamese (including recently-arrived refugees) were arrested
without charge. The apparent manipulation of the Vietnamese refugees
climaxed immediately before the 6 October 1976 military coup. For
example, the assistant police chief claimed that " i l l i c i t  activi t ies
of Vietnamese refugees living in this country are directly threatening
78the country's security". In the aftermath of the coup, which had
been just if ied partly on the grounds that Thailand was threatened by
Vietnamese-backed revolution, many Vietnamese residents were 
79arrested. Statements by some senior provincial officials and police 
officers undermined the credibil i ty of many of the claims made against
the long-established Vietnamese refugees in the 1975-76 period,
. 80 however.
The Thai right-wing's host i l i ty towards the Vietnamese refugees 
continued after the October 1976 coup, and even after the toppling of
78 Bangkok Post, 3 October 1976.
79 Bangkok home service, 0001 gmt, 16 October 1976 (SWB FE/5343/B/2, 
21 October 1976); 0001 gmt, 28 October 1976 (SWB FE/5353/B/7, 
2 November 1976); 0035 gmt, 30 October 1976 (SWB FE/5357/B/6, 
6 November 1976).
80 For example, in September 1976 the deputy governors of Sakon 
Nakhon and Udon Thani provinces (both areas with a large number 
of Vietnamese residents) accused certain Bangkok political 
factions of inciting riots against the Vietnamese, and expressed 
scepticism over ISOC claims regarding Vietnamese invasion plans. 
While Samak was making inflammatory charges against the 
Vietnamese residents in 1976, senior police officers (who came 
under Samak's ministry) were denying the same allegations. When 
Samak became Minister of the Interior after the coup he purged 
the ministry and the police department of some of those who had 
not supported his anti-Vietnamese campaign. Flood, pp. 40-42.
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81Thanin a year later .  With reference to the arrest of Vietnamese
refugees at the time of talks between Thai, Vietnamese and Lao
delegates on reviving the Mekong Committee in May 1977, one observer
noted that this happened "every time a move is made by the Foreign
82Ministry to set t le differences with Vietnam". When Thailand widened
its alien labour laws to regulate the employment of Indochinese
refugees (in general) in 1978, i t  became necessary for the f i r s t  time
for the long-established Vietnamese refugees to apply for work
permits. The hotchpotch nature of the Thai establishment's
allegations was displayed in a Bangkok Post editorial which not only
repeated military claims that the refugees were under communist
control, but also alleged that they were a threat because of their
83business competition with Thais.
Official host i l i ty towards the Vietnamese refugees intensified 
after the Vietnamese onslaught against Cambodia at the end of 1978. 
Certainly, there may have been some genuine concern that an internal 
"Vietnamese threat" could now somehow be linked up with the threat
81 The removal of the Thanin regime did, in 1978, permit a
resumption of negotiations with Hanoi on the issue of
repatriation. But Vietnam was apparently reluctant to accept the 
"refugees", who now numbered about 40,000. Vietnam's already 
formidable economic and social problems (deriving from national 
reunification, post-war reconstruction, natural disasters,
deteriorating relations with China, and the absence of Western 
economic aid) presumably would not have been ameliorated by the 
addition of almost 1% to the country's already rapidly increasing 
population. Moreover, Hanoi may have feared (probably without 
good grounds) that the repatriated refugees would, after over 
thir ty years' existence as a community in Thailand, pose a 
security threat.  Bangkok Post, 13, 15-17, 23-26, 28 October 
1978.
82 Nayan Chanda, FEER, 13 May 1977, pp. 22-24.
83 Bangkok Post, 16 October 1978.
284 -
seen to be posed by Hanoi's military presence in Cambodia. But it
seems more likely that Vietnam's military intervention in Cambodia
provided a just if icat ion for the continuing use of the Vietnamese
refugees as popular scapegoats for an internal security problem that
was rooted in local socioeconomic deficiencies rather than an
externally-based conspiracy aided by a domestic "fifth column". The
Bangkok Post urged that the refugees' "privileges" be withdrawn and
that they again be s t r ic t ly  concentrated in the nine northeastern
84provinces to which they were originally restr icted.  In March 1981 
the Thai military conducted a seminar "to formulate proper measures 
for controlling Vietnamese refugees in Thailand for the sake of 
national security".
Post-1975 Refugees and Subversion: The Thai View
To a large degree, prevailing official Thai attitudes towards the 
Vietnamese refugees from the First Indochina War carried over to 
Bangkok's view of those Indochinese refugees who arrived after 1975. 
In March 1975 the Thai Prime Minister (Kukrit) insisted that Cambodian 
refugees entering Thailand would be allowed to stay only until the 
danger to them had passed, as the Thai government "wished to avoid the 
trouble caused in a similar situation by Vietnamese refugees who had
84 Ibid., 29 January 1979.
85 Ibid. , 13 March 1979. According to one report, about a hundred 
Vietnamese arrested "over a long period" for subversive 
act ivi t ies were being held by the Thai military in July 1981. 
John McBeth and Paisal Sricharatchanya, FEER, 24 July 1981, 
p. 19.
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86refused to leave Thailand once they had entered". The Thai
au thor i t ies  sometimes adopted a s im i la r  a t t i tude  towards the Laotian
refugees: according to an army spokesman in early 1976, there was a
danger that they might cause "serious problems to national s e c u r i t y . . .
s im i la r  to those caused by the Vietnamese refugees in several
87northeastern provinces".
This suspicion that agents might have i n f i l t r a t e d  Thailand with
the refugees may not have been without foundation, bearing in mind the
evidence regarding cooperation between the CPT and Thai land's
Indochinese neighbours. But although the f low of refugees across the
border in to  Thailand provided a useful opportunity fo r  the placing of
agents, there was l i t t l e  convincing evidence that th is  was happening
on a s ig n i f ica n t  scale. Indeed, Thai claims regarding the subversive
potential  of the refugees frequently  seemed far- fe tched ,  p a r t i c u la r l y
during the Thanin period. In 1977, i t  was claimed that Pathet Lao
88personnel were i n f i l t r a t i n g  refugee camps in the northeast and then
89attempting to " indoctr ina te"  people in nearby v i l lage s .  At the same 
time, the s i tua t ion  on the Cambodian border had become so tense under 
the influence of the Thanin regime's paranoia that Thai forces were 
reported at times to have k i l l e d  anybody coming across the border,
—
86 Bangkok home service, 1300 gmt, 27 March 1975 (SWB FE/4866/A3/2, 
1 Apr i l  1975).
87 According to Colonel Ralong Ratanasithi,  Third Army Deputy Chief 
of S ta f f ,  Bangkok Post, 18 January 1976.
88 Bangkok Post, 18 January 1977.
89 Statement by Lieutenant-Colonel Thanit Wasaphuti, Deputy Chief of 
In te l l igence,  2nd Army Region, Bangkok domestic service, 1300 
gmt, 23 August 1977 ( FBIS-APA-77-165, 25 August 1977).
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regardless of whether they were Khmer Rouge troops, CPT g u e r i l las ,  
bandits - -  or re fuge es .^
After the Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia, a senior Thai
m i l i t a r y  leader claimed that the Indochinese refugees posed "a serious
and immediate national secur i ty  problem to Thai land". He al leged that
the refugees could eas i ly  become a "s ix th  column" of p o l i t i c a l ,
economic and social l i a b i l i t y  fo r  Thailand, giving cover to a " f i f t h
column" and p o te n t ia l l y  providing a pretext fo r  a hos t i le  country
(presumably Vietnam) to invade Thailand. His claim that there was
" f i rm  evidence of communist spies and agents operating inside and out
91of refugee camps", was endorsed in 1980 by what appeared to be the
most d e f in i t i v e  o f f i c i a l  statement on the issue: the In te r io r
M in is t ry  claimed that because of l imited manpower i t  was impossible to
supervise the refugees c lose ly  enough to prevent them from spying or
spreading subversive propaganda. I t  was fu r the r  al leged that there
was "no doubt that an agent network connects a l l  the camps throughout 
92the country" .
Unlike th e i r  Laotian and Cambodian counterparts, fo r  geographical 
reasons the Vietnamese refugees who reached Thailand from 1975 could 
not be expected to operate as a resistance force against the communist 
regime that was now ensconced throughout the i r  homeland. In th is  
respect, they therefore did not present a securi ty  concern fo r  
Thailand's government. But ne ither did they provide any opportun it ies
90 D Wise, FEER, 23 September 1977, p.32-33.
91 General Saiyud Kerdphol, Supreme Command Chief of S ta f f ,  Address 
to B r i t ish  Chamber of Commerce, Bangkok, 31 May 1979. Quoted by 
Bangkok Post, 1 June 1979.
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for certain Thai military and other official elements who wished to
promote such resistance. This factor, reinforced by the lack of
93ethnic closeness between Thais and Vietnamese and the well-
established and continuing official Thai habit of repressing and
manipulating the 40,000 Vietnamese "refugees" from the First Indochina
War, formed the background to Bangkok's harsh atti tude, throughout the
941975-81 period, towards the relatively small numbers of Vietnamese
who fled to Thailand. By mid-1979 (if not before), the 3400
Vietnamese in Thai refugee camps were reportedly subject to "extortion
95and mistreatment" by the Thai military authorities, amidst
allegations that Hanoi was attempting to inf i l t ra te  agents into
96Thailand with the refugees, possibly in connection with the CPT 
insurgency
Thailand's harsh policy towards Vietnamese refugees apparently 
included official negligence towards the activi t ies in the Gulf of
93 In saying this,  one would not wish to imply that there is any 
tangible evidence to support the frequent assertions made 
concerning the "historic ethnic antipathy" between Thais and 
Vietnamese; polit ical considerations rather than atavistic racial 
hatred were the dominant factor determining relations between the 
two peoples.
94 Between 1975 and August 1980 54,105 Vietnamese refugees reached 
Thailand, out of a total Indochinese refugee influx of 359,932 
but the lat ter  total did not include Cambodian "illegal 
immigrants" in border areas. Too Long to Wait. . . ,  p. 21.
95 Henry Kamm, New York Times, 1 July 1977.
96 Statement by Lieutenant-Colonel Thanit Wasaphuti, Deputy Chief of 
Intelligence, 2nd Army Region, Bangkok domestic service, 1300 
gmt, 23 August 1977 (FBIS-APA-77-165, 25 August 1977).
97 According to Interior Minister Samak Sundaravej, quoted by Henry 
Kamm, New York Times, 1 July 1977.
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Thailand of pirates based in the south of the country. In the early 
stages of the seaborne refugee flow from southern Vietnam, most boats 
headed towards southern Thailand, which was the nearest landfall.  But 
this pattern changed after Thai pirates began to attack and rob 
refugee vessels, kill ing and raping many Vietnamese in the process, so 
that by mid-1977 most "boat people" were heading for Malaysia rather 
than Thailand.^
Whether or not the Thai authorities, through not taking any
effective measures against piracy, gave the pirates licence to act as
a deterrent to the seaborne refugees is a moot point. Virtually all
of the pirates involved were fishermen, often operating from remote
villages on the southern Thai coast, in an area where piracy was
endemic. It  would have been diff icult  for the Thai government to
detect and suppress this "part-time" piracy in the 15,000 vessel
fishing f leet .  But i t  would have been possible for Bangkok to have
done more than it  actually did, if it  had possessed the political will
to do so. The will,  however, was lacking: Bangkok's perceived
interest was to prevent landings by Vietnamese refugees. Although a
US financed anti-piracy programme (costing US$2m) operated from
99February to September 1981 and the Thai Cabinet approved in March 
1981 a six point plan aimed at improving the effectiveness of anti­
piracy op e ra t io n s , ^  i t  seemed that Bangkok was s t i l l  unwilling to
98 Barry Wain, The Refused: The Agony of the Indochinese Refugees
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1981), pp. 42-43.
99 Richard Nations, FEER, 14 May 1982, p. 26.
100 Bangkok Post, 4 March 1981.
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clamp down on the pi ra tes .  For example, the reg i s t r a t i on  numbers of
many f ishing vessels engaged in piracy were reported to the Thai
au thor i t i es  by the West German refugee rescue ship, Cap Anamur, but
there was no sign of punitive action against the o f f e n d e r s . ^
Between 1975 and May 1982 less than forty pi ra tes  were apprehended by 
102the au thor i t i es .  At times i t  seemed that  there was more of f i c i a l
Thai concern over the considerably less prevalent problem of attacks
10Tby "boat people" on Thai f ishing vessels.
104In the 1975-78 period, all  the Vietnamese reaching Thailand
arrived e i ther  by sea or by way of Laos. After Hanoi's intervention
against  the Khmer Rouge, refugees from southern Vietnam (including
105ethnic Chinese, Khmer Krom and "Amerasians") began arriving in 
Thailand by way of Cambodia .^  Before long, these refugees were 
followed by hundreds of deser ters  from the Vietnamese army, including
101 Norm Aisbet t ,  Canberra Times, 3 October 1981.
102 In approximate terms this  meant that  there was "one conviction 
per 3000 murders and 5000 rapes by pi ra tes  since 1975". 
Economist, 29 May 1982.
103 This may have been a reaction to sustained internat ional  
c r i t i c i sm of Bangkok's inaction against the piracy problem. 
Official  Thai publ ici ty concerning refugee attacks on f ishing 
vessels reached a peak in early 1981. See, for example, Bangkok 
Post, 22 January 1981; The Times, 13 February 1981; Bangkok Post, 
16 February 1981.
104 According to an of f ic ia l  Thai source, in the 1975-78 period about
23,000 Vietnamese reached Thailand: th is  was jus t  over 10% of
the tota l  refugee a r r iva l s .  Too Long to Wait. . . , p. 21.
105 The Khmer Krom are ethnic Khmers (Cambodians) l iving in southern 
Vietnam.
106 Barry Wain, AWSJ, 8 July 1982.
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both northern cadres and southern c o n s c r i p t s M o r e o v e r ,  the f low
of Vietnamese "boat people" increased with the quickening of the Sino-
Vietnamese c o n f l i c t ;  without any apparent evidence, the Secretary-
General of the Thai National Securi ty Council claimed that up to 10%
108of these seaborne refugees were agents planted by Hanoi. When
in ternat iona l  pressure led Hanoi to place s t r i c t e r  controls on
seaborne departures, escape from Vietnam by the land route through
109Cambodia became even more popular. This in f lu x ,  though s t i l l  small 
compared to the size of the Laotian and Cambodian refugee 
p o p u l a t i o n s , ^  contained a considerably increased potentia l  fo r  
i n f i l t r a t i o n  and subversion from the point of view of the Thai 
a u th o r i t i e s .
There is substantial  evidence that the Vietnamese refugees 
reaching Thailand from 1979 were treated even less humanely than th e i r  
Cambodian and Laotian counterparts. Even i f  the Thai government did 
not s incere ly bel ieve that the Vietnamese posed a greater secur i ty  
r isk  than other refugees, important sectors of public opinion (a f te r  
three decades of condit ion ing, and in the face of continuing 
manipulation by r ight-wing p o l i t i c ia n s  such as Samak S u n d a ra ve j )^
107 "The Week", FEER, 28 December 1979, p. 5; John McBeth and Paisal 
Sricharatchanya, FEER, 24 July 1981, pp. 18-19.
108 Wain, The Refused. .. , p. 134.
109 I b id .,  p. 244.
110 From January 1979 to August 1980 alone, over 31,000 Vietnamese 
arr ived in Thailand, cons t i tu t ing  22% of the to ta l  refugee 
in f lu x .  Top Long to W a i t . . . , p. 21.
111 For example, in August 1979 Samak claimed: "a great number of
Vietnamese people who claimed to be refugees or boat people are 
s t i l l  roaming the country, and are not in refugee camps as they 
should be". Bangkok Post, 30 August 1979.
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might not have reacted well if the number of Vietnamese in the country 
had continued to increase.
To deter new ar r iva ls  --  and supposedly to enforce securi ty --
most of the Vietnamese were held near the border in an army-supervised
112camp, exclusively for Vietnamese, known as Northwest Nine (NW9)
and i n i t i a l l y  not allowed to apply for reset t lement  in third
countr ies .  By 1981 the Vietnamese from NW9 had all  been r ese t t l ed ,
but the Thais refused to allow any more Vietnamese to cross the
border.  This l e f t  420 Vietnamese trapped in border encampments
control led by the Khmer Rouge and Khmer Serei ,  neither of which were
noted for thei r  sympathy for Vietnamese of any po l i t i ca l  persuasion:
there is evidence that  at least  some of the Vietnamese were ki l led by 
113the Khmer Rouge. In la te  1981 the Thais opened a new camp, NW82,
to house Vietnamese "land people". According to US o f f i c i a l s  this  was
"the worst camp in the history of the Indochina refugee exodus" with
the inmates suffering from physical abuse, psychological s t ress ,
inadequate food and water, and rampant disease.  This policy of what
one refugee coordinator termed "inhumane deterrence" was reportedly
coupled with a Thai programme to rec ru i t  refugees for "res is tance work
114against  the Vietnamese government". I t  was not clear  what this
work involved, but i t  did seem that  Bangkok had found a way in which 
to use to i t s  advantage the Vietnamese as well as the Cambodian and 
Laotian components of the refugee presence.
112 Too Long to Wait. . . , p. 244.
113 Ibid . ,  p. 258.
114 Barry Wain, AWSJ, 8 July 1982.
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There was a pungent irony in the fac t  that whi le the Thai
au thor i t ies  continued to view the Vietnamese refugee presence as a
dangerous stronghold of communist subversion throughout the 1975-81
period, a f te r  the Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia Bangkok
to lerated - -  and at times encouraged - -  the presence on Thai soi l  of
Cambodian communists who had u n t i l  very recently  been staging cross-
border attacks into Thailand in cooperation with the CPT. Before the
ouster of the Pol Pot regime the Thai au thor i t ies  had expressed
concern over i n f i l t r a t i o n  of the then r e la t i v e l y  small Cambodian
115refugee population by Khmer Rouge elements. But fears of the
subversive potential  of the Khmer Rouge were almost t o t a l l y  eclipsed 
by Bangkok's wish to use a l l  avai lable means short of open armed 
c o n f l i c t  between Thailand and Vietnam to wrest Cambodia from Hanoi's 
domination.
Refugees and Subversion: The View from the Other ASEAN Countries
The other four ASEAN countr ies '  concern with the subversive 
potentia l  of the Indochinese refugee exodus was simpler than 
Thai land's, as i t  involved only seaborne refugees from Vietnam. 
Moreover, the concern with i n f i l t r a t i o n  began (or at least was made 
publ ic) only a f te r  the Vietnamese move in to  Cambodia, the Sino- 
Vietnamese war and the in te n s i f i c a t io n  of the seaborne refugee f low in 
1979. But even then, regional governments were cautious in th e i r  
handling of the issue, as any ind ication that an administrat ion was
115 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 28805 (3 February 1978).
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not in complete control of the immediate security situation carried 
with i t  the risk that opposition po l i t ica l  groups could benefit 
through demonstrating governmental incompetence. This was 
part icu lar ly  the case in Indonesia and Malaysia, where the authorities 
also wished to maintain their re lat ive ly  concil iatory policies towards 
Hanoi. The Malaysian authorities feared that extreme anti-communist 
elements (perhaps especially in the Islamic PAS party) might attempt 
to use the refugee issue to sabotage Kuala Lumpur's relationship with 
Hanoi. There was also a need to reassure foreign investors that their 
capital was secure.
In the archipelagic countries of Indonesia and the Philippines 
concern over the more direct ly  security-related problems supposedly 
caused by the "boat people" was heightened by a long-standing 
awareness of their governments' fragile control over the two states' 
outer islands.
In Indonesia responsibil i ty for managing the refugees was given 
in early 1979 to a national refugee task force, P3V, led by the chief 
of BAKIN (Mil i tary Intelligence) and under the control of the Ministry 
of Defence and Security. The Foreign Minister declared that this was 
because the refugees were a "threat to Indonesia's s e c u r i t y " . ^  
According to the Army Chief of Staff, because many of the refugees 
were former m il i tary  personnel " . . .  i t  was feared that they were sent
116 See C van Dijk, "Major developments in Indonesia in the f i r s t  
half of 1979: reactions to the Indochina c r is is " ,  Review of
Indonesian and Malayan A f fa i rs , Vol. 13, No. 2 (December 1979), 
p. 141.
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for certain purposes disguised as refugees".^7 The Supreme Advisory
Council deputy chairman, Djatikusumo, claimed that the refugee problem
had been created "to make the region vulnerable to inf i l t rat ion by...
communist ideology". A particular concern in Indonesia's case was
that subversives from China might slip into the country amongst the
refugee boats, and even ethnic Chinese genuinely from Vietnam were
118regarded with suspicion by some military and Islamic elements.
But speculation that the Jakarta regime was seriously concerned over
the security implications of the refugees was moderated by the
Minister of Defence, General Yusuf, who claimed Indonesia's "national
stabili ty" was such that the country would be able to overcome any
119diff icul t ies  caused by the refugees.
President Marcos of the Philippines questioned whether all of the
seaborne Vietnamese "were actually refugees" after some of their
120vessels were found in "security areas" around Palawan Island. But 
Marcos's implicit accusation was clearly not to be taken at face 
value, as Palawan was the nearest land to the west of the southern 
part of the central Vietnamese coast and thus the obvious place of 
landing for boats coming from that area.
The Malaysian authorities came closer than any of their ASEAN 
partners (except perhaps Thailand) to producing evidence of the
117 Statement by General Widodo, Army Chief of Staff, Antara in 
English, 0727 gmt, 29 June 1979 (SWB FE/6157/A3/17, 3 July 1979).
118 See, for example, statement by Haj Imron Rosjadi (a PPP Member of 
Parliament), Indonesian Times, 3 March 1979; Wain, The 
Refused.. . , p. 34; van Dijk, p. 142.
119 Indonesian Times, 3 July 1979.
120 Asiaweek, 29 July 1979, p. 16.
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inf i l t ra t ion  of Vietnamese agents into the region through the "boat
people". A former Viet Cong Major (who was alleged to have been a
senior security and intelligence officer until his flight from Vietnam
in November 1978) claimed to fear "Vietnamese agents" who might be
present in the Pulau Bidong camp where he was being held. According
to another report, the Malaysian police arrested and interrogated
Vietnamese agents sent with the boats by Hanoi "to monitor conditions
and report back to base". Some such "agents" were reported to have
stolen Malaysian fishing boats and committed acts of piracy in order
121to return to Vietnam. But no evidence was produced to substantiate
Deputy Prime Minister Mahathir's fear that refugees "might leave the
122camps and join the Communist guerillas in the jungles". The Home
Affairs Minister, Ghazali Shafie, was dismissive of the direct
security risk posed by the refugees, pointing out that they were " . . .
not communists but people who wish to continue l ife  in a society where
123there is free enterprise".
The Socioeconomic Impact of the Refugees
One of the most contentious issues involving the Indochinese 
refugees concerned the extent to which they imposed economic and 
social burdens on f i r s t  asylum countries. Certainly, the ASEAN states
121 Straits Times, 10 January 1979; "Towing out to sea has been going 
on since 1975", FEER, 31 August 1979, p. 41.
122 Report of meeting with Deputy Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed in 
The Indochinese Refugee Situation, August 1979, p. 28.
123 Indonesian Times, 18 January 1979.
I
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(except Singapore) were a l l  less developed countries which had no
reason to welcome any phenomenon which might upset th e i r  growing, but
f ra g i le ,  economies or th e i r  tenuous social and p o l i t i c a l  s t a b i l i t y .
For this reason the refugees were often seen as unwit t ing ly
co n s t i t j t in g  a threat  to the region 's  securi ty  ( in  the broadest sense)
and there was an almost to ta l  re jec t ion  by the ASEAN governments of
any notion that Indochinese refugees might be resett led permanently in
the recion. There were a few exceptions to th is  ru le :  fo r  example,
Singapore rese t t led  a token hundred or so Vietnamese fishermen and
1th e i r  amil ies (from the f i r s t  wave of "boat people" in 1975). 
Furthermore, Thailand and Malaysia provided permanent homes fo r  rather 
larger numbers of refugees with ethnic or re l ig ious  l inks  to 
indigerous populations.
L'ke 40 per cent of the world 's  states, none of the ASEAN
countres were signatories to e i ther the 1951 United Nations
Convenlion re la t in g  to the status of refugees or the 1967 UN Protocol
Relat i ig to the Status to Refugees, which obliged contract ing part ies
125not to expel refugees from th e i r  t e r r i t o r y .  This phenomenon arose 
largel ;  out of a desire by the region 's governments to avoid open-
124 P?ter Weintraub, FEER, 16 December 1977, p. 32; Wain, The 
Refused. . . , p. 124.
125 Mmila, which had adopted a consis tent ly  more l ib e ra l  po l icy  
t)wards the refugee issue (probably because i t  could af ford to do 
si - -  at the height of the refugee c r i s i s  in mid-1979 there were 
oi ly 4500 Indochinese in the Phi l ippines awaiting resett lement, 
ompared to 190,000 in Thailand - -  and at the same time hope to 
inprove i t s  image in Washington as far  as "human r igh ts "  issues 
w?re concerned), r a t i f i e d  both the Convention and the Protocol in 
J i ly  1981.
297  -
ended commitments to providing even temporary sanctuary for refugees 
in a part of the world where an important governmental concern was to 
inh ib i t  the porosity of borders with neighbouring states. But 
although the Indochinese refugees were o f f i c ia l l y  regarded in the 
region as " i l lega l immigrants" of "displaced persons" without the 
rights given to refugees in some other parts of the world, this did 
not mean that they were never granted temporary asylum by the ASEAN 
countries. I t  did, however, mean that the ASEAN countries were
legally allowed a choice of whether or not to grant such asylum.
In the case of Cambodian refugees wishing to enter Thailand,
Bangkok's policy was influenced by the shi ft ing balance between the
confl ict ing interests of preserving the effectiveness of the Cambodian
resistance and of excluding the refugees and their attendant problems
from Thai te r r i to ry .  Direct security interests did not play such an
important role in determining Thai policy towards refugees from Laos.
Here, the closer ethnic links across the Thai-Laotian border largely
explained the generally greater readiness of the Thai people and
authorit ies (particularly at the local level) to accept Laotian
refugees. Indeed, between 1975 and mid-1979 an estimated 25-30,000
Laotians had crossed the border and settled, admittedly without formal
o f f ic ia l  authorization, amongst their kin in north and northeast
T h a i la n d .^  By June 1981, almost 270,000 lowland Lao and Hmong
(roughly 10% of the Laotian population) had been given temporary
127asylum in Thailand at some stage.
Despite the concern expressed in the ASEAN countries over the 
subversive potential of the seaborne Vietnamese refugees, the crux of 
the prevailing regional att i tude to the problem was concerned with
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the socioeconomic impact of the exodus. It was this aspect of the 
refugees' effect on national security (or perhaps, more accurately, 
regime security) that was the main impetus behind the wish to 
discourage further departures from Vietnam by seaborne refugees and to 
encourage the West to resettle more of them, more quickly.
The attitudes of the ASEAN countries (which had hitherto been
fairly generous in their attitude towards providing "first asylum" for
the boat people) hardened markedly in late 1977, by which time
seaborne refugee departures from Vietnam had risen to 1500 each month
(compared to a monthly average of 500 in 1976). At this stage
Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia began to turn away seaborne refugees
by towing incoming vessels out to sea, as Singapore had done
consistently since 1975 (except in the case of refugees for whom a
guarantee of resettlement had been obtained prior to their
128landing). But only a minority of "boat people" were apprehended
126 Emily McFarquhar, E c o n o m i s t , 21 July 1979, p. 24; US Embassy
Bangkok, "1982 World Refugee Report to Congress: Thailand"
(Telegram to all US diplomatic posts, Ref. 136905, 19 June 1982). 
According to this report, 8500 ethnic Thais from Cambodia also 
moved across the border and settled in Thailand in the 1972-82 
period. In 1977, the Thanin government's Interior Minister, 
Samak Sundaravej, spoke of the consideration being given by the 
Thai authorities to the creation of border villages with mixed 
Thai/Laotian and Thai/Cambodian populations. The intention may 
have been to provide a more permament sanctuary for anti­
communist Indochinese who wished to mount subversive operations 
into, or at least remain close to, their homeland. But with the 
replacement of the Thanin regime no more was heard of this plan. 
Henry Kamm, New York T i m e s , 1 July 1977.
127 Figure abstracted from US Department of State, The Indochinese 
Refugee Situation (Report to the Secretary of State by the 
Special Refugee Advisory Panel, 12 August 1981), Table : 
"Indochinese Refugee Activity April 1975 thru June 1981".
128 Peter Weintraub, FEER, 16 December 1977, pp. 30-33.
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before reaching the ASEAN countr ies'  shores, and f i r s t  asylum
continued to be granted f a i r l y  f re e ly  due to American and other
in ternat iona l  pressure and the wil l ingness of th i r d  countries to
re se t t le  the refugees. Following Hanoi's d iscr im inatory moves against
Vietnam's ethnic Chinese community from March 1978, the outflow of
129seaborne refugees increased dramatical ly. When th is  was combined
130with evidence that Hanoi was act ive ly assist ing the exodus, the
ASEAN countries adopted even more str ingent measures to deal with the
boat people, culminating in a claim by the Deputy Prime Min ister of
Malaysia that le g is la t io n  might be introduced to allow the shooting of
131refugees t ry ing  to land on his country's beaches.
By the standards of the Third World as a whole, the ASEAN 
countries were f a i r l y  wealthy. Moreover, even at the height of the
refugee c r i s i s  in mid-1979 the number of Indochinese in the region
129 The number of "boat people" ar r iv ing in the ASEAN countries was
as fo l lows:
January - July-Dee
1977 1978 June 1979 1979 1980
Indonesia 679 2932 42726 5929 6821
Maiaysi a 5817 63120 43275 10721 18263
Phil ippines 1153 2582 4737 3084 4932
Singapore 308 1828 634 4817 9280
Thai 1 and 4536 6325 8766 3162 21549
SOURCE: Off ice of the United Nations High Commission fo r
Refugees, S ta t is t i c s  of Indochina Refugees and Displaced 
Persons (Geneva: United Nations, 1980) and UNHCR
f igures quoted by Shawcross, The Quali ty  of Mercy... ,  
p. 73.
130 See these e d i to r ia ls ,  fo r  example; "The real c u lp r i t s " ,  S t ra i ts  
Times, 18 June 1979; "Vietnam must be to ld  to stop", Bangkok 
Post, 18 June 1979.
131 S t ra i ts  Times, 16 June 1979; IHT, 16-17 June 1979.
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remained very small compared to the total population of the countries
conccerned -- even in Thailand the refugee population never exceeded
1321.55% of the total population. All direct capital and maintenance 
costts imposed by the refugee presence were borne by the United Nations 
High Commission for Refugees (UNCHR) (or, to a lesser extent, by 
"volluntary agencies" such as the International Committee of the Red 
Cross). This left  the host governments to cover the administrative 
cosits associated with the refugees. The evidence suggests that the 
costts imposed by the refugees were often balanced by economic benefits 
to tthe host countries, and that the economic side of the refugee issue 
was often manipulated by regional governments to encourage the faster 
resettlement of the Indochinese by developed third countries.
Thaii 1 and
The economic consequences of the refugee presence were a highly 
conttroversial issue in Thailand, mainly because of the size of the 
Indochinese influx across the land border from Indochina. On the 
posiitive side of the balance, the various international organizations 
concerned with the refugee problem spent large sums in Thailand: for
exarmple, USSlOOm on the Cambodian relief programme in the six months 
frorm October 1979 to March 1980. Such expenditure provided Thailand 
with foreign exchange that was particularly welcome in view of a 
persistent balance of trade deficit and a worsening balance of 
payments def ic i t .  A boom economy developed in Aranyaprathet and other
132 Suhrke, Pasuk and Zakaria, p. 18.
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provincial  centres:  this  increased commercial ac t iv i ty  in turn
133provided some additional revenue. As a r esul t  of a plea to the
internat ional  community in 1980, the Thai government was able to
obtain substant ial  sums of aid to maintain "social and economic 
s t ab i l i ty "  in provinces bordering Cambodia which had been affected by 
the refugee i n f l o w . ^
But on the negative side,  there was probably a net loss of
government revenue to the costs of administering the refugee presence
through the mi l i ta ry  and civi l  service.  At a time of rapid inf la t ion
(largely fuel led by oil price increases) and serious drought in 1979
and 1980 Bangkok had legi t imate reasons for  being abnormally sensi t ive
on the issue of government expenditure.  Local inf la t ion became
rampant, with prices in Aranyaprathet doubling between October 1979
and March 1980. Other costs included the loss of agr icul tural
production in areas accommodating refugees, and damage to fores t  and 
135water resources.  On balance, however, the Thai government's
complaints about the economic burden imposed by the Indochinese
133 Too Long to Wai t . . . ,  p. 8; Suhrke, Pasuk and Zakaria, pp. 8, 
20-5.
134 By mid-1982, internat ional  donor pledges for th is  "Affected Thai
Program" to ta l led  US$30m (mainly for spending on food), the 
project  including 100,000 Thais in 115 vi l l ages .  There were
also plans to include up to 60 vi l lages on the border with Laos 
in the project .  "1982 World Refugee Report to Congress. . . " ,  
Section 05.
135 For example, Khmer Rouge-controlled refugees reportedly destroyed 
crops and houses, looted and ki l led in Thai border vi l lages ,  
leading to anti-refugee r a l l i e s .  Bangkok Post, 28 May and 
25 June 1979.
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refugees seem largely  to have been a ta c t ic  aimed at securing 
greater in te rnational  assistance with the problem.
I t  was the p o l i t i c a l  and social implicat ions of th is  economic
impact, rather than an economic burden per se, which were of more
concern to the Thai au thor i t ies .  The economic benefi ts of the
refugee presence were not d is t r ibuted at a l l  equal ly through Thai
socie ty: mostly they went to a small number of large merchants,
corrupt government o f f i c i a l s  and army o f f ic e rs .  Unequal income
d is t r ib u t io n  was thus reinforced. Moreover, the border provinces
providing refuge fo r  the Indochinese were among Thailand's poorest
areas. For example, in northeast Thailand (where the Laotian refugees
were provided with asylum) 40% of the population l ived below the level
of "absolute poverty". According to an In te r io r  M in is t ry  publ icat ion,
the standard of l i v in g  of the "displaced persons" was " fa r  better"
137than that of "up-country" Thais. The refugee presence highl ighted 
Thai land's underlying social and economic in jus t ice s ,  focussing 
a t tent ion on questions of the appropriate d is t r ib u t io n  of wealth and 
the c o r r u p t i b i l i t y  of some elements of the e l i t e .  This in turn seems 
to have accentuated the regime's sense of v u ln e ra b i l i t y ,  as i t  was 
placed in the p o l i t i c a l l y  uncomfortable posit ion of having to defend 
the fac t  that assistance was being given to Indochinese (who were
136 For example, as the ASEAN states hardened and orchestrated th e i r  
approach to the refugee problem in May 1979, the Thai Supreme 
Command Chief of Staff  (General Saiyud Kerdphol) spoke of the 
refugees adding " to  the already heavy f inanc ia l  burden of the 
country". Bangkok Post, 1 June 1979.
137 Too Long to Wait. . . , p. 8.
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often regarded with ethnic condescension by many Thais) rather than
138its own poor citizens.
Maiaysia
For Kuala Lumpur the socioeconomic impact of the refugees was
even more poli t ically significant, although the actual costs to the
Malaysian exchequer were negligible. The local economic impact was
similar to that in Thailand. Like northeast Thailand, the east coast
of peninsular Malaysia (where the overwhelming majority of seaborne
Vietnamese reaching Malaysia landed) was the poorest part of the
country. As in Thailand, the local economic boom caused by the
refugee presence did not result in benefits for all -- or even a large
number of -- local residents. Indeed, the effect on most of the local
Malay population was largely negative, being characterized by rising
food prices, black market corruption with attendant gangster
profiteering, the pollution of padi fields by camp drainage, the
threat of epidemics and the tainting of staple sea food (which had
139allegedly fed on refugees' corpses).
138 When interviewed by a visiting US House of Representatives Study 
Mission in August 179, both Air Marshal Sitthi Savetsila (then 
Secretary-General of the National Security Council) and Kriangsak 
stressed such domestic political pressures. The Indochinese 
Refugee Situation, August 1979, pp. 14-15.
139 J Clementson, "Malaysia in the Seventies: Communist Resurgence
and Government Response", Journal of the Royal United Services 
Ins t i tute, Vol. 124, No. 4 (December 1979), p. 56; Straits Times, 
6 December 1978 and 26 June 1979. In January 1979 i t  was 
reported that the National Investigation Board was looking into 
"malpractices" in the supply of goods to refugees in Trengganu 
state.  Straits Times, 26 January 1979.
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But in Malaysia an important ethnic dimension was injected into
the resentment that was apparent (or at least feared by the
authorit ies).  Not only were the majority of the seaborne Vietnamese
refugees reaching the east coast ethnic C h i n e s e , b u t  the benefits
of refugee-related expenditure by international organizations and the
Malaysian government accrued primarily to local ethnic Chinese
merchants. These factors were of particular concern to the government
as the east coast was the heartland of conservative, Islamic-
141orientated Malay nationalism.
The core of the government's concern appeared to have been that
opposition Malay groups could use the ethnic dimension of the refugee
crisis  -- by asserting that i t  threatened the rights of Malays -- as a
lever with which to exert political pressure on the multiracial ruling
coalit ion. There were also fear that the ethnic issue might upset the
country's delicate racial balance (and hence i ts whole social,
economic and political stabil i ty) particularly if local Malay
grievances against incoming ethnic Chinese refugees were exaggerated
and exploited by Malay political groups in a manner comparable to the
14?events of May 1969.
140 At least 60* of the "boat people" arriving in Malaysia were 
ethnic Chinese. Milton Osborne, "The Indochinese Refugees: 
Cause and Effects", International Affairs, Vol. 56, No. 1 
(January 1980), pp. 42, 48.
141 Suhrke, Pasuk and Zakaria, pp. 31-32.
142 In 1969, electoral successes by the "Chinese" Democratic Action 
Party were used by extremist Malay politicians to incite violence 
against non-Malay communities. Home Affairs Minister Ghazali 
emphasized this precedent for a breakdown of communal relations 
in a meeting with the US House of Representatives Study Mission. 
The Indochinese Refugee Situation, August 1979, p. 24.
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The key role of e thnici ty  in producing the hard l ine of f ic ia l
Malaysian response to the Vietnamese refugee problem becomes
par t i cu la r l y  clear when a comparison is made with the government's
contemporaneous treatment of other refugee and immigrant groups. In
the second half of the 1970s Malaysia r ese t t l ed  more refugees per head
of i t s  own population (1 to every 137) than any other country in the
143 144world except I s rae l .  Almost all the 105,700 refugees rese t t led
in Malaysia on a semi-permanent basis between 1975 and 1980 were
Phil ippine Muslims who fled to Sabah from late  1972 to escape the
conf l ic t  between the Manila government and the Moro National
Liberation Front (MNLF). It  seems clear that  the influx of Phil ippine
Muslims was at leas t  i n i t i a l l y  ( that  i s ,  in the 1972-76 period)
encouraged by the Sabah s ta te  government under Chief Minister Mustapha
bin Harun. Mustapha allegedly harboured ambitious secess ionis t  plans
to detach Sabah from Malaysia and the Sulu archipelago,  Mindanao and
Palawan from the Phil ippines to form a new country. Apart from seeing
the Phil ippine refugees as a useful resource base for supporting the
MNLF, they also increased the size of the Muslim "Malay" minority (the
power base of Mustapha's United Sabah National Organization) in a
145sta te  where most of the population were Christ ians or animists.
After the electoral  ouster of Mustapha in April 1976, the 
continuing flow of Phil ippine refugees into Sabah was met with
143 World Refugee Survey 1981 (New York: US Committee for Refugees,
1981).
144 Ibid.
145 Henry Kamm, IHT, 8 March 1979; St ra i t s  Times, 22 January 1979.
306 -
benevolent indifference by local and federal authorities.  The
refugees were by this stage making an important contribution to the
1 abour-starved local economy, and there was apparently some fear of
the possible reaction of the Arab countries if they were returned to
the Philippines. Although there was some discontent amongst the local
population in Sabah at the refugee presence (particularly because of
i ts  effect on wage levels),  the threat that this posed to the
credibi l i ty of the state and federal governments was outweighed by the
polit ical dividends accruing from maintaining or increasing the size
146of the "Malay" component in the population. Federal Home Affairs 
Minister Ghazali made explicit  the difference between official 
attitudes towards Philippine and Vietnamese refugees when he told 
Pariiament:
Filipinos who come to Sabah to seek sanctuary are given 
refugee status because their presence will not have 
adverse effects on the peace and order of the 
country...  illegal immigrants from Vietnam could not be 
given similar s t a tus . . .  [and] . . .  protection because 
the Government fe l t  that their presence could have 
adverse consequences on the country.147
As well as the Philippine refugees, the Malaysian authorities 
tolerated the presence of perhaps as many as 100,000 Indonesian 
illegal immigrants in the late 1970s. According to cr i t ics  of the 
government this presence was condoned not just because i t  helped to 
resolve a chronic shortage of plantation and construction labour but
146 Straits Times, 22 January 1979; New Straits Times, 20 November 
1979; Asiaweek, 3 December 1982, p. 28.
147 Daily Express (Manila), 24 November 1979.
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also because i t  helped " to  swell the ranks of th e . . .  Malay 
population"
On a smaller scale, but nevertheless extremely pert inent to a
considerat ion of Kuala Lumpur's d i f fe re n t ia l  treatment of various
refugee groups, was the resettlement in Malaysia of Cambodian Muslims.
About 1500 of these refugees came d i re c t ly  from Cambodia by boat in
the 1975-77 period, heading fo r  a v i l lage  on the Malaysian coast with
which they had had family  and re l ig ious l inks  fo r  four hundred 
149years. Over 3000 others were selected from refugee camps in
Thailand fo r  resettlement in Thailand. The refugees were given
Malaysian c i t izensh ip  and ins t ruc t ion  in Bahasa Malaysia, and were
150quick ly integrated in to  Malay society.
The sal ience of the Vietnamese refugees' e th n ic i t y  in the 
Malaysian government's response to the problem was emphasized three 
years a f te r  the height of the refugee c r i s i s  when Mahathir Mohamed (by 
then Prime Minister)  advocated that Malaysia should create i t s  own 
market fo r  manufactured goods by increasing i t s  population by up to
148 V Selvaratnam, "Malaysia in 1981", Southeast Asian A f fa i rs  1982
(Singapore: I n s t i t u te  of Southeast Asian Studies, 1982), p. 265.
149 Kuala Lumpur home service in English, 1100 gmt, 18 Apr i l  1975 
(SWB FE/4883/A3/13, 21 Apri l  1975); Peter Weintraub, FEER, 
16 December 1977, p. 32.
150 Too Long to W a i t . . , , p. 22; S t ra i ts  Times, 13 June 1979. 
I ro n ic a l l y ,  some of these Cambodian Muslims proved to be a 
secur i ty  threat ,  as they became involved with v io len t  Islamic 
fundamental ist groups. The raid by Muslim fanat ics  on the pol ice 
s ta t ion at Batu Pahat in Johor in October 1980, in which eight 
attackers died and 23 policemen and c i v i l i a n s  were wounded, was 
led by a Cambodian refugee who had arrived in Kelantan in 1975. 
K Das, FEER, 24 October 1980, p. 10.
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151400% (that is, to 70 million). This pronouncement cast profound
doubt on the veracity of earlier Malaysian government declarations to
the effect that the country could not bear the economic burden of the
refugees (or the residue of the refugees after most had been 
152resett led).  As Ghazali said, the Vietnamese were fleeing to the 
world of free enterprise from communism: if not for their ethnic
characteristies they could presumably have played a valuable role in 
Malaysia's expanding economy. But it  was the ethnic factor (and its 
polit ical implications), rather than economic considerations, which 
played the preponderant role in deciding Kuala Lumpur's policy on the 
matter.
The extent of east coast Malays' host i l i ty towards the Vietnamese 
refugees was not clear. There were certainly some ugly and violent 
incidents on the beaches in late 1978 and early 1979: for example, a
police officer helping refugees ashore was stoned by local people, and 
150 refugees were drowned when their boat sank soon after being pushed
151 Raphael Pura, "Mahathir says a Baby Boom would be Good", AWSJ, 
22 November 1982.
152 For example, with reference to the boat people, the Malaysian
Minister of Foreign Affairs claimed: "As a small developing
country, Malaysia cannot afford to bear the burden of sheltering 
them particularly as there is no guarantee that they will be 
accepted for resettlement elsewhere". Statement by H E Tengku 
Ahmad Rithauddeen, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Malaysia at the 
opening session of the Twelfth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Bali, 
28 June 1979, ASEAN Digest, No. 4/79 (August 1979), p. 82. 
According to one senior Malaysian diplomat, "Malaysia has come to 
the limit of her capacity to accept these people". Statement by 
Z A Mochtar (Malaysian Deputy High Commissioner in Canberra) at 
Seminar on Indochinese Refugees, Australian National University, 
Canberra, 30-31 July 1979, p. l .
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153away from a beach by villagers. On the other hand, there were
numerous examples of spontaneous humanitarianism in the Malays'
154reaction to the arrival of the refugees. The truth of the matter
seems to be that there was a real element of unease amongst the local 
155population, but that this was manipulated by both opposition Malay 
groups and the government.
Kuala Lumpur's increasingly hard line approach to the refugee
issue in the f i r s t  half of 1979 was aimed as much at meeting domestic
polit ical challenges as at focussing international attention on the
problem. The domestic political threat was essentially two-pronged,
emanating from the main Malay opposition party, Parti Islam (PAS), and
from within the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) (which
dominated not only Malay polit ics but also the ruling National Front
Coalition), particularly on the east coast and in the UMNO Youth
Organization. The threat from within UMNO was particularly worrying
for the government as the July 1979 party conference approached, with
internal party elections -- which were arguably as important as a
156general election in a Malaysian context — looming in 1980. In
153 Strai ts  Times, 15 May 1979; Asiaweek, 29 June 1979.
154 See, for example, the photograph of local people helping a 
Vietnamese woman ashore, Newsweek, 1 January 1979, p. 32. A 
Malay crew, ordered to tow back out to sea a boatload of 
refugees, was reported to have knelt and prayed for their 
Captain's soul. Emily MacFarquhar, Economist, 21 July 1979,
p. 20.
155 The fact that "local people are starting to complain" was noted 
by Hussein Onn, the Malaysian Prime Minister, as early as May 
1978. Michael Richardson, FEER, 26 May 1978, p. 22.
156 Suhrke, Pasuk and Zakaria, p. 33.
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t h i s  way, the Vietnamese refugees reaching Malaysia became victims of
the dynamics of Malay po l i t i c s .  As Malay pol i t i c ians  outside the
government fanned rumours that  the refugees included f i f t h  columnists,
gangsters and drug smugglers, and cal led for firm government 
157act ion,  UMNO leaders were provided with what was e f fect ively a low-
cost  opportunity "to demonstrate t he i r  credent ial s  as defenders of 
158Malay r i gh t s " .  So although the government often urged "patience" 
159and r e s t r a in t  in the face of the refugee influx,  i t  was i t s e l f
often gui l ty  of lack of r e s t r a i n t  in the measures that  i t  took to
discourage (or at least  to show that  i t  was intent  on discouraging)
refugee landings. The use of the term " i l l ega l  immigrants" for the
refugees from November 1 9 7 7 ^  encouraged an alarmist  view of the
problem. Vessels carrying 41,000 Vietnamese were towed out to sea in
the f i r s t  half  of 1979, with t ragic  r esu l t s  on occasion: one boat
capsized under tow in circumstances which led the UNHCR to lay the
blame for the subsequent loss of 104 l ives on the Royal Malaysian 
161Navy. In January 1979 the government cal led on the mi l i t i a  to stop
1 c p
the refugees from landing, and in June 1979 Deputy Prime Minister
157 S t r a i t s  Times, 20 January 1979, 11 May 1979 and 15 May 1979.
158 Suhrke, Pasuk and Zakaria, p. 33.
159 Indonesian Times, 18 January 1979.
160 "The Week", FEER, 2 December 1977, p. 5.
161 J_HT, 3 and 11 April 1979; Asiaweek, 20 April 1979, pp. 28-29. 
One source (Indonesian Times, 4 April 1979) alleged that  over 500 
Vietnamese had died off Malaysia in similar  incidents "in recent 
months".
162 Statement by Datuk Syed Ahmed Shahabuddin, Deputy Home Minister,  
30 January 1979. S t ra i t s  Times, 1 February 1979.
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Mahathir was widely reported as warning that Vietnamese attempting to 
land might be shot .^^
Ultimately, the Malaysian government (or more accurately, the 
UMNO leadership) was successful in managing the refugee problem to 
yield maximal political benefits, both domestically and
internationally. It seems that the Malay electorate was impressed by 
the UMNO leaders' defence of Malay rights in the face of what was
being portrayed by politicians as effectively a Chinese in v a s io n .^  
Mahathir's "shoot on sight" warning of June 1979 was the culmination
of a series of measures (aimed at reducing the refugee influx and
speeding resettlement in third countries) that proved highly popular
in some parts of the Malay community, and effectively forestalled
165criticism of the UMNO leadership at the party conference in July.
An UMNO by-election victory over PAS in an east coast constituency was 
further proof of the government's success in handling the issue.
At the same time, the Malaysian authorities were largely able to 
avoid international condemnation for their tough stand, while securing
163 Mahathir later claimed, in a meeting with the US House of 
Representatives Study Mission, that his comment had been 
misunderstood and that he had actually said "we will do 
everything short of shooting them, for which we would need the 
approval of Parliament..." The Indochinese Refugee Situation, 
August 1979, p. 28.
164 About 50% of refugees reaching Malaysia from Vietnam were ethnic 
Vietnamese in 1979 (whereas they had been predominantly ethnic 
Chinese in 1978). Straits Times, 15 May 1979. But "Vietnamese" 
refugees were generally seen by east coast Malays as "Chinese" 
whatever their ethnic background.
165 K Das, FEER, 20 July 1979, p. 12.
166 "Setting limits on contest mobility", FEER, 31 August 1979, 
pp. 32, 37.
-  312 -
a new urgency in Western countr ies '  pol icies towards thi rd country
reset t lement  of the boat people. The Prime Minister moved quickly to
allay the alarm that  had been expressed in te rnat ional ly  over
Mahathir 's threat  to have refugees shot if they attempted to l a n d . ^
But Mahathir 's statement and the other Malaysian moves against the
refugee influx had the desired effect  on the West: at the July 1979
UN Conference on Indonchinese Refugees in Geneva the number of
reset t lement  places offered by third countries was increased from
125,000 to 250,000 and US$190m in cash and kind was pledged to help
168deal with the problem. In return for this  increased reset t lement ,
the Malaysian author i t ies  were more l iberal  in granting f i r s t  asylum 
to incoming r e f u g e e s . ^
Indonesia
Indonesia's refugee problem was on a much smaller scale than 
Malaysia's (except in the f i r s t  half of 1979 when Kuala Lumpur's 
policy of denying f i r s t  asylum to seaborne refugees created a large 
scale influx into Indonesia),  but the general nature of governmental 
concern over the socioeconomic and domestic pol i t i ca l  implications of 
the influx was much the same in both countries.  As in Malaysia, there 
were many local economic p r o b l e m s . ^  But General Yusuf, the Defence
167 S t r a i t s  Times, 19 June 1979; Age, 19 June 1979.
168 Wain, The Refused. , . , p. 224.
169 See, for example, "The Week", FEER, 24 August 1979, p. 7.
170 These problems included the cut t ing down of clove t rees by 
refugees who were unaware of the i r  economic importance, supply 
shortages and i nf la t i on .  Indonesian Times, 13 June 1979 and 
7 July 1979; S t ra i t s  Times, 9 July 1979.
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and Security Minister, was being melodramatic -- probably in an 
attempt to draw international attention to Indonesia's plight -- when 
he asserted in March 1979 that the refugee problem should not be 
allowed to hamper the implementation of Indonesia's Third Pelita
(Five-Year P l a n ) . ^
Jakarta's real concern, however, was with the domestic political
172implications of the refugees. As in Malaysia, the problem
presented cr i t ics  of the government (who were considerably more 
circumscribed in Indonesia) with a chance to go onto the offensive 
poli t ical ly.  In Indonesia the PPP (Development Unity Party) -- which 
had been formed when the government forced the merger of three 
opposition Islamic parties in 1973 -- was the only polit ical
organization retaining any effective autonomy, and it  was principally 
this grouping which questioned Jakarta's refugee policies. As well as 
the supposed risk that the seaborne refugees included Vietnamese 
spies, in the f i r s t  half of 1979 PPP politicians emphasized the 
financial burden of providing f i r s t  asylum. But the most dangerous 
aspect of the PPP's criticism from the government's viewpoint was 
probably typified in assertions by MPs Imron Rosjadi and Chalid
Mawardi that the many ethnic Chinese refugees amongst the boat people 
had been effectively expelled by Vietnam because they would always be 
loyal to China. Imron warned that the influx of refugees was a
171 Indonesian Times, 3 March 1979.
172 This was stressed by Vice President Adam Malik when he met the US 
House of Representatives Study Mission in August 1979. The 
Indochinese Refugee Situation, August 1979, pp. 19-20.
"refined invasion" by Chinese whose economic power was detrimental to
173Indonesia's security.
Relations between the local ethnic Chinese community and the 
indigenous population were as sensitive an issue in Indonesia as in 
Malaysia. While the relatively small size of Indonesia's Chinese 
community meant that continued national integrity did not depend on 
inter-ethnic cooperation to the same extent as in Malaysia, the 
military leadership's allegedly close links with the Sino-Indonesian 
business community implied that the Indonesian government could not 
afford to show complacency regarding the issue, for fear that i t  might 
be implicated by the opposition in Chinese schemes to subvert 
Indonesia. To maintain i ts credibility the Jakarta administration had 
to counter the implicit allegation that i t  was allowing into Indonesia 
ethnic Chinese who had already proved not to be trustworthy citizens 
of another Southeast Asian country. At the same time there may have 
been genuine concern in the government that the refugees might create 
ethnic tension in the areas where they landed.
For a number of reasons, Jakarta's response to the refugee 
influx was more restrained than that of Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok, 
despite a recognition of the importance of ASEAN solidarity.  The fact 
that the refugees landed largely on outlying and sparsely populated 
islands -- in particular,  the Anambas -- meant both that there was 
objectively l i t t l e  threat to communal relations and that there was
-  314  -
173 van Dijk, pp. 138-42; Briefing by Edward E Masters, US Ambassador 
in Jakarta, The Indochinese Refugee Situation, August 1979, 
pp. 19-20.
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l i t t l e  that  the pol i t i ca l  opposition could do to arouse local
sentiment against the " i l legal  immigrants". The refugee influx to
Indonesia was so small that  the government might have damaged i t s
internat ional  c red ib i l i t y  if i t  had over-reacted.  In par t icular ,
Indonesia's e f for t s  to follow a rela t ive ly  humane policy towards the
refugees (by allowing to land boats which had been turned away by
174Malaysia, for example) ref lected a wish for good re la t ions  with the
United States.  The Indonesian government's economic st rategy and
pol i t i ca l  legitimacy were highly dependent on continuing American
economic and mil i ta ry assistance,  and i t  was therefore important not
to offend Washington's s ens ib i l i t i e s  on human r ights  issues at a time
when these (including refugee questions) were at the forefront  of
American foreign policy under President Carter.  But at the height of
the c r i s i s  in June 1979, the Thai and Malaysian announcements
reject ing any more f i r s t  asylum refugees, coupled with an
unprecedented refugee influx to Indonesia, prompted Jakarta to
announce that  i t  would act in concert with i t s  ASEAN partners by
175mounting a naval blockade to turn away refugee boats.
174 Wain, The Refused. . . , p. 209; Asiaweek (29 June 1979, p. 19) 
reported that  refugees harassed by Thai p i ra tes  and turned away 
by Malaysia and Singapore were well looked af ter  in Indonesia. 
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees la ter  praised 
the assistance that  Indonesia gave to the Vietnamese who sought 
asylum there in 1979, claiming that "in many ways the Indonesian 
experience had been a model in how a refugee influx can be 
handled in a t ru ly  humanitarian way". Sydney Morning Herald, 
25 February 1980.
175 Age, 16 June 1979. According to Defence Minister General 
Mohammed Jusuf,  Indonesia could support no more Vietnamese 
refugees.  "The Week", FEER, 22 June 1979, p. 7. But according 
to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, no refugees were turned 
away by Indonesia. Sydney Morning Herald, 25 February 1980.
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The Philippines
The socioeconomic impact of the Indochinese refugees was less in
the Philippines than in any of the other ASEAN members which provided
f i r s t  asylum. The dangerous weather conditions and relative
difficulty in attracting the attention of international shipping in
the 1500 km crossing between Vietnam and the Philippines was
apparently a strong deterrent to the overwhelming majority of refugees
from taking this r o u t e : ^  at the height of the seaborne exodus in
1979 less than 8000 boat people reached the Philippines, compared with
177nearly 54,000 arriving in Malaysia.
On the island of Palawan, where the majority of Vietnamese
reaching the Philippines was concentrated, the refugee presence
178boosted the local economy. But according to the Philippines'
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Carlos Romulo, " . . .  those in the slums
are asking us, ' I f  you are feeding these people, why not us?' I t ' s  a
179hot potato, and there are limits to humani tarianism". It is
176 Bruce Grant, et.  a l . The Boat People: An "Age" Investigation
with Bruce Grant (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979), p. 54.
177 A Werner, Statist ics of Indochinese Refugees and Displaced
Persons: 1. Arrivals in Countries of Temporary Asylum (Geneva:
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 
1980).
178 Sheilah Ocampo, FEER, 18 December 1981, p. 10. But spending by 
international agencies on refugees in the Philippines was smaller 
than in Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia, reflecting the small 
size of the refugee population i t se l f .  In 1979, the UNHCR spent 
US$1.7m in the Philippines, compared with US$35m in Malaysia, 
US$32m in Thailand and US$13m in Indonesia. Wain, The 
Refused. . . , p. 132.
179 Asiaweek, 13 April 1979, pp. 15-16.
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doubtful that  the Phil ippines'  poor rea l ly  were exerting pressure on 
the government, l e t  alone that  the government would be sensi t ive  to 
such pressure.  But there may have been a fear in of f i c ia l  c i rc les  
that  the pol i t i ca l  opposition would use the small refugee presence as 
an issue with which to challenge the government's c r ed ib i l i ty .  In 
contrast  to the si tuat ions in Malaysia and Indonesia, however, in the 
Phil ippines there was no attempt to exploi t  as an issue the Chinese 
e thnici ty  of many of the refugees.  This ref lected the r e l a t i ve ly  
relaxed relat ionship between ethnic Chinese and the indigenous 
population, as well as the re l a t i ve ly  smaller number of incoming 
refugees.
The f i r s t  s igni f icant  change in Manila's policy towards the
refugees came in December 1978 when a vessel carrying 2300 Vietnamese
supposedly rescued at sea was refused permission to land (although i t
180 181was allowed to anchor in Manila Bay). In February and again in 
182June 1979 the Philippine author i t ies  moved physically to prevent
refugee boats from landing. Although th is  was i n i t i a l l y  j u s t i f i ed  in
terms of the need to prevent the Phil ippines from becoming "the
183wastebasket" of Asia, i t  seems that  these hard l ine actions sprang 
more from a desire to keep in step with the pol icies of the other
ASEAN s ta tes  rather  than from concern over the impact of the refugees
in the Phil ippines.  The Phil ippines'  internat ional  ident i ty was 
increasingly a function of i t s  membership of ASEAN: i t  was thus
180 "The Week", FEER, 5 January 1979, p. 5.
181 Phil ippine Times, 10-16 February 1979.
182 S t r a i t s  Times, 21 June 1979; Asiaweek, 29 June 1979, p. 16.
183 Phi 1ippine Times, 10-16 February 1979.
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important to project a sympathetic view of the other ASEAN countries'
problems in coping with the refugee i n f l u x . ^  President Marcos
emphasized this point in June 1979 when he claimed that it  was
"necessary for ASEAN to adopt a single, unified policy" on the refugee 
185issue.
While the Philippine government was willing to adopt a tougher
posture on the refugee issue for the sake of ASEAN solidarity,  like
i ts  Indonesian counterpart i t  was anxious not to offend the Carter
administration unnecessarily on a human rights issue. For this
reason, after the ASEAN countries had been successful in their
collective efforts in mid-1979 to exert pressure on the West (and
particularly the United States) to accept considerably greater numbers
of Indochinese for resettlement, Manila (like Jakarta) was quick to
indicate that i t  would probably continue to provide f i r s t  asylum to
seaborne refugees and offered fac i l i t i e s  for a Processing Centre for
186refugees who would be resettled elsewhere.
Singapore and the Conspiracy Theory
Singapore refused to provide temporary asylum to Indochinese 
refugees, except for a limited period for small numbers who had
184 According to the Philippines' Ambassador to Australia, the
refugees were " . . .  exacerbating racial conflict in some ASEAN 
countries; pressing upon their limited resources and threatening 
to disturb the political s tabi l i ty of developing countries of 
Southeast Asia". See Leticia R Shahani, "Indochina Refugees: A
Philippine Perspective" (Paper presented to Seminar on 
Indochinese Refugees, Australian National University, Canberra, 
30-31 July 1979), p. 8.
185 Agence France Presse in English, 0939 gmt, 20 June 1979 (SWB FE/ 
6148/A3/5, 22 June 1979).
186 Wain, The Refused... , p. 218.
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187already been guaranteed resettlement in third countries. The
Singaporean authorities and people were therefore hardly affected by
188any socioeconomic impact related to the refugees. But the
Singaporean leadership was outspoken in emphasizing the problems
caused for the other ASEAN countries by the refugee outflow, and in
blaming Hanoi for deliberately causing these problems.
The essence of the Singaporean thesis, which was propounded most
forcefully by Foreign Minister Rajaratnam during the 12th Annual ASEAN
Foreign Ministers' Conference in Bali at the height of the refugee
crisis  in June 1979, was that Hanoi was expelling a large part of i ts
ethnic Chinese population with the intention of exacerbating racial
sensi t ivi t ies (perhaps leading to racial warfare in the longer term)
in the ASEAN countries, which already had "delicate problems" with
189their ethnic Chinese minorities. According to Rajaratnam, the
187 Between April 1975 and June 1981, Singapore provided short-term
temporary asylum for 23,832 Indochinese. The average length of 
stay was three months. See US Department of State, The 
Indochinese Refugee Situation, Table: "Indochinese Refugee
Activity April 1975 thru June 1981".
188 The official Singaporean view was that the island republic 
physically had no room for, and could not afford the burden of, 
Indochinese refugees seeking temporary asylum. See, for example, 
address by C M See (Singaporean High Commissioner in Australia) 
at Seminar on Indochinese Refugees, Australian National
University, Canberra, 30-31 July 1979, p. 1. But Hong Kong, with 
a denser, faster-growing population enjoying a lower standard of 
living in 1979 provided f i r s t  asylum for more seaborne 
Indochinese refugees (72,000) than any other country. The 
effective absence of any democratic institutions in Hong Kong, 
however, meant that the British colonial authorities there had 
even less reason than the Singaporean authorities to fear that 
opposition political groups might inspire a popular backlash 
against the refugee presence. Moreover, Hong Kong's only 
neighbour, China, did not object to the colony's provision of 
f i r s t  asylum for the boat people.
189 Strai ts  Times, 29 June 1979.
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refugees were being used as "bombs" by Vietnam to soften the ground - -
in other words, to destab i l ize  non-communist Southeast Asia as the
190prelude to an invasion of the region. Lee Kuan Yew emphasized the
pressure that the refugees were placing on the ASEAN region 's  "social
191in f ras t ru c tu re  and...  p o l i t i c a l  fa b r ic " .
This reaction to the refugee c r i s i s  was not aimed sole ly  at
demonstrating s o l i d a r i t y  with the ASEAN states which were having to
cope with the refugee in f lux  at f i r s t  hand, although th is  may have
been an important fac to r  inf luencing Singapore's condemnation of
192Vietnam over th is  issue. Rather, the core of Singapore's concern
seemed to be that the f low of largely ethnic Chinese refugees from
Vietnam could increase anti-Chinese, and perhaps pro-Soviet,  sentiment
in the region, especia l ly  in Malaysia and Indonesia. This would cause
Singapore, with i t s  predominantly ethnic Chinese populat ion, extreme
embarrassment and perhaps serious external securi ty  problems. Lee
argued tha t ,  in the worst case, "another nation" in Southeast Asia
might be tempted to solve i t s  ethnic Chinese "problems" by emulating 
193Hanoi. In p a r t i c u la r ,  such a course might have appealed to Malay
extremists in Malaysia: there was ce r ta in ly  unease in that  country's
194non-Malay communities at the height of the exodus from Vietnam.
190 S t ra i t s  Times, 28 and 29 June 1979; IHT, 14-15 July 1979.
191 S t ra i t s  Times, 21 June 1979.
192 According to Rajaratnam: "Where we feel another member country
is in t rouble, we have to speak out and sometimes i t  is easier to 
speak louder when you are fa r  away from the antagonists because 
th e i r  aims do not reach that fa r .  Those who are closer may have 
to speak s o f t l y " .  FEER, Asia Yearbook 1979, p. 275; Mary Lee, 
FEER, 20 July 1979, p. 18.
193 Wain, The Refused. , , , pp. 132-33.
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Lack of evidence precludes a definitive assessment of the
Vietnamese authorities'  role in the refugee exodus. But i t  does seem
that Hanoi saw a number of advantages in faci l i ta t ing,  and indeed in
encouraging, the exodus of some of Vietnam's population from 1978.
Not only did the officially-sponsored refugee outflow relieve the
government of the burden of ethnic Chinese residents who were
increasingly seen as a security threat in view of the escalating
conflict with Beijing, but also of many people from southern Vietnam
whose association with the former anti-communist regime and the United
States military put their rel iabi l i ty in a socialist  society under
question. Moreover, by levying heavy fees on outgoing refugees, the
authorities were able to earn hundreds of millions of dollars in 
195gold, while simultaneously securing tighter governmental control
over the economy in southern Vietnam, to the detriment of the black 
196market. But there is no evidence to suggest that the potentially 
destabilizing effect of the refugee exodus on non-communist Southeast 
Asia was anything more than incidental to these important domestic 
benefits that Hanoi hoped to gain.
Even if Hanoi did perceive any advantage in the impact of the 
refugees on the ASEAN countries, the Vietnamese ultimately deemed this 
benefit as dispensable. It seems clear that the international outcry 
(precipitated to a large degree by the hardening policies of Malaysia
194 Ibid., p. 133.
195 According to the US Department of State, this rationale was 
acknowledged by a Vietnamese diplomat in December 1978. See US 
Department of States, Vietnam's Refugee Machine (Washington DC: 
US Department of State Document No. 2-22, 20 July 1979).
196 See Wain, The Refused. . . ,  p. 157.
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jnd i t s  ASEAN partners in the f i r s t  ha l f  of 1979) against the
/ietnamese-sponsored refugee flow was highly e f fec t ive  in persuading
lanoi to change i t s  po l ic ies  towards the refugee issue. At the UN
Conference on Indochinese Refugees at Geneva in July 1979, the
i/ietnamese agreed to a moratorium on refugee departures and the
197in s t i t u t i o n  of an "order ly"  departure scheme. From th is  time,
there was no evidence of systematic Vietnamese government complic i ty
198in the refugee t r a f f i c .
The Singaporean posit ion that re sp o n s ib i l i t y  fo r  the refugee
c r i s i s  lay with Hanoi was held to a greater or lesser extent
throughout the ASEAN region. ASEAN's foreign min is ters ,  a f te r  the i r
meeting in Bal i  in June 1979, agreed in a j o i n t  statement that Vietnam
199was responsible fo r  the unending exodus of refugees. But there was 
less wi l l ingness to al lege, l i ke  Singapore, that the Vietnamese had 
created the refugee problem de l ibera te ly  to des tab i l ize  regional non­
communist countr ies by causing p o l i t i c a l ,  economic, soc ia l,  rac ia l  and 
securi ty  problems.
The o f f i c i a l  Ph i l ipp ine view went no fu r the r  than re fe r r ing  to 
the "des tab i l iz ing  ef fec ts  generated by a seemingly del iberate design"
197 Richard Nations, FEER, 3 August 1979, pp. 18-19.
198 Indeed, the sever i ty  of the measures taken by Hanoi to stem the 
refugee f low provoked c r i t i c i s m  from at least one Western country 
(Norway). Sydney Morning Herald, 2 May 1980. Refugees reaching 
asylum countr ies a f te r  mid-1979 confirmed that f lee ing Vietnam 
had become a matter of "escaping" and running the gauntlet of 
Hanoi's navy. Personal interviews with Vietnamese refugees, 
Canberra, January 1983.
199 Joint Communique, Twelfth ASEAN M in is te r ia l  Meeting (Ba l i ,  
30 June 1979), ASEAN Digest, No. 4/79 (August 1979).
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[emphasis a d d e d ] . ^  Bangkok's view of the problem's origins was 
complicated by the fact that the great majority of refugees reaching 
Thailand were from Laos and Cambodia rather than from Vietnam i t se l f ,  
making a more sophisticated analysis necessary if Hanoi's malevolent 
culpability was to be upheld. But i t  was clear that although 
Cambodian and Laotian refugee problems were to a large extent the 
result of the political and military relationships between Hanoi and 
the Vietnamese-oriented governments in Phnom Penh and Vientiane, the 
refugee outflow across the border into Thailand did not work to the 
advantage of Vietnam (although it  did cause problems for Bangkok). On 
the contrary, i t  provided the principal resource base for the anti- 
Vietnamese resistance in both countries. Compared to the Laotian and 
Cambodian refugee presence, the Vietnamese boat people had l i t t l e  
socioeconomic impact in Thailand. For these reasons (as well as a
more general wish to keep open channels of communication with Vietnam) 
the Thai authorities, while probably not discouraging Singapore from 
accusing Hanoi of using the refugees as a weapon against the ASEAN 
countries, did not themselves attack Vietnam in such strong and direct 
terms over the issue.
In Indonesia and Malaysia official allegations concerning Hanoi's 
responsibility were tempered by some understanding of Vietnam's 
supposed problems with its ethnic Chinese minority, reflecting not 
only these countries'  own domestic situations but also a concern to 
steer ASEAN away from siding openly and completely with Beijing 
against Hanoi. Jusuf Wanandi claimed that " . . .  the source of the
200 Shahani, p. 6.
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problem lies in Hanoi. The increasing outflow of people is in fact
201'organized' by Hanoi". But by going on to assert that "internal
Vietnamese problems" were being transferred to the ASEAN countries he
acknowledged Hanoi's argument that the largely ethnic Chinese refugees
had been causing difficult ies for Vietnam.
Although there was a feeling in some official Malaysian circles
202that the refugees were equivalent "almost to a planned invasion",
Kuala Lumpur's anger over the cr is is  was directed at the United States
(and the West in general) for not doing more to help resolve the
203problem, rather than at Hanoi for creating i t .  Malaysian
displeasure towards China was also apparent: Ghazali Shafie, the
Interior Minister, unsuccessfully attempted to draw Beijing's 
attention to i ts "ethnic responsibility" for ethnic Chinese ejected 
from Vietnam.
201 Jusuf Wanandi, Security Dimensions of the Asia-Pacific Region in
the 1980s (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International
Studies, 1979), p. 63.
202 Personal interview with Malaysian official of Under Secretary 
rank, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kuala Lumpur, 15 April 1981.
203 This was emphasized by Deputy Prime Minister Mahathir and Home 
Affairs Minister Ghazali in meetings with the US House of 
Representatives Study Mission in August 1979. The Indochinese 
Refugee Situation, August 1979, pp. 23-24.
204 Asiaweek, 29 June 1979. The Malaysian authorities normally took 
a rather different stance on the issue of relations between the 
People's Republic and ethnic Chinese living in Southeast Asia: 
that is, that Beijing should disavow its connections with Chinese 
residents in the region.
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Conclusion
The f low of refugees to the ASEAN countries af ter  the communist 
v i c to r ie s  in Indochina in 1975 was not a phenomenon without precedent, 
p a r t i c u la r l y  in the case of Thai land. But in the context of communist 
Indochina as a securi ty concern of the ASEAN states th is  series of 
large-scale population movements had a new, important and m u l t i ­
faceted s ign if icance for  many of the region's policy-makers and 
decis ion-takers. Although discussion of the issue was often obscured 
by hyperbole, i t  is arguable that the approach of the ASEAN 
governments towards the post-1975 Indochinese refugee problem (or 
series of problems) was influenced more by securi ty  considerations in 
the broadest possible sense than by any other factors  such as 
humanitarian impulses.
A l l  the ASEAN governments were concerned with the securi ty  
impl icat ions of the Indochinese refugees, but p a r t i c u la r ly  in the 
early stages of the problem (before 1978), i t  was Thailand that was 
most affected, owing largely to i t s  long land borders with Laos and 
Cambodia. At f i r s t ,  the central concern in the ASEAN region was that 
the provis ion of asylum to Indochinese refugees (most of whom were, at 
th is  stage, people closely associated with the ousted anti-communist 
regimes) would jeopardize the normalization of re la t ions with the 
communist regimes in Indochina. But in Thailand there were powerful 
o f f i c i a l  elements - -  p a r t i c u la r l y  amongst regional m i l i t a r y  commanders 
and local o f f i c i a l s  - -  who sponsored, or at least acquiesced in, the 
use of the refugee camps as resource bases fo r  m i l i t a r y  and p o l i t i c a l  
a c t i v i t y  by anti-communist groups across the border into Cambodia and 
Laos. To some extent th is  phenomenon was a continuation of pract ices
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that had originated during the Second Indochina War, but i t  also 
represented an attempt to provide a counterweight to Laotian and 
Cambodian backing for Thai communist guerillas operating across the 
border in the opposite direction. But the evidence suggests that Thai 
support for cross-border subversion into Indochina may have 
precipitated, rather than kept at bay, Indochinese support for the 
CPT.
The danger that the attempted use of Indochinese refugees to
destabilize neighbouring communist regimes could effect ively invite 
intervention across the border into Thailand came to the fore as a 
security concern for Bangkok after the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia 
at the end of 1978. But in Bangkok's view this concern was overridden 
by the perceived necessity of maintaining the Cambodian resistance 
(including the Khmer Rouge and non-communist groups) as a viable 
m i l i ta ry  and po l i t ica l  force with which to counter Vietnamese 
domination of Cambodia. Indeed this la t ter  objective influenced Thai 
policy towards the Cambodian refugees more than any other factor: the
refugees were used as a lever with which to exert pressure on the
Vietnamese-imposed status quo in Cambodia through the granting of
temporary sanctuary at strategic times and the maintenance of
"agglomerations" straddling the border.
At the same time as using the Indochinese refugee presence as a 
weapon against Hanoi's dominion over Cambodia and Laos, the Thai 
authorit ies --  l ike their counterparts throughout ASEAN -- stressed 
: the threats to national security posed by the refugees' subversive 
potential and socioeconomic impact. Without access to classif ied 
information, the evidence in support of allegations that the refugees
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were engaged in subversion appears tenuous and it seems that such 
claim were more useful in underlining widely held official notions 
that the Indochinese outcasts were a threat to the social, economic, 
ethnic and political balance in the ASEAN countries than in presenting 
a convincing case that the refugee flow was part of a Vietnamese plan 
directly to infiltrate the region with agents. But even the arguments 
stressing the socioeconomic impact of the refugees on the ASEAN 
countries' security were themselves frequently unconvincing, and were 
to a large extent prompted by governmental attempts to counter efforts 
by opposition political groups to undermine the credibility of ruling 
elites: certainly, in Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia the
authorities frequently felt it necessary to demonstrate that they were 
as concerned about and as willing to take action against the refugee 
influx as their opponents. In Malaysia, and to a lesser extent in 
Indonesia, the Chinese ethnicity of many of the seaborne refugees was 
a crucial factor in precipitating harsh governmental action to counter 
the influx. In this sense, the refugee problem provoked concern over 
regime security as much as national security.
But there do seem to have been genuine fears in official circles
in the ASEAN countries that by continuing to provide "first asylum"
they could be plagued by a residue of refugees not deemed suitable for
205resettlement in third countries. It was thus felt necessary to
convince the West (and particularly the United States) that the speedy
205 Mahathir expressed this fear very directly in a meeting with the 
US House of Representatives Study Mission. The Indochinese 
Refugee Situation, August 1 979, p. 24.
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and complete resettlement of Indochinese refugees in third countries 
was vital to the security of the ASEAN states if they were to continue 
providing f i r s t  asylum. The forcible repatriation of Cambodian and 
Laotian refugees, and the towing back to sea of Vietnamese refugees -- 
on the grounds that the "security" of the ASEAN countries were 
threatened -- were very successful weapons, particularly in mid-1979, 
in the struggle to convince the West that it  should shoulder more of 
the refugee "burden". But at the same time, for reasons of
self- interest  the ASEAN countries were usually careful not to offend 
the West's standards of humanitarianism (and particularly that of the 
Carter administration) with refugee policies that were blatantly 
inhumane, as this could put in jeopardy Western economic aid, military 
assistance and polit ical support.
On one level i t  often seemed that the Indochinese refugee problem
had a further effect on the security of non-communist Southeast Asia
in the sense that it  appeared to undermine the solidarity of ASEAN's
members. For example, Bangkok's lack of firm action against piracy in
the Gulf of Thailand meant that tens of thousands of seaborne refugees
avoided the area and landed in Malaysia rather than southern Thailand.
Kuala Lumpur's tough attitude towards boats heading for Malaysia
207effectively created a refugee problem for Indonesia. But as the 
refugee problem intensified through 1979 it  seems to have become clear 
to most ASEAN policy-makers that it  was an issue that could best
206 US concern for Thailand's security was particularly evident. 
See, for example, H Eugene Douglas, "The problem of refugees in a 
strategic perspective", Strategic Review, Fall 1982, p. 15. 
Douglas was the Reagan administration's Ambassador-at-1arge and 
Coordinator for Refugee Affairs.
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be dealt with by united diplomatic action rather than by piecemeal
measures which had the effect merely of shifting the responsibility 
onto other ASEAN members. Moreover, the refugee issue came to be seen 
as part of the overall security threat emanating from Indochina -- or 
more precisely, from Hanoi's policies.
While all the ASEAN governments saw Hanoi as responsible for the
problem of the seaborne refugees, only Singapore claimed that Vietnam
had set out to use the exodus as an instrument with which to
destabilize the ASEAN region. But although the four larger ASEAN
states wished to keep open the possibility of dialogue with Hanoi,
with Indonesia and Malaysia being particularly anxious to avoid an
overly close alignment with China over the Indochinese cr is i s ,  at the
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Bali in June 1979 they all put their
weight behind a strong statement emphasizing Vietnam's responsibility
for the "serious situation" in Southeast Asia, resulting from its
"interference" in Cambodia and the "unrestricted flow of Indochinese
208displaced persons/illegal immigrants (refugees)". But the ASEAN
countries'  generally firm stand behind the Chinese and US positions on 
issues connected with Indochina probably worked against resolution of 
the refugee problem, at least in the short to medium term.
207 Indeed, according to some sources, Malaysian Interior Minister 
Ghazali Shafie claimed that an aspect of Malaysia's policy was to 
create a refugee problem for Jakarta in order to secure 
Indonesian support for Kuala Lumpur's ini t iat ive to set up a 
refugee processing centre. See Wain, The Refused.. . , pp. 131-32 
and Asiaweek, 27 July 1979, p.16. Malaysia's stance also created 
fears in Bangkok of an intensified influx of boat people. 
Bangkok Post, 17 June 1979.
208 Joint Communique, Twelfth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, (Paragraphs 
7, 9, 13-15), reprinted in ASEAN Documents Series 1967-1985, 
pp. 54-55.
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The continuing refugee flow from Vietnam after Hanoi introduced
s t r i c t  measures in 1979 to res t r ic t  the exodus showed that i t  was
influenced by factors beyond the immediate control of the Vietnamese
authorities: principally these were the deteriorating domestic
209economic conditions reflected in unemployment and shortages. These
problems would have been ameliorated if the Vietnamese economy had
received assistance from the West, and if Hanoi had not f el t  obliged
to continue i ts military role in Cambodia in response to what it
perceived as an attempt by China to maintain military pressure on two
210fronts. ASEAN acquiesced in both America's economic embargo of, 
and China's military pressure on, Vietnam. In furthering what they 
believed to be the region's long-term security interests (principally 
a Cambodia free of Vietnamese domination) the ASEAN states were 
probably indirectly exacerbating the seaborne refugee problem -- which 
they claimed to be a security threat (if a less important one than the 
presence of 200,000 Vietnamese troops in Cambodia). Moreover,
avoidance of military service in Cambodia was a more direct motive for
many Vietnamese who became "boat people" after 1979. Thailand's 
sporadic blockading of Laos undoubtedly contributed to Vientiane's 
economic problems, and to a continuing Laotian reliance on Vietnam. 
In turn this led to an increased refugee flow for both economic and
209 See Carlyle Thayer, "Vietnamese outflow expected to continue", 
Canberra Times, 14 October 1981.
210 For example, at the height of the seaborne refugee crisis in 
mid-1979, the US administration urged international charities,  
other governments and the World Bank to adopt economic sanctions 
against Hanoi in an attempt to halt the exodus. Simon Barber, 
FEER, 6 July 1979, p. 23.
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political reasons. ASEAN's opposition to the Vietnamese role in 
Cambodia contributed to -- and to some extent necessitated (in view of 
the wish to provide a resource base for the Khmer Rouge and Khmer 
Serei) -- Thailand's continuing Cambodian refugee "problem".
By 1981, any lasting end to the Indochinese refugee problem as a 
security concern of the ASEAN states seemed unlikely except in the 
case of a resolution, by political or military means, of the Cambodian 
imbroglio, and a lessening of tension between Hanoi and Beijing. In 
the mean time, the ASEAN countries'  mthod of trying to assist the 
resolution of the Cambodian problem seemed likely to help ensure the 
continuing existence of the refugee "threat".
PART THREE
THE ASEAN STATES' MANAGEMENT OF THEIR SECURITY CONCERNS WITH INDOCHINA
CHAPTER 8
THE ASEAN STATES' DEFENCE POLICIES, 1975-81: 
MILITARY RESPONSES TO INDOCHINESE DEVELOPMENTS?
The defence p o l i c i e s  o f  the ASEAN coun t r ies  began to  undergo 
im po r tan t  t rans fo rm a t ions  in  the 1970s and e a r ly  1980s. Defence 
expend i tu res  and m i l i t a r y  personnel  s t reng ths  were expanded, w h i le  
the increased procurement of  m i l i t a r y  equipment use fu l  in 
' c o n v e n t io n a l '  wa r fa re ,  and a new emphasis on such warfare  in  m i l i t a r y  
exe rc ises  seemed to  r e f l e c t  reg io na l  armed fo rc e s '  expanded capa c i t y  
f o r  defence aga ins t  ex te rna l  t h r e a t s .  Var ious of  the ASEAN s ta te s  
a lso  stepped up t h e i r  m i l i t a r y  coopera t ion  w i th  each o the r .
The f i g u r e s  in Tables 1-4 ,  w h i le  not e n t i r e l y  r e l i a b l e ,  show the 
p r i n c i p a l  t rends  in the ASEAN s ta te s '  defence expend i tu re  and m i l i t a r y  
personnel  s t reng th  f rom 1973 to  1981. S u p e r f i c i a l l y ,  the p i c t u r e  they 
present  o f  f a i r l y  dramat ic increases in  the ASEAN s ta te s '  defence 
e f f o r t s  in the 1970s and e a r l y  1980s appears to  a t t e s t  t h a t  the 
dramat ic  contemporaneous developments in  Indochina were c r u c ia l  
in f l u e n c e s  on defence p o l i c i e s  in  non-communist Southeast Asia dur ing  
t h i s  p e r io d .  However, when examined in  d e t a i l  the evidence i s  more 
ambiguous.
I f  Indochinese developments had p ro found ly  a f fe c ted  the ASEAN 
s t a te s '  defence p o l i c i e s  i t  would seem reasonable to  expect t h a t  t h e i r  
defence expendi tu re  would have r i s e n  markedly f o l l o w i n g  the two 
cataclysms of  the 1975 communist v i c t o r i e s  and the invas ion  of  
Cambodia at the end of  1978, w i th  the l a t t e r  development having a 
g rea te r  impact. Moreover,  one would have expected those governments
-  334 -
TABLE 1
Defence Expenditure by the ASEAN States 1973-1981 at Constant Prices 
Figures are in US$ million, at 1980 prices and 1980 exchange rates
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
esia (1472)* (1604)* 1976 1977 1914 2065 1963 2174 2449
sia 664 685 883 923 1059 1108 1249 1557 1856
ppines 464 728 857 978 967 888 821 776 784
pore 388 373 413 500 556 520 532 605 677
and 638 594 (741) 913 1101 1382 1557 1476 1574
for ASEAN (3626)* (3984)* (4870) 5291 5597 5963 6122 6588 7340
: ( )* = Imputed values, with a high degree of uncertainty.
( ) = Estimates
E: The figures in Table 1 were abstracted from the 1983, 1984 and 1983 editions of World
Armaments and Disarmanent: SIPRI Yearbook (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute, 1983, 1984 and 1985) and should be taken as providing a general 
impression, rather than a precise indication, of trends in military spending in the 
ASEAN states. Government statements of military expenditure —  on which the SIPRI 
figures are based —  are notoriously unreliable. Large proportions of actual military 
expenditure (especially when related to internal security and paramilitary forces) may 
be secreted in other areas of government spending. According to one estimate (see 
Astri Suhrke, "ASEAN: Adjusting to New Regional Alignments", Asia Pacific Community,
No. 12 (Spring 1981), p. 27), in the case of Indonesia three times the amount of 
declared defence spending may be "hidden" in this way. Discussions in Kuala Lumpur in 
April 1981 with academics interested in Malaysian defence policy confirmed that there 
were considerable grounds for confusion in assessing Malaysia's defence expenditure, 
owing to its division between annually recurrent operating expenditure and longer-term 
development expenditure.
Furthermore, original expenditure estimates may be revised during the financial year 
in the light of changing economic and political circumstances —  and particularly in 
times of high inflation. Another point is that the financial years of various states 
seldom coincide, making comparison difficult. These issues are examined at greater 
length in SIPRI Yearbook 1983, pp. 175-80. Nevertheless, the SIPRI figures are used 
here as they are the only readily available constant price estimates and are 
generally recognized as roughly reliable (if not wholly accurate, particularly in view 
of fluctuating exchange rates affecting the conversion to dollars).
TABLE 2
Defence Expenditure by the ASEAN States at Current Prices 
(Figures in US$ million)
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
tonesia 432 601 1108 1024 1513 2036 1653 2073 2713
.aysia 287 311 385 353 542 712 1165 1360 2037
.lippines 172 312 407 410 680 794 766 612 832
igapore 210 263 344 315 411 444 529 594 789
liland 338 430 542 601 746 794 1554 1096 1669
:al for ASEAN 1479 1917 2786 2703 3892 4780 5667 5735 8040
TABLE 3
Defence Expenditure as a Percentage of
Total Government Expenditure
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
jonesia 16.1 15.8 16.7 12.1 18.7 14.6 13.7 11.1 12.3
Laysia 20.4 17.3 17.3 16.9 12.5 13.4 16.0 14.0 17.4
ilippines 22.6 24.2 19.3 n. a. 18.3 17.9 18.9 12.2 13.7
igapore 13.4 19.1 18.1 15.3 18.5 16.6 23.4 20.7 20.0
ailand 22.8 24.5 25.7 18.0 25.2 20.0 29.9 15.9 25.8
:e: n.a. = not available
TABLE 4
Military Personnel Strength in the ASEAN States, 1973-1981
Figures are in thousands
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
donesia 322 270 266 246 247 247 239 242 273
laysia 56 66 61 62 64 65 65 66 102
Ilippines 43 55 67 78 99 99 103 113 113
igapore 21 22 30 31 36 36 36 42 42
ailand 180 195 204 210 211 212 216 231 238
:al for ASEAN 622 608 628 627 657 659 659 694 768
JRCE: The figures used in Tables 2, 3 and 4 were abstracted from various editions of
The Military Balance published between 1973 and 1983. Like those in Figure 1, 
these figures should not be taken as entirely reliable.
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(in Bangkok and Singapore) which expressed most concern over the 
security implications of these developments to have increased their 
defence efforts by a substantially greater degree than those ASEAN 
governments (in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines) which were 
less concerned.
Table 1 (which provides an indication of changes in the real 
value of the ASEAN states'  defence expenditure, in US dollars adjusted 
to take account of inflation) corroborates these hypotheses only to a 
very limited extent. The table shows that the increases in the 
aggregated defence expenditure of all five ASEAN states in 1976 (9% 
higher than the previous year), 1980 (8%) and 1981 (11%) -- the years 
following the 1975 and 1978/79 Indochinese crises -- were more 
substantial than those recorded in 1978 (7%) and 1979 (3%), and that 
Thailand and Singapore increased their defence expenditure to a 
greater extent between 1975 and 1978 (by 87% and 26% respectively) 
than their ASEAN partners. Thailand's defence spending expanded more 
rapidly than any other ASEAN sta te ' s  between 1975 and 1981.
This limited support for the argument that the ASEAN states'  
defence efforts were profoundly affected by the Indochinese events of 
1975 and 1978/79 is thoroughly undermined by the countervailing 
evidence to be found in Table 1. The largest increases in the total 
of all the ASEAN states '  defence spending occurred in 1974 (10%) and 
1975 (22%): even the lat ter  year's expenditures must have been 
budgeted for prior to the collapse of non-communist Indochina in April 
1975. The largest increases in defence spending between 1973 and 1981 
(180%) and 1978-81 (68%) took place in Malaysia, which expressed less 
concern than Thailand and Singapore over the security implications of
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i at was happening in Indochina. The 25% increase in Malaysian 
(penditure between 1975 and 1978 was very nearly as large as that 
^corded by Singapore; similarly, Kuala Lumpur's 110% increase between 
375 and 1981 was almost as substantial as the expansion of Thai 
sending over the same period. Thai defence expenditure increased far 
are rapidly in the 1974-78 period (by over 20% every year) than after 
he invasion of Cambodia. By far the largest increase from one year 
o the next occurred in the Philippines -- the ASEAN member least 
oncerned by Indochinese developments -- from 1973 to 1974 (57%). 
ndonesian defence spending remained virtually constant between 1975 
nd 1979.
Using figures provided by a different source, Table 2 also 
llustrates the growth of the ASEAN states'  defence spending in the
973-81 period, but in current US dollar values. The table indicates 
imilar trends to those already highlighted using Table 1, though the 
act that the figures are not adjusted to take account of inflation 
nd fluctuating exchange rates means that they may give a distorted 
icture of year to year changes in defence expenditure. Table 2
rovides even less evidence in support of the case that Indochinese 
evelopments profoundly affected the ASEAN states'  defence policies, 
evertheless, the table does show that Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore 
nd Thailand increased their defence spending to a much greater degree 
ver the three year period (1978-81) following the invasion of 
ambodia than in the previous three years. On the other hand, 
owever, Table 2 shows that from 1975 to 1976 expenditure by
ndonesia, Malaysia and Singapore decreased, while that by the
hi 1 ippines only increased infinitesimally: overall the dollar value
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Df the ASEAN states '  defence spending decreased by 3% in 1976. In 
:urrent dollar terms, only Thailand increased i ts military expenditure 
significantly in the immediate wake of the communist victories in 
Indochina. Moreover, the aggregate expansion of the ASEAN states'  
defence expenditure proceeded more slowly in the two years following 
the invasion of Cambodia (1979 - 19%; 1980 - 1%) than in any other 
year except 1976. It is also of note that between 1973 and 1981 
Thailand and Singapore, the two ASEAN states most concerned with the 
putative threats posed by communist Indochina, increased their defence 
expenditure less substantially (by 366% and 276% respectively) than 
Malaysia (610%), Indonesia (500%) and the Philippines (384%).
Table 3 is even more damaging to the argument that the two 
Indochinese crises decisively influenced the ASEAN governments' 
defence efforts,  as i t  indicates that the Indonesian, Malaysian, 
Singaporean and Thai authorities all allocated a smaller proportion of 
their total expenditure to defence in 1976 than in 1975. Although 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand all devoted a higher 
proportion of government resources to defence in 1979 than 1978, i t  is 
fai r ly likely that spending allocations for 1979 were decided well 
before the invasion of Cambodia. In any case, these proportions all 
declined again in 1980. Only Singapore and Thailand allocated a 
higher proportion of expenditure to defence in 1981 than in 1973, and 
in Thailand's case this did not appear to result  from a general upward 
trend.
Table 4 discloses that although the total military personnel 
strength of the five ASEAN states increased particularly rapidly after
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L978, the aggregate figure was boosted by an exceptional expansion of 
Malaysia's armed forces. The Singaporean and Thai armed forces 
expanded as much in the 1973-76 phase (that is, well before the 
invasion of Cambodia) as from 1976-81. The greatest increase in 
military personnel strength over the whole 1973-81 period was recorded 
by the Philippines, and the bulk of this expansion took place between 
1973 and 1977.
To summarize, Tables 1-4 together provide substantial evidence:
(i) that although there was a substantial expansion of the 
ASEAN states'  defence efforts between 1975 and 1981, 
increases in defence spending and military personnel 
strength were already well in train before 1975;
(i i )  that there was no extraordinary rise in the ASEAN states'  
defence expenditure or the size of their armed forces in 
the three years following the 1975 Indochinese communist 
victories;
( i i i )  that only in the cases of Thailand (as evinced by a 
substantially enlarged defence budget in 1979 and 
increases in military personnel strength in 1980 and 1981) 
and Malaysia was there any remarkable expansion of the 
ASEAN states'  defence effort after the Vietnamese invasion 
of Cambodia;
(iv) and that the expanded defence efforts of the Philippines 
(1973-77), Malaysia (1978-81) and Indonesia (throughout 
the 1973-81 period) were as marked as Thailand's and more 
notable than Singapore's between 1975 and 1981.
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In other words, the figures in Tables 1-4 show that there was 
actually l i t t l e  correlation between either the sea changes which 
occurred in Indochina in the mid- and late 1970s and increased defence 
efforts by the ASEAN states,  or the scale of particular ASEAN 
governments' increased defence budgets or military personnel strength 
and their declaratory positions with regard to the seriousness of the 
threats emanating from Indochina.
The Continuing Influence of "Background Factors"
If the course of the ASEAN states'  defence policies in the 
1975-81 period cannot be attributed (except in the case of Thailand 
after 1978) to contemporaneous political and military developments in 
Indochina, other factors must also have played very important parts. 
Indeed, a range of such factors is discernible and may be divided into 
several categories: domestic political developments (particularly
when these involved changes in the political status and role of the 
military) in the ASEAN countries; the availabili ty of funds as a 
result of fast economic growth; problems of maintaining internal 
security in the face of both communist and ethnic-separatist 
challenges; competition and latent conflict between various ASEAN 
states; changes in the interests and presence of extra-regional powers 
in the region; and new developments relating to maritime security. 
Appendix 2 to this thesis examines the influence of these 'background 
factors'  on the ASEAN states'  defence policies in some detail ,  and 
provides evidence that many of these factors continued to exert 
powerful influence over the ASEAN states'  defence expenditure,
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military force structures and arms procurement after the 1975 
Indochinese communist victories .^
A prime example of the enduring influence of these 'background
factors'  was evident in the way that in Indonesia, Thailand and to a
lesser extent the Philippines, the central political role of the armed
forces continued to allow the military leadership great influence in
the allocation of government resources. In a slightly different
sense, this was true also in Malaysia: the phenomenon of close family
relationships reached an unprecedented climax in January 1981 when
Prime Minister Hussein Onn appointed his brother as Deputy Chief of
the General Staff and his cousin and brother-in-law as Chief of the
?Armed Forces Staff.
The relatively rapid economic growth of the ASEAN countries 
allowed their governments to allocate more resources to defence 
without detriment to other areas of expenditure. This was especially 
so in Indonesia and Malaysia: both benefitted from increases in the
price of their most valuable export, oil .  Kuala Lumpur, and possibly 
other administrations in the region, also saw the development of 
defence infrastructure as possessing a valuable 'spin-off'  effect in
1 For a fuller discussion and more detailed evidence, see Tim
Huxley, The ASEAN States'  Defence Policies, 1975-81: Military
Responses to Indochina? (Canberra: Australian National
University, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Working Paper 
No. 88, 1984).
2 "Briefing", FEER, 16 January 1981, p. 6; Straits Times, 
24 January 1981.
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terms of the economic development of impoverished regions. In 
Malaysia's case, the decision in late 1981 to impose constraints on 
the expansion of the armed forces projected in the Fourth Malaysian 
Plan (published earl ier in the year) principally as a result of 
slackening international demand for the country's main exports 
i l lustrated the cri t ical  role of economic growth as an influence on 
defence spending.^
In general, internal security problems remained more important 
concerns for the four larger ASEAN states after 1975 than external 
threats.  The Thai armed forces were s t i l l  preoccupied with combating 
the Communist Party of Thailand's insurgency, while their Philippine 
colleagues devoted almost all their energies towards operations 
against the communist New People's Army and the Muslim Moro National 
Liberation Front in the south of the country. Counter-insurgency 
against the Communist Party of Malaya continued to be the principal 
role of the Malaysian armed forces. The Indonesian mil i tary's long 
standing concern with the suppression of polit ical dissidence and 
regional secessionism was reinforced with the incorporation of East 
Timor at the end of 1975.
I t  is arguable that the bilateral tensions which continued to 
exist beneath the surface gloss of ASEAN unity exerted a considerable 
influence on some of the ASEAN states'  defence policies. It seems
3
3 "RMN on the threshold of great changes", Asian Defence Journal 
(cited herafter as ADJ) , 4/79 (July/August 1979), p. 43; K. Das, 
FEER, 16 January 1980, p. 47; Astri Suhrke, "ASEAN: Adjusting to
New Regional Alignments", Asia Pacific Community, No. 12 (Spring 
1981), p. 26.
4 Michael Richardson, Age, 30 October 1981.
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l i k e l y  that the Singaporean government s t i l l  viewed Malaysia and 
Indonesia as potentia l  threats , and that the Phi l ipp ine and Malaysian 
au thor i t ies  remained concerned over the p o s s ib i l i t y  of c o n f l i c t  
invo lv ing Sabah. Moreover, i t  seems clear that some of the ASEAN 
governments allowed considerations of prest ige in re la t ion  to other 
members of the Association to inf luence th e i r  arms procurement 
decisions.
Defence planners and policy-makers in the ASEAN countries were 
also concerned with continuing changes in the regional in terests  and 
m i l i t a r y  presence of extra-regional powers in the la te  1970s. The 
costs im p l i c i t  in taking over a i r  bases and other m i l i t a r y  f a c i l i t i e s  
previously used by departing US forces necessitated increased defence 
spending by Bangkok in the mid-1970s. Even in the la te  1970s the 
expansion of the Singaporean (and to a lesser extent, Malaysian) armed 
forces was s t i l l  influenced by a desire to compensate fo r  the B r i t ish  
m i l i t a r y  withdrawal, which was completed in 1976. The Indonesian 
armed forces (and, to a lesser degree, th e i r  Malaysian counterparts) 
continued to see China as a potentia l  th rea t ,  especia l ly  in terms of 
i t s  increasing naval presence in the South China Sea from the late 
1970s. The Soviet Union's greater m i l i t a r y  involvement in the region 
from 1979 concerned a l l  the ASEAN states but, because i t  was so 
in t imate ly  l inked with Indochinese developments, i t s  impact on th e i r  
defence po l ic ies  is p a r t i c u la r l y  d i f f i c u l t  to assess.
The expansion and enhancement of the ASEAN states'  maritime 
defence capab i l i t ies  in the la te  1970s and early 1980s evident ly 
resulted largely from perceived needs to assert sovereignty over 
extended national waters ( in  the cases of Indonesia, Malaysia and the
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Phi l ippines) ,  to patrol recently-declared Exclusive Economic Zones and 
to back up claims over maritime t e r r i t o ry  in the South China Sea.
The Indochina Factor and the ASEAN S ta te s1 Mil i tary 
Expansion Programmes
Although i t  is evident that  various factors  unrelated to 
Indochinese developments exercised extremely important influences on 
the ASEAN s t a t es '  defence pol icies  during the 1975-81 period, the 
question of the degree of influence of the ' Indochina fac tor '  remains.
Developments in, or related to,  Indochina apparently had only a 
minor impact on defence pol icies in non-communist Southeast Asia from 
1975-78. The new s i tuat ion in Indochina af te r  the 1975 communist 
v ic tor ies  did create potent ial  threats  to which Thai mi l i ta ry leaders 
had as a matter of professional duty to pay a t t ent ion.  In par t i cular ,  
i t  is undeniable that  the border conf l ic t s  with Laos and Cambodia and 
these countr ies '  support for the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT)
5
influenced the development of the Thai armed forces.  But there is no 
evidence that  serious consideration was given to upgrading these 
forces to deter a large-scale conventional offensive by Vietnam.^
5 For deta i l s  of new mil i ta ry equipment procured by Thailand in the
1975-78 phase, see The Mil i tary Balance 1977-1978 (London: 
International  Ins t i tu t e  for Strategic Studies,  1977), p. 100; 
World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook 1978 (Stockholm:
Stockholm International  Peace Research In s t i t u t e ,  1978), p. 277; 
SIPRI Yearbook 1980, p. 159; Bangkok Post , 2 May, 11 September, 
4 October and 30 November 1978.
6 See Bangkok Post , 14 December 1975 and E. Stuart  Kirby, "The 
Tasks for Thai 1 and' s Army and an Assessment of i t s  Abil i ty",  
Journal of the Royal United Services I n s t i t u t e , Vol. 121, No. 1 
(March 1976), pp. 50-51.
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The pr inc ipal  aim of Kuala Lumpur's m i l i t a r y  expansion programme 
under the Third Malaysia Plan (covering 1976-80) was to enhance 
in ternal secur i ty  c ap ab i l i t ies .  To the extent that the expansion also 
improved conventional warfare capacity, th is  was related almost 
e n t i re ly  to factors other than Indochinese developments, such as the 
need fo r  a new naval base to replace the anachronist ic Woodlands 
f a c i l i t y  in Singapore, and considerations of m i l i t a r y  status in 
re la t ion  to the other ASEAN members.'7 8
The 1975 communist v ic to r ies  had no noticeable impact on the 
steady progress of Singapore's continuing m i l i t a r y  bui ld-up. Rather, 
events in Indochina were e x p l i c i t l y  held up as a v ind ication of
o
defence programmes that were already well under way. There was no
extraordinary r ise  in defence expenditure from 1975 to 1976, no sudden
spate of arms purchases and no reports of plans to expand the
Singapore Armed Forces' order of ba t t le  ahead of schedule.
Compared with the threat posed by the MNLF and NPA insurgents,
Indochina ranked very low as a securi ty  concern fo r  Manila. Although
Phi l ipp ine defence expenditure rose in 1976, th is  spending was
concentrated on increasing the army's manpower and improving i t s
g
equipment with counter-insurgency in mind.
7 International  Defense Review (c i ted hereafter as IDR) , 8/1978 
(August 1978), p. 1208; "Malaysia: Creation of a "Royal Armoured
Corps", IDR, 3/1979 (March 1979), p. 442; "RMN on the threshold 
of great changes", pp. 43-46; "Malaysian Armoured Vehicle 
Competi tion", IDR, 4/1980 (Apr i l  1980), p. 446.
8 See, fo r  example, the "Singapore Armed Forces Day" message from 
Goh Keng Swee, Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Min is ter ,  
S t ra i ts  Times, 2 July 1975.
Ho Kwon Ping and Cheah Chang Hye, FEER, 24 October 1980, p. 37; 
Richard Vokey, FEER, 8 May 1981, p. 36.
9
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The decision in 1977 or 1978 to upgrade substan t ia l ly  the 
Indonesian armed forces' cap ab i l i t ies  fo r  conventional warfare may 
have been pa r t ly  the resu l t  of concern over the secur i ty  of 
Indonesia's northernmost maritime f r o n t ie r  in the South China Sea 
where Jakarta's and Hanoi's maritime claims overlapped. But Jakarta 
did not emphasize th is  c o n f l i c t , ^  and the overal l  impression gained 
is that the impact of the Timor operation in la te  1975 and a wish to 
bo ls ter  Indonesia's claim to regional pre-eminence, together with the 
increased revenue made avai lable from Indonesia's valuable o i l  
exports, a l l  influenced Indonesian defence po l icy at least as
s ig n i f i c a n t l y  as any factors  re lated to Indoch ina.^
Indochinese developments exerted a greater inf luence on the ASEAN 
governments' defence po l ic ies  in the 1979-81 phase than in the 
previous three and a ha l f  years. But i t  was only in Thailand's case 
that  the "Indochina fac tor"  appeared to be the dominant inf luence. 
Although even the invasion and occupation of Cambodia did not imply 
tha t  Vietnam posed a serious and immediate d i re c t  m i l i t a r y  threat to 
Thai land, the cancel lat ion of Cambodia's t ra d i t io n a l  ro le  as a 
"bu f fe r "  state and the presence there of almost 200,000 Vietnamese 
troops represented a real change in Thai land's s t ra teg ic  circumstances 
and provided Thai m i l i t a r y  leaders with an almost impregnable
____________
10 Marwyn Samuels, Contest fo r  the South China Sea (New York: 
Methuen, 1982), p. 163.
11 Suharto j u s t i f i e d  increased defence expenditure to deal with
" fore ign threats" (of an unspecified nature) by c i t i n g  "the 
growing f inanc ia l  capacity of the s ta te" .  Jakarta domestic 
service, 1218 gmt, 5 January 1978 (FBIS-APA-78-7, 11 January 
1978). See also Astr i  Suhrke, "ASEAN: Adjust ing to New Regional
Alignments", Asia Paci f ic  Community, No. 12 (Spring 1981), p. 26.
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just i f icat ion for their subsequent efforts to upgrade significantly
their forces'  hitherto limited capabilities for conventional warfare.
The Vietnamese military incursion into Thailand in June 1980 bolstered
12the generals' claims for greater resources. But this is not to say 
that the factors which had previously exerted important influence over 
Thai defence policy ceased to operate. Although the CPT was in a 
state of decline by 1979, i t  would remain a serious security threat as 
long as fundamental socioeconomic problems were unresolved, and it  was 
clear that much of the new equipment procured by the armed forces 
after the invasion of Cambodia would be equally as useful in counter­
insurgency operations as in repelling Vietnamese incursions. 
Moreover, while the Thai armed forces were certainly more oriented 
towards conventional warfare in 1981 than they had been three years 
ear l ier ,  the enhanced operational effectiveness which theoretically
resulted from the defence policies of the 1979-81 period was balanced
13by the military's continuing deep political involvement. It is 
doubtful that a Thai government in which the military played a
considerably less crucial role than it  did in the Prem administration 
would have made such efforts to boost the armed forces'  capabil i t ies.  
But i t  is also fair ly clear that the military-dominated regime wished 
to avoid a direct,  large-scale military confrontation with the
12 See statements by the Supreme Commander, General Serm na Nakhon, 
and the Defence Under-Secretary, General Pralang Veeraplee, 
Bangkok Post, 20 and 22 February 1979.
13 One analyst noted " . . .  the lack of troop discipline,  incompetence
among some of the senior officer ranks, and disorganized command- 
and-control procedures". Sheldon W. Simon, The ASEAN States and 
Regional Security (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1982),
p. 45.
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Vietnamese, as a bat t lefield defeat for the Thai army might also 
irreparably damage i ts polit ical prestige, credibil i ty and
legit imacy.^
While the expansion of Malaysia's armed forces in the 1979-81
period outpaced military developments in the other ASEAN states,  Kuala
Lumpur's efforts to enhance i ts forces' conventional capabil i t ies were
by no means a simple reaction to Hanoi's subjugation of Cambodia. The
government usually just if ied the military expansion programme on the
grounds that Malaysia faced a much wider range of military
contingencies than had previously been thought likely: a threat from
15Vietnam was very seldom referred to directly, although i t  does seem
that worry over the perceived political and military weakness of
Thailand was one factor in the decision to strengthen the mil i tary's 
presence in northern peninsular Malaysia for late 1979.^ But to the 
extent that this move was related to Indochina, i t  appears to have 
reflected fears not of a Vietnamese offensive through Thailand and
into Malaysia, but rather a concern that a reduced military presence
14 The armed forces' tardy and half-hearted response to the major 
Vietnamese incussion in June 1980 was symptomatic of this desire 
to avoid a significant military clash with Vietnamese forces.
15 However, the armed forces' Chief of Staff, General Sany Ghaffar,
claimed that the mil i tary's expansion was required "to meet 
external threats posed by developments in Indochina". Straits
Times, 3 December 1979.
16 See Weekend Australian, 20-21 September 1980; Ho and Cheah, FEER, 
24 October 1980, p. 35. Concern over Thailand's weakness can be 
traced back to the earl iest  days in which the "domino theory" 
held sway. According to British Cabinet and Chiefs of Staff 
papers released at the beginning of 1984, a plan was prepared in 
1953 for British troops to secure a cordon sanitaire in southern 
Thailand to secure Malaya against communist inf i l t rat ion from the 
north. The Times, 3 January 1984.
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in Thai land's deep south (which might resu l t  from a redeployment of 
the Thai army in the event of d i re c t ,  large-scale Vietnamese 
aggresssion) might allow a reviva l in m i l i t a r y  operations by the 
Communist Party of Malaya.
But bearing in mind the lack of unanimity w i th in  the government 
regarding "the Vietnamese th rea t " ,  and the success of operations 
against the CPM, i t  seems l i k e l y  that  other factors  continued to play 
extremely in f lu e n t ia l  roles in re la t ion  to Malaysian defence pol icy 
a f te r  the invasion of Cambodia. The fac t  that important measures to 
expand the armed forces' capacity fo r  conventional warfare had been 
included in the Third Malaysia Plan (1976-80) and were implemented as 
a r ly  as 1977-78^ seems to confirm th is .  Quite apart from the 
inf luence of an expanding economy, close personal l inks  between the 
Malay p o l i t i c a l  and m i l i t a r y  e l i t e s ,  and considerat ions of m i l i t a r y  
status w i th in ASEAN, strong armed forces (especia l ly  a large army) 
were important to the government fo r  several domestic p o l i t i c a l  
reasons: they aff irmed Malay p o l i t i c a l  dominance as i t  became clear
that the New Economic Pol icy was y ie ld ing  only dubious benef i ts fo r  
many "bumiputras", and provided one element in a comprehensive 
enlargement of the government's apparatus fo r  maintaining internal 
secur i ty  in the event of renewed communal or other domestic 
upheavals.^
17 "Malaysia: Creation of a 'Royal Armoured Corps'",  In ternational
Defense Review, 3/1979, p. 442.
18 The elements of th is  in te r lock ing  apparatus were "a strong 
in te l l igence-gather ing machine, home guard, po l ice, special 
branch and army backed by special ( legal)  powers", Weekend 
Austra l ian, 20-21 September 1981.
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The increase in Singapore's defence expenditure in the 1979-81 
period did not represent a break with the gradual upward trend which 
had been evident throughout the 1970s. After 1979, there was no rush 
(as there had been in Thailand's case) to purchase major new weapons 
systems, nor to construct new defence infrastructure on a large scale. 
Given Singapore's consistent expression of the most "hawkish" views 
within ASEAN regarding "the Vietnamese threat" after the invasion of 
Cambodia, the minimal impact of this event on Singaporean defence 
policy appears paradoxical. This apparent paradox may be resolved by 
considering two important factors. First ,  Singapore's armed forces 
had been built up on the basis that the island faced a conventional 
external threat (though not from Indochina) from their very beginnings 
in the mid-1960s. If the Singaporean leadership had genuinely seen 
Vietnam as a serious threat after i ts invasion of Cambodia, Singapore 
was, largely fortuitously, already better equipped to defend i tsel f  
against this threat than were i ts ASEAN neighbours. Secondly, the 
lack of any discernible military response to the alleged threat from 
Vietnam may have indicated the largely rhetorical nature of the hard­
line Singaporean political response to the invasion of Cambodia.
Although the Indonesian government adopted a considerably more 
relaxed attitude than i ts ASEAN partners towards the possibili ty of 
Vietnam becoming a military threat after i ts  invasion of Cambodia, the 
Indonesian armed forces began to undergo important changes, aimed 
partly at increasing their "conventional" capability, during the 
1979-81 period. There was thus an apparent discrepancy between the 
government's threat assessments and its defence policy. However, 
Indonesian defence policy at this time was related much more closely
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to the factors  which had influenced the attempt to enhance the armed 
forces '  capabi l i t i es  in 1977-78 than to the invasion of Cambodia.
The accession of General Mohamed Jusuf to the posts of Defence
Minister and Commander-in-Chief in April 1978 also had a profound
effec t  on the Indonesian armed forces.  By early 1979 Jusuf had
invest igated the mi l i t a ry ' s  problems and secured President Suharto's
support for ef for t s  to overcome the armed forces '  def iciencies ,
19especial ly in terms of t he i r  combat readiness.  A new five-year 
s t ra teg ic  plan (RENSTRA I I ) ,  based on Jusuf ' s  recommendations and 
cal l ing for a compact, professional mil i tary equipped with modern 
weapons, came into e ffec t  in April 1979 .^  Although i t  is possible 
that  the mi l i ta ry development programme contained in RENSTRA II could 
have been conceived in the l ight  of the invasion of Cambodia, this
seems unlikely.  I t  is doubtful that  Jakar t a ' s  cumbersome pol i t i co-  
mi l i ta ry  decision-making machinery could make such important and
expensive decisions so quickly. Also, the new programme's primary 
emphasis was on enhancing the army's capabi l i ty,  whereas any di rect  
clash with Vietnam would almost cer ta inly  have occurred at sea.
Moreover, to the extent  that  Jakarta did upgrade i t s  naval
capabi l i t i e s ,  th i s  development was aimed at protecting Indonesia's 
Exclusive Economic Zone and defending against low intens i ty  threats
19 Personal interview with Dr Kirdi Dipoyudo, Centre for Strategic 
and International  Studies,  Jakarta,  7 April 1981; Colonel C.H.A. 
East,  "General Mohammad Jusuf,  Indonesia's top soldier" ,  Pacific 
Defence Reporter, June 1981, p. 28.
20 Hong Kong Agence France Presse in English, 1155 gmt, 9 March 1979
(FBIS-APA-79-049, 12 March 1979) and 0405 gmt, 28 March 1979 
(FBIS-APA-79-062, 29 March 1979); Donald E. Weatherbee,
"Indonesia' s Armed Forces: Rejuvenation and Regeneration",
Southeast Asian Affairs 1982 (Singapore: Ins t i tu t e  of Southeast
Asian Studies,  1982), p. 149.
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21(such as refugees, smugglers, poachers and p i ra tes ) .  F in a l ly ,
despite RENSTRA I I ' s  emphasis on improving conventional warfare
c a p a b i l i t y ,  the fac t  that Jusuf 's f i r s t  p r i o r i t y  in t ry ing  to
rejuvenate the m i l i t a r y  was to " re -un i te  the armed forces and the
people" emphasized that the army remained oriented p r in c ip a l l y  towards 
22domestic tasks.
In contrast to the other ASEAN governments, Manila lowered i t s
defence expenditure in both 1979 and 1980. The Armed Forces of the
Phil ippines were s t i l l  extremely heavi ly committed to the war against
the NPA and MNLF in the south, and the Marcos regime remained as
dependent as ever on the United States to provide an external defence
ca p a b i l i t y .  Although concern over Vietnamese expansionism and Soviet
use of Vietnamese naval and a i r  base f a c i l i t i e s  may have influenced
the very l im i ted improvements which Manila made to i t s  maritime and
23a i r  defence cap a b i l i t ie s ,  there is no evidence that Indochinese 
developments had any more profound inf luence on Phi l ippine defence 
po l icy.
21 P. Lewis Young, "Naval Developments in the South East Asian
Region: Current Trends", ADJ, 2/82 (February 1982), pp. 18-19;
Khalid Abdullah, "The Indonesian Armed Forces - -  A New Image fo r  
the ’ 80s", ADJ, 5/82 (May 1982), p. 41; Michael Richardson, 
"Indonesia Strengthens i t s  South China Sea Defences", Pac i f ic  
Defence Reporter, February 1983, pp. 40-41.
22 Weatherbee, pp. 150-53; Peter Rodgers, Sydney Morning Herald, 
23 August 1980; East, p. 28.
23 Khalid Abdullah, "The Armed Forces of the Phi l ippines: Security
Through Development in the 1980s", ADJ, 6/82 (June 1982),
pp. 21-26.
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Military Cooperation between the ASEAN States
A further aspect of military developments in non-communist 
Southeast Asia in 1975-81 was the apparently increasing willingness of 
ASEAN's members to cooperate on military matters. This cooperation 
confirmed some observers' views that the ASEAN states were responding 
collectively to Indochinese events mil i tar i ly as well as poli t ical ly.  
However, a closer examination of this military cooperation reveals 
that i t  was not as extensive as was often implied, that it  was 
generally not closely related to security concerns over Indochinese 
developments, and that important obstacles impeded i ts further 
intensification and expansion.
24With one important exception, military cooperation between the 
ASEAN states occurred on a s t r ic t ly  bilateral (or, very occasionally, 
t r i l a t era l )  basis, and by 1981 included:
(i) counter-insurgency agreements between Malaysia and
25Thailand, and Malaysia and Indonesia;
24 According to Carlos Romulo, Philippine Foreign Minister, regular 
meetings were held involving very senior military officers (at 
"Chief of Staff level") from the ASEAN states to discuss security 
issues and to exchange intelligence. But these meetings were not 
conducted under ASEAN auspices, and were not publicized. 
Personal interview with Romulo, Manila, 23 March 1981.
25 On joint  Malaysian-Indonesian border operations, see Indonesian
Times, 7 February 1976; "The Week", FEER, 16 December 1977, p. 5; 
Kuala Lumpur domestic service in English, 1000 gmt, 23 March 1979 
(FBIS-APA-79-058, 23 March 1978). For discussion of Malaysian- 
Thai border coordination, see Sheldon W. Simon, "The ASEAN 
States: Obstacles to Security Cooperation: The Maiaysian-Thai
Joint Border Operations", ADJ, October 1977, pp. 18-21.
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( i i ) Indonesian cooperation, on a bi 1 atera1 basis, with
Malaysia, Thailand and the Phi l ippines in maritime 
securi t y ; 2®
( i i i )  exchanges of m i l i t a r y  in te l l igence  between Malaysia and
Singapore, Thailand and the Phi l ippines, and perhaps other
27combinations of the ASEAN states; and 
( iv )  frequent j o i n t  exercises, especia l ly  between Indonesia and 
Malaysia.2®
But there was no po l icy  coordination with regard to arms 
29procurement, and the ASEAN sta tes ' f led g l ing  defence industr ies were
30competi t ive rather than complementary.
26 Indonesian Times, 7 February 1976, "RMN on the threshold of great 
changes", p. 42; Ho and Cheah, p. 34.
27 Bangkok Post, 22 December 1976; "ASEAN - -  A Defence Pact?", ADJ, 
January/February 1977, p. 4; Derek Davies and Denzil Pe i r is ,  
FEER, 18 February 1977, pp. 26-27; Ho and Cheah, p. 32; Personal 
interview with See Chak Mun, Director (P o l i t i c a l  A f fa i r s ) ,  
M in is t ry  of Foreign A f fa i r s ,  Singapore, 7 February 1981.
28 Bangkok Post, 11 December 1975; Indonesian Times, 7 February 1976
and 16 December 1977; ADJ, 6/1976 (December), pp. 46-49, 68; "The 
Week", FEER, 4 March and 22 July 1977, p. 5; Jakarta domestic
service, 0700 gmt, 13 November 1977 (SWB FE/5670/A3/3, 18
November 1977) and 1500 gmt, 19 March 1979 (FBIS-APA-79-055,
20 March 1977); Star (Kuala Lumpur), 15 October 1979; S t ra i ts  
Times, 14 November 1979 and 26 January 1981.
29 Coincidences in weapons procurement, due pa r t ly  to the
attract iveness of US arms owing to Washington's Foreign M i l i t a r y  
sales c red i ts ,  sometimes produced the i l l u s io n  of conscious
standardization. The value of FMS arms de l iver ies to the ASEAN 
states rose from US$59m in 1975 to US$330m in 1980. Data
Management Div is ion, Defense Security Assistance Agency, Foreign 
M i l i t a r y  Sales and M i l i t a r y  Assistance Facts 1980 (Washington DC: 
Department of Defense, 1980).
30 Economic motives - -  p r in c ip a l l y  the desire to reduce expensive
dependence on external sources of arms and to d i rec t  defence 
procurement expenditure towards the domestic economy - -  provided 
the main impetus fo r  the development of defence industr ies in the 
ASEAN states. See Ron Huisken, Defence Resources of South East 
Asia and the South West Pac i f ic :  A Compendium of Data (Canberra:
Austral ian National Un ivers i ty ,  Strategic and Defence Studies 
Centre, 1980), pp. 11-13, 25-26, 37-40, 55-57, 67.
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Evidence that the Indochinese crises of 1975 and 1978-79
stimulated the intensification of military cooperation amongst the
ASEAN states is limited. The impending collapse of the Lon Nol and
Thieu regimes may have encouraged the Indonesian and Malaysian
governments to agree on a joint counter-subversion programme in April
1975, and at least the Malaysian and Thai navies sometimes coordinated
their efforts to prevent Indochinese refugees from reaching their
31countries'  coasts. After the invasion of Cambodia, concern over 
Vietnam as a maritime threat possibly influenced the growing size and 
complexity of joint Indonesian-Malaysian naval exercises. An 
anticipation that Thailand might, in extreme circumstances, require 
air support from its ASEAN partners in the event of large-scale 
Vietnamese aggression, coupled with concern over Soviet use of 
Vietnamese air bases may have contributed to the decisions to commence 
joint Indonesian-Singaporean, Thai-Malaysian and Thai-Indonesian air 
exercises in 1 9 7 9 - 8 1 . But, general, intra-ASEAN military
cooperation related to long-standing, low intensity problems rather 
than the deterrence of external threats.
Attitudes within ASEAN towards the broadening of military 
cooperation to encompass multilateral exercises, conscious 
standardization of equipment, and perhaps a formal defence pact 
(relating particularly to the defence of Thailand against Vietnamese 
aggression) varied between the various governments, between
31 Antara in English, 0956 gmt, 19 April 1975 (SWB FE/4886/A3/13, 24 
April 1975); "Thai-Maiaysian Naval Action Stemming Refugee Tide", 
Bangkok Post, 20 July 1979.
32 Ho and Cheah, p. 34; Bangkok Post, 19 January 1981; Australian 
Financial Review, 12 February 1981.
356  -
inst i tu t ions and individuals within these governments, and over time. 
I t  was not, however, unt i l  after the invasion of Cambodia that 
discussion of the issue became widespread. But, for important 
reasons, all the ASEAN governments usually opposed suggestions that 
the already existing web of defence cooperation should be 
s ign i f icant ly  intensif ied, broadened or formalized, either in relation 
to the specific contingency of providing m i l i ta ry  assistance to 
Thailand in an emergency, or more generally in reaction to a regional 
environment that was often portrayed as increasingly unstable and 
potentia l ly dangerous.
There was particular concern that dramatically increased mil i tary
cooperation might be taken as a provocation by Hanoi, or lead to
involvement in wider conf l ic t  between major powers. Threat
perceptions within ASEAN diverged widely: even after the invasion of
Cambodia, Malaysia and Indonesia were s t i l l  concerned as much with a
perceived long-term threat from China as with Vietnamese and Soviet
objectives. Although they were generally subdued especially by the
need to maintain diplomatic unity on the Cambodian issue from 1979,
there remained lingering suspicions and latent animosities between
various ASEAN members, so that by 1981 the Association was not yet a
33"security community" in the Deutschian sense: i t  seemed highly
unlikely that the f ive states could inst i tu t ional ize their  m i l i tary  
cooperation before resolving their  differences to the extent that the 
use of force by one ASEAN state against another was no longer a
33 See K.W. Deutsch, "Security Communities", in J.N. Rosenau (ed.), 
International Polit ics and Foreign Policy (New York: Free Press
of Glencoe, 1961), pp. 98-105.
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jossibi1i ty .  Further obstacles to formalized m i l i ta ry  cooperation 
included practical problems such as wide divergences in mil i tary 
:ommand, control and communications procedures. According to some
jefence analysts in the region, there were problems enough in 
bilateral cooperation to be solved before thinking seriously about 
implementing multi lateral m i l i tary  linkages. Because of these
problems, there was no consensus that the potential benefits of a 
formalized or insti tut ional ized multi lateral defence arrangement would 
Dutweigh its  possible costs.
Conclusion
In the f inal analysis, i t  must be said that there is a sl ight air 
of unreality surrounding any discussion about the extent to which 
mil i tary developments in the ASEAN states in the 1975-81 period were a
response to developments in Indochina. Despite the claims of certain 
senior po l i t ica l  and m i l i ta ry  figures in the ASEAN countries regarding 
"threats" from Indochina, in concrete terms the m i l i tary  threat was a 
collection of low intensity problems, including small-scale incursions 
on Thailand's border with Laos and Cambodia and occasional
infringements of ASEAN airspace by Soviet a ircraf t .
As Chapter 5 substantiated, Vietnam almost certainly lacked not 
only the capabil i ty but also the w i l l  or even a motive to undertake 
further, large-scale m il i tary  adventures after the invasion of 
Cambodia (which was motivated by specific historical and security 
factors). That this was on balance clear to the ASEAN states was 
evident in their  fa i lu re  to assign greater p r io r i ty  to the enhancement
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of conventional military capabilities and the intensification of 
military cooperation with each other. To have increased their 
conventional military capabilities much more significantly would have 
required the ASEAN countries not only to increase defence expenditure 
in real terms, but also as a proportion of government spending and 
national product. This they were unwilling to do: although in 
absolute terms they spent more on defence, the ASEAN states'  
overriding common philosophy in relation to security remained the 
enhancement of domestic s tabil i ty through economic and social 
development. Moreover, security problems were s t i l l  overwhelmingly 
perceived as national concerns: the spectre of a military threat from 
Indochina was not taken seriously enough by all the ASEAN states to 
override the bilateral tensions and differences of outlook which 
precluded closer military cooperation.
What, then, was the significance of military developments in the 
ASEAN region in the 1975-81 period? These developments varied widely, 
not only between the five states but also over time. Nevertheless, i t  
is possible to draw some general conclusions.
In the f i r s t  place, i t  is important not to exaggerate the changes 
which took place in the ASEAN states'  armed forces in the 1975-81 
period. The size of these forces was certainly increased (except in 
the case of Indonesia), and a variety of new equipment was purchased. 
But although these developments undoubtedly enhanced the abili ty of 
ASEAN's armed forces to operate in low intensity roles such as 
counter-insurgency and maritime resource protection, their potential 
effectiveness in a high intensity, conventional war role remained 
essentially token.
Secondly, such military developments as there were in the ASEAN
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region from 1975 to 1978 were probably attributable in large measure 
to factors other than the communist victories in Indochina. From the 
late 1960s, sweeping changes in the balance of external powers 
involved in Southeast Asia, and particularly the creation of a partial 
military vacuum by the large-scale withdrawal of British and American 
forces, created a climate of polit ico-military uncertainty in the 
region. This phenomenon, as well as domestic political factors 
(especially the role of the military), the impact of economic growth, 
internal security problems, intra-ASEAN tensions, and developments in 
maritime security provided important reasons, generally independent of 
developments in Indochina, for the ASEAN governments to upgrade their 
armed forces'  capabil i t ies.
The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia undoubtedly represented a 
watershed in the ASEAN states'  perceptions of Vietnam as a security 
threat.  However, these fears were not based to any significant extent 
on an expectation that a large-scale military onslaught by the 
Vietnamese against non-communist Southeast Asia was likely. This was 
true even in the case of Thailand: the role of the Thai armed forces 
in relation to the border situation was essentially to control small- 
scale incursions and to manage the refugee problem. In the highly 
unlikely event of a determined cross-border assault by the Vietnamese, 
Bangkok evidently intended that Thai forces would merely constitute a 
"tripwire" for US intervention -- though whether or not Washington 
could be relied upon to intervene decisively is another question.
It seems reasonably clear that after the Vietnamese invasion of 
Cambodia, military developments in the ASEAN states were generally not 
much more attributable to events in Indochina than had been the
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limited expansion and reequipment which had taken place in the 1975-78 
period. Many of the underlying factors which had influenced defence 
policies in the region since (and before) 1975 continued to have 
important effects on military planning, expenditure and procurement. 
Defence policy was s t i l l  formulated overwhelmingly on the basis of the 
need to counter low intensity threats to national security, rather 
than regional defence cooperation to meet a common, direct threat to 
non-communist Southeast Asia as a whole.
The relationship between developments in Indochina and the 
militarization of the ASEAN region in the 1975-81 period is not as 
clear cut as is often suggested. For example, to say that the ASEAN 
states "have more than doubled their military spending since the 
communist victories in Indochina in 1975"^ is comparable to the 
common assertion that food prices in Britain have increased by a 
factor of since the United Kingdom joined the EEC: the facts on 
both sides of the equation may be correct, but their linkage is merely 
implied rather than proved. A closer examination of the facts 
concerning the ASEAN states'  militarization reveals that there were 
many other factors involved in the process besides Indochina, and that 
any attempt to link the phenomenon directly to an alleged perception 
by these states of an increasingly serious, direct military security 
threat emanating from Indochina is highly misleading. Nevertheless, 
"regional instability" after 1975 and a more specific "Vietnamese 
threat" after the invasion of Cambodia often provided useful
34 Francis Daniel, International Herald Tribune, 30 September 1982.
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just if icat ions for military developments which the ASEAN 
polit ical and military leaders saw as desirable for a broad 
reasons.
s ta tes ' 
range of
CHAPTER 9
THE ASEAN STATES' POLITICAL RESPONSES TO 
INDOCHINESE DEVELOPMENTS, 1975-78
The governments of the ASEAN states saw, or claimed to see, the 
communist states of Indochina as posing a wide var ie ty  of securi ty 
threats during the 1975-81 period. But a careful examination of these 
threat assessments makes i t  clear that concern with d i rec t  m i l i t a r y  
threats from Indochina, Indochinese sponsorship of local communist 
insurgents, and the f low of Indochinese refugees in to  the ASEAN region 
were often exaggerated and manipulated by the ASEAN governments. On 
the other hand, less tangible secur i ty  concerns re la t ing  to changes in 
the regional balance of power and the broad p o l i t i c a l ,  social and 
economic challenges posed to the ASEAN states' non-communist systems 
were more central to the ASEAN governments' threat perceptions. This 
was re f lec ted in the nature of these governments' p o l i t i c a l  responses 
to the phenomenon of communist Indochina.
Responses to the P o l i t i c a l  and Socioeconomic Challenge of 
Indochina, 1975-77
There was a widespread appreciation in the ASEAN states'  ru l ing  
c i rc les  that the end of the Second Indochina War need not necessari ly 
be ser iously detrimental to th e i r  countr ies'  secur i ty .  Although there 
was anxiety w i th in  governmental bodies concerned with internal 
: securi ty over the possible encouragement which the communist v ic to r ie s  
might provide to revolut ionary movements in the ASEAN region, there 
was also an expectation that the Indochinese states would wish to
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concentrate their energies on post-war reconstruction, and the 
consolidation of their poli t ical ,  economic and social systems, in the 
short to medium term at least.  There appeared to be grounds for 
hoping that the common interest of communist and non-communist 
Southeast Asia in peaceful development would overcome mutual suspicion 
and host i l i ty.  Two basic strands to the ASEAN states'  attempts to 
adjust their policies to the new regional environment were 
discernible. While attempting individually and collectively to 
strengthen their own poli t ical ,  economic and social systems to 
withstand the communist challenge, they also made efforts to establish 
cooperative relationships with the Indochinese states.  But this is 
not to say that the ASEAN states were uniformly successful in 
achieving these dual objectives, or even that these policies were 
necessarily pursued wholeheartedly.
Withstanding the Challenge of Indochinese Communism:
National and Regional "Resilience"
The events of 1975 did not significantly alter the general and 
well-established consensus in the ASEAN countries'  polit ical and 
military el i tes  that "security" did not involve merely the deterrence 
of and defence against external military threats.  Indeed, the 
principal concern was with actual or potential rebellion against the 
rule of government by revolutionary and ethnic-separatist insurgents. 
Counter-insurgency experience in the Philippines, Malaya, Indochina 
and elsewhere since the late 1940s had demonstrated that such low 
intensity security threats were most successfully countered not by the
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large-scale application of military force but by undermining the 
insurgents'  support through the implementation of land reforms, the 
improvement of public infrastructure and u t i l i t i e s ,  the eradication of 
official  corruption, the improvement of governmental responsiveness 
and other popular measures. There was s t i l l  a role for the armed 
forces, but this lay in the careful gathering of intelligence and in 
adopting many of the insurgents' own tactics through patient,  arduous 
and manpower-intensive patrolling on the ground. There were many 
reasons for the defeat of the anti-communist forces in Indochina but 
i t  was reasonably clear that an unwillingness to make fundamental 
social,  economic and polit ical reforms, and an over-reliance on 
military technology and firepower were key factors in the debacle. 
Moreover, the anti-communist regimes' reliance on American and other 
foreign military support had undermined their polit ical legitimacy and 
enhanced and nationalist credentials of the communists.
The Indonesian leadership provided the most highly formulated 
theoretical framework for increasing the abili ty of their country 
(and, indeed, the non-communist Southeast Asian countries in general) 
to counter -- or hopefully to pre-empt -- domestic security threats 
which might be exacerbated in the wake of the Indochinese communists' 
successes. The essential precepts of ketahanan nasional or "national 
resilience" were:
. . .  a total domestic development effort,  sustained by a 
strong national spir i t  of ideology that overcomes 
partisan divisiveness and social unrest, brings 
tangible technocratic leadership, and rejects alien 
ideologies.*
1 Justus M. van der Kroef, "National Security, Defense Strategy and 
Foreign Policy Perceptions in Indonesia", Orbis, Vol. 20, No. 2 
(Summer 1980), p. 480. Official and semi-official Indonesian 
definitions of "national resilience" in the English language are 
less concise than van der Kroef's. For a selection, see National 
Resi1ience (Jakarta), Vol. 1, No. 1 (March 1982).
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Statements by leading members of the Indonesian government at the
time of the f inal  communist v ic tor ies  in Indochina indicated that  they
saw such a developmental approach to securi ty,  emphasizing the need
for economic progress,  po l i t i ca l  s t a b i l i t y  and high national morale,
as an appropriate response to the implici t  challenge posed by the new
regional balance of power. According to Major General Ali Murtopo
(head of the Pres ident ' s  special ass i s tants  - -  Aspri), i t  was
necessary for the ASEAN countries to improve public welfare and
"narrow the gap between r ich and poor" to reduce the opportunit ies for
2
communist subversion. Foreign Minister Adam Malik echoed these
sentiments.  Suharto's former ambassador in Saigon, General Dharsono,
saw the need to "enhance r es i l i ence  in all  f i e lds"  as one of the
4
principal  lessons for Indonesia of the "fal l  of Indochina". Although 
"national res i l ience" was an Indonesian formula, po l i t i c i ans  in the 
other ASEAN countries expressed similar outlooks in response to the
5
communist successes in 1975.
In the view of many pol i t i c i ans  and o f f i c i a l s  concerned with
2 Agence France Presse,  12 and 18 April 1975 (FBIS-APA-75 and -76, 
17 and 18 April 1975).
3 Antara in English, 0907 gmt, 15 April 1975 (SWB FE/4880/A3/1, 
17 April 1975).
4 Justus M. van der Kroef, "S.E. Asia af ter  the Viet Nam War: 
Securi ty problems and s t r a tegie s" ,  Pacific Community, Vol. 7, No. 
3 (April 1976), pp. 379-80.
5 See, for example, comments by Lee Kuan Yew, Mirror (Singapore), 
19 May 1975; Juan Ponce Enrile (Philippine Defence Secretary),  
"S.E. Asia af ter  the Viet Nam War. . .",  p. 391, 24 April 1975; and 
Major General Chatchai Choonhavan (Thai Foreign Minister) ,  
Bangkok home service,  1300 gmt, 14 April 1975 (SWB FE/4883/A3/17, 
21 April 1975).
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security in the ASEAN states, "resilience" or self-rel iance was 
necessary on a regional as well as a national level in Southeast 
Asia's new strategic environment. Like "national resil ience", the 
idea of "regional resil ience" was expounded most forcefu lly  by the 
Indonesian regime. According to Malik, writ ing in 1974, Indonesia's 
concept of "national resil ience" encompassed other Southeast Asian 
countries.^ Murtopo asserted that increased collective as well as 
individual efforts by the ASEAN states were necessary to accelerate 
the pace of their economic development in order to combat foreign- 
inspired subversion.^ Indonesia's ASEAN partners were in general 
agreement that the enhancement of "regional resilience" was a 
desirable objective: indeed, the formation of ASEAN i t s e l f  in 1967
owed much to a conviction on the part of regional leaders that such a 
cooperative venture would be a useful instrument in their ef forts to 
eliminate the economic and social deprivation which had proved such a 
fe r t i l e  breeding ground for communism.
An important aspect of the concepts of national and regional 
"resilience" -- at least in the Indonesian formulation --  was their 
general lack of emphasis on conventional m i l i tary  force as a means of 
achieving security. Not surprisingly, the mil i tary  regime in Jakarta 
envisaged a key role for the armed forces in building "national 
resilience" (a concept which was partly derived from the army's own 
" te r r i to r ia l  defence" doctrine). But this role lay pr incipal ly  in
6 Adam Malik, "Regional Cooperation in International Pol i t ics",  
Indonesian Times, 29 October 1974.
7 Ali Moertopo, "Future Indonesian-U.S. Relations: A View from
Jakarta", Pacif ic Community, Vol. 7, No. 4 (July 1976), p. 582.
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maintaining internal secur i ty  by supervising soc ia l ,  economic and
p o l i t i c a l  development at grassroots leve l .  High m i l i t a r y  budgets were 
rejected as they would reduce the funds avai lable fo r  development 
programmes. Substantial  m i l i t a r y  dependence on extra-regional powers 
was eschewed because of the danger that th is  would lead to excessive 
purchases of over-sophist icated weapons, whi le undermining the popular
o
morale and wil l -power so crucia l  in developing "national res i l ience" .
On the other hand, some senior Indonesian m i l i t a r y  o f f ice rs  favoured
m i l i t a r y  cooperation between the ASEAN states as a component of
"regional re s i l ience" .  On several occasions in the early  1970s,
Jakarta's Minister of Defence, General Maraden Panggabean, suggested
that the ASEAN states should cooperate m i l i t a r i l y  on a more
formalized, m u l t i la te ra l  basis, but th is  view did not represent the
g
dominant a t t i tude  w i th in  the regime.
The communist v ic to r ie s  in Indochina provided a substantial  
impetus to ASEAN's members to in tens i fy  th e i r  cooperation through the 
Association as a means of enhancing th e i r  indiv idual and co l lec t ive  
" res i l ience"  in the face of what they perceived as a serious challenge 
to th e i r  secur i ty .  In the years between 1967 and 1975, ASEAN had
provided i t s  diverse members with a forum in which they developed a
habit of consul tat ion,  and made s ig n i f ica n t  s tr ides towards overcoming
8 Sayidiman Suryohadiprojo, "The T e r r i t o r ia l  Defense Concept", 
Indonesian Quarterly , Vo l . 1, No. 4 (July 1973), p. 68.
9 Panggabean suggested the m i l i t a r i z a t io n  of ASEAN in January 1971 
and December 1974. But on other occasions (as in Apr i l  1972 and 
February 1976) he adhered to the Indonesian regime's normal l ine 
that only b i la te ra l  m i l i t a r y  cooperation was acceptable. See 
van der Kroef, "National S e c u r i t y . . . " ,  pp. 488-89.
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the intra-regional  suspicions of the early and mid 1960s .^  But 
despi te a profusion of sanguine and rather  complacent communiques in 
ASEAN's early years,  i t  took the j o l t  provided by the collapse of non­
communist Indochina to t r igger  more tangible economic and pol i t i ca l  
cooperation.
The summit meeting of ASEAN's heads of government on Bali in 
February 1976 was the culmination of a period of intense consultat ion 
and negotiat ion following the f a l l  of Phnom Penh and Saigon. At the 
summit, the leaders of Indonesia's four ASEAN partners emphasized 
t he i r  agreement with the idea that  economic and social development and 
cooperation were essent ial  instruments with which to face the new 
regional cha l l enge . ^  This consensus was ref lected in the formal 
public statements issued by the meeting, which enshrined more 
exp l i c i t ly  than the Bangkok declarat ion (which had establ ished ASEAN 
in 1967) the idea that  securi ty could be at tained through the 
enhancement of national and regional " res i l i ence" .  The Treaty of 
Amity and Co-operation in Southeast Asia expressed a determination to 
strengthen "national res i l ience" in "p o l i t i c a l ,  economic socio­
cul tural  as well as securi ty f ie lds"  (Art icle 11) and to "co-operate
in all f i e ld s  for the promotion of regional res i l ience" (Art icle
1212). In the principal  resolut ion of the Declaration of ASEAN
10 For a concise analysis of ASEAN's progress before 1975, see Roger
Irvine,  "The Formative Years of ASEAN: 1967-75", in Alison
Broinowski (ed. ) ,  Understanding ASEAN (London: Macmillan, 1982),
pp. 8-36.
11 10 Years ASEAN (Jakarta:  ASEAN Secre tar ia t ,  1978), pp. 93, 98-9,
104.
12 For the text  of the Treaty, see ASEAN Documents Series 1967-1985
(Jakarta:  ASEAN Secre tar ia t ,  1985), pp. 26-28.
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Concord, the Associat ion' s  members agreed to "eliminate threats  posed
13by subvers ion. . .  thus strengthening national and ASEAN res i l i ence" .
Moreover, under the Declaration the ASEAN s ta tes  adopted a "programme
of action" involving specif ic measures to enhance p o l i t i c a l ,  economic,
soc ia l ,  cul tural  and securi ty coopera t ion .^
I t  is not al together  clear  that  the f lur ry  of meetings and
declarat ions  which followed the Indochinese communists' triumphs in
1975 led to any rea l ly  s igni f icant  strengthening of the individual and
col l ec t ive  "res i l ience"  of the ASEAN s ta tes  in the late  1970s.
ASEAN's members maintained impressive annual rates  of economic
growth, mainly in the 6-10% range (in terms of gross domestic 
15product).  Average per capi ta income also grew s igni f i cant ly .
Although the ASEAN countries (except Singapore) did not match the 
performance of developing East Asian economies such as those of Hong 
Kong, South Korea and Taiwan, even the weakest ASEAN economies (those 
of Indonesia and the Phil ippines) displayed considerably greater 
dynamism than those of the Indochinese c o u n t r i e s . ^
Although the ASEAN s t a te s '  economies, and average per capi ta 
incomes, continued to grow f a i r l y  rapidly in the late  1970s, th i s  did
13 Declaration of ASEAN Concord (Jakarta:  ASEAN Secre tar ia t ,  1976),
p. 1.
14 Ibid.
15 See tables r e l a t i ng  to "Performance of ASEAN Economies" in Asia
Yearbook 1979 (Hong Kong: Far Eastern Economic Review, 1979),
p. 84 and Asia Yearbook 1980 (Hong Kong: Far Eastern Economic
Review 1980), p. 83.
16 See "Regional Performance Figures",  Asia Yearbook 1983, (Hong
Kong: Far Eastern Economic Review, pp. 6-7, 1983).
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not mean that  these countries made s igni f icant  progress towards
conquering the socioeconomic problems which undermined the i r  "national
r es i l i ence" .  The Singaporean and, to a lesser  extent ,  Malaysian
governments were broadly successful in t rans la t ing t he i r  countries '
rapid growth rates into higher l iving standards for the masses. But
in the three least  developed ASEAN countries - -  Indonesia, Thailand
and the Phil ippines -- there was l i t t l e  indication of any noteworthy
amelioration of the basic rural problems of landlessness,  indebtedness
and unemployment or of any improvement in the incomes and l iving
condit ions of the rapidly enlarging urban pro l e t a r ia t .
Indeed, there were signs that  the lot  of many ordinary rural and
urban people in these countries was actual ly deter iorat ing in the late
1970s. For example, the real wages of workers in the Phil ippines
continued a decline which had begun in the early 1 9 7 0 s . B y  1979,
real agricul tural  incomes were only 60% of what they had been in 
181974. During his year in power in 1976-77, Thailand's extreme
right-wing Prime Minister Thanin Kraivichien made a policy of
attempting to cut back real wages, exacerbating "a considerable
erosion of real incomes not only for unskilled labour, but for the
19urban work force as a whole". According to a World Bank report  in 
1978, successive Thai governments' pol icies  had tended:
17 Leo Gonzaga, FEER, 17 November 1978, p. 51; Justus M. van der
Kroef, Communism in Southeast Asia (London: Macmillan, 1981),
p. 271; Robert B. Stauffer ,  "Phil ippine Authoritarianism: 
Framework for Peripheral 'Development'", Pacif ic Affairs ,  Vol. 
50, No. 3 (Fall 1977), p. 381.
18 Ho Kwon Ping, FEER, 29 June 1979, p. 52.
19 Richard Nations, FEER, 9 June 1978, pp. 18-20.
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. . .  to contribute to, rather than help reduce, welfare 
disparity among the country's population. In recent 
years i t  has become increasingly difficult  to discern a 
sense of direction and purpose in public sector 
behaviour in any way comparable to its stated 
intentions and object ives.^
In Indonesia, governmental neglect of agricultural development
continued in the late 1970s. Real agricultural wages declined and in
Java landlessness increased rapidly. By 1979, three quarters of
Java's agricultural families did not own enough land for subsistence,
21and nutritional levels were worsening. Even in relatively affluent
Malaysia, there were serious problems: the government failed to meet
the socioeconomic targets set in the Third Malaysia Plan (1976-80),
and the bumiputra policy appeared to be heightening inequality within
the Malay community. By the early 1980s, the average paddy farmer
22earned 20-25% less in real terms than he had five years earl ier.
The socioeconomic problems of the four larger ASEAN members were 
of course present in many other Third World countries and could not, 
even with the best will in the world, have been resolved quickly. But 
despite their declaratory emphasis on the need to strengthen "national 
resilience", the governments of these countries did not pursue this 
objective wholeheartedly in the 1975-81 period. If "national
20 Thailand: Towards a Development Strategy of Full Participation
(Washington: World Bank, 1978), pp. 27-54.
21 Seth Lipsky and Raphael Pura, "Indonesia: Testing Time for the 
'New Order'", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 57, No. 1 (Fall 1978), 
p. 191.
22 Ho Kwon Ping, "ASEAN: The Five Countries", in Broinowski (ed.),
p. 221.
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resilience" was to become a rea l i ty ,  those governments needed to
confront some important questions regarding their  socioeconomic
policies. Most fundamentally, i t  was necessary to recognize that
aggregated GDP growth figures did not necessarily imply that
"development" was occuring in a manner beneficial to a particular
country as a whole. In fact, such figures often obscured widening
disparit ies in wealth between both rural and urban social classes and
between central and peripheral geographical regions. I f  these
disparit ies were not to exacerbate divisive po l i t ica l  tensions which
had the potential to destroy the fragi le cohesion of the larger ASEAN
states' po l i t ica l ,  economic and social systems, a far greater emphasis
on social justice -- the distr ibution of the benefits of growth -- was 
23called for.  I f  the ASEAN governments had been t ru ly  committed to 
strengthening "national resil ience", they (part icular ly  the Thai, 
Philippine and Indonesian regimes) would have concentrated far greater 
attention and resources on measures to effect radical and
comprehensive land reform, to f i x  higher minimum wage levels and to 
ensure a fa irer  balance in the distribution of benefits between 
regions.
Their very nature made i t  extremely d i f f i c u l t  for the regimes 
which ruled the three largest ASEAN countries to implement the 
policies necessary to strengthen "national resil ience". These
23 This was recognized in Art ic le 3 of the Declaration of ASEAN 
Concord, under which ASEAN's members agreed to " . . .  intensify 
cooperation in economic and social development, with particular 
emphasis on the promotion of social ju s t i c e . . . " .  Declaration of 
ASEAN Concord, p. 2.
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luthoritarian regimes' rather narrow power bases were located
)rincipally in the military, business, landowning, bureaucratic and
:echnocratic el i tes :  given that the regimes thus depended for their
survival on the support of these elements (who generally saw their
interests as coincident with the maintenance of a social, economic and
political status quo which tolerated exploitation and corruption)
rather than the population as a whole, there was l i t t l e  incentive to
jndertake fundamental reforms. As one commentator has observed with
reference to Thailand, "public policy tends to be shaped by the
interests of small, usually urban-based higher-income groups, rather
than the declared social and economic priori t ies of the nation". In
Indonesia, "the inadequacy of the steps taken so far to alleviate the
condition of the mass of the people is indicative of the sociological
character of the ruling groups which appears to inhibit them from
24init iat ing appropriate reforms".
The continuing failure of the Indonesian, Philippine and Thai 
governments to respond effectively to their countries'  chronic 
socioeconomic i l l s  boosted popular opposition to their dominance in 
the late 1970s. In the face of such challenges, the Indonesian 
government attempted to use the need for "national resilience" 
following the communist victories in Indochina as a device for 
bolstering i ts  tenuous legitimacy, and particularly as a just ification 
for the repression of forces which challenged the status quo but whose
24 Ho Kwon Ping, "ASEAN: The Five Countries", p. 218; S.B.D. de
Silva, "The Region: Economic Trends -- Inflation,
Industrialization and Growth", Southeast Asian Affairs 1975 
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Affairs, 1975), p. 12.
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participat ion in the po l i t ica l  system was probably necessary i f  a
25tru ly  durable domestic order was to be constructed. The Indonesian 
authorit ies used the Indochinese communist victories as one pretext 
for promoting a "national ideological fanaticism" based on the 
Panjasi1 a (or " f ive principles"), which was effect ively a means of 
depoli t ic iz ing Indonesian society. The events in Indochina were used 
as a jus t i f ica t ion  by the Marcos regime in the Philippines for the 
continuation of martial law, and by the Thai right-wing for opposing
and eventually overthrowing the democratically-elected government in 
Bangkok.^ The effect of this manipulation of the idea that domestic 
po l i t ica l  sol idar i ty  was necessary in the new regional environment was 
to undermine "resil ience" by radicalizing opposition groups deprived 
of a constitutional voice, thus adding a po l i t ica l  dimension to the 
widening social and economic polarization within the larger ASEAN 
countries.
Given that at least three of the f ive ASEAN governments proved 
incapable of implementing policies which would strengthen "national 
resilience", in the sense of ameliorating fundamental socioeconomic 
and po l i t ica l  weaknesses, the strengthening of "resilience" at the 
regional level could not progress far.  One ASEAN state's 
suscept ibi l i ty to insurgency, and hence interference from outside, 
could easily undermine the "resilience" of neighbouring ASEAN members. 
Ultimately, the strengthening of "regional resil ience" was dependent
25 van der Kroef, "National Securty...", pp. 480-81.
26 Justuf M. van der Kroef, "S.E. Asia after the Viet Nam War...", 
pp. 378, 391.
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on the success of the weakest ASEAN states in overcoming th e i r  chronic 
socioeconomic problems. In the la te  1970s, the ASEAN states increased 
th e i r  cooperation on securi ty  matters, and p a r t i c u la r l y  in counter­
insurgency in border areas. In one sense th is  cooperation re f lected 
the readiness of the countries concerned to pool th e i r  e f fo r ts  as a
means of enhancing "regional res i l ie nce " ,  in l ine  with th e i r
27commitment in the Declaration of ASEAN Concord to continue securi ty
cooperation "on a non-ASEAN basis". But in another sense, i t  was
evidence of the continuing fa i l u re  of some of the ASEAN governments to
el iminate the condit ions which engendered th e i r  countr ies '  in ternal
secur i ty  problems in the f i r s t  place.
Apart from the obstacles posed to the improvement of "regional
res i l ience"  by the weaknesses of ind iv idual ASEAN states, the
divergent national in te rests  of various ASEAN members stood in the way
of closer regional cooperation. This is not to say that ASEAN did not
achieve some s t r i k in g  successes in the 1975-78 period. In p a r t icu la r ,
the Association forged ahead with the in te n s i f i c a t io n  and
in s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t io n  of i t s  re la t ions  with the indus t r ia l ized  West and 
28Japan. ASEAN was able to apply coordinated pressure on these 
"dialogue partners" to secure improved access fo r  i t s  members' exports 
and to promote fore ign investment in the region. But, as Lee Kuan Yew 
said, i t  was "easier to deal with ASEAN's external partners, than sor t
27 Declaration of ASEAN Concord, p. 7.
28 See Arnfinn Jorgensen-Dahl, Regional Organization and Order in
Southeast Asia (London: Macmillan, 1982), pp. 145-50.
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out the in t ra-reg ional  arrangements between the (ASEAN) partners 
29themselves".
Despite a f l u r r y  of meetings and a p r o l i f e ra t io n  of ASEAN bodies
a f te r  the Bal i summit, economic cooperation between the Associat ion's
members proved problematic and slow in implementation. Indonesia and
Malaysia were loath to agree to t a r i f f  reductions which might leave
th e i r  f le d g l in g  industr ies defenceless against competi tion from the
other members, so the agreement on Preferentia l  Trading Agreements
30signed in January 1977 was necessari ly gradual is t in approach. The
scheme to implement a series of j o i n t  indus tr ia l  projects fa l te red
because of c o n f l i c ts  between the selected projects and industr ies
already ex is t ing  in the region: fo r  th is  reason, Singapore's planned
diesel engine plant was u l t im a te ly  dropped from the scehme 
31completely.
Although p o l i t i c a l  cooperation between ASEAN's members general ly
fared be t ter  than the Associat ion's stymied economic dimension, i t  was
by no means uniformly successful. The Bangkok Declaration, by which
ASEAN was establ ished in 1967, emphasized economic, social and
32cu l tu ra l  cooperation but i t  was c lear from the very beginning that 
p o l i t i c a l  motives underlay the decisions of the f i v e  states involved
29 Lee Kuan Yew, speaking in August 1978, quoted by David I rv ine ,
"Making Haste Less Slowly: ASEAN from 1975", in Broinowski
( ed. ) ,  p. 64.
30 For the tex t  of th is  agreement, see ASEAN Documents Series 1967- 
1985, pp. 179-184.
31 David I rv in e ,  pp. 283-93.
32 For the Declarat ion's tex t ,  see ASEAN Documents Series 1967-1985, 
pp. 17-18.
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to join the Association. In particular, the members saw ASEAN as a
mechanism for overcoming the legacy of their recent disputes with each
other. In the late 1970s, ASEAN continued to play this role, but
latent tensions and clashes of interest remained. For example,
although President Marcos promised at ASEAN's Kuala Lumpur summit in
1977 to abandon the Philippines' claim to the Malaysian state of
33Sabah, Manila did not formally renounce its irredentist ambition and 
bilateral relations between Kuala Lumpur and Manila remained strained. 
The ASEAN states' increasing cooperation on security matters sometimes 
highlighted the divergent as well as convergent interests of the 
states in question, as in the examples of Malaysian and Thai
sensitivity to the presence of Singaporean and Malaysian forces 
(respectively) on their soil.
Accommodating Communist Indochina: Towards a New Regional Order?
The second principal aspect of the ASEAN states' attempts to 
adjust their policies to the novel regional environment involved an 
effort to reduce the security threats perceived in the new situation, 
by integrating communist Indochina into a system of regional order. 
Although there was by no means complete unanimity within individual 
ASEAN governments or between the ASEAN states that the communist
33 10 Years A S E A N , p. 164.
34 Kuala Lumpur refused to allow Singaporean forces access to
Malaysian training areas or even joint exercises between the two 
countries' forces, and there were periodic disruptions in 
cooperation between Thai and Malaysian forces against Communist 
Party of Malaya guerillas. See Sheldon W. Simon, "The ASEAN 
States: Obstacles to Security Cooperation, Orbis, Summer 1978,
pp. 420-25.
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Indochinese s ta tes  were potent ial ly sui table  partners for regional
cooperation rather  than ineluctable adversaries,  the former view
provided the dominant perspective within ASEAN in the 1975-78 period.
Could ASEAN i t s e l f  provide a sui table framework for cooperation
between Southeast Asia ' s  communist and non-communist s ta tes  af ter
1975? The 1967 Bangkok Declaration talked of the Association being
"open for  par t ic ipa t ion to all s ta tes  in the South East Asian 
35Region". But as the confl ict  in Indochina continued in the late
1960s and ear ly  1970s, i t  seemed ever less l ike ly that  Indochina could
be brought into ASEAN. Although the ASEAN governments (and
pa r t i cu l a r ly  the Suharto regime through i t s  Foreign Minister,  Adam
Malik) made moves towards expanding the Associat ion' s  membership to
include Laos, Cambodia, North Vietnam and South Vietnam, i t  was
clear tha t  meaningful part icipat ion by Vietnam and Laos was impossible
while they remained divided by war. Sihanouk was unwilling to
jeopardize Cambodia's neut ra l i ty  by joining ASEAN.
The Paris Peace Agreement in January 1973 br ie f ly  revivi f ied the
idea of enlarging ASEAN, and inspired the ASEAN Foreign Ministers,
meeting in Kuala Lumpur the following month, to cal l  for a meeting of
all  Southeast Asian countries (an "Asian Forum") "at  an appropriate
time in the future" as a step in this  d i rec t ion.  I t  was also decided
to es tabl i sh  an ASEAN Coordinating Committee for the Reconstruction
37and Rehabi l i tat ion of the Indochinese States ,  although i t  was soon
35 See "The ASEAN Declaration" reprinted in ASEAN Documents Series 
1967-1985, p. 18.
36 See Jorgensen-Dahl, pp. 96, 98-98.
37 "Five-Way Spl i t " ,  FEER, 26 February 1973, pp. 11-12.
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evident that the ASEAN states could not agree on what type of
assistance to provide, and that any such assistance was inappropriate
in the circumstances of continuing confl ic t  which prevailed in
Indochina after the Peace Agreement. Most importantly, i t  was clear
that the North Vietnamese regarded ASEAN with great suspicion, because
of the support given by members of the organization to the United
States' war e f for t .  This led Hanoi to reject invitations to send
38observers to ASEAN Ministerial Meetings.
Even after the 1975 communist victories in Indochina, important
voices in ASEAN (particular ly that of the Malaysian Prime Minister,
Tun Razak) continued to express the view that the Indochinese
39countries could and should be involved in the Association. But
quite apart from the fact that Hanoi's hostile att itude towards ASEAN
as an organization clearly indicated that Vietnam at least would not
wish to join the Association, the main trend of thinking within ASEAN
was against any expansion to include Indochina. The predominant view
within the conservative and cautious ASEAN governments was that the
potential value of ASEAN as a "practical way of safeguarding against
the possible adverse consequences of the emergence of revolutionary
Indochina" outweighed the dubious benefits of transforming the
Association into an ideologically-mixed "community of Southeast 
40Asia". The press statement issued by the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting
38 Roger Irvine, p. 31.
39 See K. Das, FEER, 18 July 1975, p. 284.
40 These two views of ASEAN's role were expressed at the May 1975 
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Kuala Lumpur by the Singaporean 
Foreign Minister (Rajaratnam) and the Malaysian Prime Minister 
(Tun Razak) respectively.
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in May 1975 made no mention of the possibili ty of expanding ASEAN's
membership. But despite the fact that ASEAN's members had decided, in
effect,  to maintain the Association's non-communist ideological purity
as a basis for creating "regional resilience", ASEAN's Foreign
Ministers left  open the possibili ty of an amicable and cooperative
relationship between the two halves of an ideologically-divided 
41region.
Indonesian Attitudes Towards Regional Order and Indochina
As with the formulas of national and regional "resilience", the
Indonesian regime provided much of the inspiration for the idea that
although i t  was not appropriate for the communist Indochinese states
to join ASEAN, they (particularly Vietnam) should be involved as
partners of the ASEAN states in creating a new regional order. While
their virulent anti-communism after the attempted coup of 1965 ensured
that some elements within the Indonesian armed forces favoured
policies aimed at bolstering the conservative regimes in Indochina
before 1975 (particularly in view of the s t i l l  close alliance between
42Hanoi and Beijing), on balance there was s t i l l  a widespread and 
real is t ic  appreciation in the Indonesian foreign policy-making el i te  
that the struggle of the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong against 
the American-backed Saigon regime was inspired as much by nationalism
41 Harvey Stockwin, FEER, 30 May 1975, pp. 22-23.
42 See Lie Tek Tjeng, "Vietnamese Nationalism: An Indonesian
Perspective" (Paper presented at the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung 
Round Table Conference on "Crisis Region Indochina -- Causes and 
Effects", Jakarta, 4-6 March 1981), p. 5.
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as communism. The ultimate communist victory in Vietnam was neither 
unexpected nor unwelcome in Jakarta. By the early 1970s there was 
consensus among the makers of Indonesian foreign policy that Vietnam 
would eventually be unified on communist terms.^ Moreover, the
Indonesian military leadership s t i l l  saw China as the major ( i f  long­
term) external threat to Indonesian security. Indonesian respect for
44Vietnamese nationalism bolstered by evidence of a widening r i f t
between Beijing and Hanoi, suggested that a unified Vietnam might act
as a welcome barrier to any future attempts by China to expand i ts
influence into the ASEAN region. Although i t  was clear in 1975 that
i t  was neither possible nor desirable (particularly in view of
Jakarta's wish to maintain the Association's cohesion as a vehicle for
Indonesia's aspirations to sub-regional leadership) for a united
communist Vietnam to join ASEAN, the Indonesian leadership hoped that
Vietnam might be willing to cooperate with the ASEAN states
45(especially Indonesia) in maintaining "regional order".
In the Indonesian regime's conception, the achievement of a
43 According to Ali Alatas, who was Secretary, Directorate General 
of Political Affairs in Jakarta's Department of Foreign Affairs 
in 1972-73. See "Summary Record of Proceedings", Seminar on 
Aspects of the Australian-Indonesian Relationship, Canberra, 
18-20 October 1979, p. 97.
44 According to Suharto in April 1975, the recent developments in 
Indochina were "nothing but a stage in an incomplete 
decolonization process -- a process of nation-building in line 
with national identity". Jakarta home service, 1250 gmt, 
24 April 1975 (SWB FE/4888/A3/5, 28 April 1975).
45 Michael Leiter, Conflict and Regional Order in Southeast Asia
(London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi
Paper No. 162, 1980), p. 31.
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satisfactory regional order implied the resolution of conf l ic t  within
and between Southeast Asian states by these countries themselves with
the help of their regional associates. The legitimate interests of
extra-regional large powers would be accommodated, but undue influence
or interference --  especially the maintenance of m i l i ta ry  bases or
alliances --  by these powers (particular ly  China, but also the USSR,
46the United States and Japan) would ideally be excluded. Most
importantly, a satisfactory regional order would involve the implic i t
acknowledgement by other Southeast Asian states (the ASEAN members, at
47least) of Indonesia's leadership. The experience of "Confrontation" 
in the mid-1960s had shown the dangers of using the mil i tary  
instrument to pursue this goal: the Jakarta regime saw that po l i t ica l
means would now have to be used. ASEAN had provided the framework for 
the reconciliation of i ts  members after their bi lateral disputes in 
the mid-1960s, and Jakarta now saw i t  as the vehicle for f u l f i l l i n g  
i ts  aspirations to leadership among the non-communist regional
46 This atti tude was derived from Indonesian ideas about the meaning 
of nationalism which, according to Suharto, involved being 
"master in one's own house", and in control of one's own destiny. 
The experiences of Dutch colonialism, American interventionism in 
the 1950s and Chinese interference in the 1960s all  contributed 
to this view.
47 Indonesia's aspirations to regional leadership were derived from
its  large population, wealth in natural resources, economic 
potential, cultural and histor ical importance and geostrategic 
position. According to Jusuf Wanandi, "Indonesia, w i l l ing or 
not, is objectively the natural leader in ASEAN and in Southeast 
Asia". See Jusuf Wanandi, "Japan and Australia: the Security
and Prosperity Connection", in Japan-Austral ia Relations: Past,
Present and Future (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and
International Studies, 1979), p. 63.
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48States. The Suharto regime hoped in 1975 that cooperation on a less 
institutionalized basis would reconcile the ASEAN and Indochinese
states,  thus reducing opportunities for interference by extra-regional
49powers. Although Jakarta could not hope to subordinate a unified
communist Vietnam to Indonesian leadership, an ini t iat ive to open
dialogue with Indochina had the potential to revive Indonesia's
5Dflagging credibili ty as the " f i r s t  among equals" in ASEAN.
In the event, Indonesia was successful in persuading i ts ASEAN
partners not only to hold the Association's f i r s t  Heads of Government
meeting on Bali (in February 1976) but also to establish the permanent
ASEAN secretariat in Jakarta, with Indonesia's Lieutenant-General
51Hartono Dharsono as i ts f i r s t  Secretary-General. More importantly, 
the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia agreed at the 
Bali summit incorporated Indonesian ideas about regional order. The 
Treaty set out a basic code for inter-state relations in the region, 
stressing the inviolability of national sovereignty and terr i tor ial
48 See Michael Leiter, Indonesia's Foreign Policy (London: George
Allen & Unwin for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 
1983), pp. 121, 142-43.
49 See statements by Malik just  before the fall  of Saigon and at the 
ASEAN Foreign Ministers' meeting in Kuala Lumpur and soon 
afterwards. Antara in English. Jakarta home service, 1200 gmt, 
13 May 1975 (SWB FE/4904/A3/9, 15 May 1975), 28 April 1975. See 
also Ali Alatas, "Summary Record of Proceedings", pp. 97-98, and 
ASEAN National Secretariat of Indonesia, "Statement on Indonesian 
Foreign Policy and ASEAN Regional Cooperation", Indonesia 
Magazine, No. 27 (September 1974).
50 Indonesian leadership in ASEAN had been undermined particularly 
by the decisions of Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines to 
establish diplomatic relations with Jakarta's bete noire, 
Beijing, in 1974-75.
51 See David Irvine, pp. 55-56.
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integrity and the peaceful settlement of disputes. Significantly, the
52Treaty was "open to accession by other states" -- a clear intimation 
that i t  could serve as a mechanism for building polit ical links 
between the ASEAN and Indochinese states.
Despite the ASEAN governments' virtually unanimous expressions of 
goodwill towards Indochina in the months after the communist victories 
there -- and particularly at the Bali summit -- their attitudes, 
policies and actual progress towards establishing cooperative
relationships with the Indochinese states were by no means uniform in 
the 1975-78 period. Differences in security, geographical and 
historical relationships with Indochina and attitudes towards security 
links with extra-regional powers all contributed to this diversity. 
There was also a considerable degree of ambivalence within the foreign 
policy making el i tes of individual ASEAN states,  due to institutional 
differences of interests.
There were differences of outlook on Indochina even within the
Indonesian regime. Some policy-makers in Jakarta, particularly within
the military, disagreed with the Foreign Ministry's view of Vietnam as
basically benign and a potential collaborator in establishing a
53regional order beneficial to Indonesia. There was concern in the
52 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (Article 18), 
reprinted in ASEAN Documents Series 1967-1985, p. 28.
53 Although the Foreign Ministry was heavily influenced by the armed 
forces (particularly through the positioning of senior military 
officers in key policy-making areas), Foreign Ministers Adam 
Malik and (from 1978) Mochtar Kusumaatmadja frequently supported 
policies at odds with the views of the military leadership. See 
David Jenkins, FEER, 29 August 1980, p. 11.
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military that Vietnam might use diplomatic and ultimately military
means to compete with Indonesia for the polit ical and economic
54leadership of Southeast Asia. Hanoi's forthright rhetoric in
support of the Fretil in resistance movement in East Timor and its
disagreement with Jakarta over maritime boundaries in the South China
Sea exacerbated the suspicions of those Indonesians who saw Vietnam as
55a competitor rather than a partner.
Vietnam's host i l i ty towards ASEAN as an organization and to 
Indonesia's role within the Association gave additional credence to 
the fears of those in Jakarta who doubted Hanoi's credibili ty as a 
collaborator. The stated wish of the Vietnamese to improve relations 
with individual non-communist Southeast Asian states did not stop 
Hanoi from sharply cri t icizing Indonesia for i ts  role as the "main 
prop" of Washington's new regional strategy of using ASEAN to rally 
regional anti-communist forces to thwart the progress of the Southeast
54 See David Jenkins, FEER, 24 June 1977, pp. 15-16.
55 Although the invasion of East Timor contravened the spir i t  of the
soon to be enunciated Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 
Southeast Asia, Jakarta expected the sympathy of regional 
countries for an action which i t  saw as necessary to prevent the 
Portuguese colony from becoming a base for hostile extra-regional 
powers. See Robert Lawless, "The Indonesian takeover of East 
Timor", Asian Survey, Vol. 16, No. 10 (October 1976), pp. 953, 
961-63; Gary E. Hansen, "Indonesia in 1975: National Resilience
and Continuity of the New Order's Struggle", Asian Survey, Vol. 
16, No. 2 (February 1976), p. 156 and J. Stephen Hoadley, The 
Future of Portuguese Timor (Singapore: Insti tute of Southeast
Asian Studies, 1975), p. 24. The maritime dispute with Hanoi 
gave the impression that the Vietnamese questioned Indonesia's 
sacrosanct "archipelago principle". See Leiter, Indonesia's 
Foreign Policy, p. 165.
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56Asian "revolutionary movement". Hanoi alleged that  the invasion of
East Timor was evidence of Jakar ta ' s  role as an instrument of the
57United States '  "aggressive st rategy".
In 1977 i t  appeared that  those in the armed forces who doubted
Vietnam's r e l i a b i l i t y  as a regional partner were gaining the upper
hand in an evidently continuing debate within the Indonesian regime
over rela t ions  with Hanoi. At the second ASEAN Heads of Government
meeting in August 1977, Suharto claimed that ,  in the face of Vietnam's
58h o s t i l i t y  towards ASEAN and i t s  members, "We have closed our ranks".
Senior off icers  also exerted pressure on the government to intensi fy
59mi l i ta ry  cooperation within ASEAN. But the Foreign Ministry
remained intent  on fostering bet ter  re la t ions  with Hanoi .^  The 
a l t erna t ive  would have been to abandon hope of establ ishing a regional
56 Radio Hanoi, Vietnamese News Agency in English, 0729 gmt,
22 February 1976 relaying a r t i c l e  in Quan Doi Nhan Dan,
22 February 1976 (FBIS-APA-76-39, 26 February 1976).
57 Nhan Dan quoted by hanoi VNA, 0700 gmt, 31 December 1975 
(FBIS-APA-76-2, 5 January 1976).
58 Lei ter ,  Indonesia's Foreign Pol icy, p. 163.
59 David Jenkins,  FEER, 18 March 1977, pp. 13-14.
60 See Denzil Pe i r i s ,  FEER, 3 September 1976, p. 14 and David
Jenkins'  interview with Foreign Minister Adam Malik, FEER, 
10 June 1977, p. 37. I t  has been suggested that  Malik's
ret irement as Foreign Minister in September 1977 was a t t r ibutable  
to his d i ssa t i s fac t i on  with the anti-communist tone of recent 
Indonesian foreign policy, which he allegedly believed to
jeopardize the poss ib i l i ty  of rapprochement with Indochina. But 
i t  seems more l ikely that  Malik's ret irement had been planned 
well in advance and was unconnected with any dispute over policy 
towards Indochina. Malik was appointed Vice-President in March 
1978 and retained considerable influence over foreign policy.  
" Intel l igence",  FEER, 16 September 1977, p. 7 and David Jenkins, 
FEER, 16 September 1977, p. 26.
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order based on reconcil iation, with the risk that this might result in 
a more clear-cut polarization of regional states into antagonistic 
sub-regional blocs. Such a development might provide new openings for 
large power interference in the region as well as undermining s t i l l  
further Indonesia's commitment to achieve security through "national 
resilience" rather than massive m i l i tary  expenditure.
While Indonesia's pretensions to sub-regional leadership through 
the vehicle of ASEAN posed a serious obstacle to the construction of a 
modus vivendi with the Indochinese states (or at least Vietnam and 
Laos), an independent in i t ia t iv e  by Jakarta to overcome this barrier 
seemed highly l ike ly .  Given the profoundly anti-communist 
predisposition of the Jakarta regime and the importance of a leading 
role in ASEAN to Indonesia's aspirations to be a respected medium 
power, any signif icant amelioration of relations with communist 
Indochina was l ike ly  to be dependent on a change in Hanoi's view of 
the Association.
Malaysia, Indochina and ZOPFAN
Malaysian poli t ic ians, o f f ic ia ls  and mil i tary  leaders were not 
seriously concerned in 1975 with any highly signif icant direct or 
immediate threat to their  country's security as a result of 
developments in Indochina. Coupled with continuing wariness towards 
China, this factor produced an overall perspective on Indochina which 
was close to the optimistic view prevalent in Jakarta, despite the 
Malay e l i te 's  lack of the widespread empathy with the Vietnamese 
communists evident in the Indonesian leadership.
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Bearing in mind Kuala Lumpur's security concerns at the time, it 
seems likely that the Razak government had fair ly precise ideas about 
the value of detente within the region. It was almost axiomatic that 
cooperative relationships with the Indochinese states were necessary, 
in the interests of continuing development and prosperity (which were 
vital to undermine support for domestic communists and ethnic or 
religious extremists), and to prevent the ideological schism within 
the region from spawning mutually antagonistic blocs. ^  More 
specifically, Malaysian Ministry of Home Affairs officials concerned 
with security thought that a rapid normalization of relations might 
undercut any nexus which might otherwise develop between Vietnam and 
the CPM. Moreover the encouragement of better relations between the 
ASEAN and Indochinese states might forestall tension on the Thai 
border with Laos and Cambodia (which had the potential to undermine 
Thai willingness to cooperate mil i tari ly with Malaysia against the 
CPM).
Malaysia possessed dist inct  advantages over i ts ASEAN partners as 
i t  attempted to construct working relationships with the communist 
Indochinese states. Although Tunku Abdul Rahman's staunchly ant i­
communist government had been associated (though not directly 
involved) with the US war effort ,  no US forces had ever been based in 
Malaysia and Tun Razak had made considerable efforts to move Malaysia
61 Personal interview with Noordin Soopie, Managing Editor, New 
Straits Times, Kuala Lumpur, 21 April 1981.
62 One specific intention of establishing diplomatic relations with 
Hanoi in 1973 was probably to nip in the bud potential Vietnamese 
support for the CPM. Nayan Chanda, FEER, 27 August 1976, p. 59.
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c  o
towards more genuinely non-aligned foreign policies in response to
Southeast Asia's changing strategic environment as British and US
forces were withdrawn from the region. Razak had established links
with communist countries, including diplomatic relations with North
Vietnam in March 1973.^ Unlike Indonesia, Malaysia did not seriously
aspire to regional pre-eminence, so there was no potential (as there
at times appeared to be in Indonesia's case) for competition with
Hanoi for the leadership of Southeast Asia.
There were close similari t ies between the Indonesian and
Malaysian governments' views regarding the desirabil i ty of a
harmonious relationship between the communist and non-communist
Southeast Asian states.  Although at the declaratory level at least
the Razak administration emphasized its proposal for the establishment
of a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in Southeast Asia
65as the overarching framework for i ts policies towards Indochina, 
Jakarta had ensured that the 1971 Kuala Lumpur Declaration which 
formally proposed ZOPFAN was in no way incongruent with the Indonesian 
perspective on regional o rder .^
63 See Marvin C. Ott, "Foreign Policy Formulation in Malaysia", 
Asian Survey, Vol. 12, No. 3 (March 1972), p. 237.
64 M.G.G. Pi l la i ,  FEER, 19 March 1973, p. 10. But diplomats were 
not exchanged with Hanoi until February 1976. Foreign Affairs 
Malaysia (cited hereafter as FAM), Vol. 9, No. 1 (March 1976), 
p. 87.
65 Thus Tun Razak claimed soon after the fall of Saigon that ZOPFAN 
would "enable regional countries to cooperate and work for mutual 
benefit". Kuala Lumpur home service in English, 1100 gmt, 4 May 
1975 (SWB FE/4896/A3/9, 6 May 1975).
66 See Leiter, Indonesia's Foreign Policy, pp. 147-59.
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In practice, Kuala Lumpur's emphasis on ZOPFAN proved to be as
much of an obstacle to the establishment of better relations with
Vietnam as the wish to retain a leading role in ASEAN was in the case
of Indonesia. According to Razak, a Zone of Peace, Freedom and
Neutrality was infeasible without the participation of the Indochinese
s ta tes . ^  But i t  had been clear from the beginning that Hanoi was
hostile to ZOPFAN, the credibili ty of which was tarnished in the eyes
of the Vietnamese communists because the Kuala Lumpur declaration had
been issued under the auspices of ASEAN, at a time when two of the
Association's members (Thailand and the Philippines) were actively
involved in supporting the United States' war effort in Indochina. In
the Vietnamese view, i t  was necessary for the ASEAN countries to end
-- or at least reduce in importance -- their military relationships
with the United States and other "imperialist" powers to make regional
68neutralization a feasible proposition.
The final withdrawal of US forces from Thailand in July 1976
substantially reduced what Hanoi had seen as a continuing American 
military threat to Vietnam's security. By this stage, the Vietnamese 
were evidently not seriously concerned by the US bases in the
Philippines or the Australian and New Zealand forces stationed in
67 Interview with Tun Razak, Age, 26 June 1975.
68 Nhan Dan, 1 December 1971. At the 1972 Paris Peace Talks, a
North Vietnamese spokesman suggested a "zone of true neutrality", 
evidently involving the withdrawal of US forces from the region 
(or at least from Thailand) as a precondition. Dick Wilson, The 
Neutralization of Southeast Asia (New York: Praeger, 1975),
p. 95.
391 -
69Malaysia and Singapore. At the same time, the Vietnamese leadership
wanted better relations with the ASEAN states,  not only for their own
sake (particularly in order to boost trade), but also to ful f i l  one of
the preconditions for normalization with Washington laid down by
Secretary of State Kissinger.7  ^ These factors doubtless influenced
Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh's announcement early in
July 1976 of a new guiding principle for Hanoi's foreign policy: the
"development of cooperation among the countries in the region for the
building of prosperity.. .  and for the cause of independence, peace and
genuine neutrality in Southeast Asia".7  ^ But official Malaysian
optimism that this principle heralded a new Vietnamese attitude
towards ZOPFAN and ASEAN was dealt a serious blow when Hanoi's Deputy
Foreign Minister, Phan Hien, visited Kuala Lumpur later in the month.
Hien emphasized the difference between Vietnam's PIN (Peace,
Independence and Neutrality) concept and ZOPFAN, objecting
particularly to the "Cold War" connotations of the "Freedom" component
in the ASEAN proposal. Hien also just ified Vietnam's continuing
suspicion of ASEAN, by quoting President Ford's emphasis on the
72Association as the cornerstone of his Pacific Doctrine.
—
69 Nayan Chanda, FEER, 30 July 1976, pp. 11-12; Carlyle Thayer,
"Vietnam's External Relations: an Overview", Pacific Community,
Vol. 9, No. 2 (January 1978), p. 220.
70 Nayan Chanda, FEER, 30 July 1976, p. 12.
71 As well as expounding this new principle, Trinh reiterated 
Vietnam's previous three-point policy for regional relations: 
mutual respect for t e r r i tor ia l  integrity and non-interference; no 
foreign military bases in the region; and mutual economic and 
cultural exchange. Nayan Chanda, FEER, 16 July 1976, p. 14; 
23 July 1976, p. 9 and 6 August 1976, p. 28.
72 Nayan Chanda, FEER, 30 July 1976, p. 12.
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The clearest ind ica t ion of Hanoi's continuing unwil l ingness to
become involved in a new regional order on ASEAN's terms (that  is ,
using ZOPFAN as a framework) came in August 1976. Laotian and
Vietnamese delegates to the non-aligned summit meeting in Colombo
attacked the ZOPFAN proposal in strong terms a f te r  Malaysia proposed
73that the meeting re-endorse the Kuala Lumpur declara t ion, claiming 
that ZOPFAN was designed to " resusci ta te the past" by camouflaging an 
in tens i fy ing  American "war of aggression in Indochina"
The Vietnamese and Laotian leaderships may genuinely have been 
worried by the potentia l  threat from an American-influenced and 
possibly m i l i ta r ize d  ASEAN, and by the p o s s ib i l i t y  that  ZOPFAN, i f  
implemented, would leg i t im ize  the influence of the United States and 
China in the region while iso la t ing  Vietnam and Laos (by stymying the 
development of th e i r  re la t ions  with the Soviet Union). But another 
explanation fo r  th e i r  behaviour at Colombo may have been that Hanoi 
and Vietnamese, acutely conscious of th e i r  post-war weakness, lacked 
the diplomatic confidence to deal with ASEAN as a p o l i t i c a l  and 
economic bloc. With the withdrawal of US forces from Thailand, 
Vietnam and Laos had l i t t l e  reason to feel m i l i t a r i l y  insecure in 
re la t ion  to the ASEAN states, but the la t t e r  were, c o l l e c t iv e l y ,  fa r  
stronger by almost every non-mil i ta ry  ind ica tor .  This may have
influenced the Vietnamese and Laotian regimes to attempt to impress on
73 The previous non-aligned summit (at Algiers in 1973) had endorsed 
ZOPFAN.
74 See speeches by the Laotian President, Souphanouvong, and the 
Vietnamese Foreign M in is te r ,  Nguyen Duy Tr inh. Nayan Chanda, 
FEER, 10 September 1976, p. 10.
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ASEAN members tha t ,  fo r  the foreseeable fu ture  at least,  only 
b i la te ra l  re la t ions  would be possible. Thai land's economic blockade 
of Laos and support fo r  anti-government Laotian rebels, resu l t ing  in 
increasing Laotian economic and m i l i t a r y  dependence on Vietnam, may 
account fo r  Vient iane's leading role in the attack on ASEAN and ZOPFAN 
at Colombo.
The success of Vietnam and Laos in preventing Malaysia and ASEAN 
from re ta in ing  non-aligned endorsement fo r  ZOPFAN at the Colombo 
summit led to a reassessment in Kuala Lumpur of the proposal 's 
usefulness in re la t ion  to Indochina. Tun Razak had died in February 
1976 and Hussein Onn, the new Prime Min is ter ,  had l i t t l e  compunction 
in pragmatical ly playing down the previous emphasis on ZOPFAN as the 
speci f ic  key to regional harmony,75 in the in te rests  of fostering 
equable b i la te ra l  re la t ions  with Vietnam and Laos as a f i r s t  step 
towards overcoming the ideological divide in the region, although 
ASEAN and ZOPFAN remained the basis of Malaysian foreign pol icy fo r  
general declaratory purposes.
The Malaysian government did not allow Hanoi's media attack on 
Thai-Malaysian m i l i t a r y  cooperation against the CPM in early 1977 to 
a f fec t  i t s  dr ive fo r  better  re la t ions with Vietnam.76 In May 1977, 
Malaysia's Foreign Min is te r ,  Ahmad Rithauddeen, became the f i r s t
75 See, fo r  example, Rithauddeen' s address to the UN General 
Assembly, 6 October 1976, FAM, Vol . 9, No. 4 (December 1976), 
pp. 13-15.
76 Although the Vietnamese c r i t i c is m  offended the Malaysian 
government, Hanoi's invective was aimed at Thai land's new r ig h t -  
wing regime rather than Kuala Lumpur. K. Das, FEER, 4 February 
1977, p. 10; Nayan Chanda, FEER, 15 Apr i l  1977, pp7"15-16.
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senior member of an ASEAN government to v i s i t  Hanoi. While there and
in Vientiane, he concluded agreements to consult with Vietnam and Laos
before fu ture  non-aligned conferences, to avoid repeating the clash
which had occurred at Colombo.77 In appearance at least ,  th is  was a
breakthrough in re la t ions between communist and non-communist
Southeast Asia. Rithauddeen also promised Malaysian technical
assistance fo r  the reconstruction of Vietnam's rubber and palm o i l
indus tr ies .  S ig n i f i c a n t ly ,  Rithauddeen mentioned nei ther ASEAN nor
ZOPFAN in his speeches in Hanoi and Vientiane, although he stressed
the s im i l a r i t y  in outlook between himself and his hosts on the
78" re a l iz a t io n  of peace and s t a b i l i t y  in the region".
The Two Strands of Thai Pol icy
Thai po l icy  towards Indochina in the aftermath of the 1975
communist triumphs was characterized by tension between two
contrast ing fore ign po l icy outlooks. I t  was not u n t i l  General 
Kriangsak seized power in October 1977 that a workable consensus on 
the issue was evolved.
In contrast to the ambivalence of the previous two Thai 
79administra t ions,  the foreign pol icy outlook of the elected
77 K. Das, FEER, 24 June 1977, p. 16.
78 Statement by Rithauddeen in Hanoi, 24 May 1977 and speech by 
Rithauddeen in Vientiane, 25 May 1977. FAM, Vol . 10, No. 2 (June 
1977), pp. 62-66.
79 The Thanom-Praphat and (after the October 1973 " revo lu t ion")
Sanya governments had made tenta t ive moves towards establ ishing 
a modus vivendi with Hanoi, but had fa i le d  mainly because of 
t h e i r  concurrent stress on the continuing relevance of Thai land's 
secur i ty  re la t ionsh ip  with Washington. See Charles E. Morrison 
and Astr i  Suhrke, Strategies of Survival:  The Foreign Pol icy
Dilemmas of Smaller Asian States (St Lucia: University of
Queensland Press, 1978), pp. 125-37.
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administrat ion led by Kukri t  Pramoj from March 1975 was s im i la r  - -  at
least on a declaratory level - -  to that of the Indonesian and
Malaysian governments. According to K u k r i t ' s  Foreign Min is ter ,  the
goal was to achieve ZOPFAN by fo l lowing a po l icy of non-interference
and genuine n e u t ra l i t y ,  by bui ld ing up indigenous social and m i l i t a r y
80strength and by in tens i fy ing  ASEAN cooperation. In pract ica l  terms,
the Kukri t  government's foreign po l icy declarat ions promised an
attempt to establ ish working re la t ionships with the Indochinese and
other communist states (p a r t i c u la r l y  China) while simultaneously
81de-emphasizing Thai land's a l l iance with Washington.
I f  i t  had been fo r c e fu l l y  and expedi t iously effected, the Kukri t  
government's declaratory po l icy would have been a profound departure 
from Thailand's recent conduct of in ternational  re la t ionsh ips.  But 
the new po l icy was to a very large extent the resu l t  of the e f fo r ts  of 
a small number of senior Foreign M in is t ry  o f f i c i a l s  under Under­
secretary of State Anand Panyarachun to convince Kukr i t  (and his 
brother Seni, a f te r  he became Prime Min ister in Apr i l  1976) of the 
need to come to terms with both the communist ascendancy in Indochina 
and the u n r e l i a b i l i t y  and u n s u i ta b i l i t y  of the al l iance with
80 Statement by Major General Chatchai Choonhavan, Bangkok home 
service, 1300 gmt, 14 Apr i l  1975 (SWB FE/4883/A3/17, 21 Apr i l  
1975).
81 For example, at the ASEAN Foreign M in is te r 's  meeting in Kuala
Lumpur, Chatchai called fo r  "an early meeting of a l l  Southeast 
Asian countries to discuss common problems and remove
misunderstandings and suspicion". Jakarta home service, 1200 
gmt, 13 May 1975 (SWB FE/4904/A3/9, 15 May 1975). Kukri t  had 
already pledged that a l l  American forces would be withdrawn from 
Thailand w i th in a year. Bangkok home service, 0001 gmt, 18 March 
1975 (SWB FE/4859/B/6, 20 March 1975).
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Washington in the new regional environment. This approach favouring
in t ra -reg iona l  reconc i l ia t ion  and a balance of extra-regional
inf luences ( inc luding better re la t ions with Bei j ing) faced widespread
opposit ion from senior m i l i t a r y  o f f ice rs  in the Cabinet, the National
Security Council and the Defence M in is t ry 's  Supreme Command, and from
82r ight-w ing c i v i l i a n  p o l i t i c ia n s .
The m i l i t a r y  and p o l i t i c a l  r ight-wing genuinely may have seen a 
un i f ied ,  heavily-armed and ideo log ica l ly  hos t i le  Vietnam, together 
with communist-ruled Laos and Cambodia as untrustworthy and as serious 
secur i ty  th reats. But there is evidence that they consciously 
exaggerated and sometimes even t r ie d  to perpetuate these threats to
82 K u k r i t ' s  coa l i t ion  Cabinet included members of part ies which were 
successors to the formerly dominant United Thai People's Party 
(UTPP) of Thanom and Praphat. Within the Cabinet, the posts most 
c losely  concerned with re la t ions  between Thailand and Indochina 
were held by two r ight-wing re t i red senior army o f f ice rs  and 
former UTPP members: Major General Chatchai Choonhavan (Foreign
Min is te r)  and his brother- in- law and p o l i t i c a l l y  a l l y ,  Major 
General Pramarn Adireksan (Deputy Prime Min ister and Defence 
M in is te r ) .  Pramarn was associated with the extreme right-wing 
Navapol movement, which opposed closer re la t ions  with Indochina 
as part of i t s  overal l  anti-communist l in e .  I t  seems l i k e l y  that 
Pramarn's support fo r  K u k r i t ' s  foreign po l icy  did not extend fa r  
beyond paying i t  l ip -se rv ice :  according to one senior Foreign
M in is t ry  o f f i c i a l ,  he was the "person i f ica t ion"  of the m i l i t a r y ' s  
extremely conservative, anti-communist foreign pol icy l ine .  
Chatchai, however, seemed to grasp i n t u i t i v e l y  the need fo r  major 
revis ions to Thai fore ign po l icy,  despite his p o l i t i c a l  
a f f i l i a t i o n s .  See Sarasin Viraphol, Direct ions in Thai Foreign 
Pol icy (Singapore: I n s t i t u te  of Southeast Asian Studies,
Occasional Paper No. 40, May 1976), pp. 50-52; Robert F. 
Zimmerman, "Thailand 1975: Transit ion to Consti tut ional
Democracy Continues", Asian Survey, Vo l . 16, No. 2 (February 
1976), p. 160; Norman Peagam, FEER, 23 January 1976, p. 14; 
27 February 1976, p. 21; 19 March 1976, p. 21; 2 Apr i l  1976, 
p. 12 and 11 June 1976, p. 22; Richard Nations, FEER, 27 August 
1976, p. 9.
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83serve their own interests.  In particular,  the evocation of an
external communist bogey was a useful instrument with which to
undermine popular support for radical, liberal and moderate
conservative political parties in Thailand during the democratic
interlude before the October 1976 coup.
The hesitancy that the Thai right-wing imposed on the Kukrit and
Seni administrations' foreign policies sometimes appeared to be aimed
at sabotaging the whole process of detente with Indochina. It is
arguable that pressure from, or obstruction by, Thai military leaders
may have prevented Kukrit from distancing Thailand to a greater degree
from a series of American actions in 1975 which jeopardized Bangkok's
burgeoning policy of rapprochement with Indochina.^ After the
"Mayaguez" incident had precipitated the Kukrit government into
announcing its intention to review all existing bilateral agreements
with Washington, Thai conservatives (especially the military)
staunchly opposed Kukrit's pressure on Washington to withdraw its
85forces from Thailand -- that is, to remove the principal obstacle to 
better relations with Vietnam.
When the final withdrawal of US forces from Thailand in July 1976 
made possible a visi t  by the Seni government's Foreign Minister,
83 The Thai press often assisted this exaggeration by i ts hostile 
and inaccurate coverage of Indochina. John Everingham, FEER, 
23 July 1976, pp. 18-20.
84 These actions included the United States'  use of i ts  air bases in 
Thailand to resupply Lon Nol's rapidly crumbling army in early 
April 1975, as sanctuaries for the sequestration of aircraft  
flown from Vietnam by fleeing Thieu regime pilots,  and as staging 
posts for operations into Cambodia during the "Mayaguez" crisis 
in May 1975.
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Pichai Rattakul,  to Vientiane and Hanoi, the extreme caution of the 
Thai mi l i ta ry  in rela t ion to Indochina became par t icu l ar l y  apparent. 
Just  before Pichai l e f t  for Vientiane in August, 200 Vietnamese
oc
refugees in Bangkok were arrested on securi ty grounds. Pichai ' s
delegat ion was accompanied by senior mi l i tary and intel l igence
o f f i c i a l s ,  presumably to ensure that  cooperation did not progress too
f a r ,  too f as t .  The jo int  communiques agreed with Laos and Vietnam
(including the establishment of diplomatic re la t ions  with Hanoi) had
to be approved by a special cabinet meeting in Bangkok before Pichai
was allowed to sign them. Even so, mil i tary leaders saw Pichai ' s
attempts to improve rela t ions with Laos and Vietnam as "contributing
87to an image of Thailand as fearful  and weak".
The means at the disposal of the Thai right-wing to counter the 
"Vietnamese threat" were limited to attempts to discourage the Kukrit 
and Seni governments from loosening securi ty l inks with Washington and 
from pursuing closer relat ions with Hanoi, while simultaneously
85 See, for example, Thanat Khoman, "The Consequences for Southeast 
Asia of Events in Indochina" (Paper delivered at the Conference 
on "Asian Business in 1976", Hong Kong, 21-23 October 1975), 
p. 85. The mi l i t a ry ' s  effor ts  to thwart government policy over 
the US mil i tary withdrawal included di rect  negotiat ions between 
the Supreme Command and the US Embassy, according to one senior 
Foreign Ministry o f f i c i a l .  (See Viraphol, p. 32.) As the 20 
March 1976 deadline for the withdrawal approached the government 
reportedly feared a mil i tary coup, or at l eas t  a violent  clash 
between pro-government demonstrators and mili tary-backed 
counter-demonstrators.  Norman Peagam, FEER, 26 March 1976, pp. 
10- 11 .
86 Such arrests  were to become a customary signal of mil i tary 
disapproval when the Foreign Ministry made approaches to Hanoi. 
Nayan Chanda, FEER, 13 May 1977, p. 24.
87 Darling, "Thailand in 1976. . .",  p. 124.
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encouraging improvements to Thai land's m i l i t a r y  ca p ab i l i t y .  But
Thai land's geographical con t igu i ty  with Cambodia and Laos provided
tangib le opportun it ies to continue to struggle fo r  inf luence in these
former buffer states, using p o l i t i c a l ,  economic and ind i rec t  m i l i t a r y
means. Although some of the disrupt ion of Thai land's eastern borders
was provoked by loca l ,  middle-level Thai o f f ice rs  and o f f i c i a l s
involved in smuggling who wished to perpetuate the unsettled
88condit ions in which such a c t i v i t y  th r ived ,  th is  was only one aspect
of a broader pattern of cross-border interference from Thailand.
Other aspects, such as the l inks  between Bangkok's Internal Security
Operations Command and the Cambodian and Laotian anti-communist
resistance groups were almost ce r ta in ly  d i rected, rather than merely
89to le ra ted ,  by the highest m i l i t a r y  echelons.
The Thai m i l i t a r y ' s  machinations on the border with Cambodia
con f l ic ted  d i r e c t l y  with the c i v i l i a n  government's in te rest  in detente 
90with Phnom Penh as a means not only of assuring f r o n t ie r  securi ty
and restor ing valuable cross-border trade, but possibly also as the
91basis fo r  re -estab l ish ing Cambodia as a buffer  against Vietnam. The
88 John Everingham, FEER, 23 July 1976, pp. 18-20.
89 See sections on "Vietnam, Laos and the Communist Party of
Thailand" and "The Khmer Rouge and the CPT, 1975-78" in Chapter 
6, pp. 200-1 and 213-14 above.
90 With encouragement from Bei j ing,  Thailand and Cambodia resumed
diplomatic re la t ions  in November 1975 when Ieng Sary (Cambodia
Deputy Premier fo r  Foreign A f fa i rs )  v is i ted  Bangkok.
91 See Robert F. Zimmerman, "Thailand 1975. . . " ,  p. 159 and Peter A.
Poole, "Cambodia 1975: the GRUNK Regime", Asian Survey, Vol . 16,
No. 1 (January 1976), p. 29.
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armed forces '  leadership was apparently as "irked" by Pichai ' s
conci l i a tory  v i s i t  to Phnom Penh in June 1976 (when the exchange of
ambassadors was agreed) as they were by his la ter  v i s i t s  to Vientiane 
92and Hanoi.
The Thai mi l i ta ry  saw the collapse of non-Pathet Lao elements in
the Laotian coal i t ion government in May 1975 as a greater securi ty
threa t  than the Khmer Rouge takeover, owing to the close ethnic and
l i ngu is t i c  l inks between the inhabitants of northeastern Thailand and
Laos. Whereas until  the second half of 1976 there was no evidence of
Khmer Rouge support for the CPT, the Pathet Lao's l inks with the Thai
93communists were wel l-establ ished by 1975. Attempts to interfere
across the border in react ion to the new s i tuat ion inside Laos had a
considerably more damaging effect  on Bangkok's overall  relat ionship
with Vientiane (and indi rect ly  Hanoi) in 1975-76 than similar meddling
had on re la t ions  with Phnom Penh. The sponsorship of Laotian rebels
and other provocations led to di rect  armed clashes between Thai and
Pathet Lao forces,  culminating in the closure of the border by Bangkok 
Q4in November 1975.
The border closure was intended to i n f l i c t  economic pain on 
95Laos to demonstrate Bangkok's (or at least  the Thai m i l i t a ry ' s )
92 Darling, "Thailand in 1976. . . " ,  pp. 124-25; Kenneth M. Quinn,
"Cambodia 1976: Internal Consolidation and External Expansion",
Asian Survey, Vol. 17, No. 1 (January 1977), p. 50.
93 See Chapter 6, pp. 196-97 above.
94 Denzil Pe i r i s ,  FEER, 28 November 1975, p. 17.
95 Laos was t r ad i t i ona l l y  dependent on the import of r ice  and other 
vi ta l  commodities from across the Mekong, and on Thai roads and 
ports for overseas t rade.
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grave view of the threats to Thai security arising from Laotian
support for the CPT and the border clashes. But this policy (which
was often repeated during the 1975-81 period) i t sel f  had effects which
were potentially damaging to Thailand's interests,  as i t  forced Laos
into greater economic dependence on Vietnam and the Soviet Union, and
may have contributed to the Pathet Lao's apparently abrupt decision in
December 1975 to dissolve the Provisional Government of National
Union, abolish the monarchy and create the Lao People's Democratic 
96Republic. Moreover, Thailand lost the more tangible benefits of
Laotian economic dependence, including revenue from high transport
charges imposed on Laotian goods.
There was no significant improvement in Thai-Lao relations until
August 1976, when Pichai's visi t  to Vientiane was made possible by the
97determination of the Seni government to implement its detente policy
and a new willingness by the Laotian leadership to negotiate with
Bangkok as a result of the final withdrawal of US forces from
Thailand, Hanoi's newly positive outlook on regional relations and
98Vientiane's wish to restore economic links with Thailand. Despite
96 Norman Peagam, FEER, 19 December 1975, pp. 14-17; MacAllister
Brown and Joseph J. Zasloff, "Laos in 1975: Peoples' Democratic
Revolution -- Lao Style", Asian Survey, Vol. 16, No. 2 (February 
1976), p. 199.
97 Although the right-wing's evocation of the Indochinese communist 
threat contributed to the virtual eradication of l e f t i s t  
parliamentary opposition in Thailand's April 1976 elections, 
Seni's new four party coalition controlled 206 of the 279 seats 
in the House of Representatives and thus possessed a clearer 
mandate than the preceding Kukrit administration. Harvey 
Stockwin, FEER, 20 August 1976, p. 11.
98 Martin Stuart-Fox, "National Defence and Internal Security in 
Laos", in Martin Stuart-Fox (ed.),  Contemporary Laos (St Lucia: 
University of Queensland Press, 1980), p. 233.
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the evident wish of the Thai right-wing to prevent a reconciliation,
agreement was reached on the re-opening of river crossings and
99measures to prevent further border clashes. For a few weeks before 
the 6 October coup, i t  appeared that the view that Thailand's 
interests were best served by a cooperative relationship with Laos was 
prevailing over that which saw continued confrontation in response to 
a perceived (but consciously exaggerated) threat from across the 
Mekong as the correct course.
The burgeoning success of the Seni administration in ameliorating 
relations with Indochina was an important factor contributing to the 
eventual overthrow of democratic rule by the October 1976 military 
coup. Many military and civilian ultra-conservatives may have 
genuinely fe l t  that national security was threatened by what they saw 
as Seni's weakness, but they also probably had ulterior motives for 
wanting continued confrontation with Indochina. In particular,  such a 
policy would help to just ify both increases in the military budget and 
an important polit ical role for the armed forces.
The declaratory policy of the regime led by Thanin Kraivichien, 
installed by the military after the coup, promised an effort to 
restore a closer security relationship with Washington and to 
strengthen cooperation with Thailand's ASEAN partners in order to 
forestall what the new administration portrayed as Indochinese 
communist expansionism -- in other words, to reverse the recent
99 John Everingham, FEER, 13 August 1976, pp. 20-21.
100 See section on "Thai Views of the CPT: Links with Vietnam and
Laos" in Chapter 6, pp. 204-5 above.
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tentative progress towards non-alignment and rapprochement with
Indoch ina.^  In practice, Thanin's relations with Vietnam were
reduced to l i t t l e  more than a propaganda contest, the security
situation on the Laotian and Cambodian borders deteriorated in a
vortex of reciprocal provocation, the regime's hardline domestic and
international policies were viewed with dismay in Washington after the
election of the liberal Carter administration, and Thanin's attitudes
towards the communist world conflicted with those of the other ASEAN
members. The main benefit was that the creation of an image of a
persistent "communist threat" helped to rally "an exhausted and
102disaffected Thai population" and to undermine domestic opposition.
Ironically, Thanin pursued his new policies at home and abroad 
too vigorously for the liking of some of the military leaders who had 
installed him. Fearing Bangkok's isolation both in the region and the 
wider world (and especially from the West and Japan), to the ultimate 
detriment of Thai security, General Kriangsak Chomanan (Supreme 
Commander of the Armed Forces and Secretary-General of the presiding 
military junta, the National Administrative Reform Council [NARC]) 
attempted to moderate Thanin's Cold War style foreign policy. 
Kriangsak recognized that neither the United States (particularly 
under the Europe-oriented Carter administration) nor ASEAN (with its 
vague notions of "regional resilience") could be expected to provide
101 According to Thanin, i t  was time to "stop doing things in 
accordance with ways and means planned and dictated by the 
communists". New Straits Times, 15 October 1976.
102 Richard Nations, FEER, 5 August 1977, pp. 13-14.
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Thailand with re l iab l e  and comprehensive securi ty guarantees.  I t  was
thus necessary for Thailand to continue to bear the main burden of
managing i t s  own securi ty concerns, par t i cu lar ly  by maintaining a
dialogue with the Indochinese s ta tes .
Beneath the surface of Thanin's bel l icose ,  anti-communist foreign
policy,  Kriangsak worked with Upadit Pachariangkul (the diplomat
appointed as Foreign Minister by the NARC) to pave the way for a
renewal of detente with Indochina. In the face of opposition from
103extreme right-wing elements the Foreign Ministry opened new links
104with Vietnam and Laos by reviving the Mekong Committee. Bangkok
announced that  Thailand would back Vietnam's bid for UN membership and
105Kriangsak cal led for economic aid for Laos and Cambodia. Upadit
met his Vietnamese and Cambodian opposite numbers at the United 
N a t i o n s . ^  Kriangsak and Upadit ef fect ively took control of Thai 
policy towards Indochina in the l a t er  stages of Thanin's rule.
The f rus t ra t ions  of Kriangsak and the NARC with Thanin's
i n f l e x ib i l i t y  culminated in a coup against the government in October
103 For example, Samak Sundaravej (the Inter ior  Minister) ordered the 
a r r e s t  of Vietnamese refugees in Bangkok. Nayan Chanda, FEER, 
13 May 1977, pp. 22-24.
104 Before 1975, the Mekong Committee had displayed the potent ial  to 
act  as a forum for the coordination of development s t ra tegies  
between the Indochinese s ta tes  and Thailand. Thai, Vietnamese 
and Laotian delegations met as the Interim Mekong Committee in 
Vientiane in July 1977. Nayan Chanda, FEER, 26 August 1977, 
p. 46.
105 Bangkok Post , 11 October 1977.
106 Interview with Upadit by Derek Davies, FEER, 9 December 1977,
p. 22.
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1977. The "Revolutionary Party" (as the NARC became) appointed
Kriangsak Prime Minister,  with Upadit as his Foreign M i n i s t e r . ^  The
new regime emphasized that  i t s  aim was to use diplomacy rather  than
confrontation as a weapon against the securi ty threa ts  posed by the
108Indochinese (and Chinese) communists and saw improved rela t ions
within the region as important also for economic reasons,  by regaining
access to important t radi t iona l  markets (especial ly Vietnam) for Thai 
109exports and improving Thailand's image as a creditworthy recipient  
for development finance from the West and J a p a n . ^
Kriangsak's a t t i tude  that  i t  was necessary to engage in 
construct ive pol i t i ca l  and economic rela t ions  with the Indochinese 
s ta tes  in order to ensure Thailand's securi ty (in the broadest sense) 
was similar to that  of the Kukrit and Seni administ rat ions.  But 
whereas the c iv i l i an  governments' ef for t s  had been compromised by 
opposition from the mi l i ta ry and c iv i l ian  extreme right-wing, 
Kriangsak was able to project  his foreign pol icies from a secure basis 
of support in the armed forces.  In e f fec t ,  Kriangsak created a 
foreign policy consensus which had been lacking since regional 
developments in the early 1970s polarized opinion within the Thai
107 Upadit was the only member of the new Cabinet who had also served 
under Thanin.
108 See statement by Admiral Sangaad Chaloryu (Chairman of the 
Revolutionary Party),  Bangkok Post , 22 October 1977.
109 Richard Nations, FEER, 9 June 1978, p. 31; Ansil Ramsay,
"Thailand 1978: Kriangsak -- the Thai who Binds", Asian Survey,
Vol. 19, No. 2 (February 1979), p. 108.
110 Richard Nations and K. Das, FEER, 23 December 1977, p. 10.
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e l i t e .  To be sure, many conservative senior o f f ic e rs  opposed 
Kriangsak's "dovish" a t t i tude  towards Indochina, but he was supported 
by a cote r ie  of generals in key posts, as well as the f i e l d  commanders
known as the "Young Turks". ^  There was now a widespread
appreciat ion in the m i l i t a r y  of the dangers of a po l icy of
confrontat ion in the new regional environment, and the fac t  that
Kriangsak - -  one of th e i r  own - -  was Prime Min is ter minimized and 
undercut c r i t i c i s m  that the new government was engaged in appeasement 
or non-a l ignment.^^
While improving re la t ions with Indochina, Kriangsak
simultaneously ameliorated Bangkok's standing with the Carter
administrat ion by the implementation of r e la t i v e l y  l ib e ra l  domestic
113c i v i l  r igh ts  po l ic ies ,  f a c i l i t a t i n g  an a f f irmat ion of US securi ty
guarantees to Thailand by Vice President Mondale when he v is i ted
114Bangkok in May 1978. But Kriangsak acknowledged that i t  was
un rea l is t ic  to expect the United States to reinvolve i t s e l f  on a major
scale in Thai land's securi ty . Kriangsak viewed improved re la t ions
with China, however, as po ten t ia l ly  useful not only in terms of
helping to neutra l ize the CPT threat ,  but also as a balance to Vietnam
115should attempts to improve re la t ions with Hanoi f a i l .
111 I b id . , p. 12; Richard Nations, FEER, 25 August 1978, pp. 26-27; 
Chai-Anan Samudavanija ,  The Thai Young Turks (Singapore: 
In s t i t u te  of Southeast Asian Studies, 1982), pp. 34-36.
112 Richard Nations, FEER, 10 November 1978, p. 21.
113 "Mondale Sows the Seeds", FEER, 19 May 1978, pp. 11-12.
114 Bangkok home service, 0001 gmt, 5 May 1978 (SWB FE/5807/A3/9-10, 
8 May 1978).
115 Kriangsak v is i ted  Bei j ing in March 1978. Peter Weintraub, FEER, 
14 Apr i l  1978, p. 11.
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S i n g a p o r e ' s  G l o b a l i s t  O u t l o o k
In t h e 1 9 7 5 - 7 8  p e r i o d  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  I n d o c h i n a  w e r e  by no m e a n s 
as i m p o r t a n t  an is su e for the S i n g a p o r e a n  g o v e r n m e n t  as t h e y  w e r e  for 
t h e  I n d o n e s i a n ,  M a l a y s i a n  and Thai a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s .  B e f o r e  the mid- 
1970s, the S i n g a p o r e a n  l e a d e r s h i p  had p l a c e d  r e l a t i v e l y  li tt le 
e m p h a s i s  on r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  e i t h e r  its A S E A N  p a r t n e r s  or w a r - t o r n  
I n d o c h i n a ,  c o n c e n t r a t i n g  r a t h e r  on d e v e l o p i n g  the w i d e r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
li nk s a p p r o p r i a t e  to a "Global C i t y " . ^  T h e  B r i t i s h  and A m e r i c a n  
m i l i t a r y  d i s e n g a g e m e n t  f r o m  S o u t h e a s t  Asia, t h e  c o l l a p s e  of the n o n ­
c o m m u n i s t  I n d o c h i n e s e  r e g i m e s  and the gl obal e c o n o m i c  c r i s i s  af te r the 
1 9 7 3 - 7 4  A r a b  oil e m b a r g o  f o r c e d  a r e v i s i o n  of S i n g a p o r e ' s  a t t i t u d e  
t o w a r d s  A S E A N .  P a r t i c u l a r l y  af t e r  the e v e n t s  of April 1975, S i n g a p o r e  
p l a y e d  a m u c h  m o r e  e n t h u s i a s t i c  p a rt in the o r g a n i z a t i o n ^ 7 in or d e r  
to s t r e n g t h e n  " r e g i o n a l  r e s i l i e n c e "  as a m e a n s  of c o u n t e r i n g  the
p o s s i b i l i t y  of a m o r e  s e r i o u s  t h r e a t  of i n s u r g e n c y  to S i n g a p o r e ' s  
118n e i g h b o u r s .  But in c o n t r a s t  to t h e i r  c o u n t e r p a r t s  in I n d o n e s i a  
(with t h e i r  i n t e r e s t  in f o s t e r i n g  V i e t n a m ' s  c o o p e r a t i o n  as a p a r t n e r  
in m a i n t a i n i n g  r e g i o n a l  or d e r ) ,  M a l a y s i a  (who, u n d e r  T u n  Ra za k 
p a r t i c u l a r l y ,  s a w the I n d o c h i n e s e  states' p a r t i c i p a t i o n  as vital for
116 A c c o r d i n g  to Lee K u a n  Yew: "All our m a j o r  li nk s h a v e  b e en w i t h
c o u n t r i e s  o u t s i d e  AS E A N .  And t h e y  h a v e  b e en g r o w i n g  f a s t e r  than
li nk s w i t h i n  A S E A N " .  S t r a i t s  T i m e s ,  26 N o v e m b e r  1975.
—
117 In deed, S i n g a p o r e ' s  w i s h  to a c c e l e r a t e  e c o n o m i c  c o o p e r a t i o n  in 
A S E A N  w a s  f r u s t r a t e d  by the d e s i r e  of ot h e r  m e m b e r s  ( e s p e c i a l l y  
I n d o n e s i a )  for a s l o w e r  pace. See M o r r i s o n  and S u h r k e ,  p. 190.
1 1 8  See L e e K u a n  Y e w ' s  C h i n e s e  Ne w  Y e a r  sp eech, S t r a i t s  T i m e s , 
18 F e b r u a r y  1977.
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the implementation of ZOPFAN) and Thailand (with t he i r  complex,
immediate securi ty concerns involving the Indochinese s t a t e s ) ,  the
makers of Singapore's foreign policy lacked i nte res t  in construct ing a
broad, cooperative re la t ionship with communist Indochina.
Whereas the other ASEAN s t a t es '  relat ionships with Vietnam showed
a gradual,  i f  d i s t i nc t l y  uneven, improvement through the 1975-78
period, the development of re la t ions  between Singapore and Hanoi was
more tenuous. Diplomatic re la t ions  had been establ ished as early as
May 1973, but Hanoi and Singapore did not exchange ambassadors even
af te r  the communist victory in South Vietnam. The Singaporean view
appeared to be that  i t  was up to the Indochinese communists to improve
thei r  rela t ionship with the ASEAN sta tes  rather than for each side to
119accommodate the other .  Lee Kuan Yew saw pos s ib i l i t i e s  for
cooperation,  but these were in the economic rather than the po l i t i ca l  
120sphere. But although Vietnam's trade with Singapore remained the
most s igni f icant  of i t s  economic l inks with any ASEAN member in the
late  1970s, i t  remained r e l a t i ve ly  small as a proportion of each
country's  total  t rade or compared to trade between Singapore and the
121Thieu regime before April 1975.
The Singaporean leadership ' s  s t ra tegic  outlook remained
119 According to Rajaratnam (the Singaporean Foreign Minister) ,  the 
ASEAN countries had a "head s tar t"  towards forming a strong 
region with which "the communist s ta tes  may come to terms". 
Rodney Tasker, FEER, 11 March 1977, p. 14.
120 "Trade Fi rs t  for Lee", FEER, 30 January 1976, p. 11.
121 See United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
S t a t i s t i c a l  Office,  Yearbook of International  Trade S t a t i s t i c s  
1977 (New York: United Nations, 1978), Vol. 1, p. 834.
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essentially globalist after 1975. Lee Kuan Yew and his government had
always harboured serious reservations about the ZOPFAN concept, seeing
Singapore's survival as best assured by the continuing balanced
involvement (in military as well as political and economic senses) of
122major extra-regional powers in Southeast Asia coupled with
strenuous efforts to increase national resilience in economic and
military terms. With the communist victories in Indochina,
Singapore's sense of vulnerability was aggravated. While inducing a
more serious interest in cooperation within ASEAN, the new regional
situation also intensified Lee Kuan Yew's enthusiasm for a continued
American military presence in Southeast Asia to balance increasing
123Soviet naval deployment (and Chinese influence) in the region and
Hanoi's nexus with Moscow. In the Singaporean view, maintaining both
Singapore's and ASEAN's poli t ical ,  military and (especially) economic
links with the industrialized West was far more conducive to security
than any precipitate movement towards intra-regional cooperation with
Indochina across the ideological divide.
Although the Singaporean leadership occasionally made encouraging
and optimistic comments regarding relations between the two
124ideological halves of the region, polit ical relations with
122 See Dick Wilson, pp. 78-84. Rajaratnam's view was the Southeast 
Asia should make i t sel f  important to the big powers so they would 
feel protective towards the region.
123 Statement by Lee Kuan Yew, Straits Times, 8 April 1975; "The 
Week", FEER, 4 November 1977, p. 5.
124 See, for example, Lee Kuan Yew's comments quoted by Straits 
Times, 6 July 1977.
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Indochina (and par t icu l ar l y  Vietnam) remained cool and occasionally
displayed f lashes of the antipathy which was to be char ac t er i s t ic
af te r  the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. Singapore reacted more
125strongly than e i ther  Indonesia or Malaysia to the repudiation by
Vietnam and Laos of Malaysia's attempts to gain the Colombo non-
aligned summit's support for ZOPFAN. Despite Singapore's own well-
known lack of enthusiasm for the neutra l izat ion proposal,  Lee Kuan
Yew lambasted Laos and Vietnam, implying that  t he i r  "peace,
independence and neutra l i ty"  proposal was aimed at the "overthrow by
violence" of the ASEAN governments. A more serious,  b i la tera l
dispute arose in November 1977 when Singapore refused to repa t r i a te
four Vietnamese who had hijacked an a i r c r a f t  to the island,
127temporarily checking the fur ther  development of economic re l a t i ons .
The Singaporean government's a t t i tude  appeared to be that  a
minimal pol i t i ca l  re la t ionship with Hanoi --  through "regular contact"
128between Vietnamese and Singaporean diplomats in thi rd countries --
125 These were the other non-aligned members of ASEAN.
126 See Denzil Pe i r i s ,  FEER, 3 September 1976, p. 14.
127 The Vietnamese Import and Export Corporation off ice in Singapore 
"continued with i t s  rout ine act iv i t i e s"  and telephone and telex 
services between Singapore and Ho Chi Minh City (broken off in 
April 1975) were restored in December 1977. But the v i s i t  to 
Singapore of an important trade mission led by Vietnam's Deputy 
Foreign Trade Minister was cancelled by Hanoi. Hansard 
(Singapore), Vol. 37, No. 5 (31 January 1978), cols .  205-06; 
Singapore home service in English, 1130 gmt, 13 November 1977 
(SWB FE/5669/A3/4, 17 November 1977). See also Michael 
Richardson, FEER, 25 November 1977, and "A correspondent",  FEER, 
9 December 1977, p. 47.
128 Hansard (Singapore), Vol. 37, No. 5 (31 January 1978), col.  206.
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was sufficient,  and that Vietnam's eagerness for trade links with 
Singapore was such that economic relations between the two states 
would not be disrupted in the medium to long term by the adoption of 
hardline positions as at Colombo and over the hijacking. So, unlike 
i ts  ASEAN counterparts, Singapore was unwilling to adopt a 
conciliatory posture in relation to Hanoi.
The Philippines: Detente with Vietnam despite the American Military
Presence
The Philippines' relationship with Vietnam in the 1975-77 period 
was remarkable for i ts  warmth, given that not only had Manila been 
actively involved in the United States'  recent war effort ,  but 
remained a close ally of Washington and provided the Americans with 
the bases for their remaining air and naval forces in Southeast Asia. 
The Philippines possessed neither an equivalent to the Indonesian and 
Malaysian administrations' grand regional visions (which required them 
to transcend Southeast Asia's ideological divide to evolve 
comprehensive and constructive relationships with communist Indochina) 
nor Thailand's interest in managing i ts pressing security concerns 
with i ts communist neighbours. So why was the Marcos regime so 
enthusiastic about establishing a cordial relationship with Vietnam 
after April 1975? Moreover, why was Hanoi willing to indulge in such 
a relationship when Manila maintained such close security links with 
Washington?
The speed with which Manila approached Hanoi after the fall  of 
• 129Saigon demonstrated the Marcos regime's desire to normalize
129 Harvey Stockwin, FEER, 2 May 1975, p. 30; Rodney Tasker, FEER, 
24 June 1977, p. 18.
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relations with Vietnam expeditiously once the communists were
victorious, although diplomatic relations were not actually
established until July 1976. But there is no evidence that Manila
saw any important specific advantages in creating a modus vivendi with
Hanoi. Geographical isolation and the orientation of the New People's
Army and Moro National Liberation Front insurgents towards China and
the Islamic world respectively effectively insulated the Philippines
from any security concerns which might be ameliorated by improving
links with Vietnam. Trade with Vietnam had not been significant even
when the Thieu regime ruled the South, and the lack of complementarity
between the Philippine and Vietnamese economies ruled out important
131economic relations in the near future.
Manila's attitude towards Vietnam was essentially just one aspect 
of a broader effort to diversify the Philippines' international 
connections in response to a changed regional and domestic polit ical 
environment in the early and mid-1970s. An upsurge in Philippine 
nationalism coincided with America's military withdrawal from Vietnam 
and Thailand, Washington's detente with Beijing and Japan's increasing 
economic role in Southeast Asia: all suggested a need for a
130 Although a joint communique was released in Hanoi in August 1975 
establishing diplomatic relations,  this was quickly rescinded by 
Manila. The Philippine diplomat involved in the negotiations 
with Hanoi appeared to have proceeded beyond the bounds of his 
assignment. Rodney Tasker, FEER, 24 June 1977, p. 18.
131 Philippine exports to Vietnam (South and North) were worth 
US$2.2m in 1974, US$0.6m in Vietnam and US$0.lm in 1976. Imports 
from Vietnam were valued at US$0.3m, US$1.4m and US$0.4m in the 
same years. Australian Foreign Affairs Record, Vol. 49, No. 1 
(January 1978), p. 22.
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re-orientation of Philippine foreign policy away from the
tradit ional ly almost total pol i t ical ,  economic and military dependence
on the United States. As well as taking a more active role in ASEAN,
the regime attempted, without great success, to use i ts openings to
132communist countries to emphasize i ts newly more active and "non-
133aligned" foreign policy. Improved relations with the social ist
camp -- including Vietnam -- were also potentially useful as levers in 
negotiation with the United States over the future of i ts  military 
bases in the Philippines. But i t  is extremely doubtful that the 
Marcos regime ever saw the expulsion of the US military presence as a 
real option, and the anticipation of a continuing American security 
"umbrella" probably increased Manila's confidence in dealing with 
Hanoi after 1 9 7 5 . ^
Although the Vietnamese communists made rhetorical attacks on
Manila's "neo-colonial" relationship with Washington and the
135continuing presence of US bases in the Philippines, Hanoi did not 
allow this issue to obstruct the normalization of relations wth the 
Philippines as i t  did in the case of Thailand. Indeed, i t  sometimes 
seemed in the 1975-77 period that the Vietnamese had singled out the 
Philippines from amongst the ASEAN states for special treatment. In 
January 1977, Manila was allowed to send the f i r s t  trade delegation
132 Bernadino Ronquillo, FEER, 30 May 1975, p. 26.
133 The Philippines was given only "guest" status at the Colombo 
non-aligned summit in 1976.
134 "Intelligence", FEER, 25 July 1975, p. 8.
135 Morrison and Suhrke, p. 252.
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from an ASEAN country to communist Vietnam and the following April an
official mission from Manila was invited to investigate the plight of
Philippine nationals stranded in the South after April 1 9 7 5 . ^
In contrast to Thailand, the Philippines had not had a
historical ly antagonistic relationship with Vietnam, and i t  is evident
that Hanoi did not feel that i t  had "scores to settle" with Manila
after 1975. Philippine involvement in the Vietnam War had been
limited in comparison to Thailand's in terms both of the clearly token
nature of Manila's military commitment in South Vietnam and the fact
that the United States was not allowed to use its Clark Field air base
for bombing Indochina. Hanoi recognized that the security
relationship between Washington and Manila was rooted in the
Philippines' colonial past, and was not directed particularly against 
137Vietnam. Most importantly, the Vietnamese appeared to be impressed
by the Marcos regime's apparently tough stand in asserting Philippine
138sovereignty in renegotiating the base agreements with Washington. 
Hanoi may have believed that i t  could use its closer relations with 
Manila to encourage Philippine nationalism and a further movement away 
from the alliance with the United States, and perhaps the eventual 
eviction of the American military presence.
136 Rodney Tasker, FEER, 24 June 1977, p. 18.
137 This was certainly the view of Phan Hien (Vietnamese Deputy 
Foreign Minister), according to Nayan Chanda, FEER, 30 July 1976, 
p. 12. See also Rodney Tasker, FEER, 24 June 1977, p. 18.
138 Nayan Chanda, FEER, 16 July 1976, p. 13; Nayan Chanda, FEER, 
21 January 1977, p. 14.
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Responses to the Emerging Con f l ic t  in Indochina, 1977-78
By the end of 1977, the ASEAN states had ce r ta in ly  not made 
uniformly good progress towards establ ishing cooperative working 
re la t ionsh ips with the Indochinese states. This was p a r t ly  due to a 
lack of consensus in e i ther  the ASEAN grouping or w i th in  ind iv idual 
ASEAN states (p a r t i c u la r l y  Thailand before the advent of the Kriangsak 
administra t ion) that the Indochinese states were trustworthy and 
re l ia b le  partners. The f a i l u r e  to construct a harmonious re la t ionsh ip  
across Southeast Asia 's  ideological divide was also due to caution, 
suspicion and h o s t i l i t y  on the Indochinese side. But the in tens i fy ing  
c o n f l i c t  between Vietnam and Cambodia, supported by the Soviet Union 
and China respective ly , had by 1978 profoundly affected the att i tudes 
of the Indochinese states and the i r  big power a l l i e s ,  apparently 
removing much of the previous ambivalence in th e i r  a t t i tudes towards 
ASEAN and i t s  members. At least on a declaratory leve l ,  Vietnam 
appeared not to demand such a major ro le  in determining the ground 
rules fo r  re la t ions  with ASEAN and i t s  members. Although th is  led to 
some l im i ted  improvements in re la t ions between pa r t icu la r  ASEAN and 
Indochinese states,  i t  also reinforced the caution of the former in 
dealing with the l a t t e r :  the ASEAN governments saw hazards as well as
opportun it ies in the clash of communist in terests  in Indochina.
Indonesia
In the words of one Indonesian observer, "the de ter io ra t ion  of 
Vietnam's re la t ions  with her giant neighbour [China] created the
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preconditions for an improvement of Indonesian-Vietnamese
139 140relations".  The visi t  by Nguyen Duy Trinh to Jakarta in January
1978 opened a new phase in the relationship, involving cooperation in
specific spheres such as negotiation over the delineation of
141continental shelf boundaries. Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong's
vis i t  in September provided further evidence of a new warmth in
relations,  with both sides pledging to respect each other's
independence, sovereignty, terr i tor ial  integrity and polit ical
systems, and not to use force or the threat of force in their
bilateral relations.  Dong did not endorse ZOPFAN as such, but both
sides stressed that this was due to differences more in terminology
142than in fundamental attitude. Probably most importantly for the 
Suharto regime, Dong said that he now understood better Jakarta's 
position on East Timor. Overall, i t  appeared that Jakarta's wish to 
involve Vietnam in maintaining regional order was gradually being 
realized, although the continuing failure of the continental shelf 
negotiations slightly undermined Jakarta's faith in Hanoi's 
goodwill,143
139 Lie Tek Tjeng, "Vietnamese Nationalism...", pp. 6-7.
140 Trinh was Vietnam's Vice-Premier with responsibility for foreign 
a f fa i r s .
141 These negotiations proved f rui t less ,  however. See C. van Dijk, 
"Major Developments in Indonesia in the First Half of 1979: 
Reactions to the Indochina Crisis", Review of Indonesian and 
Malayan Affairs, Vol. 13, No. 2 (December 1979), pp. 124-25.
142 David Jenkins, FEER, 6 October 1978, p. 19.
143 Leiter, Indonesia's Foreign Policy, p. 152.
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At the same time that the widening Sino-Vietnamese rift prompted
lanoi to move towards detente with the ASEAN countries, China's
»ehaviour reaffirmed the Indonesian military's deep-seated security
:oncern with China and weakened the hand of those policy-makers
particularly in the Foreign Ministry) who wished to normalize
144'elations with Beijing. Of particular concern to the military were 
China's protective attitudes towards the ethnic Chinese expelled by 
/ietnam, the Sino-Japanese Treaty of September 1978 (which was seen as 
i threat to Indonesia's crucial economic relationship with Japan) and 
the continuing Chinese rhetorical support for regional communist 
Darties.^
By late 1978, Jakarta's position on the intensifying Indochina
conflict had developed into barely disguised support for Vietnam. As
Deng Xiaoping began a tour of ASEAN capitals (excluding Jakarta to
which he had not been invited) in November 1978, Mochtar Kusumaatmadja
(who had succeeded Malik as Foreign Minister) visited Hanoi. The
exact timing of the visit may not have been significant, and the only
concrete result was a trade agreement, but on his return Mochtar
emphasized the "special flavour" in the Indonesian-Vietnamese
relationship. Mochtar claimed that China's withdrawal of aid and its
"belligerent attitude" had forced the recent Soviet-Vietnamese treaty
146on Hanoi, but that Vietnam was nevertheless not a Soviet "proxy".
144 For a comprehensive discussion of Jakarta's attitude towards 
Beijing in the 1970s, see Justus M. van der Kroef, "'Normalizing' 
Relations with the People's Republic of China: Indonesia's 
Rituals of Ambiguity", Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 3, No. 3 
(December 1981), pp. 187-218.
145 Rodney Tasker, FEER, 15 December 1978, pp. 32-33.
146 Ibid., p. 33; David Jenkins, FEER, 24 November 1978, p. 33.
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While i t  enabled the Suharto regime to establish a modus vivendi
with Hanoi, Indonesian policy-makers were concerned that the new
Indochinese conf l ic t  might sp i l l  over into the ASEAN region. Already
in 1978 the in s ta b i l i ty  in Indochina was generating a large-scale
refugee outflow, which was direct ly affecting Indonesia. A Vietnamese
invasion of Cambodia would have a serious impact on Thai security, and
might cause a polarization within the region between Indochina and
ASEAN and impel a closer relationship between China and ASEAN -- which
Indonesia was anxious to a v o id . ^  The dispute was increasingly
involving China and the USSR in regional af fa irs ,  to the detriment of
Indonesia's cardinal ambition that Southeast Asian problems should be
148managed by regional states themselves. I f  the Indochinese confl ic t  
was to remain of net benefit to Jakarta, i t  was important that there 
should be no precipitate sh i f t  in the sub-regional balance of power in 
Vietnam's favour.
While basically in sympathy with Vietnam and apprehensive of 
Chinese ambitions in Southeast Asia, the Suharto regime's 
unwillingness to lend fu l l  support to Hanoi was reflected in i ts  
readiness to establish links with China's a l ly ,  Democratic Kampuchea. 
Before 1978, the Khmer Rouge's atti tude towards Jakarta had generally 
been one of indifference punctuated by occasional hosti le outbursts,
147 David Jenkins, FEER, 24 November 1978, p. 33.
148 See Jusuf Wanandi, "Security in the Asia-Pacific Region: An 
Indonesian Observation", Asian Survey, Vol. 18, No. 12 (December 
1978), pp. 1215-17; David Jenkins, FEER, 24 November 1978, 
pp. 33-34.
419 -
149particularly over East Timor. Relations were not normalized until
August 1978, as Phnom Penh attempted to broaden its diplomatic
150connections in response to its conflict with Vietnam. Ieng Sary
visited Jakarta in October 1978, but the Indonesian regime was careful
not to emphasize publicly its interests in Cambodia's continuing
independence of Vietnam, for fear of jeopardizing the relationship 
151with Hanoi. Whereas some elements of the Indonesian administration
(probably including senior Foreign Ministry officials)  thought that
the reopening of Indonesia's embassy in Phnom Penh would be a useful
contribution to stabilizing the regional balance, others (almost
certainly the more cautious military leaders) saw "no need" for
152Indonesia to take this step. The rationale behind this attitude 
may have been that if Vietnam invaded Cambodia (as seemed highly 
likely by late 1978), the presence of an Indonesian mission in Phnom 
Penh would make i t  more dif f icul t  to avoid siding with China in 
condemning Hanoi's "hegemony" in Indochina.
Maiaysia
In a speech in October 1977, Malaysian Prime Minister Hussein Onn 
emphasized the opportunities provided for the ASEAN countries by the
149 See Kenneth M. Quinn, "Cambodia 1976: Internal Consolidation and
External Expansion", Asian Survey, Vol. 17, No. 1 (January 1977), 
pp. 48-49.
150 Ieng Sary was Democratic Kampuchea's Deputy Prime Minister 
responsible for foreign affairs.
151 David Jenkins, FEER, 24 November 1978, pp. 33-34.
152 Ibid., loc. ci t .
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153Indochinese schism, Kuala Lumpur exploited the new circumstances to
foster its relations with both Cambodia and Vietnam. The Malaysian
government had a particular interest in trying to reduce Cambodia's
pressure on its border with Thailand, as this was potentially
indirectly detrimental to Malaysian security. Indeed, Kuala Lumpur
may have played an intermediary role between its ASEAN partners and 
154Phnom Penh. But there was considerably more substance in
155Malaysia's dialogue with Hanoi.
According to the joint communique agreed when the Vietnamese 
Foreign Minister (Trinh) visited Kuala Lumpur in January 1978, the 
situation in Southeast Asia had undergone
deep changes favourable to the development of mutually 
beneficial relations among countries in the region 
thereby contributing to the promotion of peace, 
independence, freedom and neutrality in SoutheastA s i a . 156
The Malaysians considered that the inclusion of the word "freedom"
showed that the Vietnamese had been persuaded to move a step in the
157direction of ZOPFAN. This apparent change of policy on ZOPFAN may
153 Speech by Hussein Onn to the Asia Society Seminar on ASEAN, New 
York, 4 October 1977. FAM, V o l . 10, No. 4 (December 1977), p. 5.
154 Richard Nations and K. Das, F E E R , 23 December 1977, pp. 11-12.
155 Although Kuala Lumpur's ambassador in Beijing was accredited to 
Phnom Penh in May 1978, Malaysia did not open a diplomatic 
mission in Cambodia, and trade between the two countries remained 
insubstantial. Rodney Tasker, F E E R , 9 June 1978, p. 31.
156 "Visit of the Foreign Minister of the Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam (January 3-6)", Text of Joint Communique, 6 January 1978. 
FAM, Vol. 11, No. 1 (March 1978), p. 75.
157 Rodney Tasker, F E E R , 30 June 1978, pp. 18-19.
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have ref lected Hanoi's greater  need to ensure the support or at least
neu t ra l i t y  of the ASEAN sta tes  as the r i f t  with China and Cambodia
widened. Although Vietnam could expect to benefi t  to a l imited degree
from the sympathies of the basical ly anti-Chinese Malay leadership,
Beijing had some advantages in that  i t  had expressed support for the
ZOPFAN proposal since 1973, for ASEAN since the f a l l  of the Gang of
Four in 1976 and for the Maiaysian-Indonesian declarat ion of the
Malacca S t ra i t s  as national waters in 1970. When Vietnam's Deputy
Foreign Minister,  Phan Hien, v is i ted Kuala Lumpur again in July 1977
he took th i s  new f l e x i b i l i t y  a stage fur t her ,  claiming that  Hanoi's
previous objections to ZOPFAN, which he asserted were only minor and
158unimportant differences of i nte rpre t a t ion ,  had been misunderstood.
Malaysia's detente with Hanoi reached i t s  apogee in October 1978
with Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Van Dong's v i s i t  to Kuala Lumpur.
Dong not only r e i te r a ted  a wil l ingness to work towards making
Southeast Asia "an area of peace, independence, freedom and 
159neut ra l i ty" ,  but also e ffec t ive ly disclaimed Vietnam's l inks with 
the CPM.^  This gesture contrasted with Chinese Vice-Premier Deng's 
refusal  to disavow moral support for the Malaysian communists when he 
vi s i ted Kuala Lumpur the following m o n t h . ^
158 K. Das, FEER, 4 August 1978, p. 9.
159 Joint  statement by Hussein Onn and Pham Van Dong, 15 October 
1978. FAM, Vol. 11, No. 4 (December 1978), p. 88.
160 See text  of j oin t  statement by Dong and Hussein Onn, 15 October 
1978, VNA in English, 0724 gmt, 16 October 1978 (SWB FE/5944/A3/ 
13, 17 October 1978).
161 S t r a i t s  Times, 11 November 1978; David Bonavia and K. Das, FEER 
24 November 1978, pp. 30-32.
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Although Malaysia's re la t ions with Hanoi were the closest of any 
^SEAN state during 1978, Onn's government was careful to remain 
neutral as Vietnam's disputes with China and Cambodia deepened. 
Although B e i j ing 's  ambivalent a t t i tude  towards the region remained the
I r p
•najor external securi ty  concern, the Malaysian administrat ion 
harboured serious doubts over Vietnam's r e l i a b i l i t y  as a regional 
partner. Ghazali Shafie (the Home A f fa i rs  Min is ter)  questioned the 
value of Dong's assurances concerning the cessation of Vietnamese
I C O
support fo r  the CPM. There was also growing concern over the
large-scale exodus of Vietnamese refugees, many of whom landed on the 
Malaysian c o a s t . ^  More ser iously, a Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia 
promised to destroy the balance of power on which Kuala Lumpur's 
detente po l ic ies  were predicated: would Hanoi s t i l l  feel a need to
make concessions to Malaysia and i t s  ASEAN partners once i t s  power 
preponderated in Indochina? Vietnamese domination of Indochina might 
also increase the pressure on Thai land's borders to the detriment of 
Malaysian securi ty .
Thai 1 and
Kriangsak and his Foreign Minsi te r,  Upadit, were able to take 
advantage of the c o n f l i c t in g  na t iona l is t  forces underlying communism
162 See Speech by Hussein Onn at the dinner in honour of Deng, 
10 November 1978. FAM, Vol . 11, No. 4 (December 1978), p. 100.
163 See Ghazali Shafie, "The ASEAN Countries and Indochina" (Text of
an address at a conference on Southeast Asian Banking and Finance 
organized by The Financial Times in Singapore, 19 Apr i l  1979) 
(Kuala Lumpur: Maiaysian Government Information Off ice ,  1979),
p. 21.
164 See section on "The Socioeconomic Impact of the Refugees" in 
Chapter 7, pp. 295-300 above.
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in the region in a way that would probably have been impossible under 
Thanin's approach based on blanket d is t ru s t  of a l l  communists.
Thai land's physical posit ion and re la t ive  economic strength made
i t  v i t a l  to China and Cambodia as a geopol i t ica l  counterweight to
Vietnam, as well as an important target fo r  Hanoi's e f fo r ts  to fos ter
regional l inks  to help i t  break out of what i t  perceived as a Chinese
attempt at encirclement. In addit ion to exp lo i t ing  these factors  to
bring re la t i v e  peace to Thai land's borders with Laos and Cambodia,
Kriangsak was able to exact assurances from both the Vietnamese and
165the Chinese that they would downgrade th e i r  l inks with the CPT.
However, Kriangsak was aware that the regional s i tua t ion  held
grave dangers fo r  Thailand. Although the immediate e f fec t  of the
c r i s i s  was to move the focus of c o n f l i c t  away from Thailand's borders,
the dispute had the potentia l  to embroil Thailand and the other ASEAN 
states in the wider Sino-Soviet r i v a l r y :  Kriangsak stressed the
importance of coexistence between regional s o c ia l i s t  states themselves 
as well as between s o c ia l i s t  and non-soc ia l is t  states in Southeast 
A s i a . ^  Nevertheless, the Thai preference was ce r ta in ly  fo r  a local 
balance of power w i th in Indochina rather than a un i f ied ,  Vietnamese- 
dominated bloc.
Kriangsak t r ie d  to maintain a balance between re la t ions  with the 
Hanoi-Vientiane and Beijing-Phnom Penh axes u n t i l  (and to a l im i ted 
degree even a f te r )  the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in December
165 Such assurances were given during the v i s i t s  to Bangkok by 
Vietnamese Prime Min ister Pham Van Dong in September 1978 and 
Chinese Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping in November 1978.
166 "A Breath of Fresh A i r " ,  Asiaweek, 10 March 1978, p. 21.
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1978. This re f lected not only a wish to help s ta b i l i z e  the precarious 
regional balance, but also a continuing concern with threats to Thai 
secur i ty  from both sides of the communist schism.
The Thais were s t i l l  suspicious of Be i j ing 's  underlying a t t i tude ,
although s u p e r f i c ia l l y  China seemed less of a threat  than at any time
since 1949: when he v is i te d  Bangkok in November 1978, Deng stressed
the importance of "s ta te - to -s ta te "  re la t ions at the expense of
" par ty - to -par ty "  l i n k s . ^  But there was disquiet  w i th in  the Thai
m i l i t a r y  over B e i j ing 's  apparent f a i l u r e  to use i t s  inf luence with the
Khmer Rouge and the CPT to ameliorate the s i tua t ion  on the
1 fift
Thai-Cambodian border. B e i j ing 's  protect ive po l ic ies  towards the 
ethnic Chinese expelled by Vietnam reawakened Bangkok's concern over 
China's a t t i tude  towards Thai land's own ethnic Chinese community. 
Nevertheless, the Thai regime did not concur with Vietnamese charges 
that China intended to use i t s  l inks  with regional communist part ies 
and ethnic Chinese m ino r i t ies ,  and i t s  economic power, to exert 
p o l i t i c a l  dominance over Southeast Asia.
S im i la r ly ,  the Kriangsak administrat ion was not convinced by 
Deng's charge that Vietnam was an "Asian Cuba", i r r e t r i e v a b ly  enmeshed 
in a mult i- faceted a l l iance with the USSR.^ But, by la te  1978, 
Bangkok did view Vietnam and i t s  Soviet al l iance as a more serious 
threat to Thai secur i ty  than China or Cambodia. Although Kriangsak
167 David Bonavia, FEER, 17 November 1978, p. 10.
168 Richard Nations, FEER, 14 July 1978, p. 17.
169 David Bonavia, FEER, 17 November 1978, p. 10.
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believed that Vietnam's entry in to  COMECON ( in  June 1978) and a 
25-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Moscow ( in  November 
1978) were measures necessitated by Hanoi's wish to break out of the 
p o l i t i c a l  and economic iso la t ion  imposed by de ter io ra t ing  re la t ions  
with the USA and China, these were s t i l l  unwelcome developments as 
they increased Moscow's stake (p o te n t ia l ly  inc luding a m i l i t a r y  
dimension) in Indochina and possibly foreshadowed a decisive m i l i t a r y  
gambit against Cambodia. Thai land's re la t ionship with Democratic 
Kampuchea was not e n t i r e ly  comfortable, but a Vietnamese-control led 
Cambodia could pose a much more serious threat to Thai secur i ty .  The 
col lapse of the Khmer Rouge would not only cancel Cambodia's 
t ra d i t io n a l  ro le as a buffer  state between Thailand and Vietnam, but 
might also provide Kriangsak's extreme right-wing domestic c r i t i c s  
with a chance to attack the administrat ion 's  m i ld ly  re formist 
programme at home as well as i t s  foreign p o l i c y . ^
By the time of Deng's v i s i t  in November 1978, Thailand's 
diplomatic balancing act looked precarious: th is  was highl ighted by 
Deng's assertion that i f  Cambodia was overrun by the Vietnamese (as he 
thought l i k e ly )  then Thailand and the other ASEAN states would be 
expected to play "an important ro le  in solving the p r o b le m " . ^  But 
although i t  was clear that  n e u t ra l i t y  might be increasingly d i f f i c u l t ,  
Kriangsak persisted in demonstrating wil l ingness to cooperate with 
e i ther  side of the communist schism in order to enhance Thai secur i ty .
170 Richard Nations, FEER, 10 March 1978, pp. 10-11.
171 Nayan Chanda, FEER, 24 November 1978, p. 10.
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His visit to Vientiane in January 1979 resulted in an agreement 
renouncing subversive acts across the Thai-Cambodian border;
remarkably (in the light of later Thai policy) this agreement was 
signed as Laotian forces were assisting the Vietnamese army to 
consolidate its hold on Cambodia.
Singapore
Singapore's basic lack of interest in constructing harmonious
relationships with the Indochinese states was not altered by the
intensifying dispute in Indochina during 1978. In general, the
Singaporean leadership saw -- or professed to see -- the new
Indochinese conflict as a source of danger rather than opportunity for
the ASEAN states. In September 1978, Lee Kuan Yew saw the situation
as possibly beneficial because it might postpone the "threat" to
172Singapore and the region, but by December he was clearly concerned
that the conflict might escalate dangerously and expressed hope that
17T"sanity w i 11 prev a i 1".
The Singaporean leadership's principal worry was that the
Vietnamese-Cambodian conflict was being used by the Soviet Union and
China to wage a proxy war which might expand to involve Thailand and
174the rest of ASEAN. But there was more concern over Vietnam's role
172 Straits T i m e s , 23 September 1978.
173 Lee Kuan Yew interviewed by Michael Richardson, FEER, 24 December 
1978, p. 18.
174 Rodney Tasker, F E E R , 9 June 1978, p. 31.
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in bringing greater Soviet influence into Southeast Asia than over
China's efforts to defend i ts  regional foothold in Cambodia.
Singapore's trade relations with Hanoi were strengthened in 1978, but
p o l i t i c a l l y  and diplomatically the c i ty  state kept its  distance from
Vietnam. Hanoi's wish to open a consulate in Singapore was 
175thwarted. Although Vietnamese Vice Foreign Minister Phan Hien and 
Prime Minister Dong were allowed to v is i t  ( in July and October 
respectively), the Singaporean atti tude to these vis i tors was correct 
but unaccommodating. Indeed, Dong was probably invited to Singapore 
to maintain the appearance of ASEAN unity, rather than with the 
intention of improving bilateral r e l a i o n s . ^  I t  was clear from 
Rajaratnam's comments at the time that the Singaporean regime was 
extremely suspicious of Vietnamese and Soviet intentions towards the 
region
Superficial ly, the Singaporeans were seriously concerned about 
China's role in the Indochina conf l ic t .  The significance of Deng's 
v is i t  in November was played down and he apparently le f t  Singapore 
with no more than an assurance that the republic would not take sides 
in the dispute. Singaporean o f f ic ia ls  hinted that they s t i l l  saw
China as a long-term threat. But this apparent indifference may have 
represented less the government's true att i tude than an attempt to 
allay Indonesian and Malaysian fears regarding Singapore's empathy
175 Straits Times, 10 February 1978.
176 K. Das and Peter Weintraub, FEER, 27 October 1978, p. 13.
177 Rajaratnam interviewed by Rodney Tasker, FEER, 15 September 1978,
pp. 20-21.
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178with the ancestral homeland of most of i t s  populat ion. In fac t ,  
Singapore seemed to be considerably more comfortable hosting Deng than 
Dong, p a r t i c u la r l y  as the Chinese Vice-Premier emphasized Be i j ing 's  
lack of in te res t  in subverting the lo ya l t ie s  of Singaporean 
Chinese. ^
The Phil ippines
Manila's re la t ions with Hanoi prospered as the Vietnamese sought
to sustain the nexus in the face of competi tion from China fo r  the
Phi l ipp ines ' support. When Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy
Trinh v is i ted  Manila in January 1978, he agreed that Vietnam and the
Phi l ipp ines would se t t le  any future mutual dif ferences in a " s p i r i t  of
180con c i l ia t ion  and f r iendsh ip" .  This agreement may have reassured 
the Marcos regime that Hanoi would not take p rec ip i ta te  m i l i t a r y  
action to fu r the r  i t s  claim to the disputed Spratly  is lands. But as 
the Indochinese dispute in tens i f ied  and Hanoi strengthened i t s  
re la t ions  with Moscow, Manila became more wary of Hanoi's detente 
po l ic ie s .  Foreign Minister Carlos Romulo was p a r t i c u la r l y  cynical 
regarding Vietnam's vo l te -face on recognizing ASEAN and supporting
1 o i
ZOPFAN. Nevertheless, Pham Van Dong's v i s i t  to Manila in September 
brought an announcement that the two countries would not support
178 David Bonavia and K. Das, FEER, 24 November 1978, pp. 30-32.
179 Asia Yearbook 1979, p. 290.
180 Joint agreement signed by Trinh and Marcos, Hong Kong Agence 
France Presse in English, 1048 gmt, 7 January 1978 (FBIS-APA-78- 
5, 9 January 1978).
181 Asia Yearbook 1979, p. 283.
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subversion against each other and a more spec i f ic  agreement that they
182would s e t t le  peaceful ly th e i r  dispute over the Spratlys.
The Marcos regime did not allow i t s  comfortable re la t ionsh ip  with
Vietnam to impede the growth of l inks with Bei j ing and Phnom Penh, as
the Chinese and Cambodian governments attempted to neutra l ize Hanoi's
diplomatic offensive in the ASEAN region. But although Vice-Premier
Li Hsien-Nien - -  then the highest-ranking Chinese leader to have
v is i ted  an ASEAN country - -  re i te ra ted  support fo r  ASEAN and "the jus t
struggle of Southeast Asian countries of safeguard the i r  
183independence", Manila remained chary of China. Concern centred on
B e i j ing 's  continuing l inks with the New People's Army and possibly
also on the potential  fo r  Chinese interference to protect the
in terests  of ethnic Chinese in the P h i l i p p i n e s . ^  Nevertheless,
despite i t s  d is t ru s t  of China the Marcos regime was w i l l in g  to agree
with v i s i t i n g  Cambodian Deputy Premier Ieng Sary that an "independent
1RSCambodia" contr ibuted to regional peace. Like i t s  ASEAN partners, 
the Ph i l ipp ine government seemed to recognize the paradox that whi le 
the Indochinese c o n f l i c t  helped i t  to reduce the tension in i t s  own 
re la t ionships with the Indochinese states and China, th is  advantage 
might evaporate i f  Vietnam overturned the current balance of power in 
Indochina.
182 S t ra i ts  Times, 22 September 1978.
183 Hong Kong Agence France Presse in Engl ish, 1526 gmt, 12 March 
1978 ( FBIS-APA-78-49, 13 March 1978).
184 van der Kroef, Communism in Southeast Asia, pp. 228-29.
185 Joint communique signed by Ieng Sary and Marcos, Hong Kong Agence 
France Presse in Engl ish, 0425 gmt, 20 October 1978 (FBIS-APA-78- 
204, 20 October 1978).
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Conclusion: A Fragi le Unity
In the 1975-78 period, the ASEAN governments attempted to enhance 
th e i r  secur i ty  in the new regional environment created by the 
Indochinese communist v ic to r ie s  by in d iv id ua l ly  and j o i n t l y  s t r i v in g  
to strengthen th e i r  own p o l i t i c a l ,  economic and social systems while 
simultaneously t ry ing  to construct cooperative re la t ionships with the 
Indochinese states. But th e i r  re l iance on narrow e l i t i s t  power bases 
rendered the ru l ing  regimes of the three largest ASEAN countries 
incapable of making the fundamental socioeconomic and p o l i t i c a l  
reforms necessary to ensure that impressively rapid economic growth 
was e f f e c t i v e ly  translated in to  "national res i l ience" .  Moreover, the 
divergent national in terests  of ASEAN's members, as well as the 
weaknesses of ind iv idual ASEAN states, slowed down progress towards 
"regional re s i l ie nce " .  Although some progress was made towards 
reducing the tension which characterized re la t ions between the ASEAN 
and Indochinese states a f te r  the communist v ic to r ie s ,  Hanoi was 
unw i l l ing  to become involved in a new regional order on ASEAN's terms 
(the Vietnamese preferr ing to conduct the i r  re la t ions  with the 
economically more powerful non-communist states on a s t r i c t l y  
b i la te ra l  basis) . Moreover, cer ta in elements in the ASEAN states, 
p a r t i c u la r l y  the Thai r igh t-w ing and the Singaporean government, 
remained sceptical regarding the l i k e l y  benefi ts of any profound 
movement towards in tra-reg iona l  cooperation with Indochina.
Hanoi's deepening c o n f l i c t  with Cambodia and China had a 
s ig n i f ic a n t  impact on re la t ions  between communist and non-communist 
regional states by promoting intense competition between the Hanoi-
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Moscow and Phnom Penh-Beijing axes for the ASEAN states'  favour in 
1978. In particular,  Hanoi appeared to recognize the importance of 
ASEAN as an organization and ZOPFAN as a long-term objective for the 
Association's members. But although the ASEAN states were able to 
take advantage of this situation to improve their relations with all 
the parties to the new Indochina conflict,  this new cordiality was 
built  on an extremely delicate balance of power in Indochina.
The ASEAN states'  responses to the blandishments of the communist 
states involved in the new Indochinese conflict showed striking 
similari t ies during 1978. All were careful not to be drawn into the 
dispute on one side or the other, and the five countries displayed an 
impressive abil i ty to coordinate their responses, exemplified by their 
refusals to enter into Treaties of Peace and Friendship with Vietnam 
and their determination to move Hanoi's regional Peace, Independence
1 ftfiand Neutrality proposal closer to ASEAN's own ZOPFAN concept. But 
there were nuances in the individual ASEAN states'  attitudes,  
reflecting the divergent strategic perspectives of the five 
governments. Whereas the concern of Malaysia, Indonesia and to a 
lesser extent the Philippines with China as a serious, though 
long-term security threat inclined them to empathize ( if  not 
sympathize) with Hanoi, Thailand (mainly because of the Vietnamese 
threat to Cambodian independence), and Singapore (because of 
intensifying Soviet-Vietnamese relations) tended more towards the 
Chinese view of Vietnam as a danger to regional security. As long as 
a balance of power existed within Indochina, this intra-ASEAN
186 K. Das and Peter Weintraub, FEER, 27 October 1978, pp. 9-13.
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divergence of outlook did not threaten the diplomatic cohesion of the 
Association. But these differences foreshadowed the deeper divisions 
which emerged witin ASEAN, at times straining i ts  unity, after the 
Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia at the end of 1978 demolished the 
Indochinese balance.
CHAPTER 10
THE ASEAN STATES' POLITICAL RESPONSES TO THE VIETNAMESE 
OCCUPATION OF CAMBODIA, 1979-81
The Vietnamese invas ion  of  Cambodia at  the end of  1978 p ro found ly  
a f fe c ted  the ASEAN s ta te s '  a t t i t u d e s  and p o l i c i e s  towards Indochina.  
Hanoi 's i n t e r v e n t i o n  destroyed the in te r -commun is t  balance o f  power 
and e s ta b l i s h e d  Vietnamese preponderance in  Indoch ina ,  cance l led 
Cambodia's h i s t o r i c a l  r o le  as a b u f f e r  s ta te  between Tha i land and 
Vietnam, and appeared to  con f i rm  lo n g -e s ta b l i s h e d  Thai views about 
Vietnamese "expans ion ism".  But not on ly  Bangkok was a f f r o n te d  by and 
concerned over the invas io n :  the Vietnamese a c t ion  was c o n t ra ry  to  
the v i s i o n  o f  reg io na l  order  supported by a l l  the ASEAN s ta tes  in 
t h e i r  1976 T re a ty  o f  Amity and Cooperat ion in  Southeast As ia ,  and 
undermined the basis  o f  the non-communist c o u n t r i e s '  de tente  w i th  the 
Indochinese c o u n t r ie s  in  1977-78. The response of  the ASEAN s ta tes  to  
the in vas ion  and the subsequent i n s t a l l a t i o n  o f  the pro-Vietnamese 
Heng Samrin regime in  Phnom Penh r e f l e c t e d  a much g re a te r  concern w i th  
the ex te rn a l  t h r e a t  t o  t h e i r  s e c u r i t y  posed by Vietnam, compared to  
the 1975-78 phase when t h e i r  o v e r r id in g  s e c u r i t y  concern was w i th  
i n t e r n a l  s e c u r i t y ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  in  the l i g h t  of  the a n t i c ip a te d  
socioeconomic and p o l i t i c a l  chal lenge of  v i c t o r i o u s  Indochinese 
communism.
The crux  o f  the ASEAN s ta te s '  response to  the new s i t u a t i o n  was 
an at tempt to  p revent  Vietnam from c o n s o l id a t in g  i t s  ho ld  on Cambodia. 
In  the months and years a f t e r  the invas ion ,  the ASEAN s ta te s  d isplayed 
an impressive degree of  u n i t y  in the adopt ion o f  a se r ies  of
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diplomatic and polit ical measures aimed at compelling Hanoi to 
withdraw i ts  forces from Cambodia and at the ouster of the Heng Samrin 
administration. But beneath the superficial cohesion of ASEAN the 
divergent security perspectives of the individual members states 
persisted, as did differences of opinion within the policy-making 
establishments of each country.
The Evolution of Thai Policy on Cambodia
For geographical reasons, the invasion was of much greater 
concern to the Thai regime, whose immediate strategic environment was 
violated, than to i ts more removed ASEAN partners. The invasion posed 
a serious dilemma for the Kriangsak government, which had invested a 
great deal of polit ical capital in i ts attempts to ameliorate 
relations with Vietnam, China, Laos and Cambodia over the previous 
fifteen months. If Thailand accepted Vietnamese domination of 
Cambodia i t  would run the risk that Vietnam might try to exert 
influence over Thailand (like the Soviet Union over Finland) or 
redevelop i ts  links with the CPT once i t  had consolidated i ts  position 
throughout Indochina. Meanwhile, there was the danger that Vietnamese 
forces might violate Thailand's terr i tor ial  integrity in pursuit of 
Khmer Rouge remnants or to punish Bangkok for the support i t  gave the 
resistance. But Thailand did not i t sel f  possess military capability 
or diplomatic leverage sufficient to expel the Vietnamese forces and 
remove the Heng Samrin regime. Although a ful l-scale invasion of 
Thailand was hardly likely, Thailand's armed forces might be hard 
pressed to cope with the more likely smaller scale Vietnamese
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incursions. A m i l i t a r y  setback fo r  the Thai armed forces in such 
circumstances might imperi l  the domestic p o l i t i c a l  c r e d i b i l i t y  of the 
m i l i t a r y - le d  Bangkok rgime. Moreover, the Kriangsak adminis tra t ion 's  
most important secur i ty  concern was the CPT insurgency (and the 
socioeconomic problems on which i t  thr ived) and i t  did not wish to 
d iver t  scarce government resources away from development and counter­
insurgency.
Bangkok's re la t ionships with i t s  ASEAN partners and Washington 
were extremely useful in helping to secure the diplomatic opposition 
of Western and non-aligned countries to Vietnamese hegemony over 
Cambodia. But only China and the remnants of the ousted Democratic 
Kampuchea regime - -  the Khmer Rouge - -  were w i l l i n g  and able to exert 
physical pressure on Vietnam and the new Cambodian regime. The 
bit terness of the Khmer Rouge's dispute with Hanoi and the Vietnamese- 
supported Heng Samrin regime promised determined resistance to the new 
Cambodian status quo, and China's wi l l ingness to use m i l i t a r y  force 
against Vietnam was demonstrated by i t s  l im i ted invasion of that 
country in February-March 1979.  ^ Even a f te r  the withdrawal of Chinese 
troops from northern Vietnam in 1979, continuing Chinese m i l i t a r y  
pressure on the Si no-Vietnamese border subsequently t ied down about 
200,000 Vietnamese troops, thus reducing the forces avai lable to Hanoi 
fo r deployment in Cambodia.
Bangkok's re la t ionsh ip  with China and the Khmer Rouge a f te r  the 
Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia may not, however, be explained simply 
by the Thai government's wish to insure i t s e l f  against Vietnamese
1 China's puni t ive invasion of Vietnam may have heartened Bangkok, 
but i t  caused concern in Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur, and was 
condemned by ASEAN.
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military incursions and to exert military pressure on the Vietnamese
forces and the Heng Samrin administration. In the f i r s t  place, i t  is
by no means clear that Kriangsak had complete freedom of action in
relation to China and the Khmer Rouge. China's guarantee of Thai
2security -- in the form of promises to render assistance (perhaps 
including a "second lesson" against Vietnam) -- was probably dependent 
on Bangkok allowing the Khmer Rouge to use Thai terr i tory for 
sanctuary and resupply purposes. Secondly, if  Thailand had refused to 
become involved in opposing Vietnam's role in Cambodia, Beijing might 
have revived i ts support for the CPT. Thirdly, the Thai regime may 
have feared the consequences of not supporting the Khmer Rouge in 
their struggle against the Vietnamese: the 30-40,000 strong Cambodian
guerilla force (and very large numbers of dependents) might then have 
been forced into Thailand, possibly linking up with the CPT in 
opposition to the Bangkok government. Fourthly, the Kriangsak regime 
saw important economic reasons for closer relations with China: the
potential of the relationship in this sphere was demonstrated very 
soon after the invasion when Beijing contracted to supply up to a 
million tons of crude oil per year for five years at below market 
prices
2 The f i r s t  public airing of China's guarantee of Thai security was 
on 1 April 1979 when Beijing's envoy in Thailand, Chang Wei-Lieh, 
told journalists that China was ready to "assist the Thai people" 
in the event of an attack by Vietnamese "hegemonists". Straits 
Times, 2 April 1979. But earl ier promises of assistance may have 
been made privately when Kriangsak went to Beijing in April 1978 
or when Deng visited Bangkok the following November.
3 Bangkok domestic service in English, 0000 gmt, 19 January 1979 
(FBIS-APA-79-14, 19 January 1979). Some important Thais saw the 
increase in oil prices during the 1970s and early 1980s as a 
serious threat to their country's security in the broadest sense. 
Personal interview with Squadron Leader Prasong Soonsiri, 
Secretary-General, National Security Council, Bangkok, 20 March 
1981. The issue certainly played an important part in 
Kriangsak's downfall in early 1980.
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Having decided to acquiesce in the Chinese and Khmer Rouge
resistance to the Vietnamese domination of Cambodia, the Kriangsak
administration secured not only a possible deterrent against a large-
scale Vietnamese incursion and an instrument with which to contest
physically Hanoi's hegemony, but also a further downgrading of
Beij ing's relations with the CPT. Simultaneously, Kriangsak used the
"Vietnamese threat" to extract additional m i l i tary  and economic aid
from Washington, and generally to strengthen relations with the United 
4
States. But while the American administration may have seen i ts
positive response to Bangkok's requests pr incipal ly  in terms of 
bolstering Thailand's security against Vietnamese aggression, 
Kriangsak's main use for the additional US aid was in the counter­
insurgency campaign against the CPT, and as a signal to his opponents
in the Thai m i l i tary  that his administration had Washington's 
5
imprimatur.
Although in 1979 Thailand effectively had l i t t l e  choice but to 
become involved in supporting the Cambodian resistance, and despite 
Bangkok's exploitation of this involvement to redouble i ts  efforts to
4 Kriangsak's v is i t  to Washington in February 1979 resulted in the 
Carter administration agreeing to accelerate the delivery of 
weapons on order, a 25% increase in Foreign M il i tary  Sales 
credits for Fiscal Year 1979 (and a further one-third increase 
for FY80) and to donate to Thailand US$11.3m worth of ammunition 
le f t  in the country by US forces when they withdrew in the mid 
1970s. See Richard Nations, FEER, 2 February 1979, p. 8.
5 For discussions of Kriangsak's Cambodian policies, see New York 
Times, 5 January 1980; Richard Nations, FEER, 10 October 1980, 
pp. 13-14 and Helen Chauncey, "Thailand plays the great power 
game", Southeast Asia Chronicle, No. 69 (January-February 1980), 
pp. 2-7. Unlike either its  own successor or the Singaporean 
leadership, the Kriangsak administration did not emphasize the 
threat posed by the Soviet Union's links with Vietnam and Laos.
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suppress domestic communist rebellion and improve relations with 
Washington, Kriangsak certainly did not abandon his efforts to achieve 
detente with Vietnam and Laos. The benefits of cooperative 
relationships with Hanoi and Vientiane had been, and were potentially, 
considerable. Most importantly, Kriangsak had achieved the cessation 
of Vietnamese and Laotian support for the CPT.
Kriangsak was opposed to Vietnam's role in Cambodia, but claimed 
privately that Thailand and Vietnam shared a fundamental long-term 
strategic interest in preventing the spread of Chinese influence 
southwards.^ Although he saw cooperation with China as a tactical 
imperative in the immediate circumstances, i t  seems that the ultimate 
objective of Kriangsak's policy was probably not to "bleed" Vietnam to 
the extent of forcing i t  to relinquish its interest in Cambodia, 
withdraw from i ts  alliance with Moscow and acknowledge i ts weakness 
vis-a-vis China (as appeared to be Beijing's aim), but rather to 
negotiate a "package deal" involving concessions both to and by Hanoi. 
One possible formula might have involved a withdrawal of Vietnamese 
forces from Cambodia in exchange for the expansion of Hanoi's trade 
with ASEAN and the West, and possibly the normalization of 
US-Vietnamese relations.  By this stage -- possibly five years in the 
future -- the Thai government would have worn down the CPT to a level 
at which i t  would be unable to absorb Chinese assistance if this was 
resumed as retribution for Bangkok's defection from the 
anti-Vietnamese cause. At the same time, Thailand's security 
relationship with Washington would be revived, to balance both 
Bangkok's links with China and Vietnam's with the Soviet Union. The
6 Richard Nations, FEER, 10 October 1980, p. 14.
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aim was not to appease or accommodate Vietnam but to res tore  a stable 
balance of power in mainland Southeast Asia.
A continuing improvement in relat ions between Bangkok and Hanoi 
in ear ly 1979 evinced a mutual in teres t  in maintaining a modus 
vivendi . Although the Thai mi l i ta ry soon began to f a c i l i t a t e  the 
movement of Chinese arms to the Khmer Rouge,'7 in January 1979 the 
Kriangsak regime continued to s t ress  Thai neu t r a l i ty .  Hanoi's 
a t t i tude  was also conci l ia tory,  playing on Democratic Kampuchea's role 
in exacerbating border tensions and assert ing that  the new Cambodian
o
regime would prevent "mil i tary provocations". Until Chinese forces 
attacked northern Vietnam in February 1979, Hanoi kept i t s  forces in 
Cambodia well away (up to 30km) from the Thai border in deference to
9
Bangkok's securi ty concerns. But even when small numbers of 
Vietnamese troops began to manoeuvre through Thai t e r r i t o r y  in hot 
pursui t  of the Khmer Rouge, the Thai adminstration maintained i t s  
superf ic ial  neu t r a l i ty ,  with Kriangsak playing down the signif icance 
of these i ncu r s ions . ^
Five b i la t er a l  technical  cooperation and trade agreements with 
Hanoi were signed between January and April ,  when Thailand agreed to 
sel l  Vietnam 5 mil l ion US dol la r s '  worth of r i c e . ^  There was no open
7 Richard Nations, FEER, 23 February 1979, pp. 8-9; S t ra i t s  Times, 
2 March 1979.
8 Nhan Dan commentary, 17 January 1979 (FBIS-APA-79-012, 17 January 
1979).
9 Personal interview with senior Vietnamese diplomat, Bangkok, 
10 March 1981.
10 Bangkok domestic service in Thai, 1300 gmt, 16 November 1979 
(FBIS-APA-79-224, 19 November 1979).
11 Chauncey, p. 6.
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Thai support for the Khmer Rouge and there was no "open door" policy
for Cambodian refugees until October 1979. Relations with Vietnam's
ally Laos also fared well despite the invasion of Cambodia: 1979
witnessed a low-interest Thai loan of 100 million baht (about 5
million US dollars) intended to reinforce trade between the two
countries, an agreement to control border crossings and the use of the
frontier zone by "terrorists",  joint border committee meetings at
provincial level, and an exchange of visi ts by the two countries' 
12Prime Ministers. Kriangsak's visi t  to Moscow in March and his
declaration there that "the Soviet Union and Vietnam are our 
13friends" were intended to lend credibil i ty to Bangkok's claim of
neutrality in the Indochina conflict.  Kriangsak's wish to avoid the 
polarization and panic which might have damaged his government's 
counter-insurgency programme (by undermining the confidence of foreign 
investors and aid donors and diverting the armed forces' attention to 
the Cambodian border) was also reflected in his lack of emphasis on 
any immediate military threat from Vietnam's forces in Cambodia.
Although Kriangsak did not relinquish moderation in his policies 
towards Indochina as a result of the subjugation of Cambodia, the 
Vietnamese invasion did seriously damage the foreign policy consensus 
in Bangkok which had taci t ly supported the Prime Minister's detente 
with Indochina in 1977-78. In contrast to Kriangsak's fair ly relaxed 
view of the threat to Thailand from Vietnamese forces in Cambodia,
12 See section on "Thai-Laotian Detente and the CPT" in Appendix 1, 
pp. 526-28 below.
13 Rodney Tasker, FEER, 23 March 1979, pp. 13-14.
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important elements in the Thai military took a less sanguine view.
These figures in the armed forces may genuinely have believed
Thailand's security to be in danger, but i t  seems that they also
attempted to use the "Vietnamese threat" as a means of undermining
Kriangsak's leadership. In the summer of 1979 there were rumours that
they might stage a coup, ostensibly in reaction against Kriangsak's
14dovish line on Cambodia.
The Cambodian issue did not ultimately play a part in the
downfall of Kriangsak and his replacement as Prime Minister by the
Army Commander-in-Chief and Defence Minister, General Prem Tinsulanond
in March 1980, but the change of administration had a far-reaching
impact on Bangkok's Indochina policy. The Kriangsak administration's
Indochina policy had been based to a large extent on Kriangsak's
personal inspiration. Although Prem retained Air Marshal Siddhi
Savetsila as Foreign Minister, the new government apparently either
failed to understand or purposely disregarded the strategy behind i ts
predecessor's policy in relation to the Cambodian conflict.  Under
Prem, Thai policy on Cambodia lost sight of Kriangsak's vision of a
broad, negotiated settlement: opposition to Vietnam's role in
15Cambodia became an end in i t se l f .  The following months saw a much 
tougher Thai at t itude, displayed particularly in the large-scale 
repatriation of Cambodian refugees in June. Another indication of 
Bangkok's newly inflexible stance towards Hanoi and i ts al l ies was a
14 Chauncey, p. 3.
15 Richard Nations, FEER, 10 October 1980, pp. 13-14.
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ierious deterioration in relations with Hanoi. Kriangsak's policy 
lad been based on an attempt to restore Cambodia to some sort of 
)uffer status at a cost which Thailand could afford. Under Prem, the 
Dfficial Thai view of an ideal status for Cambodia moved closer to 
Beijing's, and Bangkok incurred greater costs as a result .  For 
example, the June 1980 refugee repatriation effectively provided the 
Vietnamese with a just ification for exercising their superior military 
strength in the frontier region. Bangkok's move towards a more 
confrontationist posture on Cambodia also widened the gulf between its 
policies and those of Indonesia and Malaysia.^
16
Indonesian and Malaysian Policy on Cambodia
Indonesian and Malaysian policy-makers faced similar dilemmas 
after the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. A continuing dialogue with 
Vietnam was even more important to the administrations in Jakarta and 
Kuala Lumpur than i t  was to Kriangsak. Indeed, many in Jakarta -- 
particularly in the Defence Ministry -- saw Vietnamese dominance in 
Indochina, provided i t  was coupled with independence from the USSR, as 
beneficial to regional security, by buffering the ASEAN states against 
Chinese pressure and acting as a "starting point for a regionally
16 Martin Stuart-Fox, "National Defence and Internal Security in 
Laos" in Martin Stuart-Fox (ed.),  Contemporary Laos (St Lucia: 
University of Queensland Press, 1980), p. 238.
17 Moreover Kriangsak and Suharto had reportedly developed a "close" 
friendship, which may have helped to moderate differences between 
Thai and Indonesian policy. Robert Manning, FEER, 28 May 1982, 
p. 14.
443  -
18ordered structure  of re la t io n s " .  Kuala Lumpur was more inc l ined to 
c r i t i c i z e  Vietnam (p a r t i c u la r l y  because of Hanoi's creation of the 
seaborne refugee problem), and Malaysian suspicion of China was muted 
by an increasingly important trading re la t ionsh ip ,  but l i ke  i t s  
Indonesian counterpart the Malaysian leadership s t i l l  saw China as the 
p r inc ipa l  long-term external threat and did not consider Vietnamese 
hegemony in Indochina as necessari ly detrimental to Malaysian 
secur i ty .  But fo r  a complex of reasons, the Suharto and Hussein Onn 
governments refused to accept the new p o l i t i c a l  status quo imposed on 
Cambodia by Vietnam.
The invasion of Cambodia forced Indonesia and Malaysia to place 
th e i r  lo y a l t y  to Thai land, a fe l low ASEAN member whose s tra teg ic  
environment had been v io la ted,  before th e i r  in te res t  in developing 
cooperative re la t ions with Hanoi. ASEAN was the centrepiece of both 
Jakarta's and Kuala Lumpur's foreign po l ic ies ,  and i t s  v i a b i l i t y  would 
have been endangered i f  e i ther  Indonesia or Malaysia had not backed 
Bangkok's opposition to Vietnam's domination of Cambodia. Although 
ASEAN's progress in terms of economic cooperation had been 
unimpressive, i t  provided a v i t a l  framework fo r  p o l i t i c a l  consultat ion 
between i t s  bas ica l ly  conservative members in rap id ly  changing 
regional and global circumstances. In the long term view, ASEAN 
continued to provide the framework fo r  Indonesia's aspirat ions to 
regional leadership and a basis fo r  Malaysian ideas about implementing
18 Michael Le i te r ,  Indonesia's Foreign Pol icy (London: George Al len
and Unwin fo r  the Royal In s t i t u te  of In ternational A f fa i r s ,
1983), p. 167.
444  -
ZOPFAN, although Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur believed i t  necessary to 
defer to Thailand on the Cambodian problem in the short term.
The invasion also v io lated the emphasis on non-interference and 
respect fo r  sovereignty in ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 
Southeast Asia, which had been pa r t ly  intended as a bridge to 
Indochinese - -  and p a r t i c u la r l y  Vietnamese - -  involvement in 
maintaining regional order. While there had seemed l i t t l e  l ike l ihood 
of open c o n f l i c t  w i th in Indochina when the Treaty was drawn up, i t  was 
c lea r ly  as relevant to the Cambodian invasion as i t  was to c o n f l i c t  
w i th in  ASEAN or between the ASEAN and Indochinese states (which had 
seemed more l i k e l y  in 1976).
Although the assurances given by Pham Van Dong to ASEAN's leaders
in September 1978 that Vietnam was not a threat to regional securi ty
may have been intended to soften the impact on the ASEAN governments
of the Soviet-Vietnamese t rea ty  and the invasion of Cambodia, some
Indonesian and Malaysian policy-makers regarded Hanoi's behaviour as
19verging on treachery. While there was l i t t l e  in c l in a t io n  in Jakarta 
or Kuala Lumpur to see the t rea ty  and the invasion as evidence of 
Hanoi's subservience to an expansionist Soviet Union, Moscow's 
increasing p o l i t i c a l  and m i l i t a r y  ro le in the region ce r ta in ly  
con f l ic ted  with Indonesian and Malaysian ideas about regional 
" res i l ience"  and n e u t ra l i t y .  For Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur to have 
forged ahead in developing re la t ions  with Hanoi without ra is ing
19 According to one respected Malaysian jo u rn a l i s t ,  Vietnam's 
behaviour in invading Cambodia was perceived as a "slap in the 
face" by the Malaysian Foreign M in is t ry .  Personal interview, 
Kuala Lumpur, 21 Apr i l  1981.
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serious objections to the invasion of Cambodia would have undermined
the c red ib i l i ty  of their  own and ASEAN's vision of regional order.
Although they lacked the physical or po l i t ica l  capabil i ty to
force Vietnam to withdraw from Cambodia, Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur also 
20saw their  support for Thai objections to the invasion of Cambodia as
important to prevent Bangkok from moving towards an overly close and
dependent relationship with Beijing. Such a relationship threatened
not only to extend Chinese influence southwards but also to disrupt
ASEAN cohesion or force the Association to align in the Sino-Soviet
dispute. Jakarta s t i l l  refused to open diplomatic links with Beijing,
21with Mochtar claiming that "China wants to make use of ASEAN". So 
although Indonesia and Malaysia allowed ASEAN to enter into a tact ical 
alliance with China over Cambodia, by maintaining ASEAN's cohesion 
they also hoped to help the Association to retain some independence in 
outlook and policy on the issue.
Kuala Lumpur was also concerned that the Vietnamese m il i tary  
presence on the Thai-Cambodian border might distract the Thai army's 
attention from cooperation with i ts  Malaysian counterpart against the 
CPM.
Although the centre of gravity of ASEAN decision-making was 
effect ively moved from Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur to Bangkok and
20 This was part icular ly  evident at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers' 
conference on Bali in July 1979. Rodney Tasker, FEER, 13 July 
1979, pp. 70-72.
21 Justus M. van der Kroef, "National Security, Defense Strategy and 
Foreign Policy Perceptions in Indonesia", Orbis, Vol. 20, No. 2 
(Summer 1980), p. 490.
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Singapore after the invasion of Cambodia, Indonesia and Malaysia were
by no means wholehearted in their support for ASEAN's policies on
Cambodia and made persistent efforts to use their equable
relationships with Hanoi to search for a negotiated settlement to the
Cambodian problem. Kriangsak's stance was moderate in comparison to
those of China and his own successor (Prem), but there was never any
indication that he agreed with the basic attitude underlying the
Indonesian and Malaysian approach -- a recognition that Vietnam as
well as Thailand had a legitimate and vital security interest in 
2 2Cambodia. Indeed, there was a widely held view in Jakarta that
Vietnam's wish to dominate Indochina was comparable with Indonesia's
own drive to control the whole extent of the former Dutch East Indies.
Thus Cambodia might be seen as "Vietnam's Irian Jaya". Other
Indonesians sympathetically compared the Cambodian invasion with
23Indonesia's incorporation of East Timor. Moreover, the East Timor 
issue made i t  dif f icul t  for Jakarta to cri t icize Vietnam over Cambodia 
without appearing blatantly hypocritical.
Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur feared that ASEAN's line on Cambodia -- 
which they fe l t  bound to support -- might in the longer term damage 
their own and ASEAN's security. The flow of Chinese supplies through
22 Kriangsak is reported to have thought the ideas expressed in the 
"Kuantan principle" dangerous. Richard Nations, FEER, 10 October 
1980, p. 13.
23 Personal interview with Dr Lie Tek Tjeng, LRKN (National Cultural
Research Inst i tute) ,  Jakarta, 6 April 1981. Shortly after the 
invasion of Cambodia, the Indonesian ambassador in Hanoi (Rear 
Admiral Sudarsono) claimed, in a statement approved by Suharto, 
that Vietnam "does not wish to be the enemy of ASEAN" and "always 
seeks a dialogue with i ts ASEAN neighbours". Jakarta domestic 
service, 1200 gmt, 23 July 1980. (FBIS-APA-80-144, 24 July
1980).
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Thailand to the Khmer Rouge raised the spectre fo r  Malaysian securi ty
o f f i c i a l s  of Bei j ing using the same route to supply the CPT and CPM.
Moreover, Indonesian policy-makers saw Thai involvement with the Khmer
Rouge as obstruct ing rather than f a c i l i t a t i n g  a sett lement by
providing the Vietnamese with a j u s t i f i c a t i o n  fo r  maintaining a f i rm
p o l i t i c a l  and m i l i t a r y  hold on Cambodia. There was also the danger
that Bangkok's assistance to the Khmer Rouge might re su l t  in a d i rec t
clash between Vietnamese and Thai forces, leading to an increased Thai
re l iance on Chinese secur i ty  assistance. The possible a t t r i t i o n  of
Vietnam's strength raised the spectre of Hanoi being subjugated to
24Chinese inf luence or forced in to  greater dependence on the USSR. In
sum, unless a way was found to decouple the Cambodian dispute from the
Sino-Soviet confrontat ion, Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur saw a danger that
not only Indochina but also Thailand and i t s  ASEAN partners would
25become enmeshed in the wider c o n f l i c t .
These apprehensions encouraged the Indonesian and Malaysian 
governments to look fo r  a formula which would s a t is fy  the securi ty 
requirements of Vietnam as well as Thailand. Discussions between 
Suharto and Hussein Onn in March 1979 led to an announcement that 
Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur would explore p o s s ib i l i t i e s  fo r  a settlement 
of the Indochina c o n f l i c t  through b i la te ra l  contacts with Hanoi as
24 Nayan Chanda, FEER, 19 December 1980, p. 32.
25 According to Adam Malik, "Big power contention and intervention 
continue to threaten the new structures of peace and harmony we 
have so pa instakingly t r ie d  to bui ld over the past few years". 
Sydney Morning Herald, 12 March 1980.
26 Indonesian Times, 7 March 1979; K. Das, FEER, 16 March 1979, 
pp. 12-13.
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well as Beij ing,  although the c r i s i s  induced by the flow of seaborne
Vietnamese refugees into the ASEAN region in the following months
subsequently dampened Indonesian and Malaysian enthusiasm for such an
i n i t i a t i v e .  But by the end of 1979 Indonesian and Malaysian
f ru s t r a t i on  with Thailand's r e l a t ive ly  tough approach towards Vietnam 
27and resurfaced.
The f i r s t  concrete manifestat ion of the search for a face-saving
formula was the so-called Kuantan Declaration of March 1980, which
proposed basical ly that  Hanoi should remain outside e i ther  Soviet or
Chinese influence in exchange for Western economic aid and a
28recognit ion by ASEAN of Vietnamese securi ty i n te res ts  in Cambodia.
The Kuantan proposal was part ly an attempt by Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur
to take advantage of the recent change of government in Thailand, but
contrary to Indonesian and Malaysian hopes, the Prem administrat ion
lacked even i t s  predecessor 's vague commitment to reach some sort  of
29compromise with Hanoi. Not only was the proposal unsat is factory 
from Bangkok's viewpoint, but Hanoi also rejected the formula at this
26 Indonesian Times, 7 March 1979; K. Das, FEER, 16 March 1979, 
pp. 12-13.
27 See, for example, Mochtar's comments af te r  the ASEAN Foreign 
Ministers '  meeting in Kuala Lumpur in mid December 1979. 
Indonesian Times, 17 December 1979.
28 Sydney Morning Herald, 28 March and 5 April 1980; K. Das, FEER, 
4 April 1980, p. 12.
29 Richard Nations, FEER, 25 April 1980, pp. 10-11. Kriangsak's 
resignat ion also accentuated Indonesian and Malaysian fears that  
Thailand's pol i t i ca l  and economic weakness might provide an 
opportunity for Beijing to increase i t s  influence in Bangkok. 
Some sort  of accommodation with Vietnam over the Cambodian 
problem would have allowed the Thai government to devote more 
energy towards resolving the deter iorat ing economic s i tua t ion.
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stage because of i ts failure to recognize the dist inct  lack of
30symmetry in Vietnam's relationships with the USSR and China: from
the Vietnamese viewpoint, China was the main threat to regional peace,
31whereas the Soviet Union was helping to stabilize Southeast Asia.
Although the Kuantan proposal was unsatisfactory from both Thai
and Vietnamese viewpoints, i t  highlighted the growing impatience of
Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur with the Cambodian stalemate. Hanoi
attempted to take advantage of this division in ASEAN's ranks,
indicating that i t  might reduce i ts military presence in Cambodia and
cooperate with ASEAN in setting up a "zone of peace and neutrality" in
exchange for acknowledgement of the "solidarity" of the Indochinese 
32states.  In May and June 1980 there were signs that at least
Indonesia and Malaysia were negotiating with Vietnam on a compromise
solution, perhaps involving the legitimizing of a broadened version of
33the Heng Samrin regime, following elections later in the year. But
30 Leiter, Indonesia's Foreign Policy, p. 168.
31 See, for example, Nguyen Co Thach's comments at his press
conference in Bangkok. Nation Review (Bangkok), 11 May 1980. 
Vietnam's lack of enthusiasm for the Kuantan ini t iat ive was
confirmed by the failure of Thach and Mochtar to reach any
significant agreement during the former's visi t  to Jakarta in 
June 1980. See P. Rodgers, FEER, 27 June 1980, pp. 10-11.
32 Hong Kong Agence France Presse (cited hereafter as AFP) in
English, 1306 gmt, 21 May 1980 (FBIS-APA-80-101, 22 May 1980); 
Nayan Chanda, FEER, 23 May 1980, pp. 16-17.
33 In mid-May the Malaysian Prime Minister had official ly confirmed 
for the f i r s t  time that delicate negotiations were under way on a 
negotiated settlement with Vietnam. At approximately this time, 
Lieutenant-General Benny Murdani, the influential deputy director 
of Jakarta's integrated intelligence services (Bakin) visited 
Hanoi to discuss the Cambodian issue. Age, 15 May 1980; John 
Burgess, Age, 11 June 1980; Richard Nations, FEER, 20 June 1980,
p. 12.
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the Vietnamese military incursion into Thai territory in June 1980
effectively forced Indonesia and Malaysia to align themselves with
34ASEAN's other members in condemning Hanoi. While it was undoubtedly
irksome for the Indonesian and Malaysian governments to have to
subordinate their own views on the Cambodian problem to those of
Thailand, their interest in maintaining the cohesion of ASEAN retained
its precedence over the desire to foster better relations with Hanoi.
ASEAN's successful lobbying on behalf of Democratic Kampuchea had
significantly increased the Association's importance as a negotiation
bloc on the world stage. The practical usefulness of this enhanced
international status extended beyond the Cambodian issue into such
vital areas as economic relations with Japan, Australia and the
35European Communities.
Malaysian enthusiasm for a compromise solution with Vietnam 
appeared to wane after the June incursion, which presumably reawakened 
the fears of security officials in Kuala Lumpur concerning the 
distraction of the Thai army from its counter-insurgency task. But 
although the Indonesian authorities -- and especially the Foreign 
Ministry -- were now more wary in their dealings with Hanoi, pressure 
from the armed forces -- and particularly Lieutenant-General Benny 
Murdani, the head of intelligence coordination -- ensured that Jakarta 
retained an interest in a constructive, bilateral dialogue with the 
Vietnamese on Cambodia.
34 Hong Kong AFP in English, 0210 gmt, 29 June 1980 (FBIS-APA-80- 
127, 30 June 1980) and 0400 gmt, 30 June 1980 (FBIS-APA-80-128, 
1 July 1980).
35 Sheldon W. Simon, The ASEAN States and Regional Security,
(Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1982), p. 134.
36 David Jenkins, F E E R , 29 August 1980, p. 10.
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Singaporean Policy on Cambodia
Although Singapore's security was not immediately threatened by
the invasion of Cambodia, the island republic nevertheless emerged as
the most outspoken ASEAN cr i t i c  of Hanoi's attack on Democratic
Kampuchea, adopting the toughest attitude towards Vietnam at the June
371979 ASEAN Foreign Ministers' meeting. The Singaporean leadership's
"globalist" outlook, emphasizing the dangers to regional security from
38Soviet-backed Vietnamese expansionism and the need for ASEAN to seek
39security guarantees from the United States and China while enhancing 
i ts  own defence capability, became even more pronounced after the 
Vietnamese invasion.
Singapore's globalist foreign policy outlook -- which had 
affected relations with Vietnam even before the invasion of Cambodia 
-- is not a total ly satisfactory explanation of i ts  attitudes towards 
Hanoi from 1979. In contrast to their Indonesian and Malaysian 
counterparts who viewed regional order principally as a useful device
37 Singapore's Foreign Minister, S. Rajaratnam, claimed that Vietnam 
was seeking "hegemony" in Southeast Asia. Singapore Government 
Press Release, NOMC/June/44/79.
38 For example, Rajaratnam claimed that "a Soviet led and funded
communist revolution" had been launched in the region. Singapore
domestic service in English, 1330 gmt, 5 April 1980 (FBIS-APA-80- 
068, 7 April 1980). In i ts publication From Phnom Penh to Kabul, 
the Singaporean government explicity coupled the invasions of 
Cambodia and Afghanistan as evidence of a Soviet expansionist
drive into Asia. See also Rajaratnam's speech at the National 
Press Club of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, 29 June 1980 when he termed 
Vietnam "the most enthusiastic of all Soviet proxies".
39 Goh Keng Swee, Singapore's Deputy Prime Minister, was clearly
impressed and reassured by China's willingness to use direct 
military force against Vietnam in 1979. See Goh Keng Swee, "No 
cause for pessimism if only we are resolute", Pacific Defence 
Reporter, May 1981, p. 18.
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fo r  enhancing national power or prestige, owing to th e i r  experiences 
in the 1960s Singaporean leaders saw regional order as crucia l to 
national surv iva l .  Although Singapore was not d i r e c t l y  threatened 
m i l i t a r i l y  as a resu l t  of the invasion of Cambodia, the Singaporean 
leadership's recognit ion of th e i r  small repub l ic 's  potential  
v u ln e ra b i l i t y  in the absence of respect fo r  the pr inc ip les of 
sovereignty and t e r r i t o r i a l  i n te g r i t y  was a more spec i f ic  reason fo r  
opposing the subjugation of Cambodia - -  ju s t  as Singapore had in 1976 
refused to jo in  i t s  ASEAN partners in voting against the UN General
Assembly resolut ion condemning Indonesia's incorporation of East
T • 40Timor.
Although the Singaporean government s t i l l  did not open formal
diplomatic l inks with Be i j ing ,  i t  was considerably less worried about
a "Chinese threat"  to the region than any of i t s  partners in ASEAN.
Alignment with Bei j ing against Hanoi on the Cambodian issue may have
41provided a safe ou t le t  fo r  popular sympathy with China. Moreover, 
the ru l in g  People's Action Party's v i r tu a l  monopoly of Singapore's 
small p o l i t i c a l  e l i t e  meant that there was not the same d ive rs i ty  of
40 S. Dhanabalan, Singapore's Foreign M in is te r ,  argued that "the
claim that one country has the moral r i g h t  to intervene in 
another and overthrow a regime that i t  does not approve of is a 
dangerous p r in c ip le .  I t  is especia l ly dangerous to us who are 
neighbours of a Vietnam that has announced repeatedly that i t  is 
the vanguard of a r e v o lu t i o n . . . " .  Speech at ASEAN M in is te r ia l  
meeting, Kuala Lumpur, 25 June 1980. Reprinted in Speeches 
(M in is t ry  of Culture, Singapore), Vo l . 4, No. 1 (July 1980), 
p. 85. Dhanabalan's second sentence helps to explain why
Singapore was not so concerned by Ind ia 's  " l i b e ra t io n "  of East 
Pakistan in 1971 or Tanzania's invasion of Uganda in 1979.
41 David Jenkins, FEER, 29 August 1980, p. 10; As tr i  Suhrke, "ASEAN: 
Adjust ing to New Regional al ignments", Asia Pac i f ic  Community, 
No. 12 (Spring 1981), p. 22.
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views found wi th in the governments and bureaucracies of the other
ASEAN states.  Consequently, the Singaporean government's Cambodian
po l icy  was unrestrained by s ig n i f i c a n t  internal debate. Singapore's
distance from the " f r o n t - l i n e "  meant that i t s  government f e l t  able to
express i t s  strong views on the Cambodian issue without Thailand's
42fear that  th is  might provoke a m i l i t a r y  response by Vietnam.
But Singapore's po l icy towards Vietnam and the Cambodian issue
was not as uncompromising as China's. Singaporean p o l i t i c ia n s  and
o f f i c i a l s  emphasized that they were not fundamentally hos t i le  to
Vietnam, but only to Vietnam's ro le  in Cambodia and Hanoi's a l l iance 
43with Moscow. At the In ternational  Conference on Kampuchea in July
1981 even Singapore insisted that ASEAN was not interested in
44"bleeding" Vietnam, but in reducing regional tension. Although
Singapore was quick to dissociate i t s e l f  from the Kuantan formula,
statements by Lee Kuan Yew la te r  in 1980 implied that he was th ink ing
in terms of acknowledging Vietnam's p o l i t i c a l  leadership of 
45Indochina. Short ly before the In ternational  Conference, Dhanabalan
42 According to Rajaratnam, " . . .  sometimes i t  is easier to speak 
louder when you are fa r  away from the antagonist because i t s  arms 
do not reach that f a r " .  S t ra i t s  Times, 4 March 1979.
43 According to Dhanabalan, ASEAN was not "anti-Vietnam". Canberra 
Times, 30 June 1980. The cruc ia l  ro le  of Vietnam's a l l iance with 
Moscow in p rec ip i ta t ing  Singaporean and ASEAN resistance to 
Hanoi's occupation of Cambodia was emphasized by See Chak Mun, 
Director (P o l i t i c a l  A f f a i r s ) ,  M in is t ry  of Foreign A f fa i r s ,  
Singapore, in a personal interv iew, 7 February 1981.
44 Nayan Chanda, FEER, 24 July 1981, pp. 13-15.
45 S. Awanohara, FEER, 22 August 1980, p. 11.
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claimed that a solution to the Cambodian problem would need to
46safeguard the "security interest" of Vietnam as well as ASEAN.
Singapore had important reasons for not wanting a complete
breakdown in relations between communist and non-communist Southeast
Asia, despite i ts  persistently "hawkish" stance on Cambodia and the
Soviet-Vietnamese nexus. The Singaporean authorities did not wish to
exacerbate tensions with Vietnam to a degree that would discourage
foreign investment. A regional "climate of confidence" was needed to
ensure continued growth and development. Neither did the government
wish to disrupt an increasingly valuable trading relationship with
Indochina -- by 1982, Singapore was Hanoi's third largest trading
47partner after the USSR and India. Singapore was also concerned not 
to alienate Indonesia and Malaysia due to disagreement over Cambodia. 
Any serious threat to ASEAN's cohesion was seen as a threat to 
Singapore's security, as the Association had provided a framework for 
the improvement of the city s ta te 's  relations with its  larger 
neighbours after the traumas of Confrontation and separation from 
Malaysia. Moreover, while the Singaporean government saw the 
Cambodian issue as the immediate problem to be solved, i t  s t i l l  
considered China to be a long-term security concern -- although the
46 Dhanabalan's speech at ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Manila, 17 June 
1981, reprinted in Singapore Government Press Release, 
09-1/81/06/17. Also personal interview with a PAP Member of 
Parliament and foreign policy adviser, January 1981.
47 Approximately 10% of Vietnam's trade was with Singapore. See 
Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the Pacific 1981 (Bangkok: 
United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the 
Pacific, 1982), pp. 551-52.
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Chinese threat was not taken as seriously as in Jakarta and Kuala 
48Lumpur. I t  was therefore important neither to weaken Vietnam to the 
extent desired by Beijing, nor to align too closely with China.
Philippine Policy on Cambodia
Compared to i ts  ASEAN partners, the Philippine government was 
both less concerned by the invasion of Cambodia and less actively 
involved in the search for a solution to the ensuing diplomatic 
impasse. In part this may be explained by the Philippines' maritime 
isolation from mainland Southeast Asia, the sense of security from 
external threats provided by this fact and by the US m il i tary  
presence, and Manila's preoccupation with internal security problems. 
The isolation factor, together with the pro-Beijing orientation of the 
New People's Army, and the development of a relaxed relationship with 
Vietnam in the 1975-78 period accounts for Manila's policy on Cambodia 
--  when i t  did exercise a policy --  being closer to those of Indonesia 
and Malaysia than those of Thailand and Singapore.
Another reason for both Manila's low prof i le on Cambodia and i ts  
generally moderate position on the issue was the inst i tu t ional 
weakness of the Philippine Ministry of Foreign Affa irs. In 1981, the 
senior Ministry o f f ic ia l  in charge of policy on Indochina professed to 
agree with Singapore's tough line on the Cambodia issue, stressing the 
dangers for the region of the Soviet-Vietnamese alliance and China's
48 Personal interview with See Chak Mun, 7 February 1981.
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49re la t i v e  benevolence. S im i la r ly ,  the veteran pro-American Foreign
Secretary, Carlos Romulo, stressed the importance of not accepting the
50Vietnamese-imposed status quo in Cambodia. Sometimes the M in is t ry 's
viewpoint was re f lected in o f f i c i a l  Phi l ipp ine po l icy ,  but the course
of th is  po l icy appears to have been influenced to a greater extent by
Marcos's " th ink - tank" ,  the President 's Center fo r  Special Studies, and
various committees inc luding representat ives from the Finance, Trade
and Industry M in is t r ies  and the National Economic Development
Author i ty  as well as the M in is t ry  of Foreign A f fa i r s .  In the Cabinet
i t s e l f ,  "hawks" on the Cambodian issue (such as Romulo) were
outnumbered by the "doves", who included not only Bias Ople (the
51Labour Min is ter)  but also the President and Mrs Marcos. Although i t
may have been wr i t ten  before the invasion, a lengthy a r t i c le  on the
region 's p o l i t i c a l  fu ture  which appeared under Marcos's name in May
1979 showed no concern with a Vietnamese-Soviet threat but emphasized
52the need fo r  "a strong and united regional community". Like 
Marcos's opinion that ASEAN should act as a "neutra l"  bulwark to "fend 
o f f  big power in tentions" in Southeast Asia, th is  viewpoint seemed 
much closer to Indonesian and Malaysian regional ism than Thai and
49 Personal interview with Ambassador Luz Del Mundo, M in is t ry  of
Foreign A f fa i r s ,  Manila, 27 March 1981.
50 Personal interview with Carlos P. Romulo, Minister of Foreign
A f fa i r s ,  Manila, 23 March 1981.
51 Personal interviews with senior B r i t i s h  and Austra l ian diplomats, 
and academics at the Un ivers i ty  of the Phi l ipp ines, Manila, March 
1981.
52 Ferdinand E. Marcos, "Southeast Asia in the year 2000",
Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 1, No. 1 (May 1979), pp. 1-22.
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Singaporean global ism. The Marcos regime's wariness of being drawn
deeper in to  what i t  saw as essent ia l ly  a problem fo r  Thailand was
demonstrated in 1981 when i t  joined Jakarta in attempting to persuade
th e i r  ASEAN partners that the Association should not become involved
53in s o l i c i t i n g  arms fo r  the Cambodian resistance c o a l i t io n .
But the Marcos regime did not general ly express openly these 
f a i r l y  c o n c i l ia to ry  views on Cambodia. ASEAN remained important to 
the regime as an a l te rna t ive  to p o l i t i c a l  and economic over-rel iance 
on the United States. By not using i t s  "cast ing vote" to t i p  the 
balance of ASEAN opinion towards con c i l ia t ion  and the accommodation of 
Hanoi's in terests  in Cambodia, Manila helped to ensure that the 
Associat ion's cohesion was not threatened. Moreover, the Phi l ipp ine 
armed forces,  whose support was v i t a l  fo r  the regime's continuation in 
power, might have objected to a Cambodian po l icy  which diverged from 
Washington's l ine .  Lastly , to have played down the Soviet and 
Vietnamese threat too fa r  might have removed one possibly useful 
fu ture j u s t i f i c a t i o n  ( in  domestic p o l i t i c a l  terms) fo r  the re tent ion 
of the US bases (which in turn helped ensure Washington's support fo r  
the regime despite i t s  abuses of human r ig h ts ) .
Attempts to Break the Stalemate: An In ternational  Conference
and a Broadened Cambodian Resistance Movement
The ASEAN governments were increasingly aware as 1980 progressed 
that the Associat ion's po l icy  on Cambodia was un l ike ly  to lead to a
53 Nayan Chanda, FEER, 13 August 1982, p. 46.
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resolut ion of the c o n f l i c t  on th e i r  terms. Reports of growing 
economic normalcy inside Cambodia, coupled with the evidently 
decl in ing m i l i t a r y  effect iveness of the Khmer Rouge, indicated that 
time might be on the side of the Vietnamese and the Heng Samrin 
administra t ion. B r i t a in ' s  derecognition of Democratic Kampuchea in 
December 1979 and Ind ia 's  recognit ion of the Heng Samrin regime in 
July 1980 confirmed the impression that i t  was becoming increasingly 
d i f f i c u l t  to maintain in ternat iona l  support fo r  the ousted Khmer Rouge 
regime. In September 1980, as in September 1979, the UN General
Assembly's credentials committee voted to recognize the Democratic 
Kampuchea regime. But the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan at the end 
of 1979 almost ce r ta in ly  contr ibuted to th is  vote against Moscow's 
a l l i e s  in Southeast Asia. I t  was becoming apparent that a new formula 
was needed to ensure that in te rnational  society did not accept the 
Vietnamese-imposed s i tua t ion  in Cambodia as a f a i t  accompli.
Recognizing that there were important elements in the ASEAN
governments which were unhappy with ASEAN's current po l icy ,  in July
1980 Hanoi proposed (through a j o i n t  statement of the Vietnamese,
Laotian and Cambodian foreign ministers - -  the so-cal led "Vientiane
proposals") a "package deal" on Cambodia involv ing d i rec t  negotiat ions
between Bangkok and the Heng Samrin regime, a demi l i ta r ized zone on
the Thai-Cambodian border, the disarming of the Cambodian resistance,
the d is t r ib u t io n  of a l l  aid w i th in Cambodia (rather than on the
border), the signing of non-aggression t rea t ies  between the
Indochinese and ASEAN states, and discussions on the establishment of
54a regional zone of peace and s t a b i l i t y .  While unacceptable to
54 Nayan Chanda, FEER, 25 July 1980, p. 8.
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Thailand -- and thus willy-nilly to the rest of ASEAN -- because they
involved recognition of the People's Republic of Kampuchea regime, the
Vientiane proposals were part of a broader Vietnamese effort to appear
reasonable by presenting attractive alternatives to the s te r i l i ty  of
ASEAN's approach. In the UN General Assembly debate on Cambodia in
September 1980, the Vietnamese suggested immediate talks between
themselves and ASEAN on the basis of ZOPFAN, the Kuantan declaration
55and the Vientiane proposals. This concession was followed by the
Indochinese Foreign Ministers' proposal in January 1981 for a regional
conference with the ASEAN states to discuss their differences, coupled
with an offer by Hanoi to withdraw some of its  forces from Cambodia or
56at least from the Thai frontier . These Vietnamese init iat ives
increased the pressure on ASEAN to inject new l ife  into its  Cambodian
policy, to maintain not only international support for Democratic
Kampuchea but also the Association's cohesion.
ASEAN's new strategy on Cambodia involved two main strands. One
strand was to make the Democratic Kampuchea regime more acceptable to
both the Cambodian population and international society by broadening
its  political make-up to include non-communist factions. The second
strand was to persuade Hanoi to negotiate a withdrawal from Cambodia
on terms that took greater account than the Vientiane proposals of
Bangkok's security interests, in the context of an international
57conference involving all interested parties.
55 Nayan Chanda, FEER, 3 October 1980, p. 16.
56 See Nayan Chanda, FEER, 6 February 1981, pp. 8-9.
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This new st rategy was broadly successful in the sense that  i t  
increased the internat ional  respec t abi l i ty  and legitimacy of
Democratic Kampuchea, ensuring that  Heng Samrin's People's Republic 
remained an internat ional  outcast  even af ter  i t  had rebui l t  Cambodia 
and held power for a longer period than the Khmer Rouge. But the
Internat ional  Conference on Kampuchea, held under UN auspices in New 
York in July 1981, and the formal achievement of a coal i t ion between 
the Khmer Rouge and two non-communist res is tance groups (led by Son
CO
Sann and Prince Sihanouk) did l i t t l e  to fos ter  a negotiated solution 
to the conf l ic t .
The new st rategy also helped to ensure that  Indonesia did not
59break ranks with the r es t  of ASEAN over Cambodia, but fa i led to 
assuage the concerns of those in Jakarta (par t icu l ar l y  in the armed 
forces) and Kuala Lumpur who questioned the appropriateness of a 
policy which s t i l l  f a i led  to take into account Hanoi's fundamental 
securi ty i n te r es t  in ensuring that  Cambodia did not resume i t s
previous role as part  of a Chinese attempt to "encircle" Vietnam.
57 The ASEAN-sponsored UN General Assembly Resolution on Cambodia of 
23 October 1980 included a proposal for an internat ional  
conference as ear ly as possible in 1981. Four days l a t e r  Prem 
vis i ted Beijing,  intending to determine China's a t t i tude  towards 
a broadening of the DK regime. Ted Morello and John McBeth, 
FEER, 31 October 1980, pp. 21-23.
58 The various Cambodian res i s tance fact ions held a ser ies  of secret  
meetings beginning in July 1981. In September they agreed in 
pr inciple to form a coal i t ion but disagreement on the issue of 
power-sharing delayed the signing of a formal agreement until  
June 1982.
59 After meeting Suharto in late  March 1981, Prem f e l t  able to 
dismiss reports that  there was any conf l i c t  between Indonesia and 
i t s  ASEAN partners over Cambodia. Bangkok Post , 27 March 1981.
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That Indonesian military leaders were not alone in their view of the 
common security interests of Vietnam and ASEAN was shown in the 
Malaysian foreign minister's claim that ASEAN would be exposed to 
"China's unfettered machinations" if Beijing succeeded in i ts  plan to 
bring Vietnam "to i ts knees".^
Both Indonesian and Malaysian governments continued to pursue 
bilateral  negotiations with Vietnam at the same time that ASEAN was 
encouraging moves towards an international conference and a Cambodian 
resistance coalition: the Malaysian Foreign Minister visited Hanoi in 
January 1981 and Jakarta hosted Phoune Sipraseuth, the Foreign 
Minister of Hanoi's ally, Laos, in Apri l .^  There were also reports 
in April that Jakarta was unhappy with Prem's refusal to adopt a more
C O
conciliatory attitude on Cambodia.
When ASEAN's Foreign Ministers met in mid-June 1981 to discuss 
their strategy for the forthcoming International Conference on 
Kampuchea, Indonesian and Malaysian pressure ensured that the draft 
resolution which they drew up was broadly sympathetic to Vietnam's 
polit ical and security interests in Cambodia. This ASEAN draft made 
i t  clear that i ts  proposed "withdrawal of all foreign forces" (that is 
Vietnam's army of occupation) would not result in a return to power by 
the Khmer Rouge, unless this was what the Cambodian people desired 
(which they almost certainly did not); there would be no time limit
60 New Straits Times, 17 June 1981.
61 Canberra Times, 27 April 1981.
62 David Jenkins, FEER, 10 April 1981, p. 16.
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fo r  the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces; a l l  Cambodian fact ions - -  
inc luding the Khmer Rouge - -  would be disarmed; and a neutral interim 
administrat ion would maintain law and order preceding UN-supervised
6  "5
free elect ions. But although ASEAN attempted to o f fe r  Vietnam
incentives to withdraw from Cambodia, there was s t i l l  in s u f f i c ie n t
common ground fo r  a construct ive discussion of the problem with Hanoi.
The Vietnamese a t t i tude  was essent ia l ly  that the conference agenda
should discuss not only Cambodia but "fundamental issues of peace and
secur i ty  in the region" - -  in other words, the "Chinese threat"  to
64Vietnam and ASEAN. U l t imate ly ,  both Vietnam and the Soviet Union
65announced that they would boycott the conference, which they claimed 
was an intereference in Kampuchea's internal a f f a i r s .
While ASEAN's d ra f t  resolut ion was undoubtedly sa t is fy ing  to 
those in ASEAN who were anxious to f ind a negotiated s o lu t i o n , ^  
Chinese objections ensured not only that Heng Samrin's People's 
Revolutionary Party was not inv i ted to the ICK^ but also that the 
conference emasculated ASEAN's f a i r l y  con c i l ia to ry  reso lu t ion .  China 
persuaded the conference to dispense with any reference to the 
disarming of the Khmer Rouge and other Cambodian resistance groups, to
63 Nayan Chanda, FEER, 26 June 1981, pp. 10-12.
64 Nayan Chanda, FEER, 17 Apr i l  1981, p. 12.
65 John McBeth, FEER, 12 June 1981, p. 12.
66 See, fo r  example, Michael Richardson's interv iew with the 
Indonesian Foreign Min is te r ,  Mochtar Kusumaatmadja ,  Sydney 
Morning Herald, 25 June 1981.
67 Nayan Chanda and Michael Richardson, FEER, 17 July 1981, 
pp. 13-14.
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replace the idea of an interim administrat ion with "appropriate 
measures" fo r  the maintenance of law and order, and to ignore ASEAN's
ca l l  fo r  a spec i f ic  o f fe r  of aid to Vietnam i f  i t  withdrew i t s
. 68 troops.
The ICK thus did nothing to break the deadlock over Cambodia. In 
the absence of representat ives from Moscow, Hanoi and Phnom Penh, the 
conference was re a l l y  no more than a gathering of those committed to 
seeking a revis ion of the Vietnamese-imposed status quo in Cambodia. 
ASEAN's co n c i l ia to ry  stance (which was more important to Indonesia and 
Malaysia than to the Associat ion's other members) was los t  in the 
ICK's f in a l  document which, in order to avoid providing Hanoi with an 
opportunity  to exp lo i t  the dif ferences between i t s  opponents, 
emphasized broad pr inc ip les  rather than the a l l  important deta i ls  
which might have reassured the Vietnamese.^
Like the ICK d ra f t  reso lu t ion,  the o r ig ina l  ASEAN idea fo r  a 
Cambodian resistance coa l i t io n  was intended to provide a basis for  
negotiat ion with Hanoi. The aim was to extend the mantle of 
in ternat iona l  legit imacy provided by the Democratic Kampuchean label 
from the Chinese-oriented and unpopular Khmer Rouge to the Cambodian 
resistance as a whole, with the in tent  of weakening the Khmer Rouge 
and strengthening (both p o l i t i c a l l y  and m i l i t a r i l y )  the non-communist 
groups led by Sihanouk and Son Sann. Mindful of hints  tha t  Hanoi and 
th e i r  a l l i e s  in Phnom Penh might be w i l l in g  to broaden the p o l i t i c a l
68 I b id . , l o c . c i t . ; Nayan Chanda, FEER, 24 July 1981, p. 13.
69 International Herald Tribune, 20 July 1981; Nayan Chanda, FEER, 
24 July 1981, p. 13.
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basis of the PRK regime, there was reason to hope that i f  the 
importance of the Khmer Rouge was reduced, the co a l i t io n  might provide 
the basis fo r  negot iat ion between the resistance and Heng Samrin's 
administrat ion, and perhaps u l t im a te ly  the formation of a coa l i t ion  
government in Phnom Penh acceptable to a l l  part ies.  But the Chinese 
- -  and probably also the Thais - -  saw the main potentia l  u t i l i t y  of a 
resistance coa l i t io n  as a means of maintaining in ternat iona l  support 
fo r  Democratic Kampuchea rather  than as a basis fo r  a sett lement with 
Vietnam.
ASEAN fa i le d  to produce a co a l i t io n  giving as much power or 
status to the non-communist Cambodian fact ions as i t  had hoped. I t  
was only a decision by Bei j ing (which by la te  1981 feared the erosion 
of in te rna t iona l  support fo r  Democratic Kampuchea) to press the Khmer 
Rouge in to  compromising which produced the eventual coa l i t io n  
agreement in 1982, and even under th is  agreement Pol Pot's
organization not only dominated the co a l i t io n  but also retained i t s  
r ig h t  to the Democratic Kampuchea mantle in the event of the 
c o a l i t io n 's  c o l l a p s e . ^  Whereas Thai land, Singapore and even Malaysia 
were op t im is t ic  about the c o a l i t io n 's  potentia l  fo r  advancing the 
cause of Democratic Kampuchea, p a r t i c u la r l y  i f  i t s  non-communist 
fact ions were given m i l i t a r y  assistance, Jakarta adopted a much more 
cautious a t t i tude  towards the whole enterprise. The Suharto regime 
was p a r t i c u la r l y  concerned that ASEAN should not became involved in 
arming the resistance co a l i t io n  or i t s  fac t ions:  i t  had no wish to
become more d i r e c t l y  a party to the Cambodian c o n f l i c t . ^
70 Rodney Tasker, FEER, 25 June 1982, pp. 8-10.
71 Indonesian Times, 5 December 1981; Paisal Sricharatchanya, FEER,
18 December 1981, p. 8.
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The Hazards of the Cambodian Stalemate
By the second half of 1981, the Cambodian confl ict  appeared to 
have at tained a s ta te  of equilibrium. The level of conf l ict  seemed 
to lerable  to all  part ies  involved. Heng Samrin's regime and the 
Vietnamese mi l i ta ry  presence may not have been very popular with the
Cambodian people, but they were more acceptable than the a l ternat ive
72--  the res i s tance coal i t ion dominated by the best ial  Khmer Rouge.
Meanwhile, the PRK administrat ion had, with Vietnamese assistance,
73gone a long way towards rebuilding Cambodia's economy and society.
Vietnamese mi l i ta ry  expenses in Cambodia were apparently rather  low by
most standards: the occupation force was manpower intensive,  with
l i t t l e  sophist icated weaponry. Ammunition was probably supplied as
grant aid by the USSR and Moscow may have supplied Vietnam with free
74fuel for mi l i ta ry  purposes. Vietnam was apparently not being "bled 
white" in Cambodia, as Beijing had hoped. But neither was there 
evidence to suggest that  the Cambodian res is tance was l ikely to be 
defeated in the foreseeable future.
The costs of the Cambodian conf l i c t  were also bearable for the 
external powers involved. For the Chinese the low intensi ty  war was
72 According to one American scholar who had conducted extensive
research inside Cambodia, there was "no evidence of any
signi f icant  sh i f t  of popular opinion in favour of Democratic 
Kampuchea". Statement by Stephen R. Heder, Hearings before the 
US Congressional Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs on
US Policy in the Indochina Region since Vietnam's Occupation of
Kampuchea, 97th Congress, 1st Session, 21 October 1981
(Washington DC: Government Print ing Office,  1981), p. 5.
73 Nayan Chanda, FEER, 19 December 1980.
74 Paul Quinn-Judge, FEER, 19 November 1982, pp. 11-12.
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an inexpensive but effective means of maintaining pressure on Vietnam. 
For the Reagan administration, the conflict provided a low risk 
theatre in which to challenge "Soviet expansionism" by backing ASEAN's 
line. For Moscow, support for Vietnam in Cambodia provided an 
opportunity to exact greater strategic advantages from the 
relationship with Hanoi while maintaining a second front in the 
confrontation with China.
There were strong pressures on the ASEAN governments to tolerate 
the continuing stalemate. But i t  is arguable — and was argued by 
some polit icians and officials in the region (and particularly in 
Indonesia) -- that the ASEAN states'  individual and collective 
policies towards Indochina in the testing strategic environment 
created by the invasion of Cambodia did not always operate in the best 
interests of their security, and were possibly counterproductive.
ASEAN Cohesion
The most obvious (though perhaps not the most serious) danger for 
the ASEAN governments stemming from their Cambodian policy was the 
threat posed to ASEAN cohesion by intra-ASEAN differences of opinion 
over the best course to take in relation to Indochina. Within ASEAN 
there was a wide spectrum of viewpoints on the Cambodian problem. At 
one end of the spectrum were Thai right-wing military and business 
circles (which effectively formed the constituency of the Prem 
government) and the Singaporean government; at the other end were 
those elements in the Indonesian armed forces who favoured a 
compromise settlement of the issue making very substantial allowance 
for Hanoi's interests.  But ASEAN's policy was based on an acceptance
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b y  all its m e m b e r s  of T h a i l a n d ' s  w i s h  to r e s i s t  the V i e t n a m e s e  
o c c u p a t i o n  of C a m b o d i a .  In t h e a b s e n c e  of a d i p l o m a t i c  or m i l i t a r y  
c a p a b i l i t y  to i n f l u e n c e  the s i t u a t i o n  i n d e p e n d e n t l y ,  A S E A N  had to 
c o o p e r a t e  w i t h  th e  C a m b o d i a n  r e s i s t a n c e  and Ch in a. T h o s e  w h o  w i s h e d  
f o r  a m o r e  c o n c i l i a t o r y  line had o n l y  a m a r g i n a l  i m p a c t  on A S E A N ' s  
p o l i c y .  In p a r t i c u l a r ,  I n d o n e s i a ' s  l o y a l t y  to the A S E A N  line f o r c e d  
J a k a r t a  to d e f e r  its a s p i r a t i o n  to r e g i o n a l  l e a d e r s h i p .
T h e  s t r a i n  in A S E A N  a f t e r  the i n v a s i o n  of C a m b o d i a  -- r e f l e c t e d  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  in th e  K u a n t a n  d e c l a r a t i o n  -- c o n t r a s t e d  w i t h  the g r e a t e r  
u n a n i m i t y  of t h e  1 9 7 5 - 7 8  p e r i o d ,  b u t  it s e e m e d  u n l i k e l y  t h a t  A S E A N ' s  
u n i t y  w a s  i m m e d i a t e l y  t h r e a t e n e d  as a re s u l t .  A S E A N ' s  d e c i s i o n s  had 
a l w a y s  b e e n  b a s e d  m o r e  on c o n s e n s u s  than u n a n i m i t y :  o n l y  the 
M a l a y s i a n  g o v e r n m e n t ,  f o r e x a m p l e ,  had b e en t o t a l l y  e n t h u s i a s t i c  ab ou t 
ZO P F A N ,  b u t  it had n e v e r t h e l e s s  b e e n  a d o p t e d  in m o d i f i e d  f o r m  as an 
A S E A N  go a l .  M o r e o v e r ,  a l t h o u g h  the I n d o n e s i a n  and to a l e s s e r  e x t e n t  
t h e M a l a y s i a n  and P h i l i p p i n e  g o v e r n m e n t s  m i g h t  h a v e  w i s h e d  for a 
r a t h e r  d i f f e r e n t  p o l i c y  on C a m b o d i a  t h e y  w e r e  a n x i o u s  not to 
j e o p a r d i z e  th e  w i d e r  a d v a n t a g e  w h i c h  A S E A N ' s  d i p l o m a t i c  s u c c e s s  over 
C a m b o d i a  h a d b r o u g h t  them. A S E A N ' s  r o l e  in the van of d i p l o m a t i c  
o p p o s i t i o n  to t h e V i e t n a m e s e  r o l e  in C a m b o d i a  had s i g n i f i c a n t l y  
b o o s t e d  t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s t a t u s  of the A s s o c i a t i o n  and its m e m b e r s .  
A S E A N  wa s  a l s o  i m p o r t a n t  to its m e m b e r s  in te r m s  of its r o l e  in 
k e e p i n g  in a b e y a n c e  the d i s p u t e s  w h i c h  had p l a g u e d  t h e i r  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  
w i t h  e a ch o t h e r  in the 1960s.
P r e s s u r e  f r o m  c e r t a i n  i n s t i t u t i o n s  ( e l e m e n t s  of the m i l i t a r y ,  
e s p e c i a l l y  B A K I N  -- the S t a t e  I n t e l l i g e n c e  C o o r d i n a t i n g  A g e n c y  -- and 
t h e  q u a s i - o f f i c i a l  C e n t r e  for S t r a t e g i c  and I n t e r n a t i o n a l  S t u d i e s ,  in
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Indonesia, the research section of the Prime Minister's Department in 
75Malaysia and the President's Center for Special Studies in the 
Philippines) for a more conciliatory line towards Hanoi influenced 
their countries'  attitudes to the Cambodian question and contributed 
to a continuous if not particularly frui t ful  moderating influence on 
ASEAN's collective policy. But the wider interests of these 
countries'  heads of state (in terms of the success of ASEAN) and 
foreign ministries (especially in terms of equable relations with 
China) ensured that there was no serious breach of the united front 
which ASEAN presented. By late 1981, a breakdown in ASEAN cohesion 
seemed unlikely except possibly in the event of fair ly radical 
domestic polit ical change in Indonesia bringing to power military 
figures less influenced by the Foreign Ministry and more favourably 
disposed towards Hanoi.
Whither ASEAN?
The Cambodian crisis had a salutary result for ASEAN's 
international status. But cr i t ics  of ASEAN's Indochina policy have 
argued that i t  also distracted the Association from i ts  most important 
original aims -- the acceleration of economic and social development 
(particularly as a means of undermining the appeal of communism), and 
the use of resultant national and regional "resilience" as a 
foundation for both cooperative relations with communist Indochina and
75 According to academics from Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia. 
Personal interviews, Kuala Lumpur, April 1981.
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the exclusion of external power interference (especia ly in terrrms of 
mi l i t a ry  bases) --  as enunciated in Bangkok (1967), Kuala Lumpur 
(1971) and Bali (1976).
There is no conclusive evidence to support the views off some 
observers in the ASEAN region that  ASEAN's concentraticn on diplioimatic 
cooperation in rela t ion to Cambodia dist racted the ^ssociatiom from 
working towards economic i n t e g r a t i o n . ^  Indeei, i t  night be argued 
tha t  the i ns t i t u t iona l i za t i on  of po l i t i ca l  cooperation within AS>EAN as 
a r esul t  of the Cambodian dispute provided a helpful bisis for  g r e a t e r  
economic cooperation in the longer term. In tie meartime, ASEiAN did 
make some progress on the economic front ,  part icularly iim i t s  
negotiat ions with extra-regional  "dialogue partrers".
Rates of economic growth in ASEAN continued to be amongist the 
world's highest  and the balance of economic power ir Southeast  Asia 
remained very markedly in the ASEAN s t a tes '  favoir as Vietnam's 
economy stagnated.  But gross d i spa r i t i es  in wealth remained thie four 
larger ASEAN s t a t es '  most pressing economic problem. At thee same 
time, the regional tension resul t ing from the Camtodian staalemate 
provided a j u s t i f i c a t i on  for very substant ial ly increased mii l i tary 
expenditure in the ASEAN s t a t es ,  ^  possible at the expemse of
76 See John McBeth's interview with Pichai Rattikul, leacder of 
Thailand's Democrat Party and a former Foreign Minister,,  FEER, 
13 August 1982, p. 60. According to Pichei t h en  was a neeecl for 
ASEAN to achieve a greater balance between economic and pol l i t ical  
matters.  See also Guy Sacerdot i ' s  interview w th David Sycip, 
Director of the ASEAN Finance Corporation, FEER, 13 Augustt 1982, 
p. 85. Sycip called for a "working economic omnunity" rather  
than " fu t i l e  statements on Cambodia".
77 See Chapter 8, pp. 333-61 above.
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development projects which would have helped to combat the 
socioeconomic inequit ies which encouraged insurgency, p a r t i c u la r l y  in 
Thai land.
Although the abortive coup by the Thai "Young Turks" in Apri l
1981 was not prompted by dif ferences over the handling of re la t ions
with Indochina, the rebe l l ion  was rooted in middle-ranking o f f ic e rs '
f r u s t ra t io n  with a regime that showed i t s e l f  incapable of tack l ing the
fundamental "economic and adminis trat ive problem which caused social
78in ju s t ic e  detrimental to the survival of Thai society".
While the Sino-Vietnamese dispute had weakened the armed
communist movements in the ASEAN region, communist (and to a lesser
extent , ethnic-separatis t)  insurgency was, ob jec t ive ly ,  s t i l l  the
pr inc ipa l  securi ty  threat  to ASEAN's governments. Yet these
governments used the "Vietnamese threat"  to j u s t i f y  the diversion of
m i l i t a r y  resources away from counter-insurgency towards conventional
forces.  To some extent th is  trend was balanced by the development of
param i l i ta ry  forces and the general ly lower level of insurgent
a c t i v i t y .  But even the Secretary-General of Thai land's National
Securi ty Council warned that the emphasis on defence against Vietnam
79might weaken counter-insurgency ca p ab i l i t y .
The Cambodian stalemate also provided the ASEAN states' armed 
forces with an opportunity to press fo r  a greater p o l i t i c a l  ro le .
78 Chai-anan Samudavanija ,  The Thai Young Turks, (Singapore: 
In s t i t u te  of Southeast Asian Studies, 1982), p. 59.
79 Prasong Soonsiri , "Kwammankong haeng chat kap nayawbai dang 
prathet" ,  Asia Review, Vol . 1, No. 3, p. 45 quoted by Astr i  
Suhrke, "Thai-Vietnamese Relations and Large Power Confl ic ts  in 
Asia" (Paper prepared fo r  the 12th World Congress of the 
International P o l i t i c a l  Science Associat ion, Rio de Janeiro, 
1-4 August 1982), pp. 5-6.
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This was p a r t i c u la r ly  true in Thai land, where even conservative 
academics pointed to the dangers of the "growth of m i l i ta r ism " ,  in 
terms not only of rap id ly  increasing defence budgets, but also the 
re tard ing e f fec t  on p o l i t i c a l  development. "The Thais are incapable 
of seeing th e i r  own b le e d in g . . . " ,  according to Khien Theeravit ,  at one
on
time a senior adviser to the Prem government.
The Recession of Regionalism
The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and the subsequent diplomatic
stalemate deferred the p o s s ib i l i t y  of peaceful coexistence and
f r u i t f u l  cooperation across Southeast Asia's ideological d iv ide.
81Although even Singapore and to a lesser extent Thailand - -  Hanoi's
harshest c r i t i c s  in ASEAN - -  maintained l im i ted trading re la t ions  with
Vietnam, the Cambodian dispute severely res t r ic ted  the p o s s ib i l i t i e s
82fo r  s ig n i f ica n t  economic in te rac t ion .  Not only did th is  contr ibute 
to Vietnam's increasing dependence on the USSR, and increasing Laotian 
and Cambodian dependence on Vietnam, but also f rus t ra ted  business 
in te res ts  in ASEAN, and p a r t i c u la r l y  Thailand. The continuing
80 See Khien Theeravit,  "Thai-Kampuchean Relat ions: Problems and
Prospects", Asian Survey, Vol . 22, No. 6 (June 1982), pp. 571-72, 
575. Sukhumbhand Paribatra, an a r is to c ra t ic  Thai academic, 
raised s im i lar  points in FEER, 10 May 1984, p. 34.
81 Bangkok suspended v i r t u a l l y  a l l  d i rec t  trade with Vietnam af ter  
the June 1980 incursion. But pr ivate trade continued by way of 
Singapore and Laos. Michael Richardson, Sydney Morning Herald, 
23 June 1983.
82 Hanoi's in te rest  in broader economic l inks  with Thailand and the 
other ASEAN countries was stressed by the Counsellor at the 
Vietnamese Embassy, Bangkok. Personal interv iew, 10 March 1981.
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pa r t ic ipa t ion  of the Thai, Vietnamese and Laotian governments in the
Interim Mekong Committee - -  which held three sessions in 1981 and
sponsored a wide range of a c t i v i t i e s  connected with the development of
83land and water resources - -  denoted a pers is tent in te res t  on both 
sides in keeping open the p o s s ib i l i t y  of regional economic 
cooperation.
Perhaps even more important than the r e s t r i c t io n  of economic
l inks was the stymying of movement towards the self-management of
Southeast Asian securi ty  by regional states themselves (which had been
apparent b r ie f l y  in 1977-78) and the in te n s i f i c a t io n  of the regional
m i l i t a r y  in te rests  of extra-regional powers. Although ASEAN leaders
re ite ra ted th e i r  commitment to regional n e u t ra l i t y  as a long-term goal
84once the Cambodian problem had been resolved, in the mean time the 
coro l la ry  of th e i r  ind i rec t  involvement in the c o n f l i c t  was a renewed 
rel iance on the secur i ty  guarantees of extra-regional powers. Coupled 
with evidence of greater m i l i t a r y  cooperation between regional states, 
th is  may have fue l led Vietnamese fears that ASEAN was acquiring the 
a t t r ibu tes  of an external ly-sponsored m i l i t a r y  organization. 
Simultaneously, Vietnam's increasing dependence on the USSR allowed 
Moscow, a f te r  twenty years of e f f o r t ,  to acquire a s t ra teg ic  foothold 
in the region through i t s  use of Vietnamese a i r  and naval f a c i l i t i e s .  
The prolonged Cambodian dispute was having the e f fec t  of po lariz ing
83 UN Committee fo r  the Coordination of Investigations of the Lower 
Mekong Basin, Annual Report, 1981.
84 For example, President Marcos claimed in May 1980 that ASEAN's 
"ob ject ive of the decade" was to establ ish ZOPFAN. Hong Kong AFP 
in Engl ish, 0843 gmt, 27 May 1980 (FBIS-APA-80-105, 29 May 1980).
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Southeast Asia along ideological l ines and l ink ing  the region more 
c lose ly  to the global confrontat ion between China and the United 
States on one side and the Soviet Union and i t s  a l l i e s  on the other.
The Dangers of Alignment with China
Not only elements in the Indonesian and Malaysian governments 
were concerned at the possible dangers of ASEAN's cooperation with 
Bei j ing on the Cambodian issue. There were also serious reservations 
w i th in  the Thai bureaucracy ( including the Foreign M in is t ry )  and armed 
forces (p a r t i c u la r l y  amongst o f f ic e rs ,  inc luding both Prem and the 
Young Turks, who had spent years f ig h t in g  the CPT) about the wisdom of
pc
moving so close to China and allowing Bei j ing to "bleed" Vietnam.
According to the Secretary-General of the Thai National Securi ty
Council, the Thai regime did not wish "to se l l  our country to China"
or to weaken Vietnam to the extent that i t  might " f a l l  under to China
or the Soviet Union", because in the long-term, "we are threatened by
86a l l  communist countries" ( tha t  is ,  China as well as Vietnam).
There were grounds fo r  concern that although China had reduced 
i t s  support fo r  the CPT, Bei j ing was bui ld ing up new channels fo r  i t s  
p o l i t i c a l  inf luence by exp lo i t ing  i t s  l inks with the Thai m i l i t a r y  and 
with business c i rc les  which acted as the conduit fo r  some of i t s  aid 
to the Khmer Rouge. For example, the Mass Line Party led by the
85 Personal interviews with Thai academics, Thammasat and 
Chulalongkorn Un ivers i t ies ,  Bangkok, March 1981; " In te l l igen ce " ,  
FEER, 24 October 1980, p. 9.
86 Personal interview with Squadron Leader Prasong Soonsiri , 
20 March 1981.
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demagogic General Sudsai Hasdin (who had been head of the Internal
Security Operations Command before his ret irement from the army in
October 1980 and was subsequently appointed to Prem's cabinet) was
87alleged to maintain close l inks with the Chinese embassy. Moreover,
Bei j ing s t i l l  maintained l inks with Thailand's ethnic Chinese
community and the CPT and could presumably resusci ta te  i t s  material
support to the l a t t e r  i f  i t  wished. The CPT's declarat ions in 1979-81
that i t  was w i l l i n g  to jo in  the Bangkok government in an anti -
Vietnamese united f ro n t  suggested that Bei j ing retained considerable
88inf luence with the Thai communists. Overal l ,  the Cambodian c o n f l i c t  
enabled China to strengthen substan t ia l ly  i t s  p o l i t i c a l  leverage in 
Thailand.
B e i j in g 's  frequent promises to aid Thailand in the event of a
89m i l i t a r y  challenge from Vietnam were greeted with caution in Bangkok
as well as the other ASEAN cap i ta ls .  Not only was i t  apparent that
these promises were probably part of a Chinese e f f o r t  to force Bangkok
90and ASEAN as a whole to take sides more dec is ive ly ,  but i t  was also 
doubtful i f  such guarantees greatly  enhanced Thai and ASEAN securi ty . 
I f  China did attempt again to "teach Vietnam a lesson", i t  would need 
to be a more impressive lesson than the 1979 invasion of Vietnam, 
which had been more a f a i l u r e  than a success m i l i t a r i l y  and had not
87 John McBeth, FEER, 22 August 1980, p. 31; personal interviews at 
Thammasat and Chulalongkorn Univers i t ies ,  March 1981.
88 Age, 14 July 1979; Bangkok Post, 21 October 1979; Tony Davis, 
Asiaweek, 7 August 1981, pp. 34-36; Bangkok Post, 14 August 1981.
89 See, fo r  example, Bangkok Post, 1 Apr i l  1979 and 16 July 1979.
90 Simon, The ASEAN States and Regional Securi ty, p. 94.
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affected Vietnam's po l ic ies  in Cambodia. But any large-scale, new 
attack on Vietnam would r isk  not only aborting Be i j ing 's  f r a g i le  
rapprochement with Moscow, but also a Soviet m i l i t a r y  response i f  
Vietnam's economic heartland was ser iously threatened (which i t  was 
not in the 1979 invasion): there were thus grounds fo r  doubting the
value of China's commitment to assist Thai land. Nevertheless, because 
of the need fo r  the Chinese government to maintain i t s  c r e d ib i l i t y ,  
B e i j in g 's  repeated guarantees of Thai secur i ty  might have necessitated 
some sort of m i l i t a r y  response against Vietnam in the extremely 
u n l ike ly  event of a large-scale Vietnamese m i l i t a r y  push against 
Thailand (such as an incursion aimed at neutra l iz ing Cambodian 
resistance groups' support bases and supply routes well inside Thai 
t e r r i t o r y ) .
I f  China did attempt a "second lesson", i t  might prove counter­
productive, by bolstering the c r e d ib i l i t y  of Hanoi's emphasis on the 
"Chinese threat"  as a j u s t i f i c a t i o n  fo r  i t s  ro le  in Cambodia, and by 
opening the way fo r  a dramatic increase in Vietnam's rel iance on 
Soviet support. To force Hanoi in to  greater dependence on Moscow ( in  
the expectation that Vietnamese national ism would eventually re-assert 
i t s e l f  and propel Vietnam towards a rapprochement with China) was, of 
course, the aim of B e i j ing 's  strategy of "bleeding" Vietnam. But 
neither a Soviet-Vietnamese a l l iance nor an eventual Sino-Vietnamese 
entente were l i k e l y  to benef i t  the ASEAN states' secur i ty .  This was
recognized even by Thai government o f f i c i a l s ,  who stressed that
91Bangkok did not want a "weak Vietnam". Indeed, the geographical
91 Personal interview with Squadron Leader Prasong Soonsir i ,  
20 March 1981.
476 -
proximity of China, compounded by i ts emphasis on modernization 
(especially in a military sense) suggested that a strong Vietnam might 
act as a useful balancing factor in the medium-to-long term.
Costs and Benefits of Partnership with Washington
The ASEAN states were, with good reason, less apprehensive about 
the revitalization of American strategic interests in Southeast Asia 
in the 1979-81 period. Not only did the United States provide an 
offshore military presence that by far outweighed the USSR's minor air 
and naval deployments in the region, and substantial economic and 
military aid and diplomatic support on the Cambodian issue, but i ts 
strategic entente with China also went some way towards reassuring the 
ASEAN governments that i ts  leverage in Beijing would prevent the 
Chinese from acting incautiously in relation to Vietnam. Bangkok had 
a special interest in using i ts alliance with Washington to balance 
Thailand's relations with China.
Although America's principal Asian security interests were 
centred in Southwest and Northeast rather than Southeast Asia, 
Washington (particularly once the Reagan administration took power) 
saw the ASEAN states as important al l ies and associates in i ts 
strategy of thwarting Vietnam's role as the spearhead of Soviet 
expansionism in a region straddling American and Japanese lines of 
communication with the Indian Ocean and the Gulf. Even before Reagan 
took office, Washington's renewed commitment was highlighted in 
November 1979 when its Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and 
the Pacific (Richard Holbrooke) claimed that Thailand was "the key to
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ASEAN and ASEAN is the key to Southeast Asia" and that "the US is in
92th is  region to stay".  But although th is  statement was in d i re c t l y  a 
response to Bangkok's attempts to gain more spec i f ic  securi ty  
guarantees from Washington a f te r  the invasion of Cambodia and even 
Indonesia and Malaysia appeared to encourage Thai and Phi l ippine 
m i l i t a r y  l inks with the United States, there was also an awareness - -  
p a r t i c u la r l y  in Jakarta - -  of the important dif ferences between 
American and ASEAN in te res ts .
I t  was evident that the increased US m i l i t a r y ,  economic and
diplomatic aid was re in fo rc ing  "s t ruc tu ra l  t ies  of dependence" between
Thailand and the United States and reducing the f l e x i b i l i t y  of
Thai land's foreign po l icy .  I t  was also reasonably clear that US
m i l i t a r y  assistance (upon which the Prem regime's c r e d ib i l i t y
increasingly depended) would be d ra s t ic a l l y  reduced i f  Bangkok moved
94towards accommodation with Hanoi. So Thailand and, by extension,
i t s  ASEAN partners were becoming locked into the ro le  of regional
proxies fo r  Washington's worldwide confrontat ion with Moscow and i t s  
95a l l i e s .  Moreover, there was scant ind ication that the US was using 
i t s  re la t ionship  with Bei j ing to moderate or otherwise influence
92 See Rodney Tasker's interv iew with Holbrooke, FEER, 16 November 
1979, p. 15.
93 Suhrke, "Thai-Vietnamese Relat ions", pp. 11-14.
94 I b id . ,  p. 13.
95 A prime example of the alignment of ASEAN - -  and p a r t i c u la r l y  
Singapore and Thailand - -  with Washington's global outlook, in 
order to maximize diplomatic support from the West, was the 
attempt to l ink  the issue of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
with Vietnam's ro le  in Cambodia.
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Chinese pol icy towards Indochina. Washington, p a r t i c u la r l y  under
Reagan, tended to look fo r  an id e n t i t y  of po l ic ies  with the People's
Republic on no n -c r i t ica l  issues such as Cambodia, e f fe c t i v e ly
deferr ing to B e i j ing 's  judgement. For example, the US did not support
the ASEAN states in th e i r  disagreements with China at the ICK.
The Thai p o l i t i c a l ,  m i l i t a r y  and bureaucratic e l i t e  forming the
power base of the Prem government gained too much from close re la t ions
with Washington to worry openly about the re la t ion sh ip 's  broader
impl icat ions. There was a current of Thai th ink ing that stressed the
need fo r  the government to avoid alignment with Washington and Beij ing
96on the Cambodian issue, but such views were not i n f lu e n t ia l  in
Bangkok in 1981. However, there was serious concern in Indonesian
o f f i c i a l  c i rc les  that ASEAN's closer s t ra teg ic  alignment with
Washington was drawing the region dangerously closer to the superpower
confrontat ion as well as fu r the r  undermining Indonesia's regional
leadership. Moreover, there was no indicat ion that Washington took
serious notice of Indonesian and Malaysian concerns over aspects of
the Sino-American re la t ionsh ip  such as the p o s s ib i l i t y  of US arms
97sales to Bei j ing.  Overal l ,  the re la t ionship with Washington
compromised ASEAN's v is ion of a reduction in great power interference 
in the region.
96 Personal interviews at Thammasat and Chulalongkorn Un ivers i t ies ,  
March 1981.
97 Barry Wain, AWSJ, 23 June 1981.
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Danger of I n s t a b i l i t y  on the Thai-Cambodian Border
The use of the Thai-Cambodian f r o n t ie r  fo r  resupply and sanctuary
by the Cambodian resistance was not t o t a l l y  benef ic ia l  to Thai
secur i ty .  The main concern fo r  the Thai m i l i t a r y  was that i t  would
be unable on i t s  own to repel a large-scale Vietnamese m i l i t a r y
incursion in to  Thailand aimed at destroying the Cambodian resistance's
bases in the f r o n t i e r  zone. Mainly because i t  might increase the r isk
of a major Vietnamese cross-border attack, the Thai m i l i t a r y  was
unenthusiast ic in 1981 about supplying arms to the non-communist
98Cambodian resistance fac t ions .  There was fu r the r  concern that 
increasing the resis tance's  f irepower might also increase i t s  
independence, endangering Thai securi ty  by al lowing less Thai 
inf luence over the conduct of i t s  operations. Thai land's ASEAN 
partners also had reasons to fear any major escalat ion in tension on 
the border, because th e i r  p o l i t i c a l  stake in ASEAN's cohesion would 
require them to render Bangkok diplomatic and possibly m i l i t a r y  
support. In Malaysia's case there was the addit ional concern over 
counter-insurgency in the Thai-Malaysian f r o n t i e r  zone.
The Refugee Problem
The Cambodian stalemate also ensured the continued existence of a 
refugee problem fo r  the ASEAN states, p a r t i c u la r l y  in terms of land 
refugees in the Thai-Cambodian f r o n t ie r  area. But the e f fec t ive
98 Simon, The ASEAN States and Regional Secur i ty , p. 104.
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economic i solat ion of Vietnam and Laos from the West and non-communist 
Southeast Asia contributed to continuing refugee flows from these 
countries also.  The ASEAN governments' exaggerated the impact of the 
refugees on t he i r  countr ies '  securi ty,  but there can be l i t t l e  doubt 
t ha t ,  on balance, they would have preferred to be without the problem.
The Future of Cambodia
Despite i t s  success as a mechanism for maintaining broad
internat ional  support for Democratic Kampuchea, there was l i t t l e
evidence to suggest that  the Cambodian res i s tance coal i t ion,  which was
s t i l l  dominated by the highly unpopular Khmer Rouge, was l ikely to
secure a suf f i c i en t  degree of legitimacy within Cambodia to make i t  a
credible a l t erna t ive  to the Heng Samrin regime. Although some reports
in 1981 indicated that  popular support for Son Sann's KPNLF was
99growing inside Cambodia, there was no reason to suppose that  the 
pol i t i ca l  or mi l i ta ry  balance of power within the res i s tance coal i t ion 
would move decisively against the Khmer Rouge in the foreseeable 
future.
There were also reasons for doubting that  the impact on the ASEAN 
s t a tes '  secur i ty  of the res torat ion to power of a Democratic Kampuchea 
regime would be en t i r e l y  beneficial .  Unless this  took place in the 
context of a broad sett lement of the Sino-Vietnamese dispute (which 
was not in prospect in 1981) i t  seemed l ike ly  that  Beijing would 
pers i s t  in using i t s  influence over the Khmer Rouge to exert  pressure
99 See, for example, John McBeth, FEER, 18 September 1981, pp. 
12-13.
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on Vietnam. A renewal of Chinese interference in the region was 
c lear ly  not desired by the Indonesian and Malaysian governments, and 
the l ike ly  detrimental e ffect  on regional s t a b i l i t y  of continued Sino- 
Vietnamese r iva l ry  in Southeast Asia was contrary to the in te res t s  of 
al l  the ASEAN s t a te s .  Moreover, there was no guarantee that  rela t ions 
between Thailand and a more na t i ona l i s t ic  successor regime in Cambodia 
would not be plagued by the b i la tera l  f r on t i e r  disputes which were 
char ac te r i s t i c  of both the Sihanouk and Khmer Rouge p e r i o d s . ^  So in 
some senses,  firm Vietnamese control over Cambodia was arguably 
beneficial  to the ASEAN s ta tes .
Was There an Alternative?
ASEAN's diplomatic i n i t i a t i ves  on Cambodia in the 1979-81 period 
were intended e ssen t ia l l y  to ensure the continuing i l legi t imacy (in 
terms of internat ional  recognition) of the Heng Samrin administration 
rather  than to provide a basis for serious negotiat ions with Hanoi 
over the withdrawal of Vietnamese f o r c e s . ^  But i t  is possible to 
make a plausible case that  the ASEAN sta tes  would have had much to 
gain i f  they had changed thei r  col lec t ive  policy towards Indochina 
from confrontation over Cambodia to an emphasis on the common 
in te res ts  of communist and non-communist Southeast Asian countries in 
finding a compromise solution to the problem. Thailand's securi ty --
100 See John McBeth, FEER, 20 August 1982, pp. 32-33.
101 See Gareth Porter ,  "ASEAN and Kampuchea: Shadow and Substance",
Indochina Issues, No. 14 (February 1981), pp. 3-5.
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the touchstone for ASEAN's Cambodian policy -- and, indeed, the wider
security interests of ASEAN as a whole might have been better served
by a much greater recognition of Vietnam's security concerns. Despite
the failure of the Kuantan ini t iat ive in 1980, in mid-1981 there was
s t i l l  a strong undercurrent of opinion within ASEAN policy-making
circles,  particularly in Indonesia and Malaysia but even in 
102Thailand, which looked to a greater recognition of the legitimacy 
of Vietnam's interests in Cambodia as the key to breaking the 
stalemate.
Vietnam's central concern in relation to Cambodia was that i t
should not be controlled by a pro-Chinese regime. I t  is possible that
Hanoi might have proved unwilling to make significant concessions on
i ts  military presence in Cambodia, particularly in view of assertions
by Vietnamese spokesmen in mid-1980 that their forces would remain in
Cambodia while the "Chinese threat" in i ts  broadest sense persisted
103and that this threat was "eternal". But although these hyperbolic 
claims may have been intended to provide a just if icat ion for Vietnam's 
role in Cambodia, they did not necessarily portend an indefinite 
military occupation of Cambodia irrespective of changes in strategic 
circumstances. ASEAN had never made an intensive effort to 
investigate Hanoi's precise conditions for military withdrawal from 
Cambodia, so i t  was by no means clear that i t  was impossible to
102 See Suhrke, "Thai-Vietnamese Relations", pp. 6-9.
103 Interview with General Von Tien Dung, Pravda, 11 June 1980
(FBIS-SU, 18 June 1980). This was reportedly also Nguyen Co 
Thach's line in negotiations with his Thai counterpart in 
Bangkok, May 1980. Quoted by Khien, "Thai-Kampuchean
Relat ions. . .",  p. 569. See also Sydney Morning Herald, 21 June 
1980.
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negotiate concessions from the Vietnamese government on Cambodia. 
Indeed, although Hanoi was unwilling to tolerate a return to power by 
the Khmer Rouge, the Vietnamese were apparently prepared to consider 
the possibility of accepting a more broadly-based administration in 
Phnom Penh, including non-communist elements providing they did not 
challenge Vietnam's suzerainty.^4 Bearing in mind the extreme 
unpopularity of the Khmer Rouge within Cambodia, a regime based on the 
Heng Samrin administration would possess considerably more domestic 
legitimacy than one based on the Democratic Kampuchea coalition.
Although Vietnam would probably see a requirement to support its
political hegemony in Cambodia with a military presence (as in Laos),
Hanoi appeared willing to res tr ic t  both the deployment and size of
this presence if this could be accomplished without risking a return
to power by the Khmer Rouge. Until late February 1979, when China
invaded Vietnam and i t  became clear that the Thai authorities had
decided to provide logistic support to the Khmer Rouge (both these
phenomena exacerbating Hanoi's fear of a Chinese attempt at strategic
encirclement), the Vietnamese authorities attempted to respect
Bangkok's security concerns by keeping their forces at least 10km from 
105the Thai border. Although the Indochinese foreign ministers'
"Vientiane proposal" in July 1980 suggested the demilitarization of
104 Age, 10 May 1980.
105 Asian Security 1979 (Tokyo: Research Institute for Peace and
Security, 1979), p. 110. According to a senior Vietnamese 
diplomat, Hanoi kept i ts  forces even further (30km) from the 
border until late February 1979. Personal interview with Luu 
Doan Huynh, Counsellor, Vietnamese Embassy, Bangkok, 10 March 
1981.
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both sides of the b o r d e r , ^  i t  did indicate that  Hanoi was 
po t ent ia l ly  wil l ing to respond to a cessation of Thai aid to the 
res i s tance by pull ing back i t s  forces again. According to Nguyen Co 
Thach, Hanoi was also wil l ing to reduce the size of i t s  forces in 
Cambodia i f  the mi l i ta ry  threat  from the Khmer Rouge was r e d u c e d . ^  
Although the pol i t i ca l  and economic costs of maintaining a large army 
of occupation in Cambodia were to lerable ,  this  did not mean that  Hanoi 
would not welcome the pol i t i ca l  and economic benefi ts  (par t i cu lar ly  in 
terms of aid from the West and Japan) which might be gained by a 
large-scale  reduction in i t s  mi l i ta ry presence.
I t  is impossible to postulate with any great accuracy the precise 
course of events i f  the direct ion of Thai and ASEAN policy on Cambodia 
had been fundamentally al tered to involve an acceptance of Vietnamese 
suzerainty by recognizing a broadened version of the Heng Samrin 
regime and ceasing to give diplomatic and l og i s t i c  support to the 
Cambodian res i s tance.  But i t  may plausibly be argued that  the 
securi ty of Thailand and ASEAN as a whole would have benefited from 
such a reor ienta t ion.  In such circumstances, i t  seems l ikely that  
Hanoi would have subs tant ia l ly  reduced i t s  mi l i ta ry  deployment in 
Cambodia and concentrated i t s  residual forces away from the Thai 
border. The reduction in border tension as a r e su l t  of the cessation 
of Thai support for the Khmer Rouge and the Vietnamese mi l i ta ry stand 
off would have minimized the immediate threat  to Thai securi ty from
106 Age, 4 August 1980.
107 Age, 9 and 10 May 1980.
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Vietnamese mil i tary incursions.  Moreover, with peace restored in 
Cambodia a large part  of the Cambodian refugee population in the Thai 
border region would probably have wished to return home, eliminating 
another major Thai securi ty concern. There would also have been less 
need for the ASEAN countries to divert  resources to t he i r  defence 
sectors  and within these sectors towards conventional warfare 
capabi l i ty ,  so resources for both developmental and mil i tary counter­
insurgency could have been restored.  Bangkok could have used i t s
newly equable relat ionship with Hanoi to f o r es ta l l  the pos s ib i l i ty  of 
the reestablishment of any potent ial ly dangerous nexus between the CPT 
(or a CPT fact ion) and the Indochinese communists, jus t  as amicable 
government-to-government relat ions with China had undermined the CPT's 
l inks with Beijing. The inclusion of non-communist elements in a 
broadened Phnom Penh regime might have fur ther  minimized the
pos s ib i l i t y  of Vietnam using i t s  assured hegemony in Cambodia as a
108basis for supporting Thai insurgents.
Recognition of an overarching Vietnamese pol i t i ca l  suzerainty in 
Cambodia need not have implied an end to Thailand's role as a 
competitor for influence there.  One component of Thailand's 
continuing quest for influence in Vietnamese-dominated Laos a f te r  1975 
was an a l l iance with anti-cormnunist Laotian res is tance groups, but 
a f t e r  the Kriangsak government's accord with Vientiane in early 1979 
t h i s  approach yielded to one based on pol i t i ca l  and economic 
cooperation.  The economic aspect of the rela t ionship was par t i cu lar ly  
important in helping Vientiane to avoid complete dependence on Hanoi.
108 Nayan Chanda, FEER, 19 December 1980, p. 37.
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In theory at least ,  the 1975-80 phase of the Bangkok-Vientiane
rela t ionship  could have provided a model for Bangkok-Phnom Penh 
109l inks .  In the longer term Bangkok might have been able to take 
advantage of any move by the Phnom Penh regime to asser t  i t s  
independence of Hanoi by intensifying i t s  l inks with third countries:  
the potent ial  for the development of a more independent foreign policy 
by the PRK regime was demonstrated in 1980-81 by i t s  ardent i n te res t  
in constructing and autonomous relat ionship with Moscow. Although the 
PRK and Thai regimes were ideological ly opposed, cul t ur al ly  and 
l ingu i s t i c a l l y  Cambodia was closer to Thailand than to Vietnam. 
Ultimately,  as i t  became clear that  i f  there was no longer a 
pos s ib i l i t y  that  the Khmer Rouge might recapture power, and i f  
Cambodian nationalism reasserted i t s e l f ,  i t  is possible that  Hanoi 
might have been prepared to downgrade i t s  hegemony over Cambodia to a 
level comparable with the Soviet-Finnish rela t ionship.  By way of 
contrast ,  a continuing stalemate necessar i ly involving the dependence 
of the Phnom Penh regime on Vietnamese support,  could only minimize 
the poss ib i l i t i e s  for reasser t ion of Cambodian autonomy.
Another advantage of conceding Cambodia to Hanoi's sphere of 
influence (at  least  in the short  term) might have been that  th i s  would 
have lessened Vietnam's economic, po l i t i ca l  and mil i tary dependence on 
the USSR, in turn l imiting Moscow's a b i l i t y  to extract  concessions 
from Hanoi in the form of naval and a i r  f a c i l i t i e s .  The l imi tat ion of 
Soviet regional influence and presence might ul t imately have
109 Ibid. ,  loc. c i t .
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contr ibuted to a reduction in Southeast Asia's importance as an arena 
of Sino-Soviet competi tion.
These arguments suggesting that a fundamental change of po l icy  on 
Cambodia might have benefited the ASEAN states were, however, balanced 
by the possible dangers of recognizing the Heng Samrin regime and 
severing l inks with the Cambodian resistance. Having invested so much 
p o l i t i c a l  capital in re s is t ing  Vietnam's domination of Cambodia, 
ASEAN's international c r e d ib i l i t y  would almost ce r ta in ly  have been 
dented - -  i f  not quite ser iously  damaged - -  i f  the Association had 
fundamentally revised i t s  stance on the issue. Although at times 
ASEAN's cohesion on the Cambodian issue appeared f r a g i l e ,  the same 
issue had also been instrumental in engendering much of the 
Associat ion's un ity . Deprived of the Cambodian problem, ASEAN might 
have los t  much of i t s  impetus fo r  cooperation in other areas.
Moreover, in the absence of rapprochement between Beij ing and 
Hanoi, any movement by ASEAN towards a profound change of course on 
Cambodia would have ser iously  r isked al ienating China. Although a 
major change of pol icy on Cambodia would represent a repudiat ion of 
Chinese influence by the Thai government, in such circumstances i t  is 
l i k e l y  that Bei j ing would have used i t s  residual leverage in Bangkok 
(through i t  l inks with Sino-Thai business c i r c le s ,  sympathetic 
elements in the m i l i t a r y  leadership, and movements such as Sudsai's 
Mass Line Party) to exert pressure on the regime to adhere to i t s  
establ ished pol icy on Cambodia, even i f  th is  resulted in Thailand 
breaking ranks with some or a l l  of i t s  ASEAN partners. I f  such 
Chinese pressure had fa i le d  to achieve i t s  object ives, i t  is possible 
that  Bei j ing would have attempted to exert addit ional leverage against
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Bangkok by reviving material support for the CPT and terminating 
economic concessions (such as the supply of oil at advantageous 
prices). Although Thailand might bear the brunt of China's reaction, 
ultimately i t  was highly likely that all the ASEAN states would face 
the prospect of a deteriorating relationship with China, possibly 
including a revivified security threat from Beijing's links with the 
region's communist parties, coupled with a strategic military 
challenge resulting from the extended reach of the Chinese armed 
forces.
If Bangkok had withdrawn its cooperation in resisting Vietnam's 
occupation of Cambodia, i t  is unlikely that Beijing would have 
relinquished its support for the Cambodian resistance. As well as
continuing to resupply the Khmer Rouge by way of islets off the 
Cambodian coast, the Chinese might have continued to funnel material 
to the resistance through Thai territory,  assisted by the CPT. In 
order both to contain the security threat posed by the spectre of a 
revived CPT linked to the Khmer Rouge, and to convince Hanoi that the 
Thai regime was wholehearted in i ts change of policy on Cambodia, i t  
would probably have been necessary in these circumstances for Bangkok 
to divert military resources to interdicting these supply lines, 
possibly in joint operations with the Indochinese governments' forces.
Another potential drawback to a change of course on Cambodia 
would be its likely impact on the ASEAN states'  relations with the 
United States. The increase in American military aid -- particularly 
to Thailand -- from 1979 was predicated on Washington's wish to 
bolster the stabil i ty of friendly anti-communist nations in the face 
of the threat to their security supposedly posed by actual and
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potential Soviet-backed Vietnamese aggression. If the ASEAN states 
had reached their own understanding with Hanoi, i t  is likely that this 
aid would have been drastically reduced. Although much of the 
military component of the US aid was increasingly diverted towards the 
acquisition of sophisticated weapons for conventional warfare -- which 
would probably have been redundant if a change of policy on Cambodia 
helped to improve the ASEAN states'  relations with Vietnam, such aid 
cuts would also have impaired the abil i ty of ASEAN governments to 
counter (by both military and socioeconomic means) their problems with 
insurgency -- and this at a time when insurgency might increase as 
relations with China deteriorated. Substantial cutbacks in US aid 
were also potentially damaging to the ASEAN governments' domestic 
political legitimacy, particularly in Thailand and the Philippines.
Conclusion
The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia effectively dashed hopes 
within ASEAN of managing security concerns with Indochina by 
constructing a framework of cooperative relations across Southeast 
Asia's ideological divide. Although Indonesian and, to a leser 
extent, Malaysian strategic perspectives allowed a more tolerant view 
of Vietnam's role in Cambodia, the invasion forced Jakarta and Kuala 
Lumpur to place their interest in maintaining both ASEAN's cohesion 
and the credibili ty of their own and ASEAN's vision of regional order 
before their interest in developing closer relations with Hanoi. 
Although the Indonesian and Malaysian governments searched for a 
formula which would satisfy both Thai and Vietnamese security
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requirements in relation to Cambodia and thus remove the major 
obstacle to a more satisfactory regional order, instransigence on the 
part of both Hanoi and the new Prem administration in Bangkok ensured 
that the "Kuantan declaration" of March 1980 was not the starting 
point for a compromise solution to the problem. Nevertheless, 
slightly waning international support for Democratic Kampuchea and 
Jakarta's continuing impatience with the Cambodian stalemate inspired 
a new ASEAN strategy involving efforts to improve Democratic 
Kampuchea's acceptability by broadening its political composition and 
to work for a negotiated solution through the medium of a conference 
of all interested parties, in the first instance.
The failure of the ICK and the Cambodian resistance coalition to 
break the deadlock highlighted the dangers of a continuing stalemate 
for the ASEAN states. It was arguable that ASEAN's Cambodian policy 
threatened the Association's cohesion, was distracting the grouping 
from its original aims (particularly the construction of national and 
regional resilience), contributed to the growth of militarism, damaged 
the prospects for peaceful coexistence and cooperation in the region, 
increased Chinese influence and Soviet interference in the region, 
fostered a dangerous level of dependence on the United States, risked 
a major military confrontation with Vietnam, exacerbated refugee 
problems, and did not promise a post-war settlement in Cambodia which 
would necessarily be in the interests of the ASEAN states.
But although there were drawbacks in the stalemate fostered by 
ASEAN's established Cambodia policy, a radical change of course 
promised new dangers and only uncertain benefits. In particular, an 
alignment by ASEAN with Vietnam raised the possibility of a new
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confrontation with China. In mid-1981 the disadvantages of the 
current deadlock s t i l l  appeared tolerable even to the Indonesian and 
Malaysian authorities, particularly as these drawbacks were balanced 
by the benefits for regime (if  not national) security of ASEAN's new 
international stature and closer political and security relations 
between the ASEAN states and with the United States.
CONCLUSION
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From the time of the v ic to r ies  of the Vietnamese, Cambodian and 
Laotian communists in 1975, observers in the West and in the ASEAN 
region ( in  both academic and jo u rn a l is t i c  spheres) tended to take at 
face value the frequent claims of the ASEAN governments that the 
communist Indochinese states posed a var ie ty  of sometimes serious 
threats to "secur i ty "  and " s ta b i l i t y "  in non-communist Southeast Asia. 
Not only did Vietnam, pa r t icu la r ly  a f te r  i t  invaded Cambodia and 
entered in to  a close m i l i t a r y  al l iance with the Soviet Union in 
1978-79, al legedly present a d irect ,  s t ra teg ic  m i l i t a r y  threat to 
Thailand and perhaps the other ASEAN states, but Hanoi and Vientiane 
(not to mention Phnom Penh from 1975-78) were also said to support 
insurgent communist movements in the ASEAN region. The f low of 
refugees from Indochina (and pa r t icu la r ly  Vietnam from 1978) was 
supposedly another aspect of the threat from Indochina.
The conventional wisdom regarding secur i ty  issues in Southeast 
Asia also stressed that the expansion and modernization of the ASEAN 
states ' armed forces were largely prec ip i ta ted by developments in 
Indochina. Overal l , the ASEAN governments were portrayed as having 
coped successful ly, despite s ign i f ican t  dif ferences i n th e i r  
in te rna t iona l  outlooks, with the threats posed by communist Indochina, 
espec ia l ly  in the way in which they coordinated th e i r  p o l i t i c a l  
responses to the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Cambodia.^
This thesis suggests tha t ,  while they were by no means t o t a l l y  
misleading, these widely-held viewpoints were ser iously flawed.
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T h r e a t  A s s e s s m e n t s  and t h e i r  M a n i p u l a t i o n
In the f i r s t  p l ac e, the e v i d e n c e  p r e s e n t e d  in P a r t  2 of the 
t h e s i s  m a k e s  it c l e a r  that the AS E A N  g o v e r n m e n t s '  d e c l a r a t i o n s  
r e g a r d i n g  th ei r s e c u r i t y  c o n c e r n s  with c o m m u n i s t  I n d o c h i n a  did not 
a l w a y s  r e f l e c t  o b j e c t i v e  t h re at a s s e s s m e n t s .  T h e  1975 c o m m u n i s t  
v i c t o r i e s  in I n d o c h i n a  and the later V i e t n a m e s e  i n v a s i o n  of C a m b o d i a  
did s i g n i f i c a n t l y  a l t e r  th e  s t r a t e g i c  e n v i r o n m e n t  of th e  A S E A N  st ates,  
and the Thai a u t h o r i t i e s  often had l e g i t i m a t e  r e a s o n s  for f e e l i n g  
i n s e c u r e  in the f a c e  of m i l i t a r y  i n c u r s i o n s  by c o m m u n i s t  I n d o c h i n e s e  
f o r c e s ,  P a t h e t  Lao and (until 1978) K h m e r  R o u g e  s u p p o r t  for Thai 
c o m m u n i s t  i n s u r g e n t s ,  and l a r g e - s c a l e  c r o s s - b o r d e r  r e f u g e e  f l o w s .  But 
t h e  i n d i c a t i o n s  are t h a t  the AS E A N  g o v e r n m e n t s  o f t e n  e x a g g e r a t e d  and 
m i s r e p r e s e n t e d  t h e s e  t h r e a t s .
S o m e  r e l a t i v e l y  r e c e n t  th eo ret ic al w o r k  on t h r e a t  p e r c e p t i o n  in 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c s  is helpful in e x p l a i n i n g  this e x a g g e r a t i o n  and 
m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n .  A c c o r d i n g  to D.G. Pr ui tt, " s y s t e m a t i c  d i s t o r t i o n s  
in the p e r c e p t i o n  of e v i d e n c e " ,  m a y  lead to " p o s s i b i 1 is t i c  t h i n k i n g
in wh i c h  f u t u r e  e v e n t s  are seen as p r o b a b l e  t h a t  s h o u l d  o n l y  be seen
2as p o s s i b l e " .  A c c o r d i n g  to Pruitt, t h e s e  d i s t o r t i o n s  are c a u s e d  b y
1 For typical e x a m p l e s  of this c o n v e n t i o n a l  w i s d o m ,  see C h a n  H e ng
Chee, "The I n t e r e s t s  and Role of A S E A N  in the I n d o c h i n a  C o n f l i c t "  
(Paper p r e s e n t e d  at I n te rna ti on al C o n f e r e n c e  on I n d o c h i n a  and 
P r o b l e m s  of S e c u r i t y  and S t a b i l i t y  in S o u t h e a s t  As ia , B a n g k o k ,  
19-21 June 1980); J.M. Ch andran, " S o u t h e a s t  A s i a  in 1980: AD i p l o m a t i c  and S t r a t e g i c  O v e r vie w" , S o u t h e a s t  A s i a n  A f f a i r s  1981 
(Sin gap or e: I n s t i t u t e  of S o u t h e a s t  A s i a n  S t u d i e s ,  19 81), p p T
17-29; and S h e l d o n  W. Simon, T h e  A S E A N  S t a t e s  and R e g i o n a l  
S e c u r i t y  (S ta n f o r d :  H o o v e r  I n s t i t u t i o n  Pr es s, 19 82 ).
2 D.G. Pruitt, " D e f i n i t i o n  of the S i t u a t i o n  as a D e t e r m i n a n t  of
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  A c t i o n " ,  in H.G. K e l m a n  (ed.), I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
Be ha v i o u r :  A S o c i a l - P s y c h o l o g i c a l  A n a l y s i s  ( N e w  York: Holt,
R i n e h a r t  & W i n s t o n ,  1955), p. 407.
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"predispositions" affecting the interpretation of evidence concerning
3
another state ' s  capability and intent to do harm. Klaus Knorr
reached similar conclusions, and recognized "intervening
predispositions" which might lead to an underestimation of threat,
f ac i l i ta te  or obstruct threat perception, and encourage
4
misperception. Raymond Cohen went further than either Pruitt  or 
Knorr: as well as highlighting the crucial influence on threat
perception of "intervening predispositions" relating to a s ta te ' s  
geopolitical and domestic political environments, he went on to
analyse "the nature of the cognitive process of appraisal" which he 
saw as central to the perception of threats.  After examining a number 
of historical examples, Cohen concluded that
The crucial inference, central to the appraisal of 
threat, is found in the recurrent argument that the 
opponent had in some way betrayed a trust or undertaken 
an illegitimate and unpermissible action -- that he had 
somehow infringed a norm of behaviour -- and that,  as a 
consequence of this,  he had ceased to be bound by 
existing restraints and was to be considered as bent on 
a policy of aggressive domination gravely damaging to 
the interests of the observing actor.5
To some extent, the findings of this thesis coincide with those 
of Pruitt ,  Knorr and Cohen. In Parts 2 and 3 of the thesis frequent
3 Ibid., pp. 399-407.
4 K. Knorr, "Threat Perception", in K. Knorr (ed.),  Historical
Dimensions of National Security Problems (Lawrence: University
of Kansas Press, 1976), pp. 78-119.
5 Raymond Cohen, Threat Perception in International Crisis
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1979), p. 165.
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reference is made to the influence on the ASEAN states'  threat 
perceptions of the "background factors' discussed in Part 1. In terms 
of the ASEAN states'  perceptions of security threats emanating from 
communist Indochina, certain of these background factors fulfi l led 
roles analogous to Knorr's "intervening predispositions". Thus, for 
example, i t  may plausibly be argued that the Thais' historical 
experience of conflict with the Vietnamese predisposed Thai 
governments in the 1975-81 period to view a united, communist Vietnam 
as a threat.  Moreover, the tendency of military commanders to make 
"worst case" assumptions concerning the intent of neighbouring states 
reinforced the predisposition of successive Thai governments (which 
were all dominated by the armed forces after the October 1976 coup) to 
see developments in Indochina as posing threats to Thailand's 
security. Equally important as an influence on the ASEAN governments' 
threat perceptions was the behaviour of the Indochinese communist 
states. Cohen's "crucial inference" that the infringement of 
"accepted norms of international conduct governing relations between 
the involved parties" (in Thomas Schelling's words, "the rules of the 
game") is cri t ical  in triggering threat perceptions is clearly 
relevant to the way in which a series of pronouncements and actions by 
the Indochinese governments in the 1975-78 period heightened the ASEAN 
governments' concern over security threats from Indochina. The most 
blatant example of such infringement of behavioural norms was, of 
course, Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia only three months after Hanoi's 
Prime Minister had assured the ASEAN governments that Vietnam's 
intentions were entirely peaceful.
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But "intervening predispositions" and the frequently disturbing 
behaviour of the Indochinese communists do not, by any means, provide 
a total ly satisfactory explanation for the ASEAN governments' often 
hyperbolic statements concerning threats from communist Indochina. 
Indeed, there is evidence that certain of the ASEAN governments -- or 
at least factions within them -- purposely manipulated various types 
of security threat related to Indochina, to ful f i l l  their own domestic 
and international polit ical objectives.
The notion of "garrison ideology" is particularly apposite to an 
assessment of the way in which certain of the ASEAN governments 
sometimes manipulated their security concerns with Indochina. 
According to David Brown:
A garrison ideology may be defined as the assertion and 
proclamation by governments of a real or incipient 
crisis  such that,  for the time being at least,  internal 
disagreements must be put to one side if the society is 
to survive intact .  The existence of the crisis 
demands, i t  is argued, that polit ical disagreement and 
criticism of the regime, which might otherwise be 
regarded as legitimate, must now be regarded as 
i l legitimate,  since i t  is imperative that all stand 
together for the duration of the cr is is .  Support for 
the regime is thus identified with commitment to the 
society and i ts  survival.6
Brown goes on to note:
6 David Brown, The Legitimacy of Governments in Plural Societies 
(Singapore: Singapore University Press for the Department of
Political Science, National University of Singapore, Occasional 
Paper No. 43, 1984), p. 7. Although Brown emphasized the
manipulation of ethnic factors, his assessment of "garrison 
ideology" clearly also had a wider significance.
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However, the regime is unlikely to be able to get away 
with inventing a c r i s i s . . .  They may indeed be able to 
exaggerate and dramatize the spectres threathening the 
society; and thus to inject an element of lie or myth 
into the language of poli t ics,  but . . .  i t  is the social 
and polit ical real i t ies which provide the regime with 
the symbols which i t  may then manipulate.^
I t  is impossible to discern, with a high degree of confidence, 
the precise extent to which the various ASEAN governments consciously 
exploited putative security threats from Indochina for their own 
purposes. Nevertheless, there are some quite clear examples where 
extreme responses to what were objectively not cri t ical  security 
threats from Indochina coincided with recognizable domestic polit ical 
motives for exaggerating them. The most striking case occurred in 
Thailand where senior military officers and extreme right-wing 
politicians just ified their seizure of power from a democratically- 
elected government in October 1976, and the subsequent imposition of 
harsh and repressive rule, on the grounds that Thailand faced a 
serious domestic and external communist threat.  As well as 
threatening Thailand with direct invasion, the Indochinese communists 
were allegedly providing assistance to student radicals in Bangkok and 
using Vietnamese refugees in northeast Thailand as a "fifth column". 
Accorcing to Brown, the invocation of such bifurcated threats is a 
typical ploy of Third World governments seeking to enhance their 
legitimacy: the alleged external threat "gives force to the demand 
for internal unity", while the domestic threat gives "dramatic
o
immediacy to the external danger".
7 Ibid. , p. 8.
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Although the evidence that ASEAN governments manipulated threats 
from Indochina for domestic political purposes on other occasions is 
generally not so persuasive as in the example of the Thanin regime, 
there were fair ly strong indications that such manipulation did occur. 
To some extent the Kriangsak and Prem administrations' sometimes 
alarmist pronouncements on the Vietnamese threat after the invasion of 
Cambodia might be excused as the result  of not only important 
"intervening predispositions", but also the "infringement of 
behavioural norms" evident in Hanoi's occupation of a traditional 
buffer state.  On the other hand, elements in the Thai government 
sometimes appeared willing to exploit what they may have genuinely 
perceived as a threat for domestic polit ical purposes, as when 
Kriangsak called on the Thai people to unite behind the three 
institutions of "nation, religion and monarch" in January 1979. The 
Prem government's tough responses to the Vietnamese cross-border 
incursion into Thailand in June 1980, the series of border incidents 
in early 1981, the emergence of a new Vietnamese- and Laotian-backed 
Thai communist group, and the inflow of Indochinese refugees may have 
been partly aimed at distracting the Thai populace's attention from a 
deteriorating domestic economic situation, and directing the energies 
of poli t ical ly ambitious "Young Turk" army field commanders towards 
their professional role.
Brown's work on the Malaysian and Singaporean governments' 
articulation of "siege mentality" concentrated on their exploitation
8 David Brown, "Crisis and ethnicity: legitimacy in plural 
societies", Third World Quarterly, Vo1. 7, No. 4 (October 1985), 
p. 989.
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g
of ethnic insecurities, and in this sense is directly relevant to the 
analysis in Chapter 7 of these administrations' responses to the 
Indochinese refugee cr isis .  But i t  is likely that the Singaporean 
government, in particular,  saw potential domestic polit ical benefits 
in exaggerating threats other than the communal issue. As Brown says
the present political leaders are undoubtedly 
worried that [complacency and liberalization] might 
indeed become the mood of the next polit ical 
generation; and so they continue to depict "success" in 
terms primarily of struggle and chal lenge.^
So there are good reasons for suspecting that official  Singaporean 
pronouncements regarding the seriousness of the threat posed to 
national and regional security by Vietnam's role in Cambodia and 
alliance with the Soviet Union from 1979, suggesting that Singapore's 
leaders took this threat even more seriously than their Thai and 
Malaysian counterparts, were part ial ly intended to maintain the 
"siege" component of the legitimacy of the ruling People's Action 
Party. Indeed, i t  seems plausible that as domestic security threats 
became less credible as just ifications for maintaining an 
authoritarian polit ical atmosphere as the 1970s progressed, 
developments in Indochina fortuitously provided a new complex of 
threats for the PAP leadership to manipulate.
9 Ibid., pp. 990-1001.
10 Ibid.,  p. 997.
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Some of the ASEAN governments also exaggerated and misrepresented 
the various threats from Indochina for reasons connected with their 
international relationships. As Peter Polomka observed, the ASEAN 
regimes sometimes perceived security threats and rivalry between major 
powers "not only in terms of danger but also opportunities to extract 
economic and military resources and security promises from rival 
in t e res t s" .^  From early 1979, Thailand and Singapore attempted, with 
a large degree of success, to link the Vietnamese occupation of 
Cambodia to broader Western concern over "Soviet expansionism". The 
Singaporean Ministry of Foreign Affairs'  booklet From Phnom Penh to 
Kabul was one clear manifestation of this strategy aimed at securing 
greater poli t ical ,  military and economic support from the United 
States and the West. More particularly,  elements within the Thai 
military leadership used Thailand's role as the "front-line state" 
facing the "Vietnamese threat" as a just if icat ion for requesting 
Washington to supply highly sophisticated and expensive weapons 
systems to the Thai armed forces. There is also persuasive evidence 
that the Thai and Malaysian governments, in particular,  exaggerated 
the security implications of the inflow of Indochinese refugees in 
order to encourage Western countries to expand and accelerate their 
resettlement programmes.
One additional point needs to be made in relation to the ASEAN 
governments' manipulation of threats from Indochina. In exaggerating
11 Peter Polomka, "Intra-Regional Dynamics: ASEAN and Indochina"
(Paper presented at Conference on "International Security in the 
Southeast Asian and Southwest Pacific Regions", Strategic and 
Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, 
12-15 July 1982), p. 20.
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and misrepresenting some of these threats, the regimes in question ran 
r isks .  One Jakarta-based diplomat had th is  to say about one e f fec t  of 
the Indonesian regime's exaggeration of securi ty threats fo r p o l i t i c a l  
purposes:
The more they ta lk  about threats , the more New /ork 
bankers pick up the phone and anxiously check with the 
US Embassy here about fu ture investment prospects.!?
Although the threats in question were p r im ar i ly  dDmestic, th is
observation was c lea r ly  also relevant to the manipulation of
Indochinese threats by Jakarta and i t s  ASEAN partners. Such
manipulation had the potential  to undermine the confidence of not only
foreign investors,  but also the local population. Indeed, the ASEAN
governments' awareness of such r isks  may help to account fo r  the i r
reluctance to stress one important factor which mi^ht have been
expected to f igure  as a major element of the i r  security concern with
Indochina in the immediate aftermath of the communist v ic tor ies:  the
threat posed by communist Indochina's potential  t;> act as an
a l te rna t ive  developmental model. That the Indochinese communists,
owing la rge ly  to the eruption of the Third Indochina War, but also
because of the cessation of US, Japanese and other ecommic assistance
13to Vietnam, bad planning and poor management, would 1ail to perform 
as impressively in the post-1975 "peace" as in the preceding war was
12 Quoted by Peter Rodgers, "Behind Jakarta's Threat Syndrome", 
National Times, 23-29 November 1980.
13 See Douglas Pike, "Vietnam in I960: The Gathering Storm?", Asian
Survey, Vol . 21, No. 1 (January 1981), pp. 84-87.
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essentially unpredictable in 1975. At the time of the communist 
victories,  the emergence of a radical new polit ical order and, 
potentially, an alternative developmental model in Indochina 
implicitly posed a serious challenge to the somewhat fragile 
pol i t ical ,  economic and social status quo in the ASEAN states.  If 
this threat was manipulated by the ASEAN governments, the manipulation 
occurred only in vague pronouncements (particularly from Jakarta) on 
the need for "national resilience" and "regional resilience": the
ASEAN governments had no wish to highlight more precisely their own 
countries'  fundamental domestic poli t ical ,  social and economic 
weaknesses.
More generally, i t  was sometimes apparent that the desire of one 
element of an ASEAN government's bureaucracy to exaggerate or 
otherwise manipulate some aspect of the threat from Indochina was in 
stark contrast with another department's wish to reassure foreign 
investors and/or the local population. This phenomenon was evident in 
both the Thai and Singaporean governments' ini t ial  responses to the 
Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in early 1979. (In the Singaporean 
case, at least, there was no evidence of significant divergence in 
threat perceptions within the government, so the ambivalent response 
at this time lends credibil i ty to the idea that the threat was 
sometimes consciously manipulated for ulterior polit ical motives.)
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Coping with threats from Indochina: how successful were 
the ASEAN governments?
Although the ASEAN governments evidently sometimes manipulated 
for ulterior motives various security threats emanating from communist 
Indochina, i t  is clear that they did also genuinely fear the 
consequences for their countries' security of various Indochinese 
developments. Sometimes these perceptions were erroneous -- the 
results of "intervening predispositions" or alarming actions by the 
Indochinese states. At other times there was a more firm and 
objective basis for the ASEAN governments' threat assessments. Often 
i t  was impossible for an observer to discern the precise motivation or 
combination of motivations for particular pronouncements by ASEAN 
governments about their security concerns with Indochina. 
Nevertheless, i t  is possible to come to some overall conclusions about 
how the ASEAN governments coped with what they perceived -- or claimed 
to perceive -- as threats from their communist neighbours. Probably 
the most important question to answer is whether the ASEAN 
governments' handling of their security concerns with Indochina 
enhanced or damaged their countries' security in relation to Indochina 
and more generally.
In the 1975-78 period, the ASEAN governments were broadly 
successful in containing and managing their security concerns with 
Indochina. This success was not, however, indicative only of skillful 
diplomacy on the part of the ASEAN states.  Rather, i t  was largely the 
result of the failure to materialize of the serious threats from 
Indochina anticipated by many observers in 1975. Hanoi continued to 
lambast the ASEAN states whenever their policies appeared to be
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running counter to Vietnam's security interests (as in the case, for 
example, of Thailand's continuing military links with the United 
States). But Hanoi displayed an ever greater willingness, 
particularly after the Fourth National Congress of the Vietnamese 
Communist Party in December 1976, to cooperate with the ASEAN 
countries as a means of expediting Vietnam's post-war reconstruction. 
Laos remained suspicious of, and basically hostile towards, Thailand 
throughout the 1975-77 period, but without Vietnamese backing did not 
pose a serious threat to Thai security. Democratic Kampuchea, 
chivvied by Beijing, strove for a working relationship with Bangkok 
for not only economic reasons, but increasingly also as a geopolitical 
counter to Vietnamese encroachment. To be sure, there were persistent 
border clashes between Thailand and its two communist neighbours, and 
evidence of continuing Pathet Lao and Khmer Rouge backing for the Thai 
communist insurgents. However, official Thai support -- at least at 
the local level (and, under the Thanin regime, from Bangkok) -- for 
anti-communist resistance groups operating into Laos and Cambodia was 
a prime reason for these phenomena.
The ASEAN states'  "success" in managing their security concerns 
with Indochina from 1975-78 was reinforced by the generally unexpected 
development of a serious intra-communist dispute, and temporary 
balance of power, within Indochina, which made all parties to the 
Indochina conflict more willing to enter into more harmonious 
relationships with non-communist Southeast Asia. Not only were the 
ASEAN states able to secure guarantees that Vietnam and Laos would not 
support insurgencies in the region, but there also seemed even less 
likelihood than in 1975 of any serious conventional military threat to
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the ASEAN region from Vietnam. The flow of refugees was certainly 
disturbing, but i t  did provide evidence of the social, economic and 
polit ical weakness of communist Indochina.
Although extremely serious domestic poli t ical ,  economic and
social problems in the four larger ASEAN countries indicated that
"national resilience" and "regional resilience" in non-communist
Southeast Asia remained long-term objectives rather than real i t ies ,  i t
was very clear by the time that the Vietnamese swept the Khmer Rouge
from power at the end of 1978 that Indochinese communism could not,
for the foreseeable future, threaten the ASEAN governments by
presenting their  citizens with an attractive alternative polit ical and
developmental model. As Singaporean Foreign Minister Rajaratnam
14claimed at the time, the "dominoes" were falling "the other way". 
But this state of affairs had arisen without the ASEAN governments 
having to exert themselves to solve their own countries'  extremely 
serious social,  economic and political problems. Similarly, the fact 
that the ASEAN governments found themselves involved in reasonably 
equable working relationships with the Indochinese communist regimes 
in 1978 was not primarily the result of their own exertions, but 
rather of the outbreak of renewed conflict in Indochina.
There is a strong case that the higher profile which the ASEAN 
governments adopted towards the management of their security concerns 
with Indochina in the 1979-81 period ironically had, on balance, a
14 "Old Maps in a New Age", speech by Rajaratnam at an international 
affairs forum organized by the Malaysian Economic Association, 
University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 19 January 1979. Singapore 
Government Press Release, MC/JAN/22/79 (Foreign Affairs), p. 10.
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Jeleter ious effect  on thei r  countr ies '  secur i ty ,  both in re la t ion to 
Indochina and more generally.  At f i r s t  glance, th i s  argument appears 
J i f f i c u l t  to j us t i f y :  a f t e r  a l l ,  the ASEAN s ta tes  were surely
successful in coordinating t he i r  pol icies  to lead diplomatic ef for t s  
Lo deny internat ional  legitimacy to the Vietnamese-instal led regime in 
3hnom Penh, while keeping al ive an a l t erna t ive  (ul t imately in the form 
}f the t r i p a r t i t e  Cambodian res is tance coal i t ion)  to Vietnamese 
jomination. Moreover, the Thai author i t ies  were able to drive home 
^ery successful counter-insurgency operations against domestic 
communist insurgents,  who were both demoralized and e f fec t ive ly  denied 
external support by the outbreak of the Third Indochina War.
But by 1981 the Cambodian problem had evolved into an uneasy
stalemate which showed few signs of being resolveable on terms
compatible with ASEAN's diplomatic posture on the issue.  Indeed, the
final  chapter of this  thesis argues that  this  stalemate,  to which
ASEAN's policy contributed,  was detrimental to the securi ty of the
Associat ion's members in a number of ways. ASEAN's emphasis on
15upholding i t s  "prescript ion for regional order",  by so sta lwar t ly
circumscribed the Associat ion's o r ig ina l ly  equally important 
conception of " secur i ty . . .  in terms of developmental goals,  with 
corresponding at tent ion given to an underpinning pol i t i ca l
15 The phrase is Michael L e i t e r ' s. See "ASEAN under s t ress  over 
Cambodia", FEER, 14 June 1984, p. 34.
16 I b i d . , Toe. c i t .
Vietnamese domination of Cambodia, overshadowed and arguably
s t a b i 1i t y " . 16 As enunciated in the 1967 Bangkok Declaration and
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subsequently, this view of security required policy action on three 
planes -- international, intra-regional, and domestic. At the 
international level, ASEAN's policy had involved an attempt 
(admittedly not supported with equal enthusiasm by all the 
Association's members) to move towards excluding unwelcome political 
and military intrusions by extra-regional powers, and greater 
self-management of regional security by regional states themselves. 
At the intra-regional level, there were attempts to contain and 
resolve disputes within ASEAN, and between the ASEAN and Indochinese 
states.  At the domestic level, the intention was to reduce and 
hopefully eliminate the impetus given to insurgency by socioeconom c 
inequity and political unresponsiveness. Progress towards the 
realization of "national resilience", "regional resilience" and ZOPFAN 
was by no means spectacular in the 1975-78 phase, but at least sone 
progress was made towards reducing suspicion and tension between the 
ASEAN and Indochinese states.  But in the 1979-81 phase, ASEAN s 
policy on Cambodia was arguably counter-productive in relation to tie 
requirements for security based on "resilience" at each of the three 
levels.
At the international level, ASEAN's Cambodian policy contributed 
to an intensification of the polit ical and military involvement of tie 
major extra-regional powers in Southeast Asia. Although the regim 
remained low in superpower (that is,  Soviet and American) priorities,  
the prolonged Cambodian stalemate effectively enmeshed Southeast Asia 
in the Sino-Soviet dispute. As their stake increased, with China 
extending i ts  support to not only the Khmer Rouge but also tie 
non-communist Cambodian resistance and Thailand, and the Soviet Unbn
509
reaping the benefits of i ts support for Hanoi (in the form of access 
to Vietnamese naval and air f ac i l i t i e s ) ,  i t  seemed ever less likely 
that the Cambodian conflict could be resolved without the imprimatur 
of both Beijing and Moscow. A fundamental improvement in Sino-Soviet 
relations might thus be necessary before any such resolution could 
occur.
At the intra-regional level, the Cambodian stalemate had the 
effect of hardening the division between the Indochinese and ASEAN 
halves of Southeast Asia. Thailand's provision of sanctuary and 
resupply fac i l i t i e s  to the Cambodian resistance provoked not only 
incessant low-intensity conflict and instabil i ty on the Thai-Cambodian 
border, but also provided the basis for apprehension in Bangkok and 
the other ASEAN capitals that the Vietnamese army might cross the 
border in strength to erase the resistance bases once and for al l .  
Less directly, the ASEAN states'  policies towards Indochina played a 
significant role in stimulating the continuing outflow of Vietnamese, 
Laotian and Cambodian refugees. The Cambodian dispute also severely 
restricted the development of economic and other forms of cooperation 
across the region's ideological divide.
As a result  of the way in which i t  helped to prevent peaceful 
coexistence and cooperation between the region's communist and 
non-communist states,  ASEAN's Cambodian policy brought to the surface 
important intra-ASEAN differences in security perspective, 
particularly between Bangkok and Jakarta. In the interest of ASEAN's 
cohesion, the Indonesian regime was forced to subordinate i ts desire 
to build "a regional balance of power incorporating Vietnam and
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directed against China"^7 (one form of "regional resilience") to 
Thailand's requirement that Vietnam's unilateral revision of the 
regional order should be contested. But, as Chapter Nine stresses,  i t  
was evident from an early stage that Jakarta was apprehensive that 
ASEAN's Cambodian policy might eventually damage the security of both 
Indonesia and the ASEAN sub-region as a whole. Similar doubts were 
evident within the governments of the other ASEAN states,  especially 
Malaysia.
At the domestic level, i t  is arguable that the Cambodian issue 
distracted the ASEAN governments from what were rightfully their 
principal security concerns. It  appeared that the spectre of a 
"Vietnamese threat" or less precisely defined "regional instabil i ty" 
occasioned by the conflict in Cambodia was providing a rationale for 
armed forces' leaders in the ASEAN countries to press for higher 
defence expenditures and more sophisticated military equipment. Even 
before the invasion of Cambodia, one analyst had speculated that 
Vietnam
. . .  might one day embark on a deliberate policy of 
military bluster against i ts  Southeast Asian 
neighbours, forcing them to divert financial resources 
from economic development to military preparedness, in 
the hope that a slowdown in economic growth might help 
radicalize their populations and give a boost to local 
communist parties.
The irony was that there were good grounds for arguing that a trend in 
this direction was evident, especially from 1979, even without Hanoi
17 Ibid.,  p. 36.
18 David Jenkins, FEER, 24 June 1977, p. 15.
needing to embark on a "deliberate policy" to this end. There was no
evidence that increasing expenditure on defence was direct ly  damaging
the ASEAN states' economies, but as one wri ter observed, the ASEAN
states' r is ing defence budgets in the late 1970s and early 1980s
coincided with the World Bank and International Monetary Fund drawing
attention "to the relat ive decline in amounts set aside --
part icular ly  in the Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand -- for
19development purposes, for health and welfare". Moreover, within the 
defence sector the ASEAN governments' defence policies sometimes 
diverted resources away from counter-insurgency.
The prolonged confrontation with Indochina also had the potential 
to retard the development of stable and responsive po l i t ica l  systems 
in the three largest ASEAN states, part icular ly  Thailand, by providing 
a jus t i f ica t ion  for the armed forces to continue claiming a key role 
in government.
Systemic Security or Regime Security?
Although "security" is a widely-used core concept in the study of 
International Relations, there is a relat ive paucity of conceptual 
discussion of i t  in the l i terature. Something similar is true of 
o f f ic ia l  use of the term, which governments throughout the world cite 
as a jus t i f ica t ion  for an extremely wide range of policies and 
actions.
However, one recent contribution to the l i terature of Strategic 
Studies and International Relations provides a re lat ive ly
-  511 -
19 Ho Kwon Ping, "ASEAN: The Five Countries", in Alison Broinowski
(ed.), Understanding ASEAN (London: Macmillan, 1982), p. 237.
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;omprehensive and satisfying analysis of what "security" is,  and how
20it might be achieved. Buzan's central arguments are that the
'national security problem" cannot be understood without reference to
Factors at three levels of analysis (the individual, the national and
the international),  and that "a full understanding of security at each
21level can only be gained if i t  is related to the other two". For 
Dractical purposes, Buzan suggests that durable security at all three 
levels could be best achieved if governments consciously adopted a 
"systemic security policy" based on
. . .  a multi-layered approach. This could start  with 
t er r i tor ia l  defence strategies, which would ensure 
individual and local participation in national 
security. On top of this could come a national 
security policy based on devising self-help solutions 
to conspicuous vulnerabilities in the social, 
pol i t ical ,  economic or military sectors of the state.  
Beyond that could exist a variety of security 
arrangements among groups of states.  These might 
include alliances and defence communities, formalized 
security communities and zones of peace, arms control 
agreements, dispute settlement procedures, arms 
production and purchase agreements, and such l i k e . 22
Buzan's proposals are interesting in the context of the ASEAN states 
as they tal ly very closely with the concepts which, until the 
Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, dominated ASEAN's official collective 
line on security. ASEAN's declaratory consensus s t i l l  stressed the 
building of "national resilience" and "regional resilience", the
20 Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: The National Security
Problem in International Relations (Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books,
1983).
21 Ibid. ,  p. 245.
22 Ibid. ,  p. 254.
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amelioration of relations with Indochina, and (as formulated in 
ZOPFAN) the exclusion, as far as was practically possible, of the 
military and political influence of the great powers. Although the 
governments of the three larger ASEAN states did not make significant 
progress towards ameliorating their very serious domestic social, 
economic and political problems, none of the ASEAN regimes generally 
responded to Indochinese developments in the 1975-78 phase by 
stressing their implications for "security" in solely a narrow, 
military sense.
Why i t  was that after the invasion of Cambodia, the ASEAN states 
(including Indonesia, the main proponent of what amounted to a 
"systemic security" approach) were willing to allow their 
"prescription for regional order" effectively to eclipse their 
earl ier ,  and arguably much more judicious holistic conception of 
security is not entirely clear. Certainly, the Vietnamese invasion of 
Cambodia drastically changed the strategic environment of Thailand 
and, to a lesser extent, the other ASEAN members. Moreover, Chapter 9 
discussed a variety of factors which militated against a change in 
ASEAN's policy of attempting to prevent Hanoi from consolidating its 
hold on Cambodia. But on their own, these reasons do not provide a
"regional resilience" of ASEAN's policies towards Indochina from early 
1979.
satisfying explanation for the ASEAN governments' willingness
to tolerate the detrimental effect on "national resilience" and
An additional explanation might be that,  like most of their 
counterparts throughout the world, the ASEAN governments were 
primarily concerned with "immediate problems of management and
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survival" in both domestic and international spheres. Because of 
the problems which they encountered in maintaining their domestic 
political legitimacy, the ASEAN governments were sometimes as much or 
nore concerned with promoting their own security in power in the short 
term as with enhancing the more broadly-defined longer term security 
of their countries, let alone of the ASEAN community or the region as 
a whole. So when Vietnam invaded Cambodia, the ASEAN governments had 
good reasons for calculating that in the short term at least,  the 
benefits of adopting a policy of confrontation towards Vietnam would 
outweigh the costs.
The successful implementation of the policies which would have 
been necessary for the achievement of "national resilience" and 
"regional resilience" might well have been incompatible with the 
security in power of at least the three largest ASEAN countries" 
regimes. A credible commitment to the realization of "resilience" at 
the national level would have necessitated a fundamental 
redistribution of resources towards the rural poor, the 
decentralization of governmental power to regional and local 
authorities,  an increase in popular participation in the polit ical 
process, and an eschewal of high levels of defence expenditure (and 
particularly the purchase of sophisticated military equipment from 
overseas) in deference to the need to concentrate government spending 
on development programmes. At the international level, such a 
commitment would have necessitated a willingness to deemphasize
23
23 The phrase is Christopher Clapham's. See his Third World 
Politics: An Introduction (Beckenham, Kent: Croom Helm, 1985),
p. 182.
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Historical and ideological differences with the Indochinese in order 
to reduce intra-regional tension and to construct a broad-based 
working relationship between non-communist and communist Southeast 
Asia. Ultimately, i t  would also have been necessary for the ASEAN 
governments to reduce their polit ical and military links with the 
United States: in particular,  the US bases in the Philippines would 
need to be phased out.
These measures would have involved the ASEAN governments in 
making some extremely unpalatable sacrifices in relation to the 
instruments they used to maintain their own security in power. For 
example, any significant amelioration of the three (or perhaps four) 
largest ASEAN countries'  domestic social, economic and polit ical 
Droblems would have risked alienating the narrow, e l i t i s t  power bases 
of the regimes in power. The polit ical role or influence of the 
military in the four largest ASEAN states militated against any 
serious attempts to restrain increases in defence expenditure. 
Downgraded links with the United States would have been unwelcome in 
view of the reliance of the ASEAN governments (particularly Bangkok 
and Manila) on substantial poli t ical ,  military and economic support 
from Washington. But also, rapprochement with Indochina would have 
deprived the ASEAN governments of some extremely important elements of 
the panoply of security threats which they sometimes manipulated both 
to extract greater benefit from their relationships with extra- 
regional powers and to enhance their domestic polit ical legitimacy.
On the other hand, in the short-term at least,  the benefits 
accruing to the ASEAN governments from their policies towards the new 
crisis  in Indochina from 1979 were considerable, extending beyond the
516 -
mere denial of Vietnamese control over Cambodia. The new Indochina 
cr is i s ,  in all i ts  aspects, assisted the ASEAN governments to maintain 
their domestic legitimacy and external support. However, while this 
suggests that the desire to maintain or enhance their own security in 
power may have been an important influence on the ASEAN governments' 
adoption of a confrontational posture towards Indochina after the 
Vietnamese invasion, i t  does not imply that the effective abandonment 
of a "systemic security" approach would continue to yield net benefits 
in the medium to long-term. Indeed, by the time of the International 
Conference on Kampuchea in July 1981 a range of side-effects which 
were clearly detrimental to "security" in i ts wider sense were already 
evident. Moreover, there were indications that,  despite the 
short-term benefits, important elements in the ASEAN governments 
doubted the wisdom of policies which concentrated so exclusively on 
one of Buzan's threee "levels" of security -- the national level.
APPENDICES
APPENDIX 1
THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THAILAND: IDEOLOGICAL DEBATES
AND EXTERNAL ORIENTATION, 1975-81
In early 1976, General Saiyud Kerdphol, Deputy Director of the
lai government's Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC),
iggested that the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) had been unable
I convene a Party Congress because of an internal power struggle
itween pro-Chinese and pro-Vietnamese factions.^ Similarly,
2;uart-Fox has asserted that between 1976 and 1978 Chinese- and 
etnamese-backed CPT factions competed for control of "key areas" in 
lailand's north and northeast: this was the latest phase of
llegedly long-standing competition between Hanoi and Beijing for 
jntrol of the Thai insurgency. While these arguments probably 
caggerated the situation, it does seem that the late 1970s saw an 
'uption of ideological debate and factional infighting within the 
>T, following precedents set earlier in the Party's internal 
istory.^
The removal of the Thai military government by a student-led 
jrising in October 1973 prompted an intense debate in the CPT over
Bangkok P o s t , 7 February 1976.
Martin Stuart-Fox, "Tensions within the Thai Insurgency", 
Australian O u t l o o k , V o l . 33, No. 2 (August 1979), pp. 191-93.
See CPT, "A brief introduction to the history of the Communist 
Party of Thailand", in Andrew Turton, Jonathan Fast and Malcolm 
Caldwell (eds.), Thailand: Roots of Conflict (Nottingham:
Spokesman, 1978), pp. 158-64; Kevin J. Hewison, "Revolutionary 
Warfare in Thailand", Australian Outlook, Vol. 34, No. 2 (August 
1980), pp. 199-200.
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i t s  revolutionary strategy. By 1975 the current orthodoxy of a
"hard-line" strategy based on an essentially Maoist rural-based armed
struggle was being challenged by some within the Party who argued for
a "soft-line" based on the premise that the CPT could benefit by
4supporting the now reformist parliamentary system. At this stage, 
there was apparently no evidence of any correlation between the views 
of these "revisionists" and their ethnicity or external orientation. 
Indeed, the Poliburo member who had initiated (or at least publicized 
at an early stage) the revolt against the Maoist underpinnings of the
5
CPT's strategy was a Bangkok-based Sino-Thai. But although the 
disputes within the CPT centred on revolutionary methods rather than 
external allegiances, the "revisionist" line coincided broadly with 
Hanoi's post-1973 view that urban political struggle was more likely 
to succeed than rural guerilla warfare.
Superficially, the accretion to the CPT after the October 1976 
military coup of perhaps as many as 4000  ^ left-wing students, 
intellectuals and other dissidents represented a tremendous boost to 
the movement's strength. But this massive influx of new recruits also 
accentuated the Party's identity cr is i s .  The radicals who fled to the 
jungles in late 1976 and 1977 came almost entirely from urban areas,
4 David Morell and Chai-anan Samudavanija,  "Thailand's
Revolutionary Insurgency: Changes in Leadership Potential",
Asian Survey, Vol. 19, No. 4 (April 1979), pp. 316-18.
5 Ibid., pp. 317-18.
6 Chatchai Yenbamrong, Straits Times, 21 January 1981. Morell and 
Chai-anan ("Thailand's Revolutionary Insurgency...", p. 293) 
quote a police estimate of "2000 to 3000".
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and predominantly from Bangkok. Their view of Thai socie ty, and hence 
th e i r  p o l i t i c a l  a t t i tudes ,  were profoundly at odds with those of the 
rather narrow, rural-based CPT orthodoxy. As G i r l ing  has pointed out, 
th e i r  idea of a correct revolut ionary strategy fo r  Thailand was closer 
to the Lenin is t  model of the urban-based Bolshevik revolut ion than to 
Mao's protracted rura l g u e r i l la  warfare.^ I n i t i a l l y  in pr ivate  only, 
the newcomers opposed the CPT's foreign po l icy  or ien ta t ion  towards 
Bei j ing and away from Hanoi and Moscow. So the CPT's new re c ru i ts ,  
whi le providing i t  with a vast ly  expanded pool of potentia l  leaders, 
also heightened tension w i th in  the Party.
In September 1977 the party formed the Coordinating Committee of 
P a t r io t i c  and Democracy-loving Forces (CCPDF), including 
representatives of the S oc ia l is t  Party, the S oc ia l is t  Front Party, the 
farmers ',  students' and labour movements, and the mass media, as well
o
as the CPT i t s e l f .  The Laos-based CCPDF seems to have been intended
as a united f ro n t  mechanism to accommodate the newcomers, who were not
yet Party members. But a f te r  toeing the Party l in e  fo r  perhaps a 
g
year the Front began openly to c r i t i c i z e  mainstream CPT ideology, and 
apparently cal led fo r  a new approach to revolut ionary strategy in 
Thai land, in the l i g h t  of Vietnam's exper ience .^  The extent of
7 John G i r l in g ,  Thai land: Society and P o l i t i c s  (I thaca: Cornell
Univers i ty  Press, 1981), p. 276.
8 David Morell and Chai-anan Samudavanija ,  P o l i t i c a l  Con f l ic t  in
Thai land: Reform, Reaction, Revolution (Cambridge, Mass.:
Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, 1981), p. 297.
9 John McBeth, FEER, 8 February 1980, p. 32.
10 I b i d . , 8 June 1979, p. 19.
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Vietnamese influence over the CCPDF at th i s  time is not clear ,  but 
e f for t s  were apparently made by Hanoi and Moscow to encourage this
germ of a more accommodating CPT a t t i tude  towards re la t ions  with 
Hanoi. For example, i t  was reported that  Moscow deposited substant ial  
funds (equivalent  to US$10 mill ion) in Vientiane for Thai students who 
wished to study in the Soviet Union.^
Deteriorat ing Relations between the CPT and Hanoi
The del icate  balance that  the CPT maintained in i t s  rela t ions
with China and Vietnam was threatened increasingly by external
developments as well as by tension within the Party.  Even before the
Indochinese communist v ic tor ies  of 1975 there had been f r i c t ion
between the CPT and Hanoi: according to a CPT document, the
Vietnamese removed arms from a shipment from China to the Thai
12communists. Manipulating i t s  greater ab i l i t y  to use material  aid to 
the CPT as a lever a f t er  Chinese assistance to the Thai communists 
diminished with the establishment of diplomatic re la t ions  between 
Bangkok and Beij ing,  from 1975 Hanoi t r i ed  to force Soviet weapons 
rather  than the preferred US arms (avai lable to the Vietnamese in
11 Justus van der Kroef, "Thailand: a new phase in the
insurgency?", Pacif ic Community, Vol. 8, No. 4 (July 1977), 
pp. 615-16.
12 "On the conf l i c t s  between the Communist Par t ies of Thailand and
Vietnam-Laos" (Underground CPT paper for study and research 
purposes, prepared in Thai by the "Udorn Group", 1 June 1979), 
p. 1. Quoted by Santi Mingmongkul, "Thai res i s tance caught in
the c ros s f i r e" ,  Southeast Asia Chronicle, No. 79 (August 1981), 
pp. 14-15.
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great quant i ty  from stocks captured from the Saigon regime) on the 
13CPT, in a move interpreted as an attempt to fos ter  dependence on 
14Moscow. Moreover, according to a subsequent CPT al legation the 
Vietnamese charged that the CPT had missed an opportunity to seize 
power at the time of the student upris ing and overthrow of the 
m i l i t a r y  regime in October 1973; that the CPT's essent ia l ly  Maoist 
stra tegy of rura l encirclement was inappropriate to a country so much 
smaller than China, and hence that the Thai communists should 
emphasize revolut ionary struggle in Thai land's plains and c i t i e s  as 
well as in mountain and jungle areas; and that the CPT opposed the 
Soviet notion of p ro le tar ian in te rnational ism - -  which was supported 
by Hanoi
This las t  point had come to the fore in late 1977 or early  1978 
when Hanoi proposed, through Vientiane, j o i n t  m i l i t a r y  e f fo r ts  by the 
CPT and Pathet Lao (and perhaps the Vietnamese army) aimed at 
" l ib e ra t in g "  at least some of Th a i la n d .^  Having previously turned
14 "On the c o n f l i c t s . . . " ,  loc. c i t .
15 "Operation Indochina", interview with a leading CPT cadre 
concerning the Indochina s i tua t ion  and past re la t ions  among 
" f ra te rn a l "  par t ies ,  in Northern Star ("a publ icat ion of the 
CPT's northern branches"), Vol. 1, No. 7 (January 1980), quoted 
by Santi ,  p. 15. The Vietnamese par ty 's  las t  publ ic greeting to 
the CPT ( in  December 1977) stressed the need fo r  the Thai 
communists to hold high "the banner of national independence" 
( tha t  is ,  to avoid close t ies  with Bei j ing)  and to form "a j o i n t  
national and democratic united f r o n t " ,  and expressed the hope 
tha t  the "m i l i t a n t  s o l id a r i t y "  of the Vietnamese and Thai part ies 
"based on the pr inc ip les  of Marxism-Leninism and pro leta r ian 
in ternat ional ism" would "become even stronger and more
consol idated". Hanoi radio in Thai, 0500 gmt, 1 December 1977 
(SWB FE/5682/A3/4, 2 December 1977).
16 On the c o n f l i c t s . . . " ,  p. 3; "Operation Indochina", pp. 20, 23.
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down a CPT request for arms and ammunition, Hanoi offered (again
through Vientiane) weapons to the par ty ' s  Laos-based northeast
regional committee (which included a large proportion of
Vietnamese-trained cadres) at the same time that  mil i tary cooperation
was suggested. This was perceived, probably correct ly,  by the CPT1 s
regional and central  leadership as an attempt to sp l i t  the p a r t y . ^
The regional committee rejected the idea of di rect  Vietnamese or
Laotian involvement in i t s  st ruggle:  not only did such "cooperation"
threaten to sp l i t  the Thai communist movement, and al ienate the Party
from the Thai people, but i t  also augured i l l  for the independence and
18integr i ty  of a future communist-ruled Thailand. These moves to
subvert the CPT's northeast  regional command may have been linked to 
shadowy Vietnamese and Laotian plans --  i f  such ever existed -- to 
detach Thailand's northeastern provinces to form a "protectorate" on 
the west bank of the Mekong.
When the CPT rebuffed Hanoi's approach on the matter of mi l i ta ry
cooperation, the Vietnamese made i t  clear that  they would not welcome
19back to Hanoi the CPT's representat ive --  who was then in Vientiane. 
This r i f t  between Vietnam and the CPT came at a time (1978) when 
Hanoi's conf l ic t s  with Cambodia and China as well as i t s  domestic 
problems were intensi fying.  As the year progressed, Hanoi saw a need 
to enhance i t s  posi t ion in these disputes by breaking out of what i t
17 Interview with "Comrade Paitoon", a member of the CPT's northeast  
regional committee, HEER, 19 September 1980, p. 44; Santi ,  p. 15.
18 Sant i ,  p. 15.
19 John McBeth, FEER^ , 19 September 1980, p. 44.
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perceived to be diplomatic iso la t ion  in the region: the Vietnamese
leadership decided that i t  was important to improve th e i r  country's 
re la t ions  with the ASEAN states.
Having reached a deadlock in re la t ions with the CPT, i t  was
presumably f e l t  that there would be l i t t l e  to lose i f  both the
Vietnamese government and communist party disowned th is  bugbear of the
Thai government. In th is  way, Hanoi would be able to outmanoeuvre
Be i j ing ,  which had made i t  c lear that i t  would maintain "pa r ty - to -
party" l inks  with regional communist movements, a pract ice that was
widely seen as dupl ic i tous in the ASEAN cap i ta ls .  When the Vietnamese
Prime Min is ter (Pham Van Dong) v is i ted  Bangkok in early September
1978, he and Kriangsak signed a communique including a pledge to
re f ra in  " . . .  from interference in each other's internal a f fa i r s  and
20from both d i rec t  and ind i rec t  subvers ion. . . " .  But there was nothing
fundamentally novel about th is  statement of mutual good in tent :
indeed, the communique was said by the two leaders to be a
rea f f i rm at ion  of the pr inc ip les  included in the Thai-Vietnamese j o i n t
21communique of August 1976.
Although the CPT apparently took an i n i t i a l l y  op t im is t ic  view of
the Kriangsak-Dong communique, viewing i t  as a "pragmatic" ploy by
22Hanoi, and strove " to  maintain a pos i t ive  image of Vietnam", i t s  
d is t ru s t  of Vietnam was heightened by the signing of the Soviet- 
Vietnamese fr iendship t rea ty  in November: Moscow had been viewed by
20 Bangkok home service, 1300 gmt, 10 September 1978 (SWB FE/5913/ 
A3/6, 11 September 1978).
21 Ib id .
22 Santi ,  p. 15.
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the Thai communists as " re v is io n is t "  since the late 1960s. But
P '3
despite attacking the Soviet Union's in te rnational  po l ic ie s ,  the
VOPT radio stat ion at th is  stage avoided d i re c t l y  c r i t i c i z i n g  Hanoi or
24i t s  re la t ionsh ip  with Moscow. The CPT was probably s t i l l  anxious to
avoid an absolute and open s p l i t  with Hanoi (and Vientiane) fo r  fear
of the e f fec t  that the loss of i t s  Laotian sanctuaries would have on
i t s  operations. Material aid from Indochina apparently a l l  but ceased
in the las t  few months of 1978, although some Chinese suppl ies were
s t i l l  being conveyed through Laos.
But the scene was now set fo r  the f in a l  breach between the CPT
and the Vietnam-Laos axis. In December 1978 Vietnamese forces invaded
and occupied Cambodia, depriv ing the CPT units on the Thai-Cambodian
border of the sanctuaries that they had been able to use in Democratic
Kampuchea. An unknown, but noteworthy, number of CPT guer i l las  in the
area joined the i r  Khmer Rouge a l l i e s  in re s is t ing  the Vietnamese 
25army. Others went to southern Laos, but the majo r i ty  had f led 
across the border into Thailand by early 1979. But the CPT did not 
openly denounce the Vietnamese invasion.
23 See, fo r  example "Review of 1978", Voice of the People of 
Thai land, 1000 gmt, 29 December 1978 (SWB FE/6009/A3/14, 
6 January 1979).
24 New York Times, 23 January 1979.
25 I b id . This report was confirmed by CPT cadres interviewed by 
Nayan Chanda of Far Eastern Economic Review in February 1981. 
Personal interview with Chanda, Canberra, August 1982.
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Thai-Laotian Detente and the CPT
While Vietnamese forces were consol idating th e i r  hold on Cambodia 
in January 1979, the Thai Prime Minister t rave l led  to the capital  of 
Vietnam's a l l y ,  Laos, fo r  an o f f i c i a l  v i s i t .  When in Vientiane, 
Kriangsak joined his Laotian counterpart, Kaysone Phomvihan, in 
signing a communique which included a renunciation of subversion 
across the Thai-Laotian border. Like the Kriangsak-Dong communique of 
the previous September, the Kriangsak-Kaysone accord was a re i te ra t io n
p c
of pr inc ip les  agreed in August 1976. But the breakdown in re la t ions 
between the CPT and i t s  Vietnamese and Laotian a l l i e s ,  coupled with 
the deepening c r i s i s  in re la t ions  between Vietnam and Laos on one hand 
and China and Cambodia on the other, motivated a new s in ce r i ty  on 
Vientiane's part in re la t ion  to th is  e f fec t ive  disavowal of support 
fo r  the CPT. Moreover, the Laotians probably hoped that by abandoning 
the CPT they could induce the Thai au thor i t ies  to cease support fo r  
the resistance inside Laos.
In January 1979, more or less simultaneously with the Kriangsak-
Kaysone communique, the Central Committee of the Lao People's
Revolutionary Party (LPRP) ordered the CPT to vacate i t s  long-
27establ ished sanctuaries in Laos by the end of the year. The reason 
given by the Laotians fo r  th is  move was that there were dif ferences
26 Also, in March 1978, Vientiane had attempted to reassure i t s  non­
communist neighbours (Thailand and Burma) that i t  would "never 
al low i t s e l f  to be used as a launching pad fo r  aggression". 
S t ra i ts  Times, 27 March 1978.
27 John McBeth, FEER, 8 June 1979 and 27 July 1979; Christ ian 
Science Monitor, 25 July 1979.
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between the p o l i t i c a l  l ines of the CPT and LPRP: s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  CPT
cadres were accused of c r i t i c i z i n g  Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia and
ro le  in Laos. I t  seemed i n i t i a l l y  that the Laotian expulsion order
might have been intended as a coercive measure aimed at forc ing the
CPT to cooperate with Vientiane and Hanoi, and to distance i t s e l f  from
Bei j ing .  But subsequent reports and events revealed that the Laotians
were in earnest. Udom Srisuwan, a member of the CPT Poli tburo who was
chairman of the CCPDF and the Party's senior o f f i c i a l  responsible fo r
l ia ison  with Vientiane, revealed on his defect ion in 1982 that  af ter
the Laotian order to qu i t  the country, Vietnamese troops had
surrounded the CCPDF's headquarters camp. Udom was disarmed by Pathet
Lao troops and escorted to the border with Thailand before being 
28released. The CPT claimed that 500 tons of Chinese arms intended
fo r  i t s  forces were withheld by the Laotians and that requests fo r  the
return to i t s  control of thousands of northeastern Thai youths
29mobilized fo r  the Pathet Lao before 1975 were ignored.
Laotian pressure on the CPT did not end with the expulsion notice 
of January 1979. In A p r i l ,  Kaysone v is i ted  Bangkok, and with 
Kriangsak signed a fu r th e r ,  more detai led communique. The new accord 
included an agreement to
. . .  adopt necessary and e f fec t ive  measures to prevent 
and smash a l l  movements of t e r ro r i s t s  using the border 
areas as hiding places to carry out operations to
28 John McBeth, FEER, 17 September 1982, pp. 12-13.
29 I b i d . , loc. c i t .
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disturb the peace of the peoples of both sides of the 
border . . .30
[n the l ight  of the hardening of o f f i c i a l  Thai a t t i tudes  towards
/ietnam because of the invasion and occupation of Cambodia, i t  seems
extraordinary that  Bangkok should have been wil l ing to pursue such
:lose cooperation with Laos, Hanoi's close al ly.  But, on the other
land, i t  is not surprising that  Bangkok seized the opportunity to
s t r ike a severe blow against  the CPT presented by th i s  government with
Vientiane on active cooperation against cross-border insurgency. By
June there were reports of attacks by Pathet Lao forces on CPT units 
31in border areas.  The Thai mi l i tary author i t i es  in the northeast
confirmed that  the Pathet Lao were cooperating with them against the
32CPT, and had provided information on the disposi t ion of CPT bases.
According to the governor of Thailand's Nong Khai province (on the
border with Laos) a large number of gueri l las  expelled from Laos were
l a t e r  captured "thanks to the fr iendly re la t ions  between Thailand and
33Laos and t he i r  cooperation in exchanging information".
30 "Joint  Communique between the LPDR and the Kingdom of Thailand", 
Bangkok domestic service in Thai, 1300 gmt, 4 April 1979 (FBIS- 
APA-79-067, 5 April 1979).
31 See, for example, Vientiane domestic service in Lao, 0400 gmt, 
22 June 1979 (FBIS-APA-79-124, 26 June 1979).
32 See statement by Major-General Arthi t  Kamlang-ek, Commander of 
the 2nd Army Region's 3rd Divison, Agence France Presse (Hong 
Kong) in English, 0957 gmt, 15 June 1979 (FBIS-APA-79-118, 
18 June 1979); Sant i ,  p. 15.
33 Bangkok home service,  0530 gmt, 17 September 1979 (SWB FE/6224/ 
A3/2, 20 September 1979).
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I t  seems reasonably clear that  the Laotian moves against the CPT
were the r e su l t  of pressure from Hanoi, which could no longer t ole ra te
the Thai Par ty ' s  fundamentally pro-Chinese stance --  especial ly as
th is  was maintained af ter  China's mi l i ta ry  attack on Vietnam in
February and March 1979. According to one Laotian diplomat, "we have
agreed to support the Thai government in eliminating communist
insurgents because they are backed by China" . ^  Vietnam's increasing
dependence on Moscow may also have in tensi f ied Hanoi's d i f f i c u l t i e s  in
continuing r ela t ions  with the anti-Soviet  CPT. Bei j ing ' s  support for
the Khmer Rouge res i s tance in Cambodia may have provided an additional
reason for  Laos to side with the Thai au thor i t i es  against the CPT:
there was a danger that  the Thai Communists would a ss i s t  the Chinese
35in providing logi s t i ca l  assistance to Pol Pot ' s  forces.
The CPT's Breach with Hanoi
By August 1979 Hanoi was attacking the CPT in such terms as 
"Peking-armed t e r ro r i s t s "  and "Maoist bandit groups led by Peking
o c
henchmen". Vietnam's deputy foreign minis ter ,  Phan Hien, asserted
in November tha t  there were no links l e f t  between the CPT and Hanoi or 
37Vientiane. In early 1981, a senior Vietnamese diplomat based in
34 Sunday Mail (Brisbane), 8 April 1979, quoted by Stuart-Fox, 
p. 194.
35 Stuart-Fox, p. 194.
36 Hanoi home service,  0400 gmt, 17 August 1979 (SWB FE/6198/A3/15, 
20 August 1979).
37 Bangkok Post , 5 November 1979.
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Bangkok reiterated Hanoi's claim that the "Maoist" CPT had no chance
of succeeding in i ts struggle against Bangkok: political change in
Thailand would hopefully occur through gradual, constitutional 
38evolution. By making i t  clear that i t  had washed i ts hands of the
CPT, Hanoi hoped to focus Thai attention on China's continuing
assistance to the Party -- rather than on the Vietnamese occupation of
Cambodia -- as a security threat.  This was made explicit in March
1981 when the Vietnamese army newspaper Quan Doi Nhan Dan claimed that
the Thai authorities might be using attacks on Hanoi's role in
Cambodia to divert the Thai people's attention from the act ivi t ies of
39CPT guerillas "armed and commanded by Peking".
The trauma of being abandoned by Vietnam did not lead the CPT 
immediately to attack openly i ts erstwhile al l ies .  Rather, there were 
five months of intense debate within the Party -- and even then i t  
seems that there was difficulty in evolving a consensual approach to 
the Party's foreign policy in the light of the new regional 
circumstances. This may have indicated that elements within the CPT 
preferred to keep open the possibility of renewed links with Vietnam 
and Laos. The CPT may also have been waiting until all i ts forces 
were safely evacuated from Laos before cri t icizing Hanoi openly.
Criticism of Vietnam by the CPT's principal public relations 
medium, the China-based Voice of the People of Thailand (VOPT) radio 
station, was at f i r s t  oblique. From mid-May 1979 the VOPT repeated
38 Personal interview with senior Vietnamese diplomat, Bangkok, 
10 March 1981.
39 Quoted by Bangkok Post, 2 March 1981.
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Statements from elsewhere in Southeast Asia (including the Thai
government) c r i t i c i z in g  Vietnam for i ts  creation of a refugee problem,
i t s  invasion of Cambodia, i t s  role as a Soviet surrogate,  and the
threa t  tha t  i t  posed to Thailand's s e c u r i t y . ^  The f i r s t  c r i t ic ism  of
Vietnam tha t  could be said to be sponsored by the CPT came in early
June, when the VOPT broadcast the text  of a paper en t i t le d  "Real
dangers which Thailand is facing", by Si Inthapanti,  a jo u rn a l is t
41member of the CCPDF. Si accused Vietnam, backed by the Soviet
Union, of planning to invade Thailand, and made allusions to
Vietnamese attempts to subvert or s p l i t  the CPT, alleging that
"Attempts have been made to set up a puppet united front  and a puppet
army" as a cover for such an invasion. Si portrayed the CPT as more
ready than the Thai government to defend Thailand's sovereignty
against Vietnamese mil i tary  incursions.
The VOPT continued indirect  attacks on Vietnam until  10 July,
when i t  broadcast the text  of an a r t i c l e  e n t i t led  "The Thai people
42must t o t a l ly  destroy the aggressor enemy". While Vietnam was not
named as "the enemy" in the statement, i t  was nevertheless the most
fo r th r igh t  attack on Hanoi so far .  I t  was also the VOPT's la s t
broadcast,  being followed immediately by an annoucement tha t  the
43sta tion would "temporarily suspend i t s  broadcasts from 11 July".
40 See, for  example, the following VOPT broadcasts in 1979 (al l  at
1000 gmt): 13 May (SWB FE/6118/A3/1, 17 May 1979); 17 May (SWB
FE/6118/A3/2, 17 May 1979); 16 May (SWB FE/6119/A3/6, 18 May 
1979); 18 May (SWB FE/6121/A3/13, 21 May 1979); 19 May (SWB FE/ 
6121/A3/13, 21 May 1979); 20 May (SWB FE/6124/A3/5, 24 May 1979); 
23 May (SWB FE/6125/A3/14, 25 May 1979).
41 VOPT, 1000 gmt, 7 June 1979 (SWB FE/6140/A3/2-5, 13 June 1979).
42 Ib id .,  1000 gmt, 10 July 1979 (SWB FE/6165/A3/7, 12 July 1979).
43 Ibid.
532  -
The CPT in Cris is
The reason fo r  the cessation of VOPT broadcasts was not made
public by the CPT, and remained unclear. But i t  appears most l i k e l y
that  closure of the radio s ta t ion was a resu l t  of improved re la t ions
between Bangkok and Bei j ing,  as well as continuing doubts and
c o n f l ic ts  wi th in the Party concerning i t s  external o r ien ta t ion .  While
the CPT1s c r i t ic ism s  of Hanoi u l t imate ly  appeared attuned to the
current Chinese l ine  (to  the extent of not mentioning "US imperial ism"
as an enemy), th is  was due as much to the CPT1 s own experience of
44Vietnamese po l ic ies  as to pressure from Bei j ing .  In postu lat ing a
d i rec t  and immediate Vietnamese m i l i t a r y  threat to Thailand the CPT
was probably being disingenuous: i t  seems fa r  more l i k e l y  that the
most serious threat that i t  saw from Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia
was actua l ly  to the Thai communist movement's own long-term
independence. Indeed, the CPT leadership was apparently convinced
that the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Cambodia were motivated
p r in c ip a l l y  by Hanoi's intolerance of any nearby revolut ionary
45movement opposing the Soviet Union. The CPT's warnings that  Vietnam 
posed a threat to Thai land's secur i ty  were probably aimed la rge ly  at 
winning popular support wi th in Thailand and contr ibu t ing  to the 
construct ion of a broad united f ro n t :  l i ke  the Thai government, the
44 See Martha Winnacker, "Another view of the c r i s i s " ,  Southeast 
Asia Chronicle, No. 69 ( January-February 1980), p. 19.
45 Sant i ,  p. 13.
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CPT attempted to manipulate the "Vietnamese th reat"  by being seen to 
be concerned about i t . ^
The Vietnamese and Laotian renunciation of support fo r  the CPT
and the Thai communists' loss of sanctuaries in Cambodia and Laos,
coupled with a drast ic  cut in Chinese assistance as a consequence of
B e i j in g 's  improved re la t ions  with Bangkok, resulted in a marked
decl ine in communist insurgency in Thai land's eastern and northeastern
47border provinces in 1979. Before September 1978 the CPT was
reportedly growing at a rate of between six and ten per cent each
y e a r , ^  and f ie lded perhaps as many as 13,000 g u e r i l l a s ,4  ^ backed by
50perhaps 100,000 sympathizers. But the c r i s i s  of 1978 and 1979, 
inc luding the improvement in China's re la t ions with the Thai and US 
governments (the CPT's two main enemies), had a traumatic e f fec t  on 
the morale of the Thai communist movement.
The f ie rce  statement by Si Inthapanti condemning Vietnam in June 
1979 was widely seen (perhaps incorrect ly )  as an o f f i c i a l  and 
d e f in i t i v e  declarat ion of CCPDF views. The fac t  that i t  was the CCPDF
46 See John McBeth, FEER, 19 September 1980, p. 44. Most
s t r i k i n g l y ,  the CPT claimed that i t s  own forces, rather than the 
Thai army, were the f i r s t  to clash with Vietnamese troops who 
made an incursion in to  Thailand in June 1980. Tony Davis,
Asiaweek, 7 August 1980, p. 36.
47 Astr i  Suhrke, "ASEAN: Adjusting to new regional alignments",
Asia Pac i f ic  Community, No. 12 (Spring 1981), p. 15.
48 New York Times, 23 January 1979.
49 Bangkok Post, 28 February 1981. An e a r l ie r  report (New York
Times, 23 January 1979) quoted a tota l of 10-12,000 CPT guer i11 as 
as being act ive in 1978.
50 New York Times, 23 January 1979.
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which had spearheaded criticism of the CPT orthodoxy in the 1977-79 
period and had appeared to favour a closer relationship with Hanoi 
highlighted the fact that the Front was riven with ideological 
c o n f 1i c t .
Although an amnesty for CPT members and associates declared by
Kriangsak in early 1978 (apparently as a result of pressure from the
army's "Young Turks'')^ had little effect at first, by the end of 1979
there had been reportedly over two and a half thousand defections from
the four thousand or so radicals who had associated themselves with
52the CPT after the October 1976 coup. This figure may be an
exaggeration, but it seems clear that there was profound
disillusionment in the Front's ranks with the strict Maoist line of
senior CPT cadres, the Party's refusal to accept Vietnamese and Soviet 
53aid, the lack of attention paid to the specific nature of Thai 
society in developing the Party's revolutionary strategy, and the 
paucity of democracy withn the Party.
51 Morell and Chai-anan, Political Conflict in Thailand.. ., p. 303.
52 Chatchai Yenbamrong, Straits T i m e s , 21 January 1981.
53 John McBeth, F E E R , 22 August 1980, pp. 30-32. It is not
absolutely clear whether those critical of the Party leadership's 
stand on Vietnamese assistance would have been willing themselves 
to accept such aid, bearing in mind the "strings" (direct 
Vietnamese and Laotian military intervention on the CPT's behalf 
in northeast Thailand) attached: but it seems likely that the
critics within the CCPDF were less averse than the Party elders 
to such an arrangement.
Vietnam, Laos and an A l te rnat ive  Thai Revolutionary Movement
Not a l l  those who defected from the CPT and CCPDF returned to the
mainstream of Thai society. As well as being d is i l lus ioned wth the
CPT's overwhelmingly ru ra l ,  Maoist approach to bui ld ing a
revo lu t ionary base, many Front members had objected to the way that
the CPT's leadership took sides with China in i t s  dispute with
Vietnam, and had urged a more detached stance. Some, bel ieving that
continued Vietnamese and Laotian support was important fo r  the CPT,
had even supported Hanoi's intervention in Cambodia. When CPT units
were expelled from Laos in early 1979, about two hundred CCPDF members
who could no longer to le ra te  the CPT's pro-Chinese or ienta t ion were
reportedly allowed by the Laotian au thor i t ies  to move to Vientiane
54from th e i r  base near the border with Thai land. According to Thai 
55secur i ty  sources, th is  revo l t  caused the pa r t ia l  col lapse of the 
CCPDF.
The CCPDF members who detached themselves from the CPT included 
important f igures such as Thongpak Phiengkat (a former United 
Soc ia l is t  Front Member of Parl iament), Therdphum Chaidee (a labour 
a c t i v i s t  and member of the CCPDF's nine-strong executive), and Boonyen 
Wothong (a former Soc ia l is t  Party of Thailand MP, who was also a
54 Chr is t ian Science Monitor, 25 July 1979; Chatchai Yenbamrong, 
S t ra i ts  Times, 21 January 1981. Some CPT sold ie rs , low-ranking 
cadres, and perhaps even a member of the Party's northeast 
regional committee were also among the renegades, according to 
John McBeth, FEER, 27 July 1979, pp. 30-31.
55 See John McBeth, FEER, 22 August 1980, pp. 30-32.
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member of the CCPDF e x e c u t i v e ) T h e r e  is no evidence that they held
57any great a f fec t ion  fo r  Hanoi, but i t  seems that they saw a br ighter 
fu ture  fo r  the Thai revolut ion (and perhaps th e i r  own p o l i t i c a l  
careers) i f  they accepted Vietnamese tutelage. I t  also seems logical 
tha t  Hanoi might have wished to compensate fo r  i t s  almost to ta l  loss 
of inf luence over the CPT by sponsoring an a l te rna t ive  Thai 
revo lu t ionary movement. Vietnamese moves in th is  d i rec t ion  may have 
begun as early  as October 1978, when Boonyen and Therdphum al legedly 
v is i te d  Ho Chi Minh City and possibly H an o i .^
I t  seems that Hanoi and Vientiane were from the s ta r t  not 
wholeheartedly enthusiast ic about supporting the new Thai 
revo lu t ionary movement (often referred to as the Thai Northeastern 
Libera t ion Party or TNLP), which was apparently formed in Laos by 
CCPDF defectors in 1979. Hanoi's primary object ive with regard to 
Thailand a f te r  intervening in Cambodia was to secure Bangkok's 
eventual acquiescence in Vietnam's ro le  there, to pr ize apart the 
community of in te res t  that had developed between Beij ing and Bangkok 
and, in the meantime, to discourage the Thais from taking pract ical  
measures to support the Khmer Rouge. I t  was necessary, therefore, to 
a l lay  Thai fears that Vietnam represented a securi ty  threat  best 
countered by a l l iance with China and the Cambodian resistance. 
Vietnamese commentaries stressed Hanoi's al legedly peaceful
56 Bangkok Post, 25 June 1979; Chatchai Yenbamrong, S t ra i t s  Times, 
21 January 1981.
57 John McBeth, FEER, 27 July 1979, p. 30.
58 Ib id . ,  pp. 30-31.
537 -
intentions, emphasizing "Beijing's long-term plan to push Southeast
Asia into a chaotic situation so that i t  may profit from i t s . . .
collusion with imperialism". I t  was also necessary for the Laotian
government -- which denied that i t  was harbouring Thai
60revolutionaries -- to maintain a reasonably amicable working 
relationship with Bangkok, in the hope of minimizing both the threat 
from right-wing Lao resistance groups supported from Thailand and 
disruption to Laotian trade (which would be drastically curtailed if 
Bangkok closed the border as a result  of guerilla incidents).
According to one report, the lack of attention that the "new" 
Thai revolutionary party received from the Vietnamese and Laotian 
authorities was the reason that many of i ts  members ultimately decided 
to defect for a second time -- this time across the Mekong to 
surrender to the Thai government.61 These defections did not spell 
the end of Vietnamese and Laotian links with Thai revolutionaries, 
however. In August 1980, Vientiane radio broadcast6  ^ a statement by 
the "Democratic Alliance of Thailand" (possibly another name for the 
TNLP) condemning the Thai government for provocations against Laos 
across the Mekong.
As one senior adviser to the Thai government pointed out in early
59 Hanoi international service in English, 1000 gmt, 27 June 1979 
(FBIS-APA-79-126, 28 June 1979).
60 Winnacker, p. 19.
61 Chatchai Yenbamrong, Straits Times, 21 January 1981.
62 Vientiane home service, 0001 gmt, 5 August 1980 (SWB FE/6491/ 
A3/5, 7 August 1980).
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fi 31981, quite apart from the Thai radicals remaining in Laos, there
were s t i l l  elements in the CPT i t se l f  which were not unsympathetic to
64Hanoi, and who acted as "agents of influence" for the Vietnamese.
Certainly, ideological debate within the CPT did not cease after the
break with Vietnam and Laos in late 1978 and early 1979. Although
Beijing was the CPT's only external source of assistance after the
loss of support from Indochina, there was profound disillusionment
with China amongst the upper-echelon Party leadership as well as
lower-level cadres and remaining CCPDF members. There was alarm at
the remarkable changes that had occurred in Beijing's foreign policy
since the mid-1970s. China's opening to the West (particularly in
terms of i t s  alignment with the United States against Moscow) and i ts
policy of trying to maintain friendly relations with Third World
governments (including the Thai regime and i ts ASEAN counterparts)
whatever their political hue, were especially disturbing. Many within
or associated with the CPT were not satisfied by Beijing's argument
that such compromises in foreign policy were necessary in order to
65counteract "Soviet expansionism".
Although Beijing continued to give limited moral and polit ical
63 Personal interview with Dr Kramol Thongthammachat (Dean, Faculty 
of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University), Bangkok, 
13 March 1981.
64 This claim corresponded with an averral by the CPT leadership 
that CCPDF members who crit icized the Party's links with China 
were "Soviet agents". Morell and Chai-anan, p. 305.
65 Helen Chauncey, "Thailand plays the great power game", Southeast 
Asia Chronicle, No. 69 (January-February 1980), p. 15; Girling, 
p. 283.
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support to  the CPT, material assistance had diminished to a t r i c k l e  by 
L979. While the Chinese stressed that re la t ions with the CPT were 
s t i l l  maintained on a "pa r ty - to -par ty "  basis, and did not go as fa r  as 
lanoi and Vientiane in promising to curb involvement with the CPT, 
vhen Deng Xiaoping v is i ted  Bangkok in November 1978 he claimed that a 
"sa t is fac to ry  understanding" had been reached on th is  issue with the 
Thai government.^ Perhaps as a resu l t  of th is  "understanding", the 
CPT came under increasing pressure from Bei j ing to subjugate i t s  
struggle against the Thai government to the requirements of China's 
pr inc ipa l  s t ra teg ic  object ive in Southeast Asia of bo lstering 
opposit ion to what i t  saw as Hanoi's attempts to impose "regional 
hegemony" . ^  Certa in ly  the CPT's desire to be seen as concerned was 
probably i n s u f f i c ie n t  to explain i t s  announcement in early 1979 that 
i t  was w i l l i n g  to a l l y  i t s e l f  with "any part ies" ( inc luding the Thai 
government) to f i g h t  any Vietnamese attempt to invade Thailand. The 
closure of the VOPT radio sta t ion in July 1979 may have resulted from 
a refusal by the CPT's Central Committee to accept re s t r i c t io n s  that
CO
Bei j ing  wished to impose on the s ta t ion 's  transmissions. According
69to Thai m i l i t a r y  sources, in 1980 Bei j ing warned the CPT not to
66 David Bonavia, FEER, 17 November 1978, p. 11.
67 For example, on 20 October 1979, Chinese Vice President Ji 
Pengfei to ld  the ed i tor  of the Bangkok Post that the CPT ought to 
j o in  the Kriangsak government in opposing "Vietnamese hegemony". 
Winnacker, p. 20. Fearing to bolster the CPT's c r e d ib i l i t y ,  
however, the Thai government rebuffed repeated overtures from the 
CPT. See Tony Davis, Asiaweek, 7 August 1981, pp. 34-35.
68 Chatchai Yenbamrong, S t ra i ts  Times, 21 January 1981.
69 Quoted by John McBeth, FEER, 22 August 1980, pp. 30-32.
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continue working in urban areas.  These were a l l  indicat ions that  the 
Chinese were t rying to reduce the threat  posed by the CPT to the Thai 
government, as an expedient measure to maintain Bangkok's support 
against  Vietnam's role in Cambodia.
The CPT Redefines i t s  Strategy
The fac t  that  the CPT was profi t ing l i t t l e  by i t s  relat ionship 
with China spurred e f for t s  by senior f igures within the Party to 
redefine i t s  foreign policy posi t ion in more independent terms. The 
CPT's relat ionship with Democratic Kampuchea had been based 
essen t ia l l y  on mutual opposition to both Washington and Moscow, and 
the Thai communists' use of Cambodian sanctuaries.  Although the CPT 
publicly condemned Vietnam's invasion and occupation of Cambodia, an 
o f f ic i a l  document ci rculated within the Thai Party in 1979 c r i t i c i zed  
the Khmer Rouge on a wide range of issues, including the abandonment 
of united front  pol icies a f te r  victory in 1975, the aboli t ion of 
money, the forced evacuation of towns, the refusal  to accept foreign 
aid,  a fa i lure  to conduct propaganda abroad and an insistence on 
s e t t l i ng  i t s  disagreements with Vietnam by war --  implying at best a 
lack of realism on the part  of Democratic Kampuchea and at worst that  
the Khmer Rouge was the aggre s so r . ^
From 1980, the CPT seemed to be t rying to communicate 
(par t i cu lar ly  to i t s  own membership and potent ial  recrui t ing base)
70 CPT, "Position Paper on the Situation in Indochina", quoted by 
Marcel Barang, FEER, 11 January 1980; Sant i ,  pp. 13-14.
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that  i t  was not subservient to Bei j ing.  Whereas China's pr inc ipal
adversary was the Soviet Union, the CPT's main enemies remained the
Bangkok regime and "US im pe r ia l ism " .^  Unlike Bei j ing,  the CPT
opposed ASEAN, p a r t i c u la r l y  in view of the cooperation between the
Associat ion 's  members against communist insurgency ( fo r  instance, in
72the Thai-Malaysian border area).
Reflect ing exasperation with the f ickleness of external a l l i e s ,
concern over the number of desertions from the CPT and CCPDF, and
awareness of the threat posed to the Party by the Prem government's
increasing emphasis on p o l i t i c a l  development as a counter-insurgency 
73device, the CPT embarked on a drive to become more inward-looking 
and s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t ,  as a means of surv iva l .  I t  seems that CCPDF 
in te l le c tu a ls  were p a r t i a l l y  successful in th e i r  attempts to force a 
re d e f in i t io n  of the CPT's revolut ionary stra tegy not only towards 
greater s e l f - s u f f i c ie n c y  but also to some extent away from i t s  
essen t ia l ly  Maoist approach and rural bias, towards a greater 
concentrat ion on fos te r ing  urban r e v o lu t i o n . ^  This re d e f in i t io n  may 
have been assisted by the increasing c r i t i c is m  of Mao and his po l ic ies
71 Sant i ,  p. 17.
72 John McBeth, FEER, 19 September 1980, p. 43.
73 According to CCPDF Secretary-General Thirayudh Boonmee, who la te r  
defected himself,  the author i t ies were "using democracy to fool 
and sabotage the struggle of the people". John McBeth, FEER, 
19 September 1980, p. 46.
74 Santi ,  p. 16. These two pr inc ip les were emphasized in a 
d i re c t iv e  issued by the Central Committee on 1 December 1980, 
according to Squadron Leader Prasong Soonsir i ,  Secretary-General 
of the Thai government's National Securi ty Council. Personal 
in te rv iew, Government House, Bangkok, 20 March 1981.
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75in China. The Party also made e f fo r ts  to decentral ize and
democratize i t s  decision-making processes. Of pa r t icu la r  importance
was a decision to establ ish a "National Democratic Front" to broaden
the CPT's p o l i t i c a l  appeal and support base: in the words of a member
of the CPT's northeast region committee i t  was necessary fo r  the Party
to " . . .  win over a l l  classes of people"^ - -  inc luding the urban
middle class,  and former members of the CCPDF who had defected at the
height o f  the CPT's in ternal wrangling in 1978-79 but remained
committed to revo lu t ionary change. But these moves to enhance the
"Thai-ness" of the CPT could not disguise the fac t  that the Party's
key leadership posi t ions were mainly s t i l l  occupied by Chinese-trained
Sino-Thai cad res ,^  whose background m i l i ta te d  against any absolute
break with e i ther  Bei j ing or a pr imar i ly  Maoist revolut ionary
strategy. The continuing fa i l u re  of the CPT to f ind  a solut ion to i t s
fac t iona l  disarray was evinced by i t s  f a i lu re  to hold i t s  Fourth Party
78Congress, which had o r ig in a l l y  been scheduled fo r  October 1979.
The Thai au tho r i t ies  were not slow to exp lo i t  the CPT's internal 
weaknesses and loss of important external support. Between 1974 and 
1979 there was a steady increase in the number of armed incidents 
i n i t i a t e d  by the CPT. But from February 1979 CPT m i l i t a r y  a c t i v i t y
75 John McBeth, FEER, 22 August 1980, pp. 30-32.
76 Interview with "Comrade Paitoon", FEER, 19 September 1980, p. 47.
77 John McBeth, FEER, 22 August 1980, p.30; Chatchai Yenbamrong, 
S t ra i ts  Times, 21 January 1981. Many middle ranking and jun io r  
cadres had been tra ined in Vietnam however.
78 John McBeth, FEER, 22 August 1980, pp. 30-32.
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79decl ined. Following the expulsion of Thai People's Liberat ion Army
units from Cambodia and Laos, Thai government forces began a series of
offensives in northeast Thai land, forc ing a reported 60-70 per cent of
the CPT northeast regional command's forces to f lee  to more remote,
80mountainous areas in the north of the country. Bangkok also
in te ns i f ied  psychological warfare and propaganda against the CPT,
taking advantage of the communists' loss of the VOPT. Reports of
s p l i t s  in the CPT, the formation of a new party in Laos and defections
by well-known radicals  were emphasized by Thai m i l i t a r y  and
in te l l igence  sources in view of the demoralizing e f fec t  that such
81accounts might have on communists s t i l l  in the jungle. According to
op
a high-ranking Thai secur i ty  o f f i c i a l ,  in 1980 nearly 1800 CPT 
guer i l las  were neutral ized by death, arrest or defect ion. By early 
1981 the CPT's strength was alleged to have fa l le n  to about 10,000 
(from a to ta l  in 1978 of 1 3 ,00 0 ) .^
An o f f i c i a l  Thai claim that "communist insurgency is breathing 
i t s  las t  in Thailand" was no more accurate than an assertion by an
79 I b id . ,  27 July 1979, p. 31.
80 John Laird, Bangkok Post, 5 March 1981.
81 Winnacker, pp. 19-20.
82 Squadron Leader Prasong Soonsir i ,  Secretary-General of the 
National Securi ty Council, quoted by John Laird, Bangkok Post, 
5 March 1981.
83 Bangkok Post, 28 February 1981. The correct f igu re  may have been 
even lower, in the l i g h t  of a Thai general 's assertion as early  
as December 1979 that there were 9900 "communist t e r ro r i s t s "  in 
Thai land. Lieutenant-General Abhichart Dhiradamrong, " P o l i t i c a l -  
M i l i t a r y  Dimensions of Southeast Asian Security" (Paper presented 
at Conference on New Foundations fo r  Asian and Paci f ic  Securi ty, 
Pattaya, Thailand, 12-16 December 1979), p. 145.
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observer sympathetic to the Thai communists that "CPT military
activity against the government has continued u n a b a t e d " . T h e  Thai
security forces did make substantial gains in their fight against the
CPT (especially in the northeast) from 1979, particularly in a series
85of offensives in early 1981. But at the same time that the CPT was 
suffering reverses, Bangkok was having to cope with problems of its 
own, including economic difficulties (leading to the ouster of the 
Kriangsak government in February 1980), the refugee influx and an 
attempted coup in April 1981. For these reasons, the Kriangsak and 
Prem regimes were not able to devote their full energies to tackling 
the problem of insurgency. Moreover, the deep-seated local 
socio-economic grievances -- such as rural poverty, m a l adminstration 
and corruption -- which formed the basis of the CPT's appeal, did not 
diminish significantly.®® Indeed, the CPT's increasingly "Thai" 
approach to revolutionary strategy, coupled with a more autonomous 
international line, probably enhanced the party's appeal. In these 
circumstances, the CPT was able to survive as a substantial fighting 
force. External assistance had definitely helped the CPT, but at no 
time in its history had it been dependent on Indochinese or Chinese 
backing.
84 Winnacker, p. 20.
85 Bangkok P o s t , 1 March, 5 March and 13 March 1981.
86 This was emphasized even by CPT and CCPDF members who 
surrendered. Straits Times, 21 January 1981.
APPENDIX 2
BACKGROUND FACTORS IN THE ASEAN STA T E S 1 MILITARIZATION
Domestic Political Factors
Of crucial importance to an understanding of the process of 
military expansion (and at times contraction) in certain ASEAN states 
is an appreciation of the salience of domestic political factors, 
particularly in terms of the position and role of the armed forces in 
the political system. Governments or regimes led, dominated or 
heavily influenced by senior military officers may display a greater 
propensity than civilian administrations to emphasize defence as a 
political and economic priority. This is partly due to the tendency 
of military leaders to base their security assessments on "worst case" 
assumptions and to underrate the usefulness of political instruments 
as tools for maintaining security in either the domestic or the 
international environment, but also to military leaders' wish to 
justify and maintain their own power and influence by presenting 
seemingly rational explanations for an inflated expenditure on, and 
political role for, the armed forces. This hypothesis certainly seems 
to be borne out by the experience of several of the ASEAN states.
Thai land
During Thailand's "democratic interlude", from October 1973 to 
October 1976, the democratic governments of Sanya Thammasak and of 
Kukrit and Seni Pramoj did not generally place a great declaratory 
emphasis on defence as a national priority, despite the radical
546 -
changes in Thailand's strategic environment resulting from the 
enunciation of the Nixon doctrine, the US military withdrawal from 
mainland Southeast Asia (including Thailand i tself)  and the seizure of 
power by communist regimes throughout Indochina. But after a 
four-year period (1971-74 inclusive) during which annual defence 
expenditure had remained roughly constant (fluctuating around US$300m 
per annum at 1973 prices), military spending rose in real terms by 
about 10 per cent in 1975 and over 20 per cent in 1976.  ^ It may 
reasonably be suggested that the impending and actual collapse of 
non-communist Indochina, coupled with the US withdrawal, were 
important factors in the Thai government's decision to increase 
military spending.
The Thai military apparently exerted strong pressure on the
civilian government to increase defence spending after the fall  of
non-communist Indochina, but this pressure was not entirely successful
in overcoming the resistance of civilian polit icians who saw diplomacy
as a preferable (and less expensive) means of coping with the new
regional balance of power. In February 1976, Prime Minister Kukrit
announced a "military build-up" partly aimed at enabling the armed
forces to take over and operate the military fac i l i t i e s  (including a
?number of large air bases) from which US forces were withdrawing. 
But four months later the government forced the Defence Ministry to
3
reduce i ts  planned budget by 55 per cent. Indeed, although defence
1 See Table 1, in Chapter 8, p. 334 above.
2 Bangkok Post, 28 February 1976.
3 Bangkok Post, 20 June 1976.
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expenditure rose considerably in absolute real terms, and remained 
roughly constant as a proport ion of gross national product, i t  f e l l  as 
a proport ion of to ta l  government expenditure (to 18 per cent from 25.7 
per cent in 1975) as the government diverted a greater share of i t s
4
resources towards developmental and social areas of spending.
The r ight-wing regime (which termed i t s e l f  a "war-time
5
government"), ins ta l led  by the m i l i t a r y  a f te r  the October 1976 coup 
ended Thai land's democratic experiment, attempted to j u s t i f y  the 
reversion to au thor i tar ian ru le largely in terms of the supposed 
internal  and external threats to Thai land's secur i ty ,  with a special 
emphasis on the danger posed by communist Indochina. In view of both 
th is  stress on Thai land's insecur i ty  and the m i l i t a r y ' s  wish to ensure 
the armed forces' prest ige and "combat readiness", which i t  had 
assessed as under threat  before the coup, i t  was not surpris ing that 
the Thanin regime placed a renewed emphasis on the m i l i t a r y  means of 
ensuring Thai land's secur i ty .
Soon a f te r  acceding to power, the new government made a series of 
statements ou t l in ing  how i t  intended to counter the threats that i t  
claimed Thailand was fac ing. Thanin announced that "the conscript ion 
rate would be increased from 80 to 100 per cent",^ although neither 
th is  i n i t i a l  declarat ion nor subsequent developments c la r i f i e d  whether
4 The M i l i t a r y  Balance 1978-1979 (London: International  In s t i t u te
fo r  Strategic Studies, 1978), p. 89.
5 Bangkok Post, 8 December 1976.
6 S t ra i ts  Times, 22 November 1976; New York Times, 23 November
1976:
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th is  meant a greater  mobilization of young men e l ig ib le  for national
service or (as some sources suggested) that  the armed forces would be
boosted to full  establishment.^ In concert with his regime's emphasis
on the danger of "communist in f i l t r a t io n "  from outside,  Thanin also
announced that  the Border Patrol Police would be expanded and that
"more modern weapons" would be acquired for the mil i ta ry .^  The
g
formation of v i l lage defence and paramili tary units  was accelerated.
To finance th is  programme of mil i ta ry  expansion, which was planned to
come to f ru i t io n  over a f ive-year  period, the government sought and
secured 20,000 million baht (approximately US$1 b i l l ion)  worth of
loans from foreign financial  so u rc e s .^
The emphasis on the importance of allocating resources to defence
continued through 1977.^  ^ Even af te r  Kriangsak's ouster of Thanin in
October 1977, the government continued to s t ress  a policy of "beefing
12up" Thailand's m il i ta ry  strength. Defence spending continued to
increase in real terms, and although i t  was cut back as a proportion
of government expenditure, th is  proportion was higher than i t  had been
13in 1976 under the "democratic" regime. The Kriangsak government was
7 New York Times, 23 November 1976; Bangkok Post , 8 December 1976.
8 S t ra i t s  Times, 8 November 1976; New York Times, 23 November 1976.
9 Charles E. Morrison and Astri Suhrke, Stra tegies  of Survival
(St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1978), p. 141.
10 Bangkok Post, 8 December 1976, 30 December 1976 and 1 July 1978.
11 See, for example, Bangkok Post, 21 February 1977.
12 Bangkok Post , 18 October 1977.
13 See Table 4, in Chapter 8, p. 335 above and Peter Fish, FEER, 
1 September 1978, pp. 79-80.
549
still dominated by the military, ensuring that the armed forces' 
requirements received priority in the allocation of resources. This 
factor remained an important permissive factor in the development of 
the Thai armed forces throughout the Kriangsak period and into the 
premiership of Prem Tinsulanond.
Malaysia
The communal riots of Kay 1969 may have had a more profound, 
long-term effect on the Malaysian military's claim to increased 
resources than is generally realized. The principal origin of the 
disturbances was a feeling on the part of many Malays that the 
political hegemony of their race (which had traditionally counter­
balanced domination of the economy by ethnic Chinese) was under 
threat. In the aftermath of the riots, one obvious way to reassure 
the Malay population that the Malay-led government was doing its best 
to ensure the paramountcy of Malay rights was to reinforce the state's 
Malay-dominated coercive institutions -- the army and the police.
Although the army included a number of multi-ethnic units'^ it 
was still built around a core formed by the Royal Malay Regiment 
(RMR), which was exclusively Malay in its ethnic composition. During 
the riots, RMR troops had apparently been more successful in keeping
14 But even non-RMR army combat units remained largely Malay in 
their ethnic composition, mainly because of the reluctance of 
non-Malays (particularly Chinese), who were generally more highly 
educated, to pursue non-technical military careers. The air 
force and navy, on the other hand, included substantial 
proportions of non-Malay personnel.
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Drder than the multi-ethnic police Federal Reserve Unit (FRU).
Whereas the FRU had attempted to restore order in an approximately
even-handed fashion, the RMR troops achieved greater success "in large
part because the Malay rioters recognized them as an affirmation of
15Malay poli t ical  superiority". According to one source, this
"affirmation" included participation by individual soldiers in 
violence against Chinese civilians: i t  was generally quite clear
whose side the Malay troops were on.^
Moreover, military service provided young Malay men with 
important opportunities for upward socioeconomic mobility. After the 
May 1969 r io t s ,  a government priori ty became the economic betterment 
of the Malay community: the creation of additional RMR battalions
15 James Guyot, "Efficiency, Responsibility and Equality in Military
Staffing: the Ethnic Dimension in Comparative Perspective",
Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 2, No. 2 (February 1976), p. 298.
16 According to a former officer in the Malaysian Territorial Army
who saw action in Kuala Lumpur during the disturbances in Kuala 
Lumpur. Personal interview, Canberra, April 1983. In an 
extensive, if  rather inconclusive examination of the significance 
of the ethnic composition of Malaysia's armed forces and police, 
Enloe makes i t  clear that the army was in general not a neutral 
force at this time. See these art icles by Cynthia Enloe: 
"Civilian Control of the Military: Implications in the Plural
Societies of Guyana and Malaysia", in Claude E. Welch (ed.), 
Civilian Control of the Military: Theory and Cases from
Developing Countries (Albany: University of New York Press,
1976), p. 73; "Malaysia's Military in the Interplay of Economic 
and Ethnic Change", in John A. Lent (ed.), Cultural Pluralism in 
Malaysia: Polity, Military, Mass Media, Education, Religion and
Social Class (Northern Il l inois University, Center for Southeast 
Asian Studies, Special Report No. 14, 1977), p. 19; "The Issue 
Saliency of the Military-Ethnic Connection: Some Thoughts on
Malaysia", Comparative Politics,  Vol. 10, No. 2 (January 1978),
p. 280.
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helped to achieve this objective as well as to reassure the Malays of 
their political dominance.^
Close cooperation between the Malay-dominated government and the
overwhelmingly Malay military high command in the aftermath of the
riots was probably a permissive factor in the subsequent expansion of
the Malaysian armed forces. For fifteen months after the
disturbances Malaysia was governed by a twelve member National
Operations Council (NOC) as well as the Cabinet. The NOC included, in
addition to politicians and civil servants, the Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces (a General) and the Inspector-General of Police, as well
18as an army Lieutenant-General acting as Chief Executive Officer. 
This increased institutionalized contact between the military and the 
government almost certainly increased the abil i ty of the former to 
influence defence policy-making in the longer term.^
Singapore
In contrast to the situation in the other ASEAN states,  the 
Singaporean military leadership wielded virtually no political
influence during the period under consideration. Control of the 
Ministry of Defence, and of all defence planning (other than at
17 By 1981, 75 per cent of officers and 85 per cent of the rank and 
f i le  in the Malaysian armed forces were Malays. Harold Crouch, 
FEER, 20 October 1983, p. 47.
18 R.S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, Politics and Government in
Malaysia (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, Rev.
ed., 1980), p. 85.
19 Enloe, "Civilian Control of the Mili tary. . .",  pp. 76-77.
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an operational level) was vested in the hands of p o l i t ic a l ly  reliable
c iv i l  servants rather than m ilita ry  officers. Indeed, the government
deliberately minimized the number of senior m il ita ry  o fficers, despite
the fast growth of the armed forces, in order to prevent the growth of
a powerful interest group with the potential to oppose or subvert the
20w il l  of the ruling People's Action Party.
Although the m il ita ry  rationale for the expansion of the 
Singaporean Armed Forces (SAF) was based princ ipa lly  on a fear of 
external rather than internal threats, the defence build-up
incidentally served certain domestic po lit ica l and socio-economic 
ends. The ins titu t ion  of m ilita ry  conscription not only overcame the 
high cost of employing regular personnel and the aversion of the
Chinese community (which constituted the great bulk of Singapore's 
population) to m il i ta ry  service, but also acted as a device for 
national integration (although Malays were largely exempted from
service in the SAF's early years) and as a means of reducing a high 
rate of unemployment (which in 1966 affected 9.1 per cent of the
labour force as a whole and 23 per cent of the labour force under the 
age of 20)
Indonesia
In contrast to the other ASEAN countries' armed forces, the
Indonesian m ilita ry  was a considerably smaller force in 1975 than i t
20 Personal interviews with Australian and Brit ish diplomats, 
Singapore, January-February 1981.
21 See W Hard A. Hanna, The New Singapore Armed Forces (American 
Universities' Field Staff Report, Southeast Asia Series, Vol. 21, 
No. 1 (Singapore), January 1973); The Budget for the Financial 
Year 1179/80 (Singapore Cmd. 4 of 1980), p. 366.
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had been a decade earl ier .  In 1965, at the height of Confrontation,
the personnel strength of Jakarta's armed forces was estimated to be
412,000;^  ^ the corresponding figure for 1975 was only 266,000.^ But
during Confrontation, Indonesia had received large-scale military aid
from China and the Soviet Union; with the fal l  of Sukarno and the
subsequent cessation of Confrontation this assistance ceased and
Suharto's new military regime increased substantially i ts defence
spending to maintain armed forces that were diminishing steadily in
size and effectiveness. Thus from 1966 to 1967 military expenditure
was reported to have more than doubled in real terms, and had more
24than doubled again by 1975.
Another effect on the Indonesian armed forces of the change of
administration was the Suharto regime's probably just if iable suspicion
that some military elements (notably within the air force and navy)
continued to harbour Sukarnoist sentiments. This was one of several
factors which acted to degrade the armed forces' combat capability
under the new regime. Until the mid-1970s at least,  i t  also reduced
the political influence of the air force and navy and hence their
25abil i ty to claim on the defence budget.
22 The Military Balance 1965-1966 (London: International Institute
for Strategic Studies, 1965), p. 34.
23 The Military Balance 1975-1976 (London: International Institute
for Strategic Studies, 1975), p. 54.
24 World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook 1979 (Stockholm:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute,  1979), 
pp. 44-45.
25 Donald E. Weatherbee, "Indonesia's Armed Forces: Rejuvenation
and Regeneration", Southeast Asian Affairs 1982 (Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1982), pp. 153-54.
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According to the Suharto regime, mil i tary as well as ideological, 
socio-economic and po l i t ica l  strength was necessary to maintain 
Indonesia's "national resilience" (which enabled the country to defend 
i tse l f  against subversion and exploitation) in the era of the "New
p c
)rder". But this m i l i ta ry  strength was overwhelmingly directed 
inwards: the armed forces reverted to their pre-Confrontation posture 
Df an orientation pr incipally towards maintaining internal security, 
rhe main peacetime role of the armed forces became the suppression of 
internal dissidence and guarding against a revival of the Indonesian 
Communist Party. Under the armed forces' dwifungsi (dual function) 
doctrine, the m i l i tary  became intimately involved in the day-to-day 
running (or at least supervision) of most sectors of the Indonesian 
poli ty ,  society and economy. According to one source, in 1975 about 
one-third of the army (approximately 65,000 personnel) was involved in 
" c iv i l  and administrative du t ies " .^
The Philippines
During the early and mid-1970s, Manila increased substantially 
both i ts  defence budget and the size of i ts  armed forces. This 
phenomenon was due mainly to the imposition of martial law by 
President Marcos in September 1972 and the regime's subsequent efforts
26 Indeed, Leiter characterizes national resilience as "an extension
of the armed forces' doctrine of te r r i to r ia l  defence". Michael 
Leiter, Indonesia's Foreign Policy (London: George Allen &
Unwin, 1983), p. 112.
27 The M il i tary  Balance 1975-1976, p. 54. For a discussion of the 
Indonesian Armed Forces' internal role and its relationship to 
defence policy and strategy, see Weatherbee, pp. 149-63.
555
to counter the Muslim rebellion in the south (which had been
precipitated by the highly centra list outlook of the martial law
regime) and the insurrection of the New People's Army. M il ita ry
expenditure increased from Pesos 796m in 1972 to Pesos 1271m in 
281973. In addition to the effect on m il ita ry  expenditure and force 
levels of objective m il i ta ry  requirements for intensified counter­
insurgency operations, martial law s ign ifican tly  increased the 
p o li t ica l importance of the armed forces. Like their Malaysian 
counterparts after the 1969 r io ts ,  the Philippines' m il i ta ry  leaders
were thus able to exert considerably increased influence over
29government policy planning regarding security matters.
Economic Factors
The pace of expansion of the ASEAN states' armed forces was 
fa c i l i ta te d ,  and indeed influenced, by the high rates of economic 
growth that these states experienced during the 1970s. Even i f  a ll
the other factors which contributed to the m il i ta ry  build-up in the 
region had been present, i t  would not have been possible to pursue 
m il ita r iza tion  on such a scale without detriment to other areas of 
government expenditure unless government revenues had been increasing
28 Taking in fla tion  into account, this represented a 40 per cent 
increase in defence expenditure. World Armaments and
Disarmament:___ SI PR I Yearbook 1981 (Stockholm: Stockholm
International Peace Research Institu te , 1981), pp. 159, 163.
29 According to one informed assessment, the AFP (Armed Forces of 
the Philippines) was "dependent on martial law for i ts  strength 
and influence". Richard Vokey, FEER, 30 January 1981, p. 28.
556 -
at least in proportion with the increases in defence spending. As i t
was, increasing military expenditure was accommodated within public
expenditure programmes which were generally expanding fairly rapidly.
The figures in Chapter 8 ' s Table 3 show that, in the 1973-81
period, defence expenditure as a proportion of total government
spending in the ASEAN countries did not rise significantly but
remained more or less stable or declined. Whether or not the ASEAN
governments would have allowed their defence expenditure to rise so
fast ,  all other factors being equal, if economic growth had been
slower, is a moot point. But the indications are that there was a
strong link between the overall dimensions of government spending and
defence expenditure. This was not only true in terms of expanding
revenue allowing greater spending on defence, but also in terms of
declining revenue causing defence expenditure to be reduced as in 1981
when the Mahathir government decided to cut back Malaysian defence
30expenditure in the light of declining oil revenues.
The development of Singapore's armed forces was influenced by a
special type of economic factor -- the wish to reassure both local and
foreign investors and traders, upon whom the city s ta te 's  very
existence depended, that i ts  national integrity could withstand
possible external threats.  According to Lee Kuan Yew in 1969:
Without adequate security forces of our own to make a 
significant contribution to joint security 
arrangements, investments may slow down. If people 
believe that we are weak and defenceless, even our own 
wealthy citizens will move part of their capital 
abroad.31
30 Asian Wall Street Journal, 3 March 1982.
31 Address by the Prime Minister to the Economics Society of Nanyang 
University, Singapore, 12 December 1969 (Mimeographed).
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In ternal  Secur i ty Factors
The need to maintain in te rna l  securi ty in the face of challenges 
to state au thor i ty  was the primary raison d 'e t re  fo r  the armed forces 
of a l l  the ASEAN countr ies except Singapore, forming an enduring 
backdrop to th e i r  expansion and development both before and a f te r  the 
1975 communist v ic to r ie s  in Indochina. As related in Chapter 6, there 
was some connection between Indochina and communist insurgency in the 
ASEAN region although th is  l inkage was frequently exaggerated by the 
ASEAN governments. Communists in the ASEAN countries remained 
self -mot ivated and very large ly  s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t .  When they did 
receive moral and physical support from external sources, th is  
general ly came from China on a fa r  greater scale than from Indochina. 
So although actual or potentia l  Indochinese support fo r  insurgency was 
almost ce r ta in ly  a fac to r  taken in to  account in the development of the 
ASEAN countr ies'  armed forces, insurgency unrelated to Indochina was 
probably a more important inf luence.
Thai land
In the 1975-78 period the emphasis in Thai defence pol icy 
continued to be on the armed forces' counter-insurgency ro le .  
Although many items of m i l i t a r y  equipment can be of equal u t i l i t y  in 
e i ther  counter-insurgency or conventional operations (and may indeed 
be acquired fo r  th is  very reason), the lack of emphasis in Thai 
m i l i t a r y  procurement on acquiring anti- tank missi les and other weapon
558 -
32systems of speci f ic  use against  external,  conventional threats
several years af ter  the events of 1975 ref lected the fact  that
Bangkok's principal  secur i ty concerns were overwhelmingly internal
rather  than external .  The threa t  from the Communist Party of Thailand
(CPT) was real and growing (par t i cular ly  af ter  the October 1976 coup
in Bangkok) whereas, apart  from r el a t ive ly  minor border incidents,  any
di rect  threat  from Indochina was potential  and long-term. Certainly,
the picture was complicated by the material support and sanctuaries
33given to the CPT by Laos and Pol Pot ' s  Cambodia. But although this  
const i tuted the most d i rec t  and potent ial ly f r u i t f u l  link between 
Indochina and a communist movement in non-communist Southeast Asia, 
the Thai communists remained essent ia l ly  s e l f - r e l i a n t .
Malaysia
Although there was no clear causal link between the two
phenomena, a marked upsurge in armed act ivi ty by the Communist Party
of Malaya (CPM) coincided with the communist success in Indochina in 
34the mid-1970s. The Malaysian government attempted to counter this  
escalat ion in insurgency by mil i tary as well as economic and social 
means. Malaysia's thi rd f ive-year  plan, announced in July 1976,
32 Equipment ordered in the 1975-78 period included armoured
personnel c a r r i e r s ,  howitzers, transport  hel icopters and l ight  
counter-insurgency a i r c r a f t .  World Armaments and Disarmament: 
SIPRI Yearbook 1978 (Stockholm: Stockholm Internat ional  Peace
Research In s t i t u t e ,  1978), p. 277.
33 See Chapter 6, pp. 194-221 above.
34 See section on "Vietnam and Communism in Malaysia. . ."  in Chapter 
6, pp. 222-27 above.
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increased projected defence and internal secur i ty  development spending 
to more than double the a l loca t ion  in the previous plan: according to 
Prime Min ister Hussein Onn th is  showed the government's determination 
to combat the CPM.^
Singapore
In contrast to i t s  ASEAN counterparts in the la te 1960s and early 
1970s, the primary operational mission of the Singaporean Armed Forces 
from the beginning was to operate in a conventional rather than an 
in te rna l  secur i ty  ro le .  Although Singapore had experienced quite 
serious communal disturbances as recently as 1964, an internal 
secur i ty  threat in the sense of a potential  armed insurrect ion led by 
communist cadres was v i r t u a l l y  non-existent in the small island 
s ta te 's  r e la t i v e l y  eas i ly -pol iced urban environment.
Indonesia
As well as suppressing communist remnants and other ideo log ica l ly  
motivated dissenters, the Indonesian armed forces under the New Order 
continued th e i r  t r a d i t io n a l  ro le of countering regional secessionism. 
Low-intensi ty operations were conducted against rebels in I r ian  Jaya, 
northern Sumatra and elsewhere in the Indonesian archipelago. In 
1975, the armed forces took on a new internal secur i ty  re spon s ib i l i t y  
with the decision to use force to incorporate East Timor into
35 Third Malaysia Plan 1976-1980 (Kuala Lumpur: Government P r in te r ,
1976), pp. 240-41; Age, 10 July 1976.
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”36Indonesia. Due to the coincidence of the fall  of non-communist
Indochina with the build-up to the invasion of Timor at the end of
1975, and in the absence of official Indonesian declarations
concerning the motives for various military developments at this time,
i t  is not possible to assess with a high degree of confidence the
relative importance of these two influences in spurring the Indonesian
military build-up which began in the mid-1970s.
The serious liquidity crisis resulting from the inabili ty of
Pertamina, the Indonesian state oil corporation, to repay i ts huge
debts in mid-1975 severely depleted Jakarta's exchange reserves and
37drastically reduced the funds available for overseas arms purchases. 
But when Suharto visited Washington in July 1975 he was apparently 
able to convince President Ford that Indonesia's security was 
potentially threatened not only by possible internal security problems 
but also by an increased vulnerability to "infi l t rat ion from overseas" 
as a result of events in Indochina. Together these reasons were 
sufficient to secure a sizeable increase in US military aid from just 
under US$20m in fiscal year 1975 (FY75, running from October 1974 to 
September 1975) to nearly US$46m in FY76, although the bulk of the 
increase was in Foreign Military Sales credits rather than grant
36 Leiter, pp. 154-60.
37 Guy Pauker, "Prospects for Regional Hegemony in Southeast Asia",
Statement prepared for the Subcommittee on Future Foreign Policy 
Research and Development of the Committee on International 
Relations, House of Representatives, 94th Congress of the United 
States, November 1975-May 1976 (Washington DC: Government
Printing Office, 1976), p. 153.
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aid. But the widely expressed official Indonesian confidence that 
events in Indochina did not present Jakarta with any important 
heightening of either direct or indirect security threats suggest that 
a wish to enhance the armed forces' internal role (particularly in 
view of the possibili ty of operations to occupy East Timor) provided 
the main impetus for the Indonesian military to seek this aid.
Indonesian defence expenditure rose markedly in 1975 to US$586m 
from US$401m to 1974, at 1973 pr ices .^  Much of this additional 
military spending was directed towards the purchase of new equipment: 
major items ordered in 1975 included helicopters, transport and light 
close support aircraft  and corvettes.40 The real operational u t i l i ty  
of this equipment lay in i ts abi l i ty to improve the effectiveness and 
mobility of the armed forces in potential operations aimed at 
maintaining control in the far-flung Indonesian archipelago, to 
provide an increased capability to protect the country's maritime 
resources and to prevent the infi l t rat ion of arms. The emphasis was 
on what might be called "strategic internal security": in the absence 
of a serious, near term external threat, there was no need to attempt 
to provide a capability (such as a strategic air defence system or
38
38 Age, 17 July 1975; Data Management Division, Defense Security
Assistance Agency, Foreign Military Sales and Military Assistance 
Facts, December 1980 (Washington DC: Department of Defense,
1980), pp. 13-14, 35-36, 51-52. Foreign Military Sales credits 
rose in value from US£5m to US$23.1m, Military Assistance Program 
grants from US$12.5m to US$20.3m and International Military 
Education and Training Funds from US$2.39m to US$2.44m.
39 SIPRI Yearbook 1979, pp. 44-45.
40 National Times, 30 May 1977; The Military Balance 1976-77
(London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1976),
p. 95.
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anti-shipping missi les) aimed at deterr ing, or defending Indonesia 
against, such a cont ingency.^
The bui ld-up to, and execution of,  the East Timor operation may
have accounted fo r  part of the increase in the 1975 defence budget.
The continuing campaign there ce r ta in ly  reduced subs tan t ia l ly  the
42stocks of m i l i t a r y  suppl ies which had existed before 1976. But 
another, more important, impact of the Timor experience in Indonesian 
m i l i t a r y  po l icy seems to have occurred in the wake of the invasion. 
The operation exposed serious weaknesses in the armed forces' command 
procedures, morale, tac t ics  and equipment.^
Whether or not the f l u r r y  of orders for  new m i l i t a r y  equipment 
which fol lowed the invasion in the 1976-78 period was pa r t ly  a resu l t  
of the narrowly-missed m i l i t a r y  debacle in Timor is not e n t i re ly  
clear. But in the absence of o f f i c i a l  pronouncements regarding 
speci f ic  secur i ty  threats to Indonesia, i t  seems reasonable to propose 
that the Timor operation (which continued through the la te 1970s and 
into the 1980s as a low- in tens i ty  counter-insurgency campaign against
41 For example, in "guidance" given to the new Commanding General of
KOWILHAN I (Regional Defence Command I ,  covering Sumatra, West 
Kalimantan and maritime areas extending to the Natuna and Riau 
Islands) in October 1977, Defence Min ister General Panggabean 
stressed that the new commander's mission was to prepare his
Command to cope with "covert wars" ( inc luding "subversion,
insurgency and i n f i l t r a t i o n " )  and " d e f in i t e ly  not open or "hot" 
wars". See "A M i l i t a r y  Mission Indonesian Sty le" ,  Indonesian 
Times, 19 October 1977.
42 Astr i  Suhrke, "ASEAN: Adjusting to New Regional Alignments",
Asia Paci f ic  Community, No. 12 (Spring 1981), p. 26.
43 National Times, 5 January 1976 and 30 May 1977; R. Will iam
Liddle, "Indonesia 1976: Challenges to Suharto's Au thor i ty " ,
Asian Survey, Vol. 17, No. 2 (February 1977), pp. 100-1; 
Weatherbee, pp. 152, 160-61.
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Freti l in remnants) prompted a major reassessment of the armed forces'
44military effectiveness. Timor had shown that although the armed 
forces might be useful for r iot control in Java, their performance was 
not so impressive when faced with determined, yet only lightly-armed 
and essentially amateurish guerillas. Such a revelation would have 
cast serious doubt on the armed forces' abi l i ty to ensure the 
integrity of Indonesia against potential threats such as large-scale 
regional secessionism or a clash with Vietnam in the South China Sea, 
unlikely as these contingencies may have appeared to an outside 
observer.
The Philippines
The threat perceptions of Philippine military planners were 
clearly reflected in the nature of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines' (AFP) expansion after martial law was declared in 1972.
In 1972, the AFP (excluding the Philippine Constabulary) totalled
31,000 personnel: this figure had more than doubled to 67,000 by
1975, and more than tripled to 99,000 by 1978. The great bulk of this 
expansion accrued to the army, the strength of which almost
quadrupled. The navy more than tripled in size, much of this increase 
being in the size of the Marines. By contrast, the air force — the 
expansion of which would have been a key element in any effort to make
44 According to Weatherbee (p. 152), "Since 1976 a number of ABRI 
off icers . . .  argue that greater emphasis should be given to the 
conventional warfare capabilities of the armed forces".
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the AFP a credible deterrent to determined, large-scale external
45aggression - -  did not even double in size.
Purchases of m i l i t a r y  equipment for the AFP during the 1972-78 
period also confirmed an emphasis on bui lding up counter-insurgency 
ca p a b i l i t y .  For the army, th is  involved acquiring large quant i t ies of 
basic in fa n t ry  equipment including the licence production of 50,000 
M-16 r i f l e s  annually in government factories from late  1976. More 
sophist icated army equipment was l imited to new armoured personnel 
ca r r ie rs ,  l i g h t  tanks and howitzers. The navy received a substantial  
in fus ion of small vessels eminently suitable fo r  reducing the in te r ­
island m o b i l i ty  of insurgents. A ir  force re-equipment centred on the 
purchase of he l icopters, counter-insurgency a i r c r a f t  and transports,
although the token a i r  defence capabil i ty  was rejuvenated with one
46squadron of F-5Es and two of F-8Hs.
Tensions w i th in ASEAN
On a super f ic ia l  leve l ,  the very formation of ASEAN in 1967 
implied that the b i la te ra l  problems which had previously prevented
45 The M i l i t a r y  Balance 1972-1973, p. 53; The M i l i t a r y  Balance 1975-
1976, p. 58; The M i l i t a r y  Balance 1978-1979, pp. 66-67. In the 
1972-78 period the strength of the fourth arm of the AFP, the 
param i l i ta ry  Phi l ippine Constabulary, was increased from 23,000 
to 40,000.
46 The M i l i t a r y  Balance 1973-1974, p. 84; The M i l i t a r y  Balance 1976-
1977, p. 95; The M i l i t a r y  Balance 1977-1978, p. 100; The M i l i t a r y  
Balance 1978-1979, p^  107; The M i l i t a r y  Balance 1979-1980, 
fK 106; SIPRI Yearbook 1975~ p! 233; SIPRI Yearbook 1977, 
pp. 333-35 ; SIPRI YearboöF~T978, p. 274; ~S I PR I Yearbook 1979, 
pp. 232-23; Wilfredo Salvatierra, "Massive M i l i t a r y  Bui ld-up in 
R.P.", Phi 1ip p ine Times, 1-15 August 1976, pp. 22, 25.
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closer cooperation between the Association's members had been solved.
In the mid-1960s certain of these problems had played important roles
in the development of the Malaysian, Singaporean and Indonesian armed
forces. In the case of Malaysia, the incorporation of the former
British colonies of Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak in 1963,
Confrontation with Indonesia (1963-65) and the Philippine claim to
Sabah (which was pressed in 1963-66) had all contributed to the
47expansion of the armed forces. Unlike its  ASEAN partners, before 
1965 Singapore neither existed as a sovereign state nor possessed a 
significant military force. Upon expulsion from Malaysia in that 
year, in the midst of Confrontation, the Singaporean government was 
faced with the task of expanding the 1,600 man Singapore Infantry 
Regiment into a credible national defence force. The requirements of 
Confrontation had led to a substantial increase in the size and 
capabilities of the already large Indonesian armed forces.
Beneath the surface calm of ASEAN unity, bilateral tensions 
continued to exist after 1967: certain conflicts of interest had been
merely put to one side. Some of these differences resurfaced quite 
quickly: for instance, Manila reactivated i ts  claim to Sabah in
1968-69. Other bilateral conflicts remained dormant, but nevertheless 
sometimes exerted a strong influence on defence planning.
47 See Chandran Jeshurun, The Growth of the Malaysian Armed Forces, 
1963-1973: Some Foreign Press Reactions (Singapore: Institute
of Southeast Asian Studies, Occasional Paper No. 35, October 
1975). But with the demise of Sukarno and the end of 
Confrontation in 1966, Jakarta adopted an increasingly friendly 
posture towards Malaysia and probably ceased to be seen as a 
security threat by defence planners in Kuala Lumpur.
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Singaporean Tlreat Perceptions
As the Singaporean armed forces evolved, i t  became clear that 
they were intended to deter, and i f  necessary to defend Singapore 
against, external threats which might develop within the immediate 
region. Althojgh relations with Indonesia and Malaysia were generally 
f a i r l y  cordial by the mid-1970s, beneath the surface there remained 
considerable po li t ica l (and at times economic) tension between 
Singapore (w iti i ts  overwhelmingly Chinese ethnic composition) and its  
two much larger and predominantly Malay neighbours. For example, 
Singapore's feeling of vu lnerab ility  was reflected in its  refusal to 
endorse the Mclaysian and Indonesian claim from 1971 that the Straits 
of Malacca were not international waters, and i ts  fa ilu re  to vote with 
i ts  ASEAN par;ners against a UN General Assembly resolution c r i t ic a l  
of Indonesia's invasion of East T i m o r . A l t h o u g h  the Singaporean
leadership never o f f ic ia l ly  indicated that either Indonesia or 
Malaysia posed a m il i ta ry  threat, the feeling that such a threat might 
develop (perhaps as a result of radical po li t ica l change in Indonesia 
or the ascendancy of Islamic fundamentalism in Malaysia) formed an 
important and enduring backdrop to the island republic's security
policies from 1965 onwards.
From the beginning, the stress in building up Singapore's
m il i ta ry  strength was on developing a credible a ir defence capability, 
a short-range but sophisticated naval force with some amphibious
capability, and an offensively-oriented army (with appropriate air
48 Leifer, pp. 146, 158.
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Support) able to cross the causeway dividing Singapore from Malaysia
and to hold a forward defence line about 30km deep into the Malaysian
state of Johor (thus securing Singapore's water supply as well as a
49more easily defensible frontier).  In 1966 advisers from the Israeli
army -- noted for i ts prowess in conventional warfare rather than in
counter-insurgency -- were hired to assist in the development of this
50essentially pre-emptive military capability.
The Phi lippine-Sabah-Malaysia Imbroglio
The issue of the Philippine claim to Sabah continued to sour 
relations between Kuala Lumpur and Manila throughout the 1970s. But 
the claim was not actively pressed, and indeed was renounced by 
President Marcos in 1977, and any military threat to Malaysia's hold 
on Sabah remained vague. There is no evidence that the Malaysian 
military reacted any more strongly to the vague possibili ty of 
conflict  over the issue than developing contingency plans -- and the 
existence of even these cannot be proved.
The potential for conflict involving Sabah was fe l t  more acutely 
in Manila than in Kuala Lumpur. Although the overriding security
49 Keegan, "Singapore", p. 519; Personal interviews with diplomats, 
journalists and academics, Singapore. January-February 1981. 
This strategy was congruent with Lee Kuan Yew's much earlier 
assertion (made before Singapore's separation from Malaysia in 
1965) that "Mili tari ly. . .  Singapore and Malaya are one uni t . . .  He 
who conquers Malaya conquers Singapore. The Japanese proved i t".  
Lee Kuan Yew, The Fixed Political Objectives (Singapore: 
People's Action Party, undated), p. 171.
50 Morrison and Suhrke, p. 183.
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concern of the Philippine government (including the military
leadership) in the early and mid-1970s was with internal problems, in
the view of "Philippine military strategists" a significant external
threat at this time was the possibility that Sabah might secede from
Malaysia and lay claim to the Sulu archipelago: this was the mirror
image of Manila's own claim to Sabah, based on the historical extent
51of the Sultan of Sulu's dominions.
Already, since late 1972, the Sabah state government under
Mustapha bin Harun had harboured a large refugee population of
Philippine Muslims, which the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)
52was permitted to use as a recruiting and support base. In the early 
1970s the Philippine armed forces apparently lacked the capability to 
stem the flow of arms from external sources (notably Libya) by way of 
Sabah to the MNLF: it was clear that an independent and irredentist
Sabah might pose severe problems for Manila's already overstretched 
f o r c e s .
Interactive Factors in Military Expansion
Perceptions of specific security threats of one sort or another 
(direct or indirect, originating domestically or emanating from 
Indochina or other ASEAN countries) were not the only factors involved 
in inspiring ASEAN governments to expand their military capabilities
51 Salvatierra, pp. 22, 25.
52 See section on "The Socioeconomic Impact of the Refugees" in 
Chapter 7, pp. 305-6 above.
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in the 1970s. In Thailand and Indonesia the military were intimately 
involved in the polit ical process; the polit ical power of their 
Malaysian and Philippine counterparts had increased substantially 
after 1969 and 1972. This polit ical role gave military leaders in 
four of the five ASEAN states varying degrees of abili ty to exert 
influence in the process of resource allocation to the defence sector.
There is a widespread propensity for military leaders to think in 
terms of "worst case" scenarios for military planning purposes and to 
desire to keep abreast of contemporary military technology 
(particularly as a result of technical or staff training in mil i tari ly 
advanced countries such as the US, Britain or Australia in the case of 
ASEAN's armed forces). Certainly there are indications that these 
factors,  together with considerations of national prestige (as likely 
to be advanced by politicians as by military leaders), contributed to 
the military expansion programmes of the ASEAN states during the 
period under examination.
One symptom of the influence of such non-threat factors on
military policies in the ASEAN states has been termed "interactive
53weapons acquisition". Ron Huisken suggests that the acquisition by 
one ASEAN state of a class of weapon system not previously possessed 
by regional powers, or of a new generation of a system already 
present, may have precipitated other ASEAN countries into acquiring 
either similar systems or other weapons that could counter the newly-
53 See Ron Huisken, Arms Limitation in Southeast Asia: A Proposal
(Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian
National University, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 
16, 1977), pp. 16-17.
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introduced systems, despite the frequent avowals of good 
neighbourliness within ASEAN. This process was partly a result of the 
"worst case" assumptions of regional military leaders, and partly of 
their wish to maintain morale within their forces, the standing of the 
armed forces within their respective countries, and the prestige of 
their countries within the region and the wider world. According to 
Huisken, " . . .  for each country, military developments in neighbouring
countries are among the most important factors determining the size
54and composition of i ts  own armed forces".
The precise extent to which specific weapons acquisitions were 
influenced by developments in ostensibly friendly neighbouring 
countries will never be known. But i t  seems clear that interactive 
acquisition played a role in certain instances. For example, i t  was 
allegedly evident to the Indonesian military regime in the mid-1970s
that Jakarta's claim to regional leadership needed to be backed up by
55a more impressive military capability. For example, by 1977 
Indonesia was the only ASEAN country not possessing modern jet  combat 
aircraft :  whereas the Singaporean, Malaysian, Thai and Philippine air
forces all operated supersonic F-5s, the Indonesian Air Force's most 
advanced fighters were subsonic, ex-Australian Sabres. It  seems very 
likely that a desire to "catch up" with the other ASEAN countries in 
terms of modernity of military equipment played a significant role in 
development of the Indonesian armed forces in the late 1970s.
54 Ibid., p. 35.
55 Personal interview with Dr Kirdi Dipoyudo, Head, Department of 
International Relations, Centre for Strategic and International 
Studies, Jakarta, 7 April 1981.
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Huisken argues fairly convincingly that the purchase of missile­
armed fast attack craft by four of the ASEAN states' navies (beginning
with orders placed by Malaysia in 1970) was partially due to a process
56of competitive acquisition. Kuala Lumpur's decision to purchase
tanks for its projected armoured corps was apparently based largely on
the rationale that Malaysia was "the only country in the region
without tanks", a fact that "worried" the Malaysian army's 
57leadership. Whether or not Kuala Lumpur's decision in 1978 to 
purchase a large number (88) of A-4 ground-attack aircraft was 
influenced by the ever-widening gap in size and capability between the 
Malaysian and Singaporean air forces in debatable: but at the time
there seemed to be a lack of plausible military reasons for such a 
purchase.
Changes in the Military Presence of Extra-regional Powers
The importance of changes in the political interests and military 
presence of extra-regional powers in Southeast Asia as factors 
influencing military policies in the ASEAN countries from the late 
1960s was considerable.
The British Withdrawal
The British military withdrawal from Singapore and Malaysia, 
first announced in 1967, increased the urgency which the Singaporean
56 Huisken, pp. 49-52.
57 "Malaysia: Creation of a 'Royal Armoured Corps'", International
Defense Review, 3/1979, p. 442.
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government attached to i t s  already burgeoning m i l i t a r y  bui ld-up, 
although under the Five Power Defence Arrangements (which were 
subst i tu ted fo r  the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement in 1971) some 
B r i t i s h  forces remained u n t i l  1976 and Austral ian and New Zealand
forces even a f te r  tha t .  Indeed, i t  seems un l ike ly  that Singaporean
m i l i t a r y  expansion would have processed so fa r  and so fas t  had B r i t ish  
forces remained in th e i r  previous strength. In pa r t icu la r ,  there 
would have been l i t t l e  incentive for the development of the
Singaporean A ir  Defence Command (SADC) had the m u l t i - ro le  B r i t ish  Far 
East Air  Force (FEAF) stayed in Singapore. Indeed, the f i r s t  
substantial  growth of the SADC was made possible as FEAF assets 
( inc luding three major a i r  bases, a radar s ta t ion ,  much other
in f ras t ru c tu re  and a squadron of Bloodhound sur face- to -a i r  missi les) 
were transferred to the Singaporean government.
The e f fec t  of the B r i t i s h  withdrawal on the development of the 
Malaysian armed forces was not as decisive as in the case of 
Singapore, where the bulk of B r i ta in 's  forces in the region were based 
by the la te  1960s. The pr inc ipa l  impetus fo r  the Malaysian m i l i t a r y  
expansion at th is  time was almsot ce r ta in ly  more c lose ly  connected 
with the aftermath of the 1969 r io t s .  Nevertheless, the gradual
attenuation of B r i ta in 's  p o l i t i c a l  w i l l  and physical a b i l i t y  to defend 
Malaysia against external threats e f fe c t iv e ly  forced Kuala Lumpur to 
give greater at tention to providing fo r  the country's external 
secur i ty .  This was re f lec ted in the a i r  force 's  move towards the 
acquis i t ion of an a i r  defence capab i l i ty  from 1969, when Austra l ia
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donated a squadron of obsolete Sabre fighters; in 1972 a squadron of
58supersonic F-5Es was ordered.
The Chinese Threat
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the ASEAN governments 
generally saw communist China as the principal external source of 
threat to their security: indeed, a common fear of the People's
Republic was a significant factor in the formation of ASEAN in 1967. 
Although Sino-American detente and the moderation of Beijing's 
atti tude towards ASEAN and i ts  members in the early and mid-1970s 
(culminating in the opening of diplomatic relations with Malaysia, the 
Philippines and Thailand) diluted these perceptions of China as a 
threat,  this factor continued to influence the defence policies of 
some of the ASEAN states in the 1975-81 period.
59For various historical and domestic political reasons, the 
Indonesian regime's perceptions of a Chinese threat remained alive in 
the late 1970s. Although Jakarta's security concern with China was 
related mainly to Beijing's potential instigation of subversion using 
i ts  links with the Indonesian Communist Party and the local ethnic 
Chinese community, as late as 1980 a standard scenario for 
conventional warfare used in Indonesian Armed Forces Command and Staff 
College (SESKOAD) exercises involved an invasion by China.^ Although
58 A. Khalid, "The Making of an Air Force", Asian Defence Journal 
(cited hereafter as ADJ) , 6/83 (June 1983), p. 29.
59 See Chapters 1, 3 and 4, pp. 11-12, 18-20, 80-1, 86-8, 114-15, 
and 128 above.
60 Suhrke, p. 23.
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M a l a y s i a  was g e n e r a l l y  less c o n c e r n e d  than I n d o n e s i a  w i t h  a t h r e a t  
f r o m  C h i n a ,  a f t e r  the o u t b r e a k  of open c o n f l i c t  b e t w e e n  V i e t n a m  and 
t h e P e o p l e ' s  R e p u b l i c  in 1979, Ku a l a  L u m p u r  r e p o r t e d l y  s h ar ed  
J a k a r t a ' s  c o n c e r n  t h at i n c r e a s i n g  C h i n e s e  i n t e r e s t  in the S o u t h  C h i n a  
S e a  ( e v i n c e d  b y  a s t r e n g t h e n e d  naval pr es e n c e ) ,  c o u p l e d  w i t h  a w i s h  to 
p u n i s h  Hanoi ag a i n  for its o c c u p a t i o n  of C a m b o d i a ,  m i g h t  i n s p i r e  
B e i j i n g  to s e i z e  t h e f i v e  V i e t n a m e s e - h e l d  i s l a n d s  in th e  S p r a t l y s  
g r o u p . ^  It se e m s  l i k e l y  t h a t  a p p r e h e n s i o n  o v e r  C h i n a ' s  i n c r e a s i n g  
i n t e r e s t  and naval p r e s e n c e  in the So ut h C h i n a  S e a e x e r t e d  an 
i n f l u e n c e  on I n d o n e s i a n ,  and p e r h a p s  M a l a y s i a n ,  d e f e n c e  p o l i c y  in the 
m a r i t i m e  s p h e r e  f r o m  the late 1970s.
T h e  A m e r i c a n  W i t h d r a w a l
T h e  i m p a c t  on d e f e n c e  p r o g r a m m e s  in the A S E A N  r e g i o n  of the Paris 
p e a c e  a g r e e m e n t s ,  the e n u n c i a t i o n  of the N i x o n  d o c t r i n e  in 1971, and 
th e  1 9 7 3  w i t h d r a w a l  of US f o r c e s  from I n d o c h i n a  ( t o g e t h e r  w i t h  the 
r e l a t e d  e x o d u s  f r o m  T h a i l a n d )  is less e a s y  to e v a l u a t e  t h a n  t h at of 
t h e B r i t i s h  w i t h d r a w a l .  T h i s  is m a i n l y  b e c a u s e  the tw o  p h e n o m e n a  of 
A m e r i c a n  w i t h d r a w a l  and c o m m u n i s t  success in I n d o c h i n a  w e r e  so c l o s e l y  
li n k e d ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  in the m i n d s  of poli tic al and m i l i t a r y  le a d e r s  in 
t h e A S E A N  s t a t e s .  But o v e r a l l ,  the A m e r i c a n  w i t h d r a w a l  w a s p r o b a b l y  
of c o n s i d e r a b l y  g r e a t e r  and m o r e  w i d e s p r e a d  r e l e v a n c e  to m i l i t a r y  
d e v e l o p m e n t s  in th e  r e g i o n  af t e r  1975 t h a n  w a s  the e a r l i e r  B r i t i s h
61 D a v i d  J e n k i n s ,  F E E R , 7 A u g u s t  1981, p. 26; M i c h a e l  R i c h a r d s o n ,  
" I n d o n e s i a  S t r e n g t h e n s  its South C h i n a  S e a  D e f e n c e s " ,  P a c i f i c  
D e f e n c e  R e p o r t e r ,  F e b r u a r y  1983, p. 40.
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pull-out. The essence of this impact was a widespread appreciation by 
regional governments that they would have to play a considerably
greater role in their own defence.
The impact of the US military withdrawal on Thai military policy
was not as great, in the event, as might have been expected. The
possibly detrimental effects of the run-down of the US presence in
Vietnam on Thailand's security in the early 1970s was, from the Thai
government's viewpoint, counter-balanced by an increased US Air Force
strength in Thailand. Although these US forces were related to the
continuing conflict in Indochina, from the point of view of the Thai
military government they were also symbolic of an American commitment
to Thailand's security. Bangkok hoped that the US bases might
ultimately be bargained away for Chinese and North Vietnamese
assurances to respect the independence of Laos and Cambodia and to
cease supporting Thai communist insurgents. The Thai authorities also
6?used the bases to extract substantial military aid from Washington.
The overthrow of the Thanom-Praphat regime in October 1973 gave 
greater rein to those in Thailand who questioned the value of the US 
military presence. Indeed, even before the change from military rule, 
Bangkok had pressured Washington into withdrawing some of its  forces. 
Although the withdrawals were accelerated through 1974, i t  was not 
until the final Vietnamese communist victory in the spring of 1975 
that the Thai leadership (with the exception of some senior military 
officers) was finally persuaded by the course of events that the US
62 Morrison and Suhrke, p. 127.
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m il i ta ry  presence no longer served Thailand's security interests. 
Indeed, i t  was increasingly clear that the US bases formed a serious 
obstacle to Thailand's adjustment to the po l i t ica l  rea l i t ies  that were 
emerging on i ts  doorstep. By July 1976 all  US forces were 
withdrawn.^
Although the withdrawal of the US mil i tary  presence from Thailand 
began in 1973, this did not immediately stimulate a s ignif icantly 
greater e f for t  by the Thai government to improve the capabil it ies of 
the Thai armed forces. However, despite a continuing policy of 
emphasizing diplomatic accommodation rather than a mil i tary  build-up 
as the principal means of coping with Thailand's new strategic 
environment, a substantial increase in defence expenditure was 
announced in February 1976. According to the Prime Minister (Kukrit) 
this increase did relate to the US withdrawal, in the specif ic sense 
of enabling the Thai mi l i tary to take over and operate certain of the 
US bases. Apart from this, the US withdrawal had no other 
signif icant,  d is t inct  impact on the Thai armed forces.
The implications of the Nixon doctrine for America's role in 
Southeast Asia had a signif icant effect on Philippine defence policy 
from the early 1970s. The importance of the Philippines as a host for 
US m i l i ta ry  bases increased as Washington withdrew i ts  forces from 
South Vietnam and Thailand in the early and mid-1970s, and i t  s t i l l  
seemed probable that US mil i tary  intervention could be expected in the 
highly unlikely event of direct external aggression against the
63 Ib id . ,  pp. 129-31.
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Philippines. But the Nixon doctrine implied that in the "post-
Vietnam" era i t  was far less like ly  that US forces would become
d ire c t ly  involved in the event of the development of an internal
security threat with which the Armed Forces of the Philippines could
not cope. This factor contributed to Manila's emphasis, from May
641975, on m il i ta ry  "self-reliance" -- a concept that attempted to 
make a virtue out of the necessary of improving the AFP's counter­
insurgency capabilities.
Although the impact of the US military withdrawal on the defence
policies of Malaysia and Singapore was not as immediately apparent as
that of the earlier British m il ita ry  pull-out, the prospect of a
m il i ta ry  vacuum in mainland Southeast Asia does appear to have
contributed to the momentum of these states' programmes of m il ita ry
expansion. I t  is also clear that "the prospect of the United States
in a phase of strategic decline aroused profound concern" in 
65Jakarta, but there is no way of ascertaining the extent to which 
this concern influenced Indonesian defence policy.
The Expanding Soviet Presence
The influence of the heightened Soviet po li t ica l interest and, 
more particu larly , the increased Soviet naval presence in the
64 See, for example, statement by Defense Secretary Juan Ponce 
Enrile, Manila home service in English, 1000 gmt, 1 May 1975 (SWB 
FE/4894/A3/9, 3 May 1975). In September 1975, President Marcos 
claimed that Manila wished to end “all forms of dependence on US 
m il ita ry  assistance". Canberra Times, 11 September 1975.
65 Leiter, p. 154.
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Southeast Asian region in the late 1970s on defence policies and 
militarization is dif f icul t  to assess, largely because these phenomena 
were so intimately bound up with developments involving Indochina. 
Soviet interest in Southeast Asia intensified with the escalation of 
the United States'  role in the Vietnam war in 1965, and again after 
the Vietnamese communists' victory in 1975, and i t  was Vietnam's 
effective political and economic isolation by the West and China in 
the 1975-78 period which provided Moscow with the opportunity to 
increase significantly i ts  stake in the region through i ts November 
1978 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Hanoi. The Sino- 
Vietnamese conflict in early 1979 precipitated Hanoi into allowing 
regular Soviet use of Vietnamese naval and air bases. From this time 
onwards, the ASEAN states'  perceptions of Vietnam as a security 
concern were complicated and heightened by the fact of Hanoi's 
increasingly close polit ical and military relationship with Moscow.
Although some sources quote the changing balance of extra- 
regional powers' maritime forces in the region, and particularly 
"increasing Soviet naval activity",  as a factor exerting an important 
influence on the development of the ASEAN states'  navies,® i t  is 
doubtful that there was any significant direct link between the two 
phenomena in the period under consideration. The Soviet naval 
presence remained minor compared to the US Seventh Fleet, which 
continued to use Subic Bay in the Philippines as a forward base and 
s t i l l  effectively dominated the region in naval terms. Rhetoric
66 See, for example, P. Lewis Young, "Naval Developments in the 
South East Asian Region -- Current Trends", ADJ, 2/82 (February 
1982), p. 14.
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aside, military leaders in the region were presumably well aware that 
US air and naval forces in the region would probably be able to 
neutralize the Soviet naval and air presence in Vietnam and the South 
China Sea in a general war. I t  was hard to conceive of any limited 
war context in which these Soviet forces would have been used against 
the ASEAN countries in isolation, as any such conflict would almost 
certainly have escalated to involve the United States. The evidence 
suggests that the ASEAN governments appreciated the importance of the 
remaining US naval and air presence in the region in relation to 
developments in the Soviet regional presence from early 1979, and 
partly for this reason exerted considerable pressure to ensure the 
continuation of Washington's role in Southeast Asia for the 
foreseeable future. The withdrawal of American naval and air forces 
from the Philippines might have caused regional states to consider 
expanding considerably their own naval, maritime air and air defence 
forces.
The missile-armed fast  attack craft acquired during the 1970s 
would, in theory at least,  have given ASEAN's navies a capability to 
take on Soviet navy surface combatants; the sinking of the Israeli 
destroyer Eilat by a missile from an Egyptian fast attack craft  in 
1967 had presumably been noted by regional naval staffs.  But there 
was never any suggestion that consideration of such a specific role 
played a significant part in the decisions to procure these craft .  
Missile-armed fast  attack craft  were in quite widespread use in the 
ASEAN states'  navies before 1979, and to a limited extent before 1975. 
Other factors such as the desire to modernize navies with effective 
yet affordable weapons systems, competitive acquisition, and a desire
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to enhance the credibil i ty of national claims to maritime terri tory 
and resources exercised far more decisive influence in the acquisition 
of these vessels. Similar comments may be applied to the procurement 
by the ASEAN states'  air forces of high performance air defence and 
maritime reconnaissance aircraft :  there were numerous factors 
influencing such developments, apart from the Soviet use of Vietnamese 
bases.
Maritime Security Issues
The importance of maritime resources and freedom of maritime 
movement in the ASEAN region -- and particularly the South China Sea 
-- increased markedly during the 1970s from the viewpoints of both 
regional and extra-regional powers. This escalating interest was 
paralleled by an increase in the potential for armed conflict,  
particularly between Vietnam and China or certain of the ASEAN states, 
over various islands and maritime territory.
While the possibili ty of conflict involving Vietnam in the South 
China Sea probably contributed to the development and operational 
employment of the ASEAN states'  maritime forces, several issues less 
clearly related to Indochina also had an impact on naval developments 
in non-communist Southeast Asia. The increasing economic and 
strategic importance of regional waters was reflected in efforts by 
certain ASEAN governments to secure greater control over their local 
maritime environment. Since 1971, Indonesia and Malaysia had claimed 
the Malacca Straits as national waters: in theory the vessels of 
third countries passing through the Straits became subject to the
-  581 -
doctrine of "innocent passage", under which their innocence could be 
challenged by the Indonesian or Malaysian authorities by means of 
interception and searches. Moreover, Indonesia and the Philippines 
had both declared (the former as early as 1957) their belief in the 
"archipelago principle" with the result that all the sea area 
connecting the huge number of islands making up each of the two 
countries was defined as national waters.87 These extensions of 
national sovereignty in the maritime sphere, together with a 
heightened consciousness of conflicting ter r i tor ial  claims in the 
South China Sea and the implications of 200 mile maritime Exclusive 
Economic Zones (EEZ)68 exerted considerable influence on the defence 
policies of various ASEAN states in relation to the development of 
important and growing responsibilit ies in terms of maintaining the 
integrity of te r r i tor ia l  waters and EEZ, and in monitoring the passage 
of international merchant and naval shipping through these waters 
while at the same time encouraging ocean transi t  -- which i tsel f  was 
necessary for the development of the ASEAN states '  own trade-oriented 
economies.6  ^ But the low polit ical status of naval staff  in the ASEAN 
states militated against any great success on their part in
67 Sheldon W. Simon, "Maritime Interests, Policies and Future
Policies of the ASEAN States" (Paper prepared for the Conference 
on "The Indian Ocean: Perspectives on a Strategic Arena", Centre
for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, Halifax, 
Canada, 14-16 October 1982), pp. 2-3.
68 By March 1981 all the ASEAN states except Singapore had declared
200 mile Exclusive Economic Zones. The Statesman's Yearbook 
1981-82 (London: Macmillan, 1981), pp. xxv-xxvii; Bangkok Post,
10 March 1981.
69 Simon, "Maritime Interests . . . " ,  pp. 6-10.
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competing with other elements of the armed forces (p a r t i c u la r l y  the 
armies) fo r  defence resources.
Nevertheless, the importance attached by the ASEAN states to the 
ro le  of th e i r  maritime forces in protect ing th e i r  stakes in the 
regional maritime environment was ref lected in o f f i c i a l  statements 
regarding naval operational p r i o r i t i e s ,  and in equipment procurement. 
Before the mid-1970s regional navies' capab i l i t ies  had permitted them 
to operate only in an essent ia l ly  short-range coastal mode. 
Developments in the mid and la te  1970s enhanced these meagre forces, 
providing a greater ( i f  s t i l l  l im i ted)  capab i l i ty  fo r  regional states 
to enforce th e i r  maritime national sovereignty. Most importantly , a l l  
the ASEAN states except Singapore (which already possessed such weapon 
systems) acquired missile-armed fas t  attack c ra f t .  Indonesia also 
ordered new mine counter-measures vessels and submarines in 1976-77.^
O f f i c ia l  and sem i-o f f ic ia l  sources emphasized the importance of 
securing t e r r i t o r i a l  waters and protect ing maritime economic in te rests  
against low- in tens i ty  threats in peacetime as well as in war. In 
pa r t icu la r ,  the declarat ion of 200 mile EEZ was frequent ly  quoted as a 
reason for  the enhancement of naval c ap ab i l i t ies .  According to one 
au thor i ta t ive  source, by 1981 the protect ion of Malaysia's EEZ in 
general and o i l  and natural gas d r i l l i n g  platforms in pa r t icu la r  had 
become the pr inc ipal  operational ro le ,  and reason fo r  continuing
70 SIPRI Yearbook 1978, pp. 263, 271, 274, 277; SIPRI Yearbook 1980, 
pp. 145, 151, 155, 159.
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expansion, of the Malaysian navy.7'*' EEZ and maritime protection also
came to the fore by the early 1970s as a principal  task of the
72Phi l ippine,  Indonesian and Thai navies.
Although there were important l inks between th is  emphasis on EEZ
protect ion and developments in Indochina, given the overlapping of
Hanoi's maritime claims with those of Jakarta,  Manila and Kuala
Lumpur, the dimensions of the issue subsumed more than j u s t  these
la t ent  conf l ict s  with Vietnam. Not only were China and Taiwan also
involved in competition with each other and with Vietnam, Indonesia
73and the Phil ippines in the South China Sea, but there were
addi t ional ly maritime tensions between various of the ASEAN countries:  
Kuala Lumpur, for example, was seriously concerned at the implications 
of Indonesia's "archipelago principle" for uninterrupted sea 
communication between peninsular Malaysia and the Borneo s t a t es .
71 Personal interview with Captain Eric Rajah, Royal Malaysian Navy 
(Reti red) ,  Editor,  Asian Defence Journal, Kuala Lumpur, 16 April 
1981. See also "The Royal Malaysian Navy", ADJ, No. 4/1976 
(August), p. 33 and "RMN on the threshold of great  changes", ADJ, 
No. 4/79 (July/August 1979), p. 34.
72 Weatherbee, p. 152; P. Lewis Young, pp. 18-21; Khalid Abdullah, 
"The Indonesian Armed Forces --  A New Image for the '80s",  ADJ, 
5/82 (May 1982), p. 41; Rear Admiral M. Alejandro (Commander of 
the Phil ippine Navy), "The Philippine Navy and the Challenges of 
the Times", ADJ, 6/82 (June 1982), p. 30.
73 For example, the Phil ippine government was concerned over the 
Chinese Nat ional ist  base on Itu Aba in the Spratly group, and 
also by the i l l egal  f ishing ac t iv i t i e s  of Taiwanese vessels.  
David Jenkins, FEER, 7 August 1981, p. 26.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
I .  OFFICIAL SOURCES
( i ) Government P ub l ica t ions
A u s t r a l ia n  Foreign A f f a i r s  Record. (Monthly)
Commonwealth of A u s t r a l i a ,  Department of Defence. Defence Report 
1981. Canberra: A u s t ra l ia n  Government Publ ishing Serv ice ,  1981.
Commonwealth of A u s t r a l i a ,  Parl iament of the.  Jo in t  Committee on 
Foreign A f f a i r s  and Defence. Power in Indo China Since 1975. 
Canberra: A u s t ra l ia n  Government Publishing Serv ice ,  1981.
Foreign A f f a i r s  M a la y s ia . (Q u ar te r ly )
Ghazali  Shaf ie ,  Tan Sr i  M. The ASEAN Countries and Indochina . Text  
of an address at  a Conference on Southeast Asian Banking and 
Finance organized by The F inancia l  Times in Singapore,  19 A p r i l  
1979.  Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Government In formation O f f i c e ,
1979.
Larsen, S.R. and J .L .  C o l l in s .  A l l i e d  P a r t i c i p a t i o n  in Vietnam. 
Washington D .C. :  Government Pr in t ing  O f f i c e ,  1975.
Malaysian Government. Th ird  Malaysia Plan 1976-1980. Kuala Lumpur: 
Government P r i n t e r ,  1976.
______________. Mid-Term Review of the Third Malaysia P lan , 1976-80,
Kuala Lumpur: Government P r in t e r ,  1979.
M a lays ia ,  M in is t ry  of  Foreign A f f a i r s .  Facts on ASEAN. Kuala Lumpur: 
M i n is t r y  of Foreign A f f a i r s ,  n.d.
Marcos, President Ferdinand E. "The P i l l a r  of Our Na t ion 's  Strength  
and S ecur i ty" .  Speech to P h i l ipp ine  M i l i t a r y  Academy graduates,  
Baguio, 18 February 1980.
M i r r o r  (M in is t r y  of  Communications and In fo rm at ion ,  Singapore).  
(T w ice-month ly ) .
Publ ic  Papers of the Presidents:  Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1954 .
Washington D.C. :  Government Pr in t ing  O f f i c e ,  1960.
Publ ic  Papers of the Presidents:  Gerald R. Ford,  1975. Washington,
D .C. :  Government P r in t in g  O f f i c e ,  1977.
Singapore Government. The Budget fo r  the F inancia l  Year 1 9 7 9 /8 0 . 
Cmnd. 4 of  1980.
585 -
Singapore Government Press Releases.
Singapore, Parliament.  Parliamentary Papers (Hansard) , 1975-79.
Singapore, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  From Phnom Penh to Kabul. 
Singapore: Ministry of Foreign Affairs,  1980.
Soci a l i s t  Republic of Vietnam, Ministry of Foreign Affairs .  The Truth 
About Viet Nam-China Relations Over the Last 30 Years, October
1979.
. Statement on Kampuchean-Thai Border Tension, 27 June
1980.
____________ . Memorandum: Truth about the Tension Now Prevail ing in
Southeast Asia and the Correct Path to the Settlement of th i s  
S i t ua t i on , 20 August 1980.
Thailand, Communist Suppression Operations Command. Communist 
Insurgency in Thailand. White Paper. Bangkok: Thai Government,
1973.
Thailand, Ministry of the Inter ior :  Operation Center for Displaced
Persons. Too Long to Wait: Displaced Persons from Kampuchea in
Thailand. Bangkok: Thai Government, c i rca 1980.
Thailand, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  The Vietnamese Acts of 
Aggression Against Thailand's Sovereignty and Ter r i tor ia l  
Integri ty^ Bangkok: Thai Government, c i rca 1980.
United States  Congress. House of Representatives.  Committee on
Internat ional  Relations.  Shift ing Balance of Power in Asia: 
Implications for Future U.S. Policy Hearings before the 
Subcommittee on Future Foreign Policy Research and Development of 
The Committee on International  Relations, November 1975-May 1976. 
94th Congress. Washington D.C.: Government Print ing Office,
1976.
United States  Congress. House of Representatives.  Committee on
Foreign Affai rs .  The Indochinese Refugee Si tuat ion August 1979. 
Study Mission Reports, 16 September 1979, 96th Congress, Ti t  
session.  Washington, D.C.: Government Pr int ing Office,  1979.
____________ . Playing the China Card: Implications for United
States-Soviet-Chinese Relations. Report prepared for the 
Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs by the Foreign Affairs and National Defense 
Division,  Congressional Research Service,  October 1979. 
Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office,  1979.
United States Congress. Joint  Economic Committee. Indochinese 
Refugees: The Impact on Fi rs t  Asylum Countries and Implications
for American Policy, by Astri Suhrke, Pasuk Pongphaicit and 
Zakaria Haji Ahmad. Washington D.C.: Government Print ing
Office,  1980.
586 -
United States Congress. House of Representatives.  Committee on
Foreign Affairs .  U.S. Policy in the Indochina Region since
Vietnam's Occupation of Kampuchea._____Hearings before the
Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on
Foreign Af f a i r s , October 1981. 97th Congress, 1st session.  
Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office,  1981.
United States,  Department of Defense: Data Management Division,
Defense Securi ty Assistance Agency. Foreign Mil i tary Sales and 
Mil i t a ry  Assistance Facts , December 1980.
United States ,  Department of State.  Vietnam's Refugee Machine.
Document No. 2-22, 20 July 1979.
____________ . The Indochinese Refugee S i t ua t i on . Report to the
Secretary of State by the Special Refugee Advisory Panel, 
12 August 1981.
Vietnam News Bullet in (Embassy of the Social i s t  Republic of Vietnam, 
Canberra).
( i i ) Publications of International Organizations
ASEAN Digest .
ASEAN Secre tar ia t .  10 Years ASEAN. Jakarta:  ASEAN Secretar iat ,
1978.
____________ . ASEAN Documents Series 1967-1985. Jakarta:  ASEAN
Secre t ar i a t ,  1985.
South East Asia Treaty Organization. Manila Pact and Pacific Charter. 
Bangkok: South East Asia Treaty Organization, 1968.
United Nations, Committee for the Coordination of Invest igations of 
the Lower Mekong Basin. Annual Report, 1981.
United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs S t a t i s t i ca l  
Office.  Yearbook of International  Trade S t a t i s t i c s  1977.
United Nations, Department of International Economic and Social 
Affairs S t a t i s t i c a l  Office. S t a t i s t i ca l  Yearbook 1979/80.
United Nations, Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the 
Paci f ic .  S t a t i s t i c a l  Yearbook for Asia and the Pacific 1981. 
Bangkok: Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the
Paci f ic ,  1982.
-  587 -
United Nations, High Commissioner for Refugees. S t a t i s t i c s  of Indo- 
Chinese Refugees and Displayed Persons: 1, Arrivals in Countries
of Temporary Asylum. Geneva: Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees, 1980.
____________ . S t a t i s t i c s  on Indochina Refugees and Displaced Persons,
November 1980.
World Bank. Thailand: Towards a Development Strategy of Full
Pa r t i c i pa t ion . Washington: World Bank, 1978.
_______________ . World Development Report 1985. New York: Oxford
Universi ty Press,  1985.
( i i i )  Unpublished Official  Material
Commonwealth of Austral ia,  Department of Foreign Affairs .  "Annual
Review of Aust ra l ia ' s  Relations with Indonesia 1980".
(Unpublished report ,  Canberra, 1981).
Malaysian Armed Forces Staff College: Syndicate "Kalapati".
"National In teres t  and Foreign Policy in Southeast Asia: Future
Trends". Unpublished project paper, November 1978.
Thayer, Carlyle A. "Vietnam's Foreign Pol icies (1975-1979): 
Implications for Australia".  Submission prepared for Sub­
committee A ( Indo-China). Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs,  
Parliament of the Commonwealth of Austral ia ,  20 January 1980.
I I .  BOOKS
Albinski,  Henry S. The Australian-American Securi ty Relationship: A
Regional and International  Perspective. St.  Lucia: Queensland
Universi ty Press, 1982.
Booth, Ken. Strategy and Ethnocentrism. New York: Holmes & Meier,
1979.
Boyce, Peter.  Malaysia and Singapore in International  Diplomacy: 
Documents and Commentaries. Sydney: Sydney University Press,
1968.
Broinowski, Alison, ed. Understanding ASEAN. London: Macmillan,
1982.
588 -
Buchanan, Iain.  Singapore in Southeast Asia. An Economic and 
Pol i t ica l  Appraisal . London: G. Bell and Sons, 1972.
Buzan, Barry. People, States and Fear: The National Securi ty Problem
in International  Polit ics"] Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books, 1983.
Chai-anan Samudavanija .  The Thai Young Turks. Singapore: I ns t i tu t e
of Southeast Asian Studies,  1982.
Cheah Boon Kheng. The Masked Comrades: A Study of the Communist
United Front in Malaya, 1945-48. Singapore: Times Books
Internat ional ,  1979.
Clapham, Christopher. Third World Po l i t ic s :  An Introduct ion.
Beckenham, Kent: Croom Helm, 1985.
Cohen, Raymond. Threat Perception in Internat ional  C r i s i s . Madison: 
Universi ty of Wisconsin Press, 1979.
Corrine Phuangkasem. Thailand and SEATO. Bangkok: Thai Watana
Panich, 1973.
Crouch, Harold. The Army and Pol i t ics  in Indonesia. Ithaca: Cornell
Universi ty Press,  1978.
Dahm, Bernhard and Werner Draguhn, eds. Po l i t i c s ,  Society and Economy 
in the ASEAN S ta te s . Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1975.
E l l i o t t ,  David W.P., ed. The Third Indochina Confl ic t . Boulder: 
Westview Press,  1981.
Fi tzgerald,  C.P. China and Southeast Asia Since 1945. Camberwell, 
Vic.: Longman, 1973.
Gir l ing,  John. Thailand: Society and P o l i t i c s . Ithaca: Cornell
Universi ty Press,  1981.
Grant, Bruce. Indonesia. Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1964.
Grant, Bruce et .  a/L The Boat People: An 'Age1 Inves t igat ion.
Ringwood, Victoria:  Penguin, 1979.
Gurtov, Melvin. China and Southeast Asia --  The Pol i t ics  of Survival : 
A Study of Foreign Policy Interact ion. Lexington, Mass.: Heath
Lexington Books, 1971.
Hal l ,  D.G.E. A History of Southeast Asia. London: Macmillan, 1955.
Hinton, Harold C. China's Turbulent Quest: An Analysis of China's
Foreign Relations Since 1949. Bloomington: Indiana University
Press,  1972.
Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung. Twenty Years Indonesian Foreign Pol icy. 
The Hague: Mouton, 1973.
589 -
Jervis ,  Robert. Perception and Misperception in International  
P o l i t i c s . Princeton: Princeton University Press,  1976.
Jorgensen-Dahl, Arnfinn. Regional Organization and Order in Southeast 
Asia. London: Macmillan, 1982.
Kaul, Man Mohini. The Phil ippines and Southeast Asia. New Delhi: 
Radiant Publishers,  1978.
Keegan, John, ed. World Armies. 2nd ed. London: Macmillan, 1983.
Legge, J.D. Sukarno: A Pol i t ical  Biography. London: Allen Lane,
1972.
Lei ter ,  Michael. Dilemmas of Statehood in Southeast Asia. Singapore: 
Asia Pacif ic Press,  1972.
____________. Indonesia's Foreign Pol icy. London: George Allen and
Unwin for the Royal I n s t i tu t e  of International  Affairs ,  1983.
Lim Joo-Jock. Geo-Strategy and the South China Sea Basin. Singapore: 
Singapore University Press,  1979.
McDonald, Hamish. Suharto's Indonesia. Austral ia:  Fontana Books,
1980.
Mackie, J.A.C. Konfrontasi ._____ The Indonesia-Malaysia Dispute
1963-1966. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1974.
May, Brian. The Indonesian Tragedy. London: Routledge and Kegan
Paul, 1978.
Means, Gordon. Malaysian P o l i t i c s . London: University of London
Press,  1970.
Milne, R.S. and Diane K. Mauzy. Pol i t ic s  and Government in Malaysia. 
Rev. ed. Vancouver: University of Bri t ish Columbia Press,  1980.
Milne, R.S. and K.J. Ratnam. Malaysia --  New States in a New Nation: 
Pol i t ical  Development of Sarawak and Sabah in Malaysia. London: 
Frank Cass, 1974.
Mohamed Amin and Malcolm Caldwell, eds. Malaya: the Making of a Neo-
Colony. Nottingham: Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation for
Spokesman Books, 1977.
Morell, David and Chai-anan Samudavanij a .  Pol i t ical  Conflict  in 
Thailand: Reform, Reaction, Revolution. Cambridge, Mass.:
Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, 1981.
Morrison, Charles E. and Astri  Suhrke. St rategies & Survival:  The
Foreign Policy Dilemmas of Smaller Asian S t a t es . St.  Lucia, 
Queensland: Universi ty of Queensland Press, 1978.
590 -
Mozingo, David. Chinese Policy toward Indonesia. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1976.
Myint, H. Southeast Asia's Economy: Development Policies in the
1 970s. A Study sponsored by the Asian Development Bank. 
Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1972.
Osborne, Milton. Southeast Asia: An Introductory H i s t o r y . Sydney:
Goerge Allen & Unwin, 1979.
Pluvier, Jan. Southeast Asia from Colonialism to Independence.
Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1974.
Poole, Peter A. The Vietnamese in Thailand: A Historical
Perspective. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970.
Puey Ungphakorn. Thailand: Glancing Back, Looking F o r w a r d .
Melbourne: Sixth of October Thais' United Front for Democracy,
1977.
Quah,, Jon S.T., Chan Heng Chee and Seah Chee Meow, eds. Government 
and Politics of Singapore. Singapore: Oxford University Press,
1985:
Riggs, Fred W. Thailand: The Modernization of a Bureaucratic P o l i t y .
Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1966.
Samuels, Marwyn. Contest for the South China S e a . New York: 
Methuen, 1982.
Shawcross, William. Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction
of C a m b o d i a . London: Andre Deutsch, 1979.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . The Quality of Mercy: Cambodia, Holocaust and Modern
Conscience. London: Andre Deutsch, 1984.
Simon, Sheldon W., ed. The Military and Security in the Third World: 
Domestic and International Impacts. Boulder, Colorado: Westview
Press, 1980.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . The ASEAN States and Regional Sec u r i t y . Stanford,
Cal.: Hoover Institution Press, 1982.
Sobel, Lester A., ed. South Vietnam: U.S.-Communist Confrontation in
Southeast A s i a . V o l . 5. New York: Facts on File, 1973.
Solomon, Richard H., ed. Asian Security in the 1980s: Problems and
Policies for a Time of Transition. Cambridge, Mass.: 
Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, 1980.
Stuart-Fox, Martin, ed. Contemporary L aos. St. Lucia: University of
Queensland Press, 1982.
591 -
Suryadinata,  Leo. China and the ASEAN States:  The Ethnic Chinese
Dimension. Singapore: Singapore University Press,  1985.
Tanham, George K. Trial  in Thailand. New York: Crane, Russak, 1974.
Tate,  D.J.M. The Making of Modern Southeast Asia: Volume 1 --  The
European Conquest. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press,  1971.
Taylor,  Jay. China and Southeast Asia: Peking's Relations with
Revolutionary Movements. 2nd ed. New York: Praeger, 1974.
Turton, Andrew, Jonathan Fast and Malcolm Caldwell, eds. Thailand: 
Roots of Conf l ic t . Nottingham: Spokesman, 1978.
van der Kroef, Justus M. Communism in Southeast Asia. London: 
Macmillan, 1981.
Wain, Barry. The Refused: The Agony of the Indochinese Refugees.
New York: Simon and Schuster,  1981.
Wanandi, Jusuf.  Securi ty Dimensions of the Asia-Pacific Region in the 
1980s. Jakarta:  Centre for Strategic and Internat ional  Studies,
T979T
Weinstein, Franklin B. Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemma of 
Dependence: From Sukarno to Suharto. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press,  1976.
Wilson, David A. Po l i t i c s  in Thailand. Ithaca: Cornell Universi ty
Press,  1962.
Wilson, Dick. The Neutral izat ion of Southeast Asia. New York: 
Praeger, 1975.
Wong, John. The Pol i t ica l  Economy of China's Changing Relations with 
Southeast Asia. London: Macmillan, 1984.
Wriggins, W. Howard. The Ruler ' s  Imperative: St rategies  for
Pol i t ical  Survival in Asia and Afr ica. New York: Columbia
Universi ty Press,  1969.
Wu, Yuan-Li. The St ra tegic  Land Ridge: Peking's Relations with
Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia. Stanford: Hoover
I ns t i tu t ion  Press,  1975.
Yahuda, Michael. Towards the end of Isolationism: China's Foreign
Policy a f t er  Mao. London: Macmillan, 1983.
Zacher, Mark W. and R. Stephen Milne, eds. Conflict  and S t a b i l i t y  in 
Southeast Asia. New York: Anchor Press, 1974.
592  -
I I I .  PUBLISHED PAPERS 
( i ) Monographs
Browni, David. The Legitimacy of Governments in Plural Societies. 
Occasional Paper No. 43. Singapore: Singapore University Press
for the Department of Pol i t ica l  Science, National University of 
Singapore, 1984.
Browm, Leslie H. American Security Policy in Asia. Adelphi Paper No. 
132. London: International Inst i tu te  for Strategic Studies,
1977.
Carlsson, Seviric. Malaysia: Search for National Unity and Economic
Growth. Washington Papers Vol. I l l :  25. Beverley H i l ls :  Sage
Publications, 1975.
Chancdran Jeshurun. The Growth of the Malaysian Armed Forces, 1963-73: 
Some Foreign Press Reactions. Occasional Paper No. 35. 
Singapore: In s t i tu te  of Southeast Asian Studies, 1975.
Chin Kin Wah. The Five Power Defence Arrangements and AMDA. 
Occasional Paper No. 23. Singapore: Inst i tu te  of Southeast
Asian Studies, 1974.
Fletccher, Nancy McHenry. The Separation of Singapore from Malaysia. 
Southeast Asia Program Data Paper No. 73. Ithaca, N.Y.: 
Department of Asian Studies, Cornell University, 1969.
Granit, Bruce. The Security of Southeast Asia. Adelphi Paper No. 152. 
London: International Inst i tu te  for Strategic Studies, 1978.
Haas:s, Richard. Congressional Power: Implications for American
Security Pol icy. Adelphi Paper No. 153. London: International
Inst i tu te  for Strategic Studies, 1979.
Hann<a, Willard A. The New Singapore Armed Forces. American 
Universities Field Staff  Report. Southeast Asia Series Vol. 21, 
No. 1 (January 1973).
Hawk ins, David. The Defence of Malaysia and Singapore: From AMDA to
ANZUK. London: Royal United Services In s t i tu te ,  1972.
Hede>r, Stephen R. Kampuchean Occupation and Resistance. Asian 
Studies Monographs No. 027. Bangkok: In s t i tu te  of Asian
Studies, Chulalongkorn University, 1980.
Hoad ley, J. Stephen. The Future of Portuguese Timor. Occasional 
Paper No. 27. Singapore: Inst i tute  of Southeast Asian Studies,
1975.
593  -
Huisken, Ron. Arms Limita t ion in Southeast Asia: A Proposal.
Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 16. Canberra: 
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Austra l ian National 
Univers i ty ,  1977.
Huxley, Tim. Indochina and Insurgency in the ASEAN States, 1975-1981. 
Working Paper No. 67. Canberra: Strategic  and Defence Studies
Centre, Austra l ian National Univers i ty ,  1983.
____________. Indochinese Refugees as a Security Concern of the ASEAN
States, 1975-81. Working Paper No. 1. Canberra: Department of
International  Relat ions, Austral ian National Univers i ty , 1983.
_____________ . Recent M i l i t a r y  Developments in Southeast Asia: Their
Implicat ions fo r  Aus t ra l ia 's  Secur i ty . Basic Paper No. 2, 1983. 
Canberra: Legis la t ive Research Service, Department of the
Parliamentary L ibrary, 1983.
____________ . The ASEAN States' Defence Po l ic ies ,  1975-81: M i l i t a r y
Responses to Indochina? Working Paper No. 88. Canberra:
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Austra l ian National
Univers i ty ,  1984.
____________ . ASEAN and Indochina: A Study in P o l i t i c a l  Responses,
1975-81. Canberra Studies in World A f fa i r s  No. 19. Canberra:
Department of In ternational Relat ions, Austra l ian National
Univers i ty ,  1986.
Indor f ,  Hans H. ASEAN: Problems and Prospects. Occasional Paper No.
38. Singapore: In s t i t u te  of Southeast Asian Studies, 1975.
Kawin W i la i ra t .  Singapore's Foreign Pol icy: The F i r s t  Decade. Fie ld
Report No. 10. Singapore: I n s t i t u te  of Southeast Asian Studies,
1975.
Khaw Guat Hoon. An Analysis of China's A t t i tudes Towards ASEAN, 
1967-76. Occasional Paper No. 48. Singapore: In s t i t u te  of
Southeast Asian Studies, 1977.
Lau Teik Soon. Indonesia and Regional Securi ty:  the Djakarta
Conference on Cambodia. Occasional Paper No. T4T Singapore: 
I n s t i t u te  of Southeast Asian Studies, 1972.
L e i te r ,  Michael. C on f l ic t  and Regional Order in Southeast Asia.
Adelphi Paper No. 162. London: In ternational  I n s t i t u te  fo r
Strategic Studies, 1980.
McLeod, Kenneth J. and Ernst Utrecht, eds. The ASEAN Papers. Papers 
and Talks on Southeast Asia presented to the Transnational 
Co-operative's ASEAN Conference, Sydney, 1-4 September 1977. 
Southeast Asian Monograph No. 3. Cairns: James Cook Univers i ty
of North Queensland, 1979.
594 -
Marks, Thomas A. Thailand: the Threatened Kingdom. Conflict Studies
No. 115. London: Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1980.
Modelski, George. International Conference on the Settlement of the 
Laotian Question. Working Paper No. 1. Canberra: Department of
International Relations, Australian National University, 1962.
O'Brien, Roderick. South China Sea Oil: The Problems of Ownership
and Development. Occasional Paper No. 47. Singapore: Insti tute
of Southeast Asian Studies, 1977.
Osborn, George K. Balance of Power in Southeast Asia. Occasional
Paper No. 53. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,
1978.
Polomka, Peter. ASEAN and the Law of the Sea. Occasional Paper No. 
36. Singapore: Insti tute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1975.
Rajaretnam, M. U.S. Energy-Security Interests in the Indian Ocean. 
Occasional Paper No. 34. Singapore: Institute of Southeast
Asian Studies, 1975.
Randolph, R. Sean and W. Scott Thompson. Thai Insurgency:
Contemporary Developments. The Washington Papers No. 81. 
Beverley Hills: Sage Publications, 1981.
Sarasin Viraphol. Directions in Thai Foreign Policy. Occasional 
Paper No. 40. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,
1976.
Sim, Richard. Malaysia: Containing the Communist Insurgency.
Conflict Studies No. 110. London: Institute for the Study of
Conflict, 1979.
Stargardt, A.W. Problems of Neutrality in South East Asia: The
Relevance of the European Experience. Occasional Paper No. 12. 
Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1972.
Stowe, Judith. Philippines: The Need for a New Society. Conflict
Studies No. 37. London: Institute for the Study of Conflict,
1973.
Tilman, Robert 0. The Enemy Beyond: External Threat Perceptions in
the ASEAN Region. Research Notes and Discussions Paper No. 42. 
Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1984.
Turpin, Alex. New Society's Challenge in the Philippines. Conflict 
Studies No. 122. London: Institute for the Study of Conflict,
1980.
van der Kroef, Justus M. The Lives of SEATO. Occasional Paper No. 
45. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1975.
595  -
______________ . Patterns of Con f l ic t  in Eastern Indonesia. Con f l ic t
Studies No. 79. London: I n s t i t u te  fo r  the Study of C on f l ic t ,
1977 .
Wilborn, Thomas L. The Soviet Union and ASEAN. Strategic Issues 
Research Memorandum ACN 80039. Car l is le  Barracks, Penn.: U.S.
Army War College, 1980.
( i i )  A r t i c le s  in Journals
Abdul Aziz, Lt .  Gen. Syed. "The Case fo r  an ASEAN Defence 
Arrangement". Asian Defence Journal, 2/1976 (A p r i l ) .
Alejandro, Rear Admiral M. "The Phil ippine Navy and the Challenges of 
the Times". Asian Defence Journal, 6/82 (June 1982).
Anon. "Communist Patterns in the South-East Asian Rim". Asian 
Defence Journal, 6/1976 (December).
____________ . "Greater Malaysian/Indonesian M i l i t a r y  Co-operation".
Asian Defence Journal, 6/1976 (December).
____________ . "Le t ter  from Southeast Asia".  Southeast Asia
Chronicle, No. 79 (August 1981).
____________ . "Malaysia: Creation of a "Royal Armoured Corps'.
In ternat iona l  Defense Review, 3/1979.
____________ . "Malindo Jaya VI Strengthens S t ra i ts  Defence", Asian
Defence Journal, 6/1976 (December).
____________ . "RMN on the threshold of great changes". Asian Defence
Journal , 4/79 (July/August 1979).
____________ . "The Royal Malaysian Navy". Asian Defence Journal,
No. 4/76 (August).
Barang, Marcel. "Business is Business". South, No. 47 (September 
1984).
Barnett ,  Robert W. "ASEAN's Unguarded Coasts". Foreign Po l icy ,
No. 38 (Spring 1980).
Brown, David. "Cr is is  and E thn ic i ty :  Legitimacy in Plural
Soc ie t ies" .  Third World Quarterly , Vol. 7, No. 4 (October 1985).
Brown, MacAlister and Joseph J. Zaslo f f .  "Laos in 1975: People's
Democratic Revolution - -  Laos Sty le" .  Asian Survey, Vol. 16, No. 
2 (February 1976).
596 -
Chauncey, Helen. "Thailand Plays the Great Power Game". Southeast 
Asia Chron i c l e , No. 69 (January-February 1980).
Clementson, J. "Malaysia in the 'Seventies: Communist Resurgence and
Government Response'". Journal of the Royal United Services 
Institute, Vol. 124, No. 4 (December 1979).
Darling, Frank C. "Thailand in 1976: Another Defeat for
Constitutional Democracy". Asian S u r v e y , Vol. 17, No. 2 
(February 1977).
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . "Political Functions of the United States Embassy in
Thailand". Asian S u r v e y , Vol. 18, No. 11 (November 1978).
Devillers, Philippe. "Vietnam in Battle". Current Hi s t o r y , Vol. 77, 
Whole No. 452 (December 1979).
Donnell, John C. "South Vietnam in 1975: the Year of Communist
Victory". Asian S u r v e y , Vol. 16, No. 1 (January 1976).
Douglas, H. Eugene. "The Problem of Refugees in a Strategic 
Perspective". Strategic R e v i e w , Fall 1982.
Dutter, Lee E. and Raymond S. Kania. "Explaining Recent Vietnamese 
Behaviour". Asian S u r v e y , Vol. 20, No. 9 (September 1980).
East, Colonel C.H.A. "General Mohammad Jusuf, Indonesia's Top 
Soldier". Pacific Defence Reporter, June 1981.
Enloe, Cynthia. "The Issue Saliency of the Military-Ethnic
Connection: Some Thoughts on Malaysia". Comparative Politics,
Vol. 10, No. 2 (January 1978).
Fifield, Russell H. "ASEAN: Image and Reality". Asian S u r v e y , Vol.
19, No. 12 (December 1979).
Flood, E. Thadeus. "The Vietnamese Refugees in Thailand: Minority
Manipulation in Counter-Insurgency". Bulletin of Concerned Asian 
Sch o l a r s , Vol. 9, No. 3 (July-September 1977).
Frost, Frank. "The Origins and Evolution of ASEAN". World Review, 
Vol. 19, No. 3 (August 1980).
Godley, Michael R. "Politics in the Penumbra: Chinese in Southeast
Asia". World R e v i e w , Vol. 21, No. 1 (April 1982).
Goh Keng Swee. "No cause for concern if only we are resolute". 
Pacific Defence Reporter, May 1981.
Grazebrook, A.W. "Maritime Warfare in Southeast Asia". Pacific 
Defence Reporter, March 1980.
597  -
Guyot, James F. "E f f ic iency ,  Responsib i l i ty , and Equali ty  in M i l i t a r y  
S ta f f ing :  the Ethnic Dimension in Comparative Perspective".
Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 2, No. 2 (February 1976).
Hainsworth, Geoffrey B. "Economic growth and poverty in Southeast 
Asia: Malaysia, Indonesia and the Ph i l ipp ines" .  Pac i f ic
Af f a i r s , Vol. 52, No. 1 (Spring 1979).
Hamzah, B.A. "ASEAN M i l i t a r y  Cooperation Without Pact or Threat".
Asia Pac i f ic  Community, No. 22 (Fal l  1983).
Hansen, Gary E. "Indonesia in 1975: National Resi lience and
Continuity  of the New Order's Struggle". Asian Survey, Vol. 16, 
No. 2 (February 1976).
Haryomataram, S. "National Resi l ience". National Resi lience 
(Jakarta),  Vol. 1, No. 1 (March 1982).
Hassan Dias Birhan. "Malaysia Report". Pac i f ic  Defence Reporter, 
June 1978.
Heilman, Donald C. "Japan and Southeast Asia: Continui ty  Amidst
Change". Asian Survey, Vol. 19, No. 12 (December 1979).
Hewison, Kevin J. "Revolut ionary Warfare in Thai land". Austra l ian
Outlook, Vol. 34, No. 2 (August 1980).
Indor f ,  Hans H. "Malaysia in Search of Affluence and Tolerance". 
Current H is to ry , Vol. 77, Whole No. 452 (December 1979).
____________. "Malaysia 1979: A Preoccupation with Secur i ty" .  Asian
Survey, Vol. 20, No. 2 (February 1980).
Jencks, Harlan W. "China's 'Pun i t ive ' War on Vietnam: A M i l i t a r y
Assessment". Asian Survey, Vol. 19, No. 8 (August 1979).
Jorgensen-Dahl, Arnf inn.  "The Signif icance of ASEAN". World Review, 
Vol. 19, No. 3 (August 1980).
Jukes, Geoffrey. "The Soviet Union and Southeast Asia". Austra l ian 
Outlook, Vol. 31, No. 1 (Apr i l  1979).
Khal id Abdullah. "The Indonesian Armed Forces - -  A New Image fo r  the 
'80s". Asian Defence Journal, 5/82 (May 1982).
"The Making of an A ir  Force". Asian Defence Journal, 
6/83 (June 1983).
___________ . "The Armed Forces of the Phi l ippines: Securi ty
Development in the 1980s". Asian Defence Journal, 6/82 (June 
1982).
_______. "The Malaysian Army - -  an Overview". Asian Defence
Journal , 3/83 (March 1983).
598 -
Khien Theeravit.  "Thai-Kampuchean Relations: Problems and
Prospects".  Asian Survey, Vol. 22, No. 6 (June 1982).
Kirby, E. Stuar t .  "The Tasks for Thailand's Army and an Assessment of 
i t s  Abi l i ty".  Journal of the Royal United Services I n s t i tu t e ,  
Vol. 121, No. 1 (March 1976).
"Kirpa Wong bin Rahim". "The Singapore Armed Forces". Pacif ic
Defence Reporter, November 1980.
Kumar, S. "The Fight within the Communist Party of Malaya --  A Tale 
of Ideologies",  Asian Defence Journal , March/April 1977.
___________ . "A New Era of Cooperation". Asian Defence Journal ,
March/April 1977.
Lau Teik Soon. "The Role of Singapore in Southeast Asia". World
Review, Vol. 19, No. 3 (August 1980).
. "ASEAN and the Cambodian Problem". Asian Survey, Vol. 
22, No. 6 (June 1982).
Lawless,  Robert. "The Indonesian takeover of East Timor". Asian
Survey, Vol. 16, No. 10 (October 1976).
Liddlle, R. William. "Indonesia 1976: Challenges to Suharto's
Authori ty".  Asian Survey, Vol. 17, No. 2 (February 1977).
. "Indonesia 1977: The New Order's Second Parliamentary
Elect ion".  Asian Survey, Vol. 18, No. 2 (February 1978).
Lim Joo-Jock. "How Singapore sees the Vietnam threa t" .  Pacif ic
Defence Reporter, December 1981/January 1982.
Lipsky, Seth and Raphael Pura. "Indonesia: Testing Time for the 'New
Order ' " .  Foreign Af fa i r s , Vol. 57, No. 1 (Fall 1978).
Loescher,  G.D. "The Sino-Vietnamese Conflict in Recent Historical  
Perspect ive".  Survey, Vol. 24, No. 2 (Spring 1979).
Lyon, Peter.  "Indochina versus ASEAN? -- Southeast Asia in the World 
of the 1980s". NATO's Fifteen Nations, February-March 1980.
Malik, Adam. "Djakarta Conference and Asia's Pol i t ical  Future".
Paci f ic  Community, Vol. 2, No. 1 (October 1970).
Marcos, Ferdinand E. "Southeast Asia in the Year 2000". Contemporary 
Southeast Asia, Vol. 1, No. 1 (May 1979).
Marks, Thomas A. "Sino-Thai Relations".  Asian Affairs ,  Vol. 5, No. 3 
(October 1974).
___________ . "Thai Security during the 'American Era' ,  1960-76".
Issues and Studies,  Vol. 15, No. 4 (April 1979).
599 -
Melchor, Alejandro. "Assessing ASEAN's Viabi l i ty  in a Changing 
World". Asian Survey, Vol. 18, No. 4 (April 1978).
Melnikov, Vladimir. "ASEAN Dilemmas", New Times (Moscow), No. 35, 
1981 (August).
Moertopo, Ali.  "Future Indonesian -- U.S. Relations:  A View from
Jakarta".  Pacif ic Community, Vol. 7, No. 4 (July 1976).
Mulliner,  K. "Singapore: Prosperi ty in a Global City". Current
History, Vol. 77, Whole No. 452 (December 1979).
Osborne, Milton. "Kampuchea and Vietnam: A Historical  Perspective".
Pacif ic Community, Vol. 9, No. 3 (April 1978).
____________ . "The Indochinese Refugees: Cause and Effects"
Internat ional  Af fa i r s , Vol. 56, No. 1 (January 1980).
Ott ,  Marvin C. "Foreign Policy Formulation in Malaysia". Asian 
Survey, Vol. 12, No. 3 (March 1972).
Park» Choon-Ho. "The South China Sea Dispute: Who Owns the Islands
and the Natural Resources". Ocean Development and International  
Law Journal , Vol. 5, No. 1 (1978).
Pauker, Guy J.  "The ASEAN Energy Scene in Global Perspective".  Asian 
Survey, Vol. 19, No. 6, (June 1979).
Pavlovsky, V. "Problems of Regionalism in Asia". International  
Affairs  (Moscow), No. 4/1969 (April).
Pengelley, R.B. "The Singapore Mi l i ta ry/ Indus t r ia l  Scene".
Internat ional  Defense Review. Vol. 9, No. 4 (August 1976).
Pike, Douglas. "Vietnam during 1976: Economics in Command". Asian
Survey, Vol. 17, No. 1 (January 1977).
. "Vietnam in 1977: More of the Same". Asian Survey,
Vol. 18, No. 1 (January 1978).
. "Communist vs. Communist in Southeast Asia".
Internat ional  Securi ty,  Summer 1979.
"The USSR and Vietnam : into the Swamp". Asian Survey,
■"Vol. 19, No. 12 (December 1979) •
# "Vietnam in 1980: the Gathering Storm?". Asian•  c uu I I I •  t i l t  V
Survey, Vol. 21, No. 1 (January 1981).
Poole, Peter A. "Cambodia 1975: The GRUNK Regime". Asian Survey,
Vol. 16, No. 1 (January 1976).
___________ . "The United States and Southeast Asia: A New Theme".
Current History, Vol. 77, Whole No. 452 (December 1979).
-  600 -
Quinrn, Kenneth M. "Cambodia 1976: Internal  Consolidation and
External Expansion". Asian Survey, Vol. 17, No. 1 (January
1977).
Rams.ay, Ansil .  "Thailand 1978: Kriangsak --  the Thai Who Binds".
Asian Survey, Vol. 19, No. 2 (February 1979).
Rich<ardson, Michael. "How not to mount a counter-insurgency 
campaign". Pacif ic Defence Reporter, May 1982.
____________ . "Indonesia Strengthens i t s  South China Sea Defences".
Pacific Defence Reporter, February 1983.
____________ . "The Influence on the ASEAN Community of Austral ian-
American Securi ty Relations".  Australian Outlook, vol. 38, No. 3 
(December 1984).
Sachii, Captain R. "Destroying the Communist Ter ror i s t :  the Primary
Task of the Malaysian Army". Asian Defence Journal,  No. 2/1976 
(April 1976).
Sachii, Major R. "Towards a Modern army". Asian Defence Journal.  
4/82 (April 1982).
Santti Mingmongkul. "Thai resistance caught in the c rossf i re" .  
Southeast Asia Chronicle, No. 79 (August 1981).
Sayiidiman Suryohadiprojo. "The Ter r i tor ia l  Defense Concept". 
Indonesian Quarterly, Vol. 1, No. 4 (July 1973).
Seafm Chee-Meow. "Major Powers and the Search for a New Equilibrium in 
Southeast Asia". Asia Pacific Community, No. 7 (Winter 1980).
Sharrif Ahmad, Dato' .  "Our National Securi ty".  Asian Defence Journal , 
No. 6/76 (December 1976).
Shete Poon-Kim. "A Decade of ASEAN, 1967-1977". Asian Survey, Vol. 
17, No. 8 (August 1977).
Simeon, Sheldon W. "The ASEAN States:  Obstacles to Securi ty
Cooperation". Orbis, Summer 1978.
____________ . "Kampuchea: Vietnam's 'Vietnam'". Current History,
Vol. 77, Whole No. 452 (Deember 1979).
____________ . "China, Vietnam, and ASEAN: The Pol i t ics  of
Polarizat ion".  Asian Survey, Vol. 19, No. 12 (December 1979).
Staiuffer,  Robert B. "Phil ippine Authoritarianism: Framework for
Peripheral 'Development'". Pacific Affairs ,  Vol. 50, No. 3 (Fall 
1977).
601 -
St:uart-Fox, Martin. "Factors influencing re la t ions  between the 
Communist par t ies  of Thailand and Laos". Asian Survey, Vol. 19, 
No. 4 (April 1979).
____________ . "Tension within the Thai Insurgency". Australian
Outlook, Vol. 33, No. 2 (August 1979).
St:ubbs, Richard. "Peninsular Malaysia: the "New Emergency". Pacific
Af f a i r s , Vol. 50, No. 2 (Summer 1977).
Siuhrke, Ast r i .  "ASEAN: Adjusting to New Regional Alignments". Asia
Pacific Community, No. 12 (Spring 1981).
Thai  Quang Trung. "L'enjeu Cambodgien dans L'equi l ibre du Sud-Est 
Asiat ique".  Pol i t ique Etrangere, Vol. 46, No. 3 (September
1981).
Thayer,  Carlyle A. "North Vietnam in 1975: National Liberation,
Reunification and Social i s t  Construction". Asian Survey, Vol. 
16, No. 1 (January 1976).
____________ . 'Viet-Nam's External Relations: An Overview". Pacific
Community, Vol. 9, No. 2 (January 1978).
Tiurley, William S. and Jeffrey Race. "The Third Indo-China War" 
Foreign Pol icy, No. 38 (Spring 1980).
V cani der Kroef, Justus M. "Before the Thaw: Recent Indonesian
Attitudes towards China". Asian Survey, Vol. 13, No. 5 (May 
1973).
_______. "Southeast Asia af ter  the Viet Nam War: Security
Problems and Strategies" .  Pacific Community, Vol. 7, No. 3 
(April 1976).
_______. "Hanoi and ASEAN: A New Confrontation in Southeast
Asia". Asia Quarterly, 1976/3.
_______ . "Thailand: a New Phase in the Insurgency". Pacific
Community, Vol. 8, No. 4 (July 1977).
_______ . "Pat terns of Pol i t ical  Opposition in Southeast Asia".
Pacific Af fa i r s , Vol. 51, No. 4 (Winter 1978-79).
_______ . "Cambodia: From 'Democratic Kampuchea' to People's
Republic". Asian Survey, Vol. 19, No. 8 (August 1979).
_______ . "The Indochina Tangle: the Elements of Conflict  and
Compromise". Asian Survey, Vol. 20, No. 5 (May 1980).
_______. "National Security,  Defense Strategy and Foreign Policy
Perceptions in Indonesia". Orbis, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Summer 1980).
-  602 -
_______. "ASEAN in the 1980s". World Review, Vol. 19, No. 3
(August 1980).
_______. "Soviet Pol ic ies in Southeast Asia: Patterns of
Secur ity  Perceptions". Strategie Studies, Vol. 4, No. 4 (Summer 
1981).
____________ . " 'Normal iz ing' Relations with the People's Republic of
China: Indonesia's Rituals of Ambiguity". Contemporary
Southeast Asia, Vol. 3, No. 3 (December 1981).
van D i jk ,  C. "Major developments in Indonesia in the f i r s t  ha lf  of 
1979: reactions to the Indochina c r i s i s " .  Review of Indonesian 
and Malayan A f f a i r s , Vol. 13, No. 2 (December 1979).
Wain, Barry. "The Indochina Refugee C r is is " .  Foreign A f fa i r s ,  Vol. 
58, No. 1 (Fal l  1979).
Wanandi, Jusuf. "P o l i t i c a l -S e c u r i t y  Dimensions of Southeast Asia". 
Asia Survey, Vol. 17, No. 8 (August 1977).
____________ . "Security in the Asia-Pacif ic  Region: An Indonesian
Observation". Asian Survey, Vol. 18, No. 12 (December 1978).
Weatherbee, Donald E. "U.S. Pol icy and the Two Southeast Asias'.  
Asian Survey, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Apr i l  1978).
Weinstein, Frankl in B. "The Meaning of National Securi ty in Southeast 
Asia" . Bu l le t in  of the Atomic S c ien t is ts , Vol. 34, No. 9 
(November 1978).
____________ . "The United States and the Security of Southeast Asia".
B u l le t in  of the Atomic Scient is ts ,  Vol. 34, No. 10 (December 
1978).
Whymant, Robert. "U.S. M i l i t a r y  Quiet ly Returning to Thai land". 
Southeast Asia Chronicle, No. 69 (January-February 1980).
Wilson, Dick. "Sino-Soviet Rivalry in Southeast Asia". Problems of 
Communism, Vol. 23, No. 5 (September-October 1974).
Winnacker, Martha. "Another View of the C r is is " .  Southeast Asia 
Chronicle, No. 69 (January-February 1980).
Young, P. Lewis. "Naval Developments in the South East Asian Region 
- -  Current Trends". Asian Defence Journal, 2/82 (February 1982).
Zara Dian. "Malaysian National Security from the Bureaucrat's Eye: A
Prel iminary Analysis". Asian Defence Journal, No. 4/80 (Ju ly /  
August 1980).
Zimmerman, Robert F. "Thailand 1975: Transit ion to Consti tut ional
Democracy Continues". Asian Survey, Vol. 16, No. 2 (February 
1976).
603 -
_______ . "Insurgency in Thailand". Problems of Communism, Vol.
25, No. 3 (May-June 1976).
( i i i i )  Ar t ic les  and Chapters in Edited Volumes
Anvnina Tyabji.  "The Economy". In Government and Pol i t ic s  of 
Singapore. Edited by Jon S.T. Quah, Chan Heng Chee and Seah Chee 
Meow. Singapore: Oxford University Press,  1985.
Chnan Heng Chee. "Pol i t ical  Par t ies" .  In Government and Pol i t ic s  of 
Singapore. Edited by Jon S.T. Quah, Chan Heng Chee and Seah Chee 
Meow. Singapore: Oxford University Press,  1985.
Chnandran, J.M. "Southeast Asia in 1980: A Diplomatic and Strategic
Overview". In Southeast Asian Affairs 1981. Singapore: 
I n s t i t u t e  of Southeast Asian Studies,  1981.
Chnrist ie,  C.J.  "Nationalism and the Pathet Lao". In Contemporary 
Laos. Edited by Martin Stuart-Fox. St. Lucia: Universi ty of
Queensland Press,  1982.
Coommunist Party of Thailand. "A br ief  introduction to the his tory of 
the Communisty Party of Thailand". In Thailand: Roots of
Conf l ic t . Edited by Andrew Turton, Jonathan Fast and Malcolm 
Caldwell. Nottingham: Spokesman, 1978.
Deeutsch, K.W. "Security Communities". In International  Pol i t ics  and 
Foreign Pol icy. Edited by J.N. Rosenau. New York: Free Press
of Glencoe, 1961.
Ennloe, Cynthia. "Malaysia's Mil i tary in the Interplay of Economic and 
Ethnic Change". In Cultural Pluralism in Malaysia: Pol i ty,
Mi l i tary,  Mass Media, Education, Religion and Social Class. 
Special Report NöT Edited by John A. Lent. Center for
Southeast Asian Studies,  Northern I l l i no i s  University,  1977.
_____________ . "Civil ian Control of the Mil i tary:  Implications in the
Plural Societ ies of Guyana and Malaysia". In Civil ian Control of 
the Mil i tary:  Theory and Cases from Developing Countries.
Edited by Claude E. Welch. Albany: State University of New York
Press,  1976.
Gaayler, Admiral Noel. "Securi ty Implications of the Soviet Mil i tary 
Presence in Asia". In Asian Securi ty in the 1980s. Edited by 
Richard H. Solomon. Cambridge, Mass.: Oelgeschlager, Gunn and
Hain, 1980.
Gooh Keng Swee. "Vietnam and Big-Power Rivalry". In Asian Securi ty in 
the 1980s. Edited by Richard H. Solomon. Cambridge, Mass.: 
Oelgeschlager,  Gunn and Hain, 1980.
604 -
Hasttings,  Peter.  "National Integration in Indonesia: The Case of
Ir ian Jaya". In Armed Separatism in Southeast Asia. Edited by 
Lim Joo-Jock and Vani S. Singapore: I n s t i t u t e  of Southeast
Asian Studies,  1984.
Ho IKwon Ping. "ASEAN: The Five Countries". In Understanding ASEAN.
Edited by Alison Broinowski. London: Macmillan, 1982.
Irv/ ine,  David. "Making Haste Less Slowly: ASEAN from 1975". In
Understanding ASEAN. Edited by Alison Broinowski. London:
Macmillan, 1982.
Irv/ ine,  Roger. "The Formative Years of ASEAN: 1967-75". In
Understanding ASEAN. Edited by Alison Broinowski. London:
Macmillan, 1982.
Knoarr, K. "Threat Perception". In Historical  Dimensions of National 
Securi ty Problems. Edited by K. Knorr. Lawrence: Universi ty of
Kansas Press,  1976.
Lauu Teik Soon. "ASEAN, North Vietnam and the Communist Challenge". 
In Southeast Asian Affairs 1976. Singapore: I n s t i tu t e  of
Southeast Asian Studies,  1976.
Mayynard, Harold W. "Views of the Indonesian and Phil ippine Mil i tary 
E l i tes " .  In The Mil i tary and Security in the Third World. 
Edited by Sheldon W. Simon. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press,
1978.
McccGwire, Michael. "Soviet Naval Doctrine and St ra tegy1. In Soviet 
Mil i tary Thinking. Edited by D. Leebaert. London: George Allen
& Unwin, 1981.
Merrcade, Eliseo R. "Culture,  economics and revolt  in Mindanao: the 
origins of the MNLF and the pol i t i cs  of Moro separatism". In 
Armed Separatism in Southeast Asia. Edited by Lim Joo-Jock and 
Vani S. Singapore: I n s t i t u t e  of Southeast Asian Studies,  1984.
Omaar Farouk. "The Historical  and Transnational Dimensions of Malay- 
Muslim Separatism in Southern Thailand". In Armed Communist 
Movements in Southeast Asia. Edited by Lim Joo-Jock and Vani S. 
Singapore: I ns t i tu t e  of Southeast Asian Studies,  1984.
Ostborne, Milton. "Kampuchean Refugees: The Continuing Evolution of a
Humanitarian and Pol i t ica l  Problem". In Refugees: Four
Pol i t ical  Case Studies . By Milton Osborne, Beverley Male, Gordon 
Lawrie and W.J. O'Malley. Canberra Studies in World Affairs No. 
3. Canberra: Department of International  Relations,  Australian
National University,  1981.
605 -
Pauuker, Guy J. "The Security Implications of Regional Energy and 
National Resource Exploitation". In Asian Security in the 1980s. 
Edited by Richard H. Solomon. Cambridge, Mass.: Oelgeschlager,
Gunn and Hain, 1980.
Pri/uitt, D.G. "Definition of the Situation as a Determinant of
International Action". In International Behaviour: A Social-
Psychological Analysis. Edited by H.G. Kelman. New York: Holt,
Rinehard & Winston, 1965.
Se'?lvaratnam, V. "Malaysia in 1981". In Southeast Asian Affairs 1982. 
Singapore: Inst i tute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1982.
Sinmon, Sheldon W. "China and Southeast Asia: Security in
Transition". In The Military and Security in the Third World. 
Edited by Sheldon W. Simon. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press,
1978.
____________. "Indochina's Security Situation". In The Military and
Security in the Third World. Edited by Sheldon W. Simon. 
Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1978.
Solomon, Richard H. "American Defense Planning and Asian Security: 
Policy Choices for a Time of Transition". In Asian Security in 
the 1980: Problems and Policies for a Time of Transition.
Edited by Richard H. Solomon. Cambridge, Mass.: Oelgeschlager,
Gunn and Hain, 1980.
Sttuart-Fox, Martin. "National Defence and Internal Security in Laos". 
In Contemporary Laos. Edited by Martin Stuart-Fox. St. Lucia: 
University of Queensland Press, 1980.
____________. "Laos: The Vietnamese Connection". In Southeast Asian
Affairs 1980. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,
1980.
Utthai Dulyakasem. "Musiim-Malay Separatism in Southern Thailand: 
Factors Underlying the Political Revolts". In Armed Separatism 
in Southeast Asia. Edited by Lim Joo-Jock and Vani S. 
Singapore: Insti tute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1984.
vaan der Kroef, Justus M. "Laos in Thailand: The Balancing of
Conflict and Accommodation". In Contemporary Laos. Edited by
Martin Stuart-Fox. St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press,
1982.
Waanandi, Jusuf. "Japan and Australia: the Security and Prosperity
Connection". In Japan-Australia Relations: Past, Present and
Future. Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International
Studies, 1979.
Weeatherbee, Donald E. "Indonesia's Armed Forces: Rejuvenation and
Regeneration". In Southeast Asian Affairs 1982. Singapore: 
Insti tute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1982.
-  606 -
Z a a s l o f f ,  Joseph J .  and MacAlister  Brown. "Laos: Coping with
Confinement".  In Southeas t  Asian Af fa i r s  1982. Singapore:  
I n s t i t u t e  of Southeas t  Asian Studies ,  1982.
IVV. UNPUBLISHED PAPERS
( i i )  Theses
Dual ton,  J .B.  "The Development of Malayan External  Po l i cy ,  1957-1963".  
D. Ph i l ,  t h e s i s ,  U n i ve r s i t y  of Oxford, 1967.
Lc.au Teik Soon. "Maiaysia-Singapore Foreign P o l i c i e s  in Southeast  
Asia,  1965-1970".  Ph.D. t h e s i s ,  Aust ra l i an Nat ional  Un i ve r s i t y ,  
1971.
Räau, R. "Singapore ' s  Foreign Relat ions  1965-1972 with Emphasis on the 
Five Power Commonwealth Group". Ph.D. t h e s i s ,  Un i ve r s i t y  of
Michigan,  1974.
T^engsico,  L i l i a  F. "The Secur i t y  Imperative in ASEAN-Indochina 
Re l a t i ons ,  1975-1977".  M.A. t h e s i s ,  Au s t r a l i a n  Nat ional
Uni ve r s i t y ,  1978.
Ve/el 1 u t , Jean-Luc.  "Asian Pol i cy of the P h i l i p p i n e s ,  1935-1963".  
Ph.D. t h e s i s ,  A u s t r a l i an  Nat ional  Univers i ty ,  1964.
ZZakaria bin Haji Ahmad. "The pol ice  and p o l i t i c a l  development in 
Malaysia:  change,  c o n t i n u i t y  and i n s t i t u t i o n - b u i l d i n g  of a
' coe r c i ve '  appar a tus  in a developing,  e t h n i c a l l y  divided
s o c i e ty " .  Ph.D. t h e s i s ,  Massachusetts I n s t i t u t e  of Technology,  
1977.
( { i i )  Conference and Seminar Papers
AAbhichart  Dhiradhamrong, Lt .  Gen. " P o l i t i c o - M i l i t a r y  Dimensions of 
Southeast  Asian S e c u r i t y " .  Paper del ivered at  Conference on "New 
Foundations f o r  Asian and Pac i f i c  Secur i ty" ,  Pa t t a ya ,  Thai land,  
12-16 December 1979.
CChan Heng Chee. "The I n t e r e s t s  and Role of ASEAN in the Indochina 
Co nf l i c t " .  Paper de l i ve red  at  Conference on "Indochina and 
Problems of S e c u r i t y  and S t a b i l i t y  in Southeas t  Asia" ,  
Chulalongkorn U n iv e r s i t y ,  Bangkok, 18-21 June 1980.
-  607 -
Dev'i I l e r s ,  Phi l ippe. "An Analysis of the Vietnamese Objectives in 
Indochina". Paper del ivered at Conference on "Indochina and 
Problems of Securi ty and S ta b i l i t y  in Southeast Asia",
Chulalongkorn Univers ity , Bangkok, 18-21 June 1980.
Dhaivorn Sukhakanya. "Notable Points about Thai-Vietnamese Rivalry 
From a H is to r ica l  Perspective". Paper del ivered at workshop on 
"Future ASEAN-Vietnam Relat ions", In s t i t u te  of Securi ty and 
In ternat ional  Studies, Chulongkorn Univers i ty ,  Bangkok, 
7-9 February 1983.
Ditbb), Paul. "The Interests of the Soviet Union in Southeast Asia and 
the Pac i f ic :  Implicat ions fo r  Regional Secur i ty " .  Paper
delivered at Conference on " In ternat ional  Securi ty in the
Southeast Asian and Southeast Paci f ic  Region", Austral ian 
National Univers i ty , Canberra, 12-15 July 1982.
E V l i i o t t ,  David. "Thinking about the Indochina Problem". Unpublished 
paper, March 1980.
____________ . "Recent U.S. Pol icy toward Indochina". Paper del ivered
at Conference on "Indochina and Problems of Securi ty and
S t a b i l i t y  in Southeast Asia, Chulalongkorn Univers i ty ,  Bangkok, 
18-21 June 1980.
Fujn'ston, John. "The P o l i t i c s  of Resurgent Islam in Malaysia". 'Work- 
in-progress' seminar paper, Department of In ternational 
Relat ions, Austral ian National Univers i ty , 7 February 1979.
Ghia.zali Shafie, The Honourable Tan Sri M. "Towards a Pac i f ic  Basin 
Community - -  A Malaysian Perception". Paper delivered at 
Conference on "New Foundations for  Asian and Pac i f ic  Secur i ty",  
Pattaya, Thai land, 12-16 December 1979.
Heeinzig, Dieter.  "The Role and Interests of the USSR in Indochina". 
Paper del ivered at Conference on "Indochina and Problems of 
Securi ty and S ta b i l i t y  in Southeast Asia", Chulalongkorn 
Un ivers i ty ,  Bangkok, 18-21 June 1980.
Hiuy/nh Kim Khanh. "Assessing Post-Colonial Vietnam". Paper del ivered 
at Conference on "Indochina and Problems of Secur i ty and 
S t a b i l i t y  in Southeast Asia", Chulalongkorn Un ivers i ty ,  Bangkok, 
18-21 June 1980.
Kiusuma Snitwongse. " In terna l  Problems of the ASEAN States: the
Dilemmas of Nat ion-Bui ld ing". Paper del ivered at Conference on 
" In ternat iona l  Securi ty in the Southeast Asian and Southwest 
Pac i f ic  Region", Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Austral ian 
National Univers i ty ,  Canberra, 12-15 July 1982.
L i e  Tek Tjeng. "Vietnamese Nationalism: An Indonesian Perspective".
Paper delivered at the Fr iedrich Ebert S t i f tung  Round Table 
Conference on "C r is is  Region Indochina - -  Causes and Ef fects" ,  
Jakarta, 4-6 March 1981.
608 -
Limi Joo-Jock. “The Indochina Situation and the Superpowers in 
Southeast Asia". Paper delivered at Conference on “New 
Foundations for Asian and Pacific Security", Pattaya, Thailand, 
12-16 December 1979.
Mac:h<etzki, Rudiger. “The Interests and Objectives of the PRC in 
Indochina". Paper delivered at Conference on "Indochina and 
Problems of Security and Stability in Southeast Asia", 
Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, 18-21 June 1980.
Moe^rtopo, Lt. Gen. Ali. "Keynote address" to Conference on "New
Foundations for Asian and Pacific Security", Pattaya, Thailand, 
12-16 December 1977.
Mouint, Frank. "Will Vietnam Invade Thailand?". Paper delivered at 
Conference on "New Foundations for Asian and Pacific Security", 
Pattaya, Thailand, 12-16 December 1979.
Ostborne, Milton. "The Indochinese Refugee Situation: A Kampuchean
Case Study". Paper delivered at the Academy of the Social
Sciences in Australia's Symposium, "Refugees: The Challenge of
the Future", Canberra, 1981.
Pei Monong. "Comments on "China's Interests and Objectives in 
Indochina". Paper delivered at Conference on "Indochina and 
Problems of Security and Stability in Southeast Asia", 
Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, 18-21 June 1980.
PO'lomka, Peter. "Intra-Regional Dynamics: ASEAN and Indo-China".
Paper delivered at Conference on "International Security in the 
Southeast Asian and Southwest Pacific Regions", Strategic and 
Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 12-15 
July 1982.
Po>rter, Gareth. "The Vietnamese Perspective on Thailand". Paper 
delivered at the Workshop on "Future ASEAN-Vietnam Relations", 
Institute of Security and International Studies, Faculty of 
Political Science, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, 7-9 
February 1981.
Saindhu, Kernial. "Stability and Security in the Region in the 1980s". 
Paper delivered at the Conference on "International Security in 
the Southeast Asian and Southwest Pacific Region", Strategic and 
Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, 
12-15 July 1982.
Shiahani, Leticia R. "Indochina Refugees: A Philippine Perspective".
Paper delivered at the Seminar on "Indo-China Refugees", 
Australian National University, Canberra, 30-31 July 1979.
Siimion, Sheldon W. "Maritime Interests, Policies and Future Policies 
of the ASEAN States". Paper delivered at Conference on "The 
Indian Ocean: Perspectives on a Strategic Arena", Centre for
Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Canada, 
14-16 October 1982.
609 -
Summary Record of Proceedings. Seminar on "Aspects of the Australian- 
Indonesian Relationship", Canberra, 18-20 October 1979.
Theamat Khoman. "The Consequences for Southeast Asia of Events in 
Indochina". Paper delivered at the "Asian Business in 1976" 
Conference, Hong Kong, 21-23 October 1975.
____________. "New Dimensions of Security in Southeast Asia". Paper
delivered at Conference on "New Foundations for Asian and Pacific 
Security", Pattaya, Thailand, 12-16 December 1979.
Th.ajyer, Carlyle A. "Three Revolutionary Currents: Vietnamese
Perspectives on International Security". Paper delivered at
Conference on "Asian Perspectives on International Security", 
Australian National University, Canberra, 11-14 April 1983.
Thiete, Marek. "The China-Indochina Conflict: Notes on the background
and conflict resolution -- the case of neutrality". Paper 
delivered at Conference on "Indochina and Problems of Security 
and Stabil ity in Southeast Asia", Chulalongkorn University,
Bangkok, 18-21 June 1980.
Wain.andi, Jusuf. "Politico-Security Dimensions of Southeast Asia -- A 
Southeast Asian View". In Southeast Asia and the World of
Tomorrow. Papers presented at the U.S.-Southeast Asia Seminar, 
Bali, 30 May-1 June 1977. Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and
International Studies, 1977.
____________. "Dimensions of Southeast Asian Security". Paper
delivered at Conference on "New Foundations for Asian and Pacific 
Security", Pattaya, Thailand, 12-16 December 1979.
____________. "Political and Social Instability with Southeast Asia".
Outline of presentation delivered at Conference on "Indochina and 
Problems of Security and Stability in Southeast Asia",
Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, 18-21 June 1980.
V.. PERIODICALS 
( i ) ) Yearbooks
A:sTa Yearbook (1975-83). Hong Kong: Far Eastern Economic Review.
Asian Security (1979-81). Tokyo: Research Institute for Peace
and Security.
J.aine1s Fighting Ships (1980-81). London: Jane's Yearbooks.
-  610 -
Miilitary Balance (1974-82). London: International Institute for
Strategic Studies.
Statesman's Yearbook (1981-82). London: Macmillan, 1981.
Sttrategic Survey (1975-81). London: International Institute for
Strategic Studies.
Whho's Who Malaysia, 1982. Kuala Lumpur: Who's Who Publications,
1981.
Woorld Armaments and Disarmament:_ _ _ _ SI PR I Yearbook (1975-82).
Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.
Woorld Refugee Survey (1981). New York: American Council for
Nationalities Service, US Committee for Refugees, 1981.
( i i i ) W e e k l y  J o u r n a l s  
Assiaweek.
Awiation Week and Space Technology.
Bdulletin. (Sydney).
Ecconomist.
Ffar Eastern Economic Review.
Guuardian Weekly.
NNational Times. (Sydney).
NNewsweek.
((iii) N e w s p a p e r s
A4ge (Melbourne).
A4sian Wall Street Journal.
AAustralian.
AAustralian Financial Review.
BBangkok Post.
BBulletin Today (Manila).
-  611 -
Catmberra Times.
Ch ir is t ian  Science Moni tor.
Daii 1y Express (Manila).
Imdlonesian Times.
In te rn a t io n a l  Herald Tribune.
N a t io n  Review (Bangkok).
New/ S t ra i ts  Times (Kuala Lumpur).
New/ Sunday Times (Kuala Lumpur).
New/ York Times.
Phii 1ippine Times.
South China Morning Post (Hong Kong).
Sttair (Kuala Lumpur).
S t t ra i t s  Times (Singapore).
Sujmday Times (Singapore).
Sy/dney Morning Herald.
Thie Times.
Washington Post.
Weekend Austra l ian .
( i iv/) Research Aids
Assiia Research B u l le t i n .
Keesing 's  Contemporary Archives.
( w )) Radio Broadcast Transcripts
BE8C Summary of World Broadcasts. Far East.
U..S. Foreign Broadcast Information Service: Asia and Pac i f ic ,  Dai ly
Report .
